The political economy of public investment when population is aging: A panel cointegration analysis

Time preferences vary by age. Notably, according to experimental studies, senior citizens tend to discount future payoffs more heavily than working-age individuals. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that demographic change has contributed to the cut-back in government-financed investment that many advanced economies experienced over the last four decades. We demonstrate for a panel of 19 OECD countries between 1971 and 2007 that the share of elderly people and public investment rates are cointegrated, indicating a long-run relationship between them. Estimating this cointegration relationship via dynamic OLS (DOLS) we find a negative and significant effect of population aging on public investment. Moreover, the estimation of an error correction model reveals long-run Granger causality running exclusively from aging to investment. Our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables typically considered in the literature on the determinants of public investment.     

Comparative financing analysis and political economy of noncommunicable diseases

The pandemic of chronic non-communicable diseases (NCDs) poses substantial challenges to the health financing sustainability in high-income and low/middle income countries (LMICs). The aim of this review is to identify the bottle neck inefficiencies in NCDs attributable spending and propose sustainable health financing solutions. The World Health Organization (WHO) introduced the “best buy” concept to scale up the core intervention package against NCDs targeted for LMICs. Population- and individual-based NCD best buy interventions are projected at US$170 billion over 2011–2025. Appropriately designed health financing arrangements can be powerful enablers to scale up the NCD best buys. Rapidly developing emerging nations dominate the landscape of LMICs. Their capability and willingness to invest resources for eradicating NCDs could strengthen WHO outreach efforts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, much beyond current capacities. There has been a declining trend in international donor aid intended to cope with NCDs over the past decade. There is also a serious misalignment of these resources with the actual needs of recipient countries. Globally, the momentum towards the financing of intersectoral actions is growing, and this presents a cost-effective solution. A budget discrepancy of 10:1 in WHO and multilateral agencies remains in donor aid in favour of communicable diseases compared to NCDs. LMICs are likely to remain a bottleneck of NCDs imposed financing sustainability challenge in the long-run. Catastrophic household health expenditure from out of pocket spending on NCDs could plunge almost 150 million people into poverty worldwide. This epidemiological burden coupled with population ageing presents an exceptionally serious sustainability challenge, even among the richest countries which are members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Strategic and political leadership of WHO and multilateral agencies would likely play essential roles in the struggle that has just begun.     

Diminished-dimensional political economy

Economists base policy advice on models of responses by a variety of economic entities to policy adoptions. There is compelling evidence that these entities do not optimize as mainstream economics assumes. Rather, they limit decision-making to solving problems of much smaller dimensionality. We consider how political economy goes awry when ignoring diminished dimensionality, and some research avenues opened up by this realization.     

Robust political economy

This paper introduces the idea of “robust political economy.” In the context of political economic systems, “robustness” refers to a political economic arrangement's ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes in the face of deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals' motivations and information. Since standard assumptions about complete and perfect information, instantaneous market adjustment, perfect agent rationality, political actor benevolence, etc., rarely, if ever actually hold, a realistic picture and accurate assessment of the desirability of alternative political economic systems requires an analysis of alternative systems' robustness. The Mises-Hayek critique of socialism forms the foundation for investigations of robustness that relax ideal informational assumptions. The Buchanan-Tullock public choice approach complements this foundation in forming the basis for investigations of robustness that relax ideal motivational assumptions. JEL Code B53, P16, P26     

On the political economy of immigration

We study how immigration policies that impose capital and skill requirements would be determined under majority voting when native agents differ in their wealth holdings and vote to maximize their income.     

Principles of political economy

As a guide to efficient social organization, neo-classical economics is deficient in two major ways. First, it uses simplifying assumptions about the decision-environment which destroy its possible relevance to an understanding of decision situations in the real world: notably in its inability to embrace the unknowability of the future and the subjectivity of human decisions. Second, it specifies the nature of policy-relevant choice in too restrictive a fashion to explain the major (constitutional and political) choice-situations inherent in any system of social organization. A more satisfactory intellectual construct can be derived from a political economy-public choice model. This follows broadly the contractarian-liberal model developed notably by Buchanan and Brennan, but envisages a much more thoroughgoing rejection of neo-classical (Paretian) concepts. Thenew political economy would identifyefficiency with the ability of the citizen to constrain government-as-leviathan in a context of multi-level choice. The opportunity-cost situation of citizens-as-choosers is specified by reference to their ongoing possibilities of usingvoice to change unsatisfactory institutional constraints orexit to escape their consequences. The model is used to appraise the constitutional characteristics of fiscal federalism. I am indebted to the Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University and the Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University, for the provision of facilities. Colleagues at both institutions also provided valuable advice and comment.     

On the political economy of zoning

Households choose a community in a metropolitan area and collectively set a minimum housing quality and a property tax to finance a local public good. The collective imposition of a lower bound on housing consumption induces an income-stratified equilibrium in a specification where meaningful community differentiation would not arise without zoning. We show computationally that zoning restrictions are likely to be stringent, with a majority facing a binding constraint in communities that permit it. By inducing a stratified equilibrium, zoning causes Tiebout-welfare gains in aggregate but with large welfare transfers. Relative to stratified equilibrium without zoning, the zoning equilibrium is significantly more efficient as it reduces housing-market distortions.     

Reflections on critical realism in political economy

This paper studies critical realism in political economy. Thefocal points are two important tensions in critical realism.The first tension relates generally to the status and importanceof philosophy and the scope of critical realism. The secondtension relates specifically to critical realism in politicaleconomy. Firstly, two perspectives within critical realism inpolitical economy are separated: a Marxist current and a broadheterodox current. Secondly, these two perspectives within criticalrealism are contrasted and discussed on the basis of a criticalstance towards philosophical reductionism. Thirdly, it is arguedthat reconciliation between central aspects of the two perspectivesis both feasible and desirable, and finally, neo-Marxist politicaleconomy is pinpointed as a critical-constructive and developmentalmediation for critical realism in political economy.     

The political economy of naturalization

This paper presents a political economy model in which self‐interested natives decide when citizenship and/or voting rights should be granted to foreign‐born workers. Native voters know that immigrants hold different ‘political’ preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible. They also consider, however, that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration. We find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity, quality (productivity), and preferences of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue.     

The political economy of industrialisation

This paper analyses how incentives under different sets of political institutions map into policies that promote industrialisation. I set out an endogenous growth model with non-overlapping generations, where agents are heterogeneous with respect to wealth, skills and political power. The skills of the political elite play a crucial role for industrialisation to occur. It is shown that a flat wealth distribution and a skilled political elite enhance development the most in elitist regimes, while democracies perform as well as elitist regimes in terms of industrialisation. The theoretical results regarding elitist regimes are in line with evidence on the Industrial Revolution.     

Power fluctuations and political economy

We study (constrained) Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy where the group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. For high discount factors, the economy converges to a first-best allocation where labor supply decisions are not distorted. For low discount factors, distortions do not disappear and fluctuate over time. Most importantly, the set of sustainable first-best allocations is larger when there is less persistence in the identity of the party in power (because this encourages political compromise). This result contradicts the common presumption that there will be fewer distortions when there is a “stable ruling group”.     

The political economy of regionalism

We examine the incentives of regions to unite and separate. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of government. Our paper explores the influence of size, location and the diversity within regions in shaping this trade-off. We then examine the way in which alternative political institutions aggregate regional preferences and thereby define the number of countries.     

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

The political economy of the impossible trinity

This paper reconsiders the policy trilemma in an open economy by incorporating political economy concerns. We argue that the impact of government ideology on monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and capital flow restrictions should be analyzed in the broader context of restrictions imposed by the impossible trinity instead of the usual single-dimensional constraints. Employing a de facto measurement of these restrictions for a sample of 111 countries from 1980 to 2010, we show that the impact of government ideology on a country's position in this trilemma is highly context dependent: we find that its impact on exchange rate stability and monetary independence varies between developed and developing countries. We also show that the impact of government ideology on these two trilemma components is contingent on the stance of the respective economy's business cycle. Left-leaning governments seem to favor exchange rate stability over monetary independence in case of a negative output gap; suggesting a reversal of their commonly assumed partisan preferences in economically tight times.