Investigating Donating Behavior Using Hypothetical Dictator Game Experiments

We conduct dictator game experiments to investigate donating behavior by simultaneously examining the time delay when the donee receives the donation and the individual characteristics of the donor. We show that donations decrease as the time delay rises and that gender, education level, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and utilitarianism affect donations independent of the time delay.     

Contagion of Self‐Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

We examine how group decision‐making affects other‐regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision‐making and whether the difference in decision‐making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision‐making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision‐making.     

Reciprocity and Giving in a Consecutive Three‐Person Dictator Game with Social Interaction

We study pure indirect reciprocity by setting up a modified dictator game with three players A, B, and C acting sequentially. Subject A takes a share of a pie and passes the rest to subject B, while B divides the rest between herself and C. We find that this consecutive three‐person dictator game increases generosity compared with the traditional two‐person dictator game. We analyze the influence of social interaction and uncertainty. In treatments with certainty we observe pure indirect reciprocity: B indirectly reciprocates for A's behavior in the decision on how generous to be to C.     

Dictator monopolies and essential goods: experimental evidence

Monopolists set prices and if the good is unessential this may place the consumer in an uncomfortable position. But if the good is essential the consumer faces a pay-to-live or -die choice. Dictator and ultimatum games are superficially similar in that one game offers the right of refusal, while the other does not. The dictator monopoly is, however, not a game, and behaviour could be radically different in the market environment versus game environment. We recast the dictator game as a dictator monopoly experiment and find that the fairness characteristic of the game evaporates quickly as rounds progress.     

Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look

This article replicates and “stress tests” a recent finding by Eckel and Grossman (2003) that matching subsidies generate substantially higher Charity Receipts than theoretically comparable rebate subsidies. In a first replication treatment, we show that most choices are consist with a “constant (gross) contribution” rule, suggesting that inattention to the subsidies’ differing net consequences may explain the higher revenues elicited with matching subsidies. Results of additional treatments suggest that (a) the charity dimension of the decision problems has little to do with the result, and (b) extra information regarding the net consequences of decisions reduces but does not eliminate the result.     

The Great Recession and charitable giving

We examine the impact of the Great Recession on charitable giving. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we estimate a variety of specifications and find sharp declines in overall donative behaviour that is not accounted for by shocks to income or wealth. These results suggest that overall attitudes towards giving changed over this time period.     

Effect of religious priming in prosocial and destructive behaviour

In this paper, we study the behavioural impact of religious priming by showing participants religious words in a scrambled sentence task before a dictator game and a joy‐of‐destruction game. We also elicited data on individual religiosity and religious affiliation using a questionnaire. Priming religious words significantly increased prosocial behaviour in the dictator game, and the effect was especially striking among those reporting no religion, atheists and agnostics. The religious prime has no significant effect in mitigating destructive behaviour or own expectations of the other's destruction choice, but both destructive behaviour and expectations correlate positively with the multi‐dimensional religiosity measure.     

The impacts of religion,political ideology,and social capital on religious and secular giving: evidence from the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey

Using a double hurdle model and data from the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey (SCCS2006) we examine religious and secular giving, focusing on the impacts of religion, political ideology and social capital. Our main results indicate that greater participation in religious activities positively impacts religious and secular giving, the intensity of religious belief increases religious giving at the expense of secular giving, religious giving by very conservative individuals is higher than for other ideological groups, and measures of social capital are very important in raising the level and likelihood of philanthropic giving.     

Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality

The methodological ideal of experimentalists, E, is easily stated: derive a testable hypothesis, H, from a well-specified theory, T; implement experiments with a design; implicitly in the latter are auxiliary hypotheses, A, that surface in the review/discussion of completed research reports (payoffs are 'adequate,' Ss are 'relevant,' instructions, context are 'clear,' etc.). We want to be able to conclude, if statistical test outcomes support not-H, that T is 'falsified.' But this is not what we do; rather we ask if there is a flaw in the test, i.e. not-A is supported, and we do more experiments. This is good practice—much better than the statistical rhetoric of falsificationism. Undesigned social processes allow E to accumulate technical and instrumental knowledge that drive the reduction of experimental error and constitute a more coherent methodology than falsificationism.     

House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments

Are decisions in economics experiments distorted because the money subjects risk comes from the experimenter rather than their own pockets? There is some evidence that people receiving small, one time “windfall gains” have a higher marginal propensity to consume them, and when doing so, exhibit greater risk-seeking behaviour. This has been found in individual decision making experiments when anticipated wealth effects have been controlled, and labelled the “house money effect.” In public good experiments, house money effects could be driving the high levels of voluntary contributions commonly observed. This possibility is tested by comparing VCM contribution rates when subjects supply their own endowments with those when endowments are provided, while holding constant the distribution of promised earnings. No evidence of house money effects is found, suggesting that use of “free” initial money endowments does not distort subsequent contributions in VCM environments.     

The identifiable victim effect in charitable giving: evidence from a natural field experiment

We design a natural field experiment to enhance our understanding of the role of the identifiable victim effect in charitable giving. Using direct mail solicitations to 25 797 prior donors of a nonprofit charity, we tested the responsiveness of donors to make a contribution to either an identifiable or a statistical victim. Unlike much previous research, which has used only laboratory experiments, we find that the campaign letter focusing on one identifiable victim did not result in significantly larger donations than the campaign letter focusing on the statistical victim. In addition to the role of the identifiable victim, we investigate the degree to which each of our campaign letters affected donors’ payments to other concurrent and future campaigns and whether there is decreasing marginal returns to campaigning in the sense that receiving a letter crowds out donors’ payments to other future and concurrent campaigns. We find some evidence of crowding out, indicating that charitable giving could be a zero-sum game; however, the treatment letters did not have different effects on other payments.     

How giving affects giving: a long-term analysis of donations

Social preferences theories suggest that at least some people show altruistic behaviour. However, this philanthropic behaviour ranges from pure altruistic preferences to reluctant altruists. The fact that a subset of contributors has impure preferences raises questions regarding the stability of prosocial contributions. Assuming differences in other regarding preferences, we examine whether at an aggregated level monetary contributions are stable or fragile over time. We study the aggregated donations in the US from 1973 to 2013 using ARIMA and ARMAX models. The significant autoregressive and moving average coefficients in our estimations suggest that aggregated donations are highly autocorrelated. Our estimated impulse response functions indicate that aggregated donations converge to their historic mean quickly after an exogenous shock, which shows the stickiness of the inclination to donate.     

Choosing Your Object of Benevolence: A Field Experiment on Donation Options*

In a large natural field experiment, we explore the effect of providing donors with the opportunity of choosing the target country for their donations. We find that our treatment manipulation affects neither the average donation size nor the response rate. Only a small fraction of donors (3.5 percent) actually choose their object of benevolence. These donors give more than those who do not specify a recipient. However, based on previous donations, we can only provide indicative evidence that this might be a causal effect rather than a mere selection effect.     

Revisiting the impact of impure public goods on consumers’ prosocial behavior: A lab experiment in Shanghai

In this study, we implemented a dictator game experiment to examine how the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good affects individuals’ prosocial behaviour. A within‐subject design was used in the experiment. The dictator game was repeated six times with an impure public good introduced in four of them. We observe that the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good partly crowds out individuals’ subsequent donations, which could be explained by a seemingly ‘mental accounting’ mental process. In addition, we also find that the selfish behaviour of individuals in dictator games with impure public goods, to some extent, has an inertia influence on their subsequent donations when the impure public good is removed.     

Fundraising under two-dimensional asymmetric information: the case of mindless donations

The paper develops a model of charity’s choice of fundraising method under two dimensions of asymmetric information, quality and purpose. The main implication from this model is a separating equilibrium where the higher-quality charity uses a traditional fundraising method, while the lower-quality one exploits a low-stakes, take-it- or leave-it, ‘mindless’ method. Empirical results support the hypothesis that charities of lower quality are more likely to adopt the mindless fundraising method. Even so, consumers still choose to give in the equilibrium, due to the small requested amount of mindless donations, which disincentivizes serious thinking by consumers. The mindless method, along with purpose uncertainty, has the potential to alleviate the free-riding problem that is characteristic of public good provision and is, therefore, welfare improving.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited

Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making others' behaviour a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without actually deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable for most economics experiments, and works by a modification of an already standard device, the Random Lottery incentive system. The deceptive scenarios of designs which use deceit are replaced with fictitious scenarios, each of which, from a subject's viewpoint, has a chance of being true. The design is implemented in a sequential play public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more sensitive to freeriding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that subjects are at least as cooperative when uninformed about others' behaviour as they are if reacting to high contributions. No deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous play is found to be more efficient than sequential play, and subjects contribute less at the end of a sequence than at the start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.     

Reciprocity and Social Order: What Do Experiments Tell us About the Failure of Economic Growth?

This paper makes three observations for policy-makers, interested in promoting economic growth, based on the experimental work done at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science. First, safeguards must be put into place to protect impersonal exchange from our innate desire for personal exchange. Second, policy must take into account the heterogeneity of individual cognitive strategies that are observed in economics laboratories. Third, policy must be test-bedded in economic experiments where the status quo is modeled as an ecologically rational response to the economic environment and the proposed policy change occurs in an environment where individuals have access to a full repertoire of personal exchange behaviors.JEL classification: C93     

Testing for the Presence of a Tremble in Economic Experiments

The classical trinity of tests is used to check for the presence of a tremble in economic experiments in which the response variable is binary. A tremble is said to occur when an agent makes a decision completely at random, without regard to the values taken by the explanatory variables. The properties of the tests are discussed, and an extension of the methodology is used to test for the presence of a tremble in binary panel data from a well-known economic experiment.     

产业结构生态化的有效实现途径——基于一个博弈模型

目前,我国正处于工业化中期阶段,重工业的产值比重占整个GDP的比重高达70%,中技术产业的增长率超过了高技术产业。这样的产业结构无疑会对我国的能源消耗和生态环境造成巨大的负面影响。如何破解实现工业化与我国所拥有的自然资源存量之间的矛盾;以及在资源环境越来越成为经济发展硬约束的情况下,如何解决严重的环境污染问题、降低污染治理成本,成为当前我国经济发展不可逾越的课题。文章提出了产业结构生态化的概念,并通过构建博弈模型,揭示了要建立长期稳定的生态产业链需要产业链中上下游企业、政府以及社会大众的共同努力。其中政府的作用主要在于通过制订相关激励措施,改变企业面临的生产和消费环境,引导企业主动将生态成本内部化,实现废弃物资源化和循环再利用。