What Is Systemic Risk?

The traditional view of risk in a financial system is that it is the summation of individual risks within the system. However, the financial crisis that started in 2007 has driven home that this view of risk is inadequate. It is the interactions of financial institutions and markets that determine the systemic risks that drive financial crises. We identify four types of systemic risk. These are (i) panics—banking crises due to multiple equilibria; (ii) banking crises due to asset price falls; (iii) contagion; and (iv) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system.     

Stock Return Predictability of Residual‐Income‐Based Valuation: Risk or Mispricing?

In an influential paper, Frankel and Lee (1998) conclude that the stock return predictability of the value‐to‐price ratio (V/P) results from market mispricing. This paper confirms whether the V/P reflects the rational risk premiums associated with the V/P factor or is better explained by market inefficiency. Following Daniel and Titman (1997), this paper examines whether the V/P characteristics or the V/P factor loadings predict stock returns. The findings show that the V/P loadings are positively associated with average returns even after controlling for the V/P characteristics in both time series and cross‐sectional tests. The overall results suggest that the mispricing explanation of the V/P effect is premature.     

Risk‐Sharing or Risk‐Taking? Counterparty Risk,Incentives, and Margins

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk‐sharing, can breed risk‐taking. Bad news about the risk of an asset underlying a derivative increases protection sellers' expected liability and undermines their risk‐prevention incentives. This limits risk‐sharing, creates endogenous counterparty risk, and can lead to contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers' incentives and in turn enhance risk‐sharing. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk‐prevention incentives.     

Do Large Blockholders Reduce Risk?

The conventional assumption in the asset pricing literature is that the identity of a company's owners is largely irrelevant, but studies of companies with “blockholders”—shareholders with large positions in a particular company—provide grounds for questioning this assumption. Unlike the well‐diversified investors of modern portfolio theory, blockholders have strong incentives to monitor corporate performance and, when necessary, to exert control over ineffective managements and boards. The findings of many studies support the idea that blockholders have a positive effect on rates of return. The authors of this article report the findings of their recent investigation of whether blockholders might also have a positive effect on shareholder value by reducing the risk of the companies in which their holdings are concentrated. After distinguishing between companies with individual as opposed to corporate blockholders, and those with one share, one vote as opposed to those with dual‐class shares, the authors find that ownership of large positions by individuals—but not corporations—was associated with lower systematic risk (when using both Fama‐French multiple factor and CAPM models). At the same time, they find that the firm‐specific risk of such companies was higher, but “biased” toward positive outcomes—that is, smaller downsides with larger upsides. What's more, this upward shift in performance and risk‐profile was achieved at least partly through increases in productivity as reflected in higher profit margins, profitability, profit per employee, and operating leverage, and lower costs of goods sold, SGA, and cash holdings. By contrast, in the case of blockholders in companies with dual‐class share structures, all of these positive associations with blockholders were either significantly weaker, or reversed. That is, whereas the presence of individual blockholders appears to increase productivity and value under a one share, one vote governance regime, blockholders in companies with dual‐class structures were associated with higher systematic risk and reduced productivity and value.     

Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?

In this paper we investigate whether banks that borrow from other banks have lower risk levels. We concentrate on a large sample of Central and Eastern European banks that allows us to explore the impact of interbank lending when exposures are long term and interbank borrowers are small banks. The results of the empirical analysis generally confirm the hypothesis that long-term interbank exposures result in lower risk of the borrowing banks.     

How Much of Bank Credit Risk Is Sovereign Risk? Evidence from Europe

We examine European banks' exposures to systematic and country‐specific sovereign risk. We organize our investigation around a multifactor affine credit risk model estimated on credit default swap data of different maturities. During the 2008–15 period, about one third of banks' credit risk is sovereign. However, banks strongly differ both in the magnitude and type of their sovereign exposures. Measures of indirect exposures, such as bank size and return on equity, capture these cross‐sectional differences better than measures of direct exposures. Furthermore, the properties of the distress risk premiums turn out to be important to understand the effect of sovereign risk on bank funding costs.     

Can Time‐Varying Risk of Rare Disasters Explain Aggregate Stock Market Volatility?

Why is the equity premium so high, and why are stocks so volatile? Why are stock returns in excess of government bill rates predictable? This paper proposes an answer to these questions based on a time‐varying probability of a consumption disaster. In the model, aggregate consumption follows a normal distribution with low volatility most of the time, but with some probability of a consumption realization far out in the left tail. The possibility of this poor outcome substantially increases the equity premium, while time‐variation in the probability of this outcome drives high stock market volatility and excess return predictability.     

Why Does Implied Risk Aversion Smile?

Implied risk aversion estimates reported in the literature arestrongly U-shaped. This article explores different potentialexplanations for these "smile" patterns: (i) preference aggregation,both with and without stochastic volatility and jumps in returns,(ii) misestimation of investors’ beliefs caused by stochasticvolatility, jumps, or a Peso problem, and (iii) heterogeneousbeliefs. The results reveal that preference aggregation andmisestimation of investors’ beliefs caused by stochasticvolatility and jumps are unlikely to be the explanation forthe smile. Although a Peso problem can account for the smile,the required probability of a market crash is unrealisticallylarge. Heterogeneous beliefs cause sizable distortions in impliedrisk aversion, but the degree of heterogeneity required to explainthe smile is implausibly large. (JEL: G12, G13)     

Rational Risk Perception: Utopia or Dystopia?

Societal conflicts with regard to risk management are common. The public has different beliefs than many experts and administrators with regard to such issues as the citing of a repository for spent nuclear fuel or whether genetically modified organisms should be allowed to enter the human food chain. As a result, political tensions arise and there may be a skew allocation of resources for risk mitigation. The question raised in the article is if a consensus society is possible and desirable. If views converge on high risk beliefs, the cost would be very high as well. If views converge on low risks, some hazards could be neglected and environmental damage considerable, as used to be the case in the Former Soviet Union and other socialist countries which lacked a free press. A consensus society is neither possible nor desirable. No party has access to the final truth with regard to risks and hazards; diversity is an asset.     

Does Idiosyncratic Risk Matter for Individual Securities?

This paper investigates the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and returns for individual securities within a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedascticity (GARCH)‐in‐mean framework. We demonstrate that, on average, 15% of stocks exhibit a significant relationship between returns and risk, of which 9% are positive. These proportions vary over time and with model specifications. Some characteristics influence the probability of a positive and a negative relationship, while others appear to affect only one, but not the other. This evidence implies that the factors that explain a positive connection between idiosyncratic risk and returns are different from the factors that explain a negative connection.     

Does Financial Distress Risk Drive the Momentum Anomaly?

This paper brings together the evidence on two asset pricing anomalies—continuation of prior returns (momentum) and the market mispricing of distressed firms—using UK data. Our analysis demonstrates both these effects are driven by market underreaction to financial distress risk. In particular, we find momentum is proxying for distress risk, and is largely subsumed by our distress risk factor. We also find, as with US studies, no evidence that size and book-to-market (B/M) effects in stock returns are linked to financial distress .     

Don't They Care? Or,Are They Just Unaware? Risk Perception and the Demand for Long‐Term Care Insurance

The potential need for long‐term care (LTC) is one of the greatest financial risks faced not only by the elderly but also by their adult children, who often provide care or financial assistance. We investigate adult children's role in the demand for LTC insurance. Similar to flood insurance, we find that demand for LTC insurance is low due to low risk perception. The more aware adult children are of the risk, the more likely LTC insurance is to be purchased, either by the children themselves on behalf of their parents or by the parents under the influence of their children.     

High‐Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? Convex Compensation,Long Horizons,and Portfolio Choice

We study the portfolio choice of hedge fund managers who are compensated by high-water mark contracts. We find that even risk-neutral managers do not place unbounded weights on risky assets, despite option-like contracts. Instead, they place a constant fraction of funds in a mean-variance efficient portfolio and the rest in the riskless asset, acting as would constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) investors. This result is a direct consequence of the in(de)finite horizon of the contract. We show that the risk-seeking incentives of option-like contracts rely on combining finite horizons and convex compensation schemes rather than on convexity alone.     

Risk Analysis in Capital Budgeting Contexts Simple or Sophisticated?

The aim of this paper is to report findings from a comprehensive UK survey which covered a wide range of risk handling issues in capital budgeting. The results provide a clear and up-to-date picture of the current practices of risk analysis within 146 large companies. In addition, the relationships between some risk analysis practices and other firm characteristics were explored. Their implications for theory and management, and some possible suggestions to bridge the gap between theory and practice, are discussed.     

‘Wait-and-See’ business cycles?

Are shocks to firms' profitability risk, propagated by physical capital adjustment costs, a major source of business cycle fluctuations? This paper studies this question using a heterogeneous-firm dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, where firms face fixed capital adjustment costs. Surprise increases in idiosyncratic risk lead firms to adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ policy for investment. The model is calibrated using a German firm-level data set with broader coverage than comparable U.S. data sets. The main result is that time-varying firm-level risk through ‘wait-and-see’ dynamics is unlikely a major source of business cycle fluctuations.     

How to Evaluate Risk Management Units in Financial Institutions?

Based on the existing Enterprise Risk Management framework and current government regulations, “banks are required to establish risk management units (RMUs) to review and evaluate their risks, monitor them, and to advise top management.” Currently an integral part of the risk governance and management process, RMUs in financial institutions have become increasingly important since the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This article details the authors' creation of an index to evaluate the performance of risk management units in financial institutions, and then examines some of their findings. The index transforms twelve parameters into a simple and convenient index that isolates the RMU's activities from the rest of the organizational risk management process, its risk preferences and the activities of the rest of the units. The index's parameters are divided into three dimensions of the RMU's performance: professionalism, organizational status and relationship with top management and the board. The authors found a positive relationship between their RMUI and some important risk governance characteristics: CROs who are among the five highest paid executives at the bank, banks with at least one independent director serving on the board's risk committee having banking and finance experience and boards with greater efficacy.     

When Does Extra Risk Strictly Increase an Option's Value?

It is well known that risk increases the value of options. Thisarticle makes that precise in a new way. The conventional theoremsays that the value of an option does not fall if the underlyingasset becomes riskier in the conventional sense of the mean-preservingspread. This article uses two new definitions of "riskier" toshow that the value of an option strictly increases (i) if theunderlying asset becomes "pointwise riskier," and (ii) onlyif the underlying asset becomes "extremum riskier."