Rating mutual funds: Construction and information content of an investor-cost based rating of Danish mutual funds

We develop a new rating of mutual funds: the atpRating. The atpRating assigns crowns to each individual mutual fund based upon the costs an investor pays when investing in the fund in relation to what it would cost to invest in the fund's peers. Within each investment category, the rating assigns five crowns to funds with the lowest costs and one crown to funds with the highest costs.We investigate the ability of the atpRating to predict the future performance of a fund. We find that an investor who has invested in the funds with the lowest costs within an investment category would have obtained a risk-adjusted excess return that is approximately 3–4 percentage points higher per annum than if the funds with the highest costs had been invested in.We compare the atpRating with the Morningstar Rating. We show that one reason why the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating contain different information is that the returns Morningstar uses as inputs when rating funds are highly volatile whereas the costs the atpRating uses as inputs when rating funds are highly persistent. In other words, a fund that has low costs one year will most likely also have low costs the following year, whereas the return of a fund in a certain year generally contains only little information about the future return that the fund will generate.Finally, we have information on the investments in different mutual funds made by a small subgroup of investors known to have been exposed to both the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating. We find that investors have clear preferences for funds rated high by both the atpRating and the Morningstar Rating.     

Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds in response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999 period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performance is closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentives to increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the top who exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidence suggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risk taking behavior of under-performing fund managers and the winner takes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fund managers to be the top manager. We also analyze the difference in the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managers and single managers.     

Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual fundsin response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performanceis closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentivesto increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the topwho exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidencesuggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risktaking behavior of underperforming fund managers and the winnertakes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fundmanagers to be the top manager. We also analyze the differencein the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managersand single managers. JEL Classification codes: G2 L2     

Why mutual funds “underperform”

I propose a parsimonious model that reproduces the negative risk-adjusted performance of actively managed equity mutual funds. In the model, a fund manager can generate state-dependent active returns at a disutility. Negative expected performance and mutual fund investing simultaneously arise in equilibrium because the active return the fund manager generates covaries positively with a component of the pricing kernel that the performance measure omits, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Using data on U.S. funds, I also document new empirical evidence consistent with the model's cross-sectional implications.     

Difference in interim performance and risk taking with short-sale constraints

Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers are expected to increase their volatility so as to catch up with winners. We consider a rational model of a mutual fund tournament in the presence of short-sale constraints and find the opposite: Interim winners choose more volatile portfolios in equilibrium than interim losers. Several empirical works present evidence consistent with our model. However, based on the above informal argument, they appear to conclude against the tournament behavior. We argue that this conclusion is unwarranted. We also demonstrate that tournament incentives lead to differences in interim performance for otherwise identical managers and that mid-year trading volume is inversely related to mid-year stock return.     

Executive incentives and payout policy: Empirical evidence from Europe

We investigate how corporate payout policy is influenced by executive incentives, i.e. stock and option holdings, stock option deltas and stock-based pay-performance sensitivity for 1,650 publicly listed firms from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, over the period from 2002 to 2009. Our results show that executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas are associated with lower dividend payments in our sample of European countries, where we do not observe any presence of dividend protection for executive stock options. We find that this relationship is mainly driven by exercisable stock options and by options that are in the money. Additionally, we observe that executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas have a negative impact on total payout, suggesting that executives do not substitute share repurchases for dividends. Furthermore, the fraction of share repurchases in total payout increases as executive stock option holdings and stock option deltas increase. Finally, our results show that executive share ownership and stock-based pay-performance sensitivity may mitigate agency conflicts by significantly increasing the level of total payout.     

Fund Volatility Index using equity market state prices

The Fund Volatility Index (FVX) is proposed as a forward measure of volatility with applications in fund hedging and risk management. The method applies equity market state prices to individual fund pay‐offs. FVX is validated as a predictor of short‐term realised volatility for 30 exchange traded funds. Performance of the method is compared with existing methods using a data set of 14 925 non‐traded funds. FVX has lower bias and higher forecast accuracy than existing methods. As a more general measure, it allows for incorporation of terms to capture individual fund skewness and projection of higher moments of returns.     

New Zealand mutual funds: measuring performance and persistence in performance

The present study investigates the performance of New Zealand mutual funds using a survivorship‐bias controlled sample of 143 funds for the period of 1990–2003. Our overall results suggest that New Zealand mutual funds have not been able to provide out‐performance. Alphas for equity funds, both domestic and international, are insignificantly different from zero, whereas balanced funds underperform significantly. There is no evidence of timing abilities by the fund managers. In the short term, significant evidence of return persistence for all funds is observed. This persistence, however, is driven by ‘icy hands’ rather than ‘hot hands’. Finally, we find the risk‐adjusted performance for equity funds to be positively related to fund size and expense ratio and negatively related to load charges.     

Herding by mutual funds: impact on performance and investors’ response†

In this paper we investigate whether herding by actively managed equity funds affects their performances and flows over the 1980–2013 period. We show that during the herding quarter, on average, funds that trade with the herd benefit from this behavior. Although this does not directly translate into a positive association between the extent to which funds herd and their subsequent performance, we find that the funds that follow the herd earn negative abnormal returns whereas the ones that lead earn no abnormal returns. Our results also indicate that investors react adversely to follower funds while they are neutral towards the leader funds.     

Performance attribution of mutual funds in India: outperformance or mis‐representation?

We conduct a novel holdings‐based performance attribution, particularly suited to emerging markets, for equity‐oriented active mutual funds in India. Although, we find significantly positive alphas for an average fund, the stated benchmarks are grossly mis‐specified. A style‐adjusted benchmark could beat the stated benchmarks by greater margins than the funds themselves. While funds’ trading activity consistently adds value, cash drag and market timing usually diminish value. Although, the best‐performing funds exhibit superior security selection abilities, their outperformance does not persist. However, despite the lack of persistence winner funds continue to generate significantly higher alphas than loser funds for quite some time.     

Investor risk evaluation in the determination of management incentives in the mutual fund industry

This paper examines the way in which investors evaluate risk in deciding which mutual funds to invest. New fund investment is found to be positively related to a distributed lag of past fund performance with a strong degree of inertia. The relationship is mostly linear with significant nonlinearities at the upper (and possibly the lower) end of the performance spectrum. Investors appear to use publicly available data in a way that is consistent with the theory, giving equal weight in their decisions to the return and market risk components of the performance measure, while ignoring diversifiable risk. Finally, it is shown that improved performance in any year has a significant impact on the earnings of the management company. Because managers are rewarded on the basis of risk adjusted returns, risk neutral managers have no incentive to manipulate risk, except at very high performance levels.     

Dedicated REIT Mutual Fund Flows and REIT Performance

This study examines the effects of weekly and monthly capital flows into the dedicated REIT mutual fund sector on aggregate REIT returns and, simultaneously, the effects of industry-level REIT returns on subsequent REIT mutual fund flows. The dynamic relation between REIT capital flows and returns is estimated using vector autoregression (VAR) techniques. Unlike static regression techniques, our dynamic model produces estimates of the short-run relationships, long-run relationships, impulse response functions, and forecast variance decompositions. We find evidence that REIT mutual fund flows are positively and significantly related to prior returns, while prior REIT mutual fund flows do not significantly influence REIT returns. However, contemporaneous flows do appear to have an initial positive effect, which is partially reversed one period later. The positive contemporaneous effect, however, is the result of unexpected REIT mutual fund flows, while the expected portion is insignificant.     

Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows

The paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets. Analyzing mutual fund data, we find that, consistent with a theoretical model, funds with illiquid assets (where complementarities are stronger) exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets. We also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors. We present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects. We analyze the implications for funds’ performance and policies.