竞争度、集中度和金融体系的稳定性——基于新兴市场经济国家的数据

本文研究新兴市场经济国家银行业市场的竞争度、集中度与金融体系稳定性的关系,基于Bankscope数据库以及IMF数据库的数据,运用Z得分、赫芬达尔指数(HHI)和经效率调整后的Lerner指数,并引进一系列控制变量进行实证研究,结果表明,新兴市场经济国家银行业在1997—2012年间的集中度不断下降,从而有助于降低银行体系的风险,实证结论支持竞争稳定性假说和集中脆弱性假说,即银行业竞争度越高,集中度越低,则银行体系的稳定性越高。     

中国银行业的集中度、竞争度与银行风险

本文基于1995～2010年125家商业银行的非平衡面板数据,并利用更具微观基础的Lerner指数衡量银行竞争度,研究了我国银行业集中度、竞争度与银行风险之间的关系。结果表明,我国银行业集中度和竞争度均与银行风险呈显著的正相关关系,这一结论在一定程度上支持了"集中度-脆弱性假说"和"竞争度-脆弱性假说"。研究还发现,银行竞争度并不是导致银行集中度与银行风险正相关的原因。这些结论意味着,我国可以通过放松银行业进入管制来降低银行集中度,从而降低银行风险。同时,由于银行竞争度并不会影响银行集中度与银行风险之间的相关关系,因此即使银行业竞争度上升,也不宜因此而出台加强银行业进入管制的政策。     

中国影子银行与银行体系稳定性阈值效应研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

2007年爆发的全球金融危机暴露了影子银行对银行体系稳定性的巨大破坏力。本文采用1992-2010年的年度数据对中国影子银行规模和银行体系稳定性进行测度,并在数据模拟的基础上建立相应模型实证研究两者关系。结果发现,影子银行规模与银行体系稳定性之间存在阈值效应,当影子银行规模低于阈值时,影子银行的发展有利于提高银行体系的稳定性,相反则降低银行体系的稳定性。     

我国上市银行股权集中度与经营绩效的实证分析

现有研究结论认为,商业银行股权集中度与其经营绩效之间存在复杂且不确定的关系.本文以我国7家上市银行为样本,通过构建股权集中度和经营绩效指标,实证检验二者之间的关系.结果表明,上市银行股权集中度与银行绩效之间存在倒U型关系.     

城商行股权集中度与银行绩效关系研究——基于上市城市商业银行数据的实证分析

城市商业银行的股权集中度与银行绩效有着密切的联系。本文通过选取A股上市的三家城商行数据,就其股权集中度与银行绩效之间的关系做了实证分析。结果发现,城市商业银行的股权集中度与银行绩效之间存在着＂U＂型关系,第一大股东的持股比例、前五大股东的持股比例与银行绩效负相关,前十大股东的持股比例与银行绩效正相关;城市商业银行的控制层级对银行绩效有正向影响,资产负债率对银行绩效有负向影响;城市商业银行第一大股东的身份和城商行规模与其绩效并无显著关系。     

市场竞争导致的银行集中、制度与净利息收入关系研究

本文基于亚洲八个国家和地区的面板数据,实证研究市场竞争导致的银行集中与银行效率的理论:集中—结构效率论和集中—制度效率论。结果表明,银行集中度与银行效率有明显的正相关关系,而银行存款总额、私人贷款总额与银行效率有显著的负相关关系,所以,集中—结构效率论成立。在加入制度变量后,银行集中度与银行效率仍有明显的正相关关系,但制度变量不显著,不支持集中—制度效率论。所以,提高银行效率必须从银行业务调整,努力创造竞争的环境,以提高银行集中度,从而提高银行效率。     

银行所有权集中度与银行风险控制——基于我国15家上市银行的实证研究

本文基于Berle和Means(1933)提出的所有权集中可以改进银行风险的观点,选取中国15家上市银行2005-2010年的相关数据,采用资本充足率和不良贷款率作为检测银行风险的衡量指标,对银行所有权集中度和银行风险之间的关系进行了实证分析.回归结果表明,所有权集中可以提高资本充足率,但也会增加不良贷款率,这说明银行所有权过于集中和过于分散都不能有效地防范银行风险.因此,所有权集中度对银行风险的影响程度呈倒“U”型.     

中国银行业SCP实证分析

本文利用1994-2009年金融年鉴的相关数据计算出我国当前银行业市场集中率和HHI,并根据贝恩的市场结构经验标准和赫希曼-赫芬达尔指数标准,分析我国银行业市场结构。在SCP分析范式的基础之上,考虑可能影响银行绩效的相关因素,构造了一个非结构实证模型,分析验证市场集中度、规模经济、用人效率和宏观经济景气指数等因素同银行绩效之间的关系。实证结果表明,从行业整体的角度看,我国银行业整体的市场绩效同市场集中度之间呈正向关系,即集中度-利润率假说,在其他变量,如规模经济和GDP增长率的共同影响下在我国银行业成立。     

政治关联、股权集中度与银行绩效——基于我国上市银行业的实证研究

本文利用2006-2013年的数据分析我国上市银行董事长、总经理各自的政治关联以及银行股权集中度对银行业绩的影响。实证结果表明:上市银行董事长和总经理的政治关联对银行业绩的影响各不相同,董事长的政治关联显著提高银行的绩效,而总经理的政治关联则与之相反;上市银行的业绩随着股权集中度的上升而逐步提高,同时,股权集中度在一定程度上抑制了政治关联所起的作用。将银行样本划分为"一股独大"和"股权制衡"两种类型后,上述结论仍然成立。     

我国商业银行绩效实证研究——基于“小银行优势假说”的视角

本文主要就"小银行优势假说"在我国的适用性进行实证研究。由于我国国情的特殊性,这些优势在我国可能并非对应着小银行,因此本文的研究重点是这一假说所暗示的银行绩效和某些因素之间的关系。具体来说,这些影响因素主要包括市场结构、信息传递效率、银企关系发展程度、费用偏好和资产结构。     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.     

中国银行业市场结构演变的金融稳定效应研究

银行业市场结构模式到底是“集中-稳定”还是“集中-脆弱”观点尚未达成一致,但是通过采用熵值分解指数来刻画我国银行业市场结构可以针对该问题给出较为合理的答案。研究结果表明,我国银行业市场结构的集中程度与风险之间的关系是负相关的,我国较高的银行业市场集中度,某种程度上提高了我国银行业体系的稳定程度。     

货币供应量、利率与银行系统性金融风险——基于CoVaR方法的实证研究

在常态化疫情防控的背景下,商业银行系统性金融风险有上升迹象,这对央行实施货币政策工具和力度的把握提出了更高要求。本文利用条件在险值模型检验了我国货币供应量、利率与银行系统性金融风险的关系。研究结果表明,货币供应量和利率与银行系统性风险之间的关系不是线性的,而是U型的,即存在最优的货币供应量和利率能够使商业银行的系统性金融风险最低。当货币供应量和利率小于这个最优组合时,增加货币供应量和提高利率能够有效降低商业银行的系统性金融风险;而当货币供应量和利率大于这个最优组合时,增加货币供应量和提高利率反而会增加银行系统性金融风险,进而降低商业银行的金融稳定性。     

Bank concentration,competition, and crises: First results

Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions about the relationship between bank concentration, bank competition and banking system fragility, this paper studies the impact of national bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the likelihood of a country suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 69 countries from 1980 to 1997, we find that crises are less likely in economies with more concentrated banking systems even after controlling for differences in commercial bank regulatory policies, national institutions affecting competition, macroeconomic conditions, and shocks to the economy. Furthermore, the data indicate that regulatory policies and institutions that thwart competition are associated with greater banking system fragility.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Countercyclical Credit Spreads

We study optimal monetary policy in a New‐Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with a credit channel and relationship lending in banking. We show that borrowers' bank‐specific (deep) habits give rise to countercyclical credit spreads, which, in turn, make optimal monetary policy depart substantially from price stability, under both discretion and commitment. Our analysis shows that the welfare costs of setting monetary policy under discretion (with respect to the optimal Ramsey plan) and of using simpler suboptimal policy rules are strictly increasing in the magnitude of deep habits in credit markets and market power in banking.     

How does competition affect bank risk-taking?

A common assumption in the academic literature and in the supervision of banking systems is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. A recent paper by Martínez-Miera and Repullo (MMR, 2010) shows that a nonlinear relationship theoretically exists between bank competition and risk-taking in the loan market. We test this hypothesis using data from the Spanish banking system. After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, we find support for this nonlinear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in both the loan and deposit markets. When direct measures of market power, such as Lerner indices, are used, the empirical results are more supportive of the original franchise value hypothesis, but only in the loan market. Overall, the results highlight the empirical relevance of the MMR model, even though further analysis across other banking markets is needed.     

Competition and innovation: Evidence from financial services

This paper presents new evidence on the relationship between competition and innovation by extending previous literature from manufacturing to financial services. We introduce a new measure of overall innovation by estimating and enveloping annual minimum cost frontiers to create a global frontier. The distance to the global frontier constitutes each bank’s technology gap, which decreases if the bank manages to innovate. Our innovation measure enables us to derive and estimate the model of Aghion et al. (2005b) at the firm level for the US banking industry. Based on individual bank Call Report data for the period 1984–2004, consistent with theoretical and empirical work by Aghion et al., we find evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation that is robust over several different specifications. Further evidence on major structural changes in the US banking industry indicates that banks moved beyond their optimal innovation level and that interstate banking deregulation resulted in lower bank innovation. Policy implications to financial reform and prudential regulation are discussed also.     

Concentration and foreign penetration in Latin American banking sectors: Impact on competition and risk

In the 1990s, Latin American banking sectors experienced an accelerated process of concentration and foreign penetration that prompted diverse views regarding its implications for the competitive behavior of banks and the financial stability of the system. In this paper, we examine these issues exploiting a rich bank-level database for eight Latin American countries. We find that, while increased concentration did not weaken banking competition within the region, foreign penetration appears to have led to a less competitive industry. Moreover, we find that bank risk has been negatively associated with competition which, coupled with the previous finding, explains the positive link between banking sector stability and foreign penetration revealed by the data.     

Competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks

Cooperative banks are a driving force for socially committed business at the local level, accounting for around one fifth of the European Union (EU) bank deposits and loans. Despite their importance, little is known about the relationship between bank stability and competition for these small credit institutions. Does competition affect the stability of cooperative banks? Does the financial stability of banks increase/decrease when competition is higher? We assess the dynamic relationship between competition and bank soundness (both in the short and long run) among European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009. We obtain three main results. First, we provide evidence in line with the competition-stability view proposed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Bank market power negatively “Granger-causes” banks' soundness, meaning that there is a positive relationship between competition and stability. Second, we find that this fundamental relationship does not change during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Third, we show that increased homogeneity in the cooperative banking sector positively affects bank soundness. Our findings have important policy implications for designing and implementing regulations that enhance the overall stability of the financial system and in particular of the cooperative banking sector.     

The profitability of small single-market banks in an era of multi-market banking

This paper examines the relationship between the profitability of small single-market banks and the presence in the market of large banking organizations and banking organizations that operate primarily outside of the local banking market. We find that, in rural banking markets, the profitability of small single-market banks is significantly related to the presence of both large and small primarily-out-of-market banks. We also find that an increased presence of large or small primarily-out-of-market banks in rural banking markets reduces the positive effect of an increase in concentration on small single-market bank profits. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions reported in the recent literature and has important implications for antitrust policy. In urban banking markets, we find little evidence of any relationship between the profitability of small single-market banks and the presence of large or primarily-out-of-market banks.