Investor attention, overconfidence and category learning

Motivated by psychological evidence that attention is a scarce cognitive resource, we model investors’ attention allocation in learning and study the effects of this on asset-price dynamics. We show that limited investor attention leads to category-learning behavior, i.e., investors tend to process more market and sector-wide information than firm-specific information. This endogenous structure of information, when combined with investor overconfidence, generates important features observed in return comovement that are otherwise difficult to explain with standard rational expectations models. Our model also demonstrates new cross-sectional implications for return predictability.     

Endogenous overconfidence in managerial forecasts

We examine whether attribution bias leads managers who have experienced short-term forecasting success to become overconfident in their ability to forecast future earnings. Importantly, this form of overconfidence is endogenous and dynamic. We also examine the effect of this cognitive bias on the managerial credibility. Consistent with the existence of dynamic overconfidence, managers who have predicted earnings accurately in the previous four quarters are less accurate in their subsequent earnings predictions. These managers also display greater divergence from the analyst consensus and are more precise. Lastly, investors and analysts react less strongly to forecasts issued by overconfident managers.     

CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.     

CEO overconfidence and corporate cash holdings

This study proposes chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to be an alternative explanation to corporate cash holdings. We find positive effects of CEO overconfidence on the level of cash holdings and the value of cash, which are mainly due to the investment environments faced by firms. The positive effects of CEO overconfidence on cash holdings level and cash value are barely affected by the traditional motives of cash holdings based on trade-off and agency theories. The analysis of cash sources further explains why firms with overconfident CEOs can aggressively pursue risky investments and maintain large cash holdings at the same time. Although the prior literature indicates that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity issues for their capital investments, the contribution to cash savings from equity is higher than that from debt. Additional robustness tests also support our empirical findings.     

CEO overconfidence and corporate debt maturity

This paper extends our knowledge of corporate debt maturity structure by examining whether and to what extent overconfident CEOs affect maturity decisions. Consistent with a demand side story, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs tend to adopt a shorter debt maturity structure by using a higher proportion of short-term debt (due within 12 months). This behavior of overconfident CEOs is not deterred by the high liquidity risk associated with such a financing strategy. Our demand side explanation remains robust even after considering six possible alternative drivers including a competing supply side explanation (in which creditors are reluctant to extend long-term debt to overconfident CEOs).     

CEO overconfidence and bank loan contracting

In this paper, we examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on bank loan spreads. Our theoretical model and empirical results support that firms with highly overconfident CEOs have lower loan spreads and that the reducing effect of these CEOs on the spread is more pronounced when the loan contracts have collateral or covenants. Unlike firms with highly overconfident CEOs, firms with moderately overconfident CEOs do not receive lower loan spreads. We perform various tests to alleviate the concerns about endogeneity, and the results are robust. The results are consistent with the idea that highly overconfident CEOs are more willing to pledge collateral and accept covenants in exchange for a reduction in their loan rate.     

Investigation of investors' overconfidence, familiarity and socialization

This study, using a sample of New Zealand investors, investigates three behavioural finance theories: investor overconfidence, socialization and the familiarity effect. We find support for the investor overconfidence theory, using characteristics such as past success, optimism, confidence in one's abilities, investment experience and investment‐related knowledge. Concerning the socialization theory, we observe that the investors actively sought information regarding the stock market, 75 per cent doing this on a weekly basis. Those investors that kept themselves informed daily outperformed other investors by 8 per cent. The familiarity effect was confirmed, showing investors to hold a far too high proportion of local stocks, although the majority of investors believed international equity markets would provide returns that were either better or equal to New Zealand stocks.     

CEO optimism and forced turnover

We show theoretically that optimism can lead a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to choose the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholder value. Optimism below (above) the interior optimum leads the CEO to underinvest (overinvest). Hence, if boards of directors act in the interests of shareholders, CEOs with relatively low or high optimism face a higher probability of forced turnover than moderately optimistic CEOs face. Using a large sample of turnovers, we find strong empirical support for this prediction. The results are consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial optimism that maximizes firm value.     

CEO overconfidence and the tone of press release

This paper examines how CEO overconfidence affects the tone of press releases. Using option-based proxies for CEO overconfidence, I find that over the 2000–2018 period, the press releases issued by firms with overconfident CEOs have more positive tone and receive more positive market reactions. The relation between CEO overconfidence and the tone of press releases is stronger among firms with good operating performance and concentrated in investment-related news but is insignificant for earnings news. These findings suggest that CEO overconfidence leads to biases in press releases.     

CEO overconfidence and the level of short-selling activity

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This study examines the impact of CEO overconfidence on the level of short-selling activity, as proxied by the short interest ratio. This research...     

Book-tax differences,CEO overconfidence,and bank loan contracting

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We assess information embedded in the difference between the reported book income and the taxable income (the book-tax difference, BTD hereafter)...     

AIA submission: CEO overconfidence and the incidence of financial restatement

The role of the Chief Executive Officer (hereafter, CEO) in financial reporting is almost universally assumed to be significant (Carcello, Neal, Palmrose & Scholz, 2011; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002; Connelly, 2005; Paredes, 2004). While academics and regulators agree that the CEO can have a large impact on financial reporting decisions, there is very little research on how individual CEO characteristics actually influence the financial reporting process. This paper examines the impact of one such CEO characteristic – CEO overconfidence – on the incidence of financial restatement. We utilize a matched-pairs research design consisting of 75 restatement firms (obtained through the GAO restatement sample) and a set of 75 non-restatement control firms. Using an options-based measure of CEO overconfidence developed by Malmendier and Tate (2008), we document a statistically significant positive relation between CEO overconfidence and financial statement restatement.     

Investor attention,firm-specific characteristic,and momentum: A case of the Korean stock market

This study examines the sources of negative momentum profits by combining investor attention and the properties of common and firm-specific factors. We choose the Korean stock market as a good case to characterize the negative momentum profits identified in Asia. In both portfolio and stock analyses, a method is devised to generate return data involving the property of each common and firm-specific factor within stock groups by investor attention. This study found significant negative momentum profits within the stock group with high investor attention. This momentum effect is highly dependent on the reversed performance of the past loser portfolio, not the continued performance of the past winner portfolio, and this reversal is strongly attributable to the properties of firm-specific factors, and not those of common factors. These results are robustly consistent regardless of changes in empirical design and the consideration of influence factors, market dynamics, and other stock markets.     

The influence of accountability on overconfidence and resistance to change: A research framework and experimental evidence

This paper presents a research framework and demonstrates how commitment to a particular course of action might lead to information search that is biased in favour of the chosen alternative. The framework also incorporates accountability as a strategy for mitigating overconfidence and resistance to change.An experiment was conducted to test the predictions of the proposed framework. Results of the experiment indicate that commitment to a particular cost allocation system leads to increased desirability of the chosen system and decreased desirability of the rejected alternative. The results also show that managers who are committed to a particular cost allocation system become too conservative and overconfident in their preferred system, which leads to high resistance to change. These effects, however, were attenuated by making the managers accountable for the negative consequences of their decisions.     

Information disclosure,CEO overconfidence,and share buyback completion rates

An open market share buyback is not a firm commitment, and there is limited evidence on whether firms repurchase the intended shares. Unlike US studies, we use data from unique UK regulatory and disclosure environment that allows to accurately measure the share buyback completion rates. We show that information disclosure and CEO overconfidence are significant determinants of the share buyback completion rate. In addition, we find that large and widely held firms that conduct subsequent buyback programs and have a past buyback completion reputation exhibit higher completion rates. Finally, we assess whether other CEO characteristics affect buyback completion rates and find that firms with senior CEOs who hold external directorships and have a longer tenure as CEO are more likely to complete the buyback programs. In sum, our results suggest there is a clear relationship between information disclosure, CEO overconfidence, and buyback completion rates.     

Financial distress,outside directors and corporate tax aggressiveness spanning the global financial crisis: An empirical analysis

We examine financial distress and tax aggressiveness spanning the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 and the impact of the interaction between board independence and firm-specific financial distress on tax aggressiveness. Our regression results show that both financial distress and the GFC are positively associated with tax aggressiveness. More importantly, we find that the positive association between financial distress and tax aggressiveness is magnified by the GFC. We also observe that the interaction between board independence and financial distress is positively associated with tax aggressiveness. Our results are robust to multiple measures of financial distress and tax aggressiveness.     

A theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency concerns

This paper studies the impact of both liquidity and solvency concerns on corporate finance. I present a tractable model of a firm that optimally chooses capital structure, cash holdings, dividends, and default while facing cash flows with long-term uncertainty and short-term liquidity shocks. The model explains how changes in solvency affect liquidity and also how liquidity concerns affect solvency via capital structure choice. These interactions result in a dynamic cash policy in which cash reserves increase in profitability and are positively correlated with cash flows. The optimal dividend distributions implied by the model are smoothed relative to cash flows. I also find that liquidity concerns lead to a decrease of dispersion of credit spreads.     

Trade credit and company performance during the 2008 financial crisis

We investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis had an impact on companies’ trade credit, and whether changes in trade credit mitigated the crisis’s impact on firm profitability. We document that the availability of trade credit decreased, and that this decline is more pronounced, the higher the companies’ pre‐crisis reliance on short‐term debt. We further report evidence that the redistribution hypothesis holds during crisis periods. Finally, we show that the crisis had a negative impact on company performance, but that this impact was lower (greater) for firms that report an increase in trade receivables (payables) in crisis compared to pre‐crisis periods.     

IRS Attention

We study how public and private disclosure requirements interact to influence both tax regulator enforcement and firm disclosure. To capture IRS enforcement activities, we introduce a novel data set of IRS acquisition of firms’ public financial disclosures, which we label IRS attention. We examine the implementation of two new disclosure requirements that potentially alter IRS attention: FIN 48, which increased public tax disclosure requirements, and Schedule UTP, which increased private tax disclosure. We find that IRS attention increased following FIN 48 but subsequently decreased following Schedule UTP, consistent with public and private disclosure interacting to influence tax enforcement. We next examine how private tax disclosure requirements under Schedule UTP affected firms’ public disclosure responses. We find that, following Schedule UTP, firms significantly increased the quantity and altered the content of their tax‐related disclosures, consistent with lower tax‐related proprietary costs of disclosure. Our results suggest that changes in SEC disclosure requirements altered the IRS's behavior with regard to public information acquisition, and, relatedly, changes in IRS private disclosure requirements appear to change firms’ public disclosure behavior.     

Terrorist attacks and corporate investment: The beneficial value of CEO overconfidence

This study examines whether terrorist attacks influence corporate investments and firm value. We expect that overconfident CEOs can mitigate the underinvestment problem caused by terrorist attacks because they overestimate the returns on investment. Using measures of terrorist attack proximity in the U.S., we find that firms with non-overconfident CEOs significantly decrease their investment growth when terrorist attacks affect them, while firms with overconfident CEOs do not. Consequently, the impact of terrorist attacks on firm value varies between firms with overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. Overall, this study suggests that CEO overconfidence can benefit shareholder value under certain conditions, such as terrorist attacks.