Decision-making Criteria for Purchasing Milk Quota at the Individual Farm Level: Reply

Careful perusal of the comment by Barichello suggests that there are no substantive criticisms of the issues raised in our original paper. At the same time, it is apparent that there is some misinterpretation of the models that we used, and of the assumptions underlying the models. For example, the optimality criterion that marginal cost equals marginal revenue in the earlier models is important in determining whether profits in the enterprise can be increased or decreased. However, the difference between average total costs and average revenue is important in determining the levels of profits and hence the potential rents involved.     

Decision-making Criteria for Purchasing Milk Quota at the Individual Farm Level: A Comment

In a recent article in this journal, Stonehouse and MacGregor outlined several elements of the farm level decision to purchase milk quota. They provide a useful reminder that, because quota is an asset, decisions regarding its purchase or sale should be undertaken and analyzed with capital budgeting techniques. More specifically, they describe procedures for calculating the net flow return from additional quota under different cost circumstances and the subsequent bid price which that farm could pay for the quota asset. It is the purpose of this comment to show that errors of both commission and omission have found their way into the paper. In addition, there is a problem of inconsistency because the text and the actual calculation formulae are sometimes contradictory.     

Interprovincial Reallocation of Market Sharing Quota for Industrial Milk

This paper examines allocations of industrial milk quota across provinces in Canada under two hypothetical scenarios. The study focuses on the case where considerable reallocation of production occurs across farms and provinces due to changes in the distribution of quota holdings. The allocations are determined using linear programming (LP) analysis, where the objective of the optimization problem is to minimize the delivered cost of products such as cheese, butter, ice cream, and yogurt. The LP model seeks to meet provincial targets for domestic disappearance on a milk-equivalent basis in the short to medium term, where limits are imposed on the maximum achievable growth of production and processing capacity in any one I he conclusions are that reallocation of existing quota across farms and provinces has a potential to reduce considerably the costs of industrial milk production and the cost of transporting manufactured products.     

Improving Food Safety at the Dairy Farm Level: Farmers' and Experts' Perceptions

This study examines farmers' and experts' perceptions of important action points for improving food safety on the dairy farm. Adaptive conjoint analysis is used to elicit these perceptions. A comparison on the basis of professional background (farmers versus experts) shows no major differences in the perceptions regarding chemical and microbiological hazards. Two-stage cluster analysis of individual perceptions regarding chemical and microbiological hazards results in four and three distinct groups, respectively. Although results indicate a rather good level of farmers' knowledge of most important action points, the findings can be used to modify current education programs aimed at improving farm-level food safety.     

The Simple Analytics of Transferable Production Quota: Implications for the Marginal Cost of Ontario Milk Production

Using a competitive dynamic optimization model, the difference between unused and used industrial milk quota values is shown to give an exact measure of the annual rental rate of production quota. Knowledge of the rental rate of production quota and output price can be used to impute the marginal cost of industrial milk production. However, if there is a transfer tax on production quota sales, the imputation of the equilibrium rental value of quota depends on the elasticity of demand and supply for quota as well as the level of the transfer assessment. The marginal cost of Ontario milk production is estimated for each year from 1980–81 to 1994–95, based on unused and used quota values. However, the imputed marginal cost estimates are not totally satisfactory. The results suggest that caution should be exercised in using the difference between unused and used quota prices as a measure of the rental rate of industrial milk production quota.     

Individual Vessel Quota Price-induced Effects for Canadian Pacific Halibut: Before and After Alaska IFQs

Two significant management changes have affected the British Columbia Pacific halibut fishery. The first was the implementation of the British Columbia individual vessel quota (IVQ) program in 1991, which tended to increase ex vessel prices. The second was Alaska's decision to follow its own individual fishery quota program in 1995, which tended to decrease British Columbia ex vessel prices. In a previous journal paper, the market driven ex vessel price increases for the British Columbia IVQ halibut fishery was estimated for 1991–1994. This paper examines the price‐ induced effects from 1995 to 1998 and quantifies how much of the previous price‐induced IVQ increases remained after Alaska went to IFQs. Results indicate that approximately one‐half of the price advantages of the British Columbia IVQ system was lost after Alaska went to the IFQs. However, a substantial revenue advantage remains, with the revenues estimated to have been $16.1 million higher during 1995–98 than would have occurred if both the British Columbia and Alaska had not put the individual quota programs into place. This brings the estimated total eight‐year British Columbia Pacific halibut revenue increase due to IVQs at $39.5 million. Deux grands changements de gestion ont bouleversé le secteur de la pêche du flétan du Pacifique en Colombie‐Britannique. Le premier a été la mise en place, en 1991, du contingent individuel de prises par vaisseau (IVQ) qui a eu pour effet général d'accroître les prix du poisson au débarquement. Le deuxième a été l‘adoption par l'Alaska en 1995 de son propre programme de contingent individuel de pêche, qui a eu en général un effet négatif sur les prix des poissons débarqués en Colombie‐ Britannique. L'avantage du programme IVQ était qu'il permettait de mettre en marché un produit de meilleure qualité durant la presque totalité de l'année. Dans un article précédent, nous examinions les effets des prix résultant du programme IVQ pour les années 1991 à 1994. Nous examinons id les effets pour les années 1995 à 1998 et nous quantifions la pan des accroissements d'IVQ générés par les prix qui subsistait après que l'Alaska ait adopte son propre régime. Il semble qu'approximativement la moitié de l‘avantage de prix obtenu par le régime IVQ de la Colombie‐Britannique ait été perdue avec l'entrée en application du régime de l'Alaska. Il reste encore, cependant, des avantages subtantiels, comme en fait foi le niveau plus élevé des revenus de la pêche du flétan, qui ont été de 16,1 millions de dollars canadiens plus élevés dans la période 1995–1998 que si aucun des deux regimes de contingentement n'avait pas été mis en place. L'accroissement global pour la Colombie‐Britannique des recettes tirées de la pêche du flétan du Pacifique depuis l'adoption du IVQ en 1991 s'établit donc à 39,5 millions de dollars canadiens.     

New Futures Markets in Agricultural Production Rights: Possibilities and Constraints for the British and Dutch Milk Quota Markets

Farms are increasingly being affected by policies that involve production rights. Because of fluctuations in the prices of these rights in the spot market, farmers face a price risk. Establishing a futures market might enable them to hedge against this price risk. Rights futures have some features that differ from those of traditional commodity futures. This makes them an effective and efficient tool for managing price risk. The implications of these findings will be illustrated for milk quotas in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Prior conditions which might make a futures market for milk quotas successful in both countries will be deduced.     

努力提高收购资金封闭管理水平

今年是国家实施“十五”计划的开局之年,也是农发行实施五年改革和发展规划的起步之年。在刚刚结束的中国农业发展银行分行党委书记、行长会议上,总行党委书记、行长何林祥同志,在客观总结2000年工作、全面分析当前形势的基础上,提出了认真执行政策、从严监管企业、严格规范管理、切实防范风险、努力提高收购资金封闭管理水平的总体工作要求,明确了今年的五项重点工作任务和六项主要工作目标。要求全行干部职工在加快市场化改革后防止放松管理、单纯追求贷款规模扩张和对封闭管理工作估计过高、盲目乐观的三种倾向,进一步坚定信心,克服困难,迎接挑战,做好工作。要积极探索市场经济条件下做好政策性信     

Economics of Quota Allocation Within Supply Managemnt Analysis of the Present Procedures for Quota Allocation

The institution of supply management has evolved to deal with a farm income problem and to achieve social objectives such as the maintenance of the family farm. In many respects, the institutions have developed in response to significant technological and market development that had potentially profound impacts on the number, size and profitability of farm operations. Supply management has proven successful in transfer— ring income, partially stabilizing prices and production and arresting the spread of vertical integration and maintaining the "family farm." Although the institution has had its failures, more specifically, income transfers have been capitalized into asset values. Second generation farmers will face higher costs and will benefit only if they too can "short the market" and extract monopoly profits from the marketplace. Further, the rigidities in quota allocation methods have inhibited resource allocation, necessary structural adjustments and imposed real costs to consumers. These negative results are incongruent to an otherwise viable and dynamic Canadian agriculture.
Is It North It
One may argue that the consequences of regulation, which are reduced efficiency/competitiveness and lost opportunities, are acceptable if it is felt a transfer of benefits to a disadvantaged group of society is needed. However, can it be held that those farmers operating under supply management remain disadvantaged? If not, regulatory reform and/or adjustments are needed. Otherwise, the tendency towards deregulation in the general economy, widening price gaps, consumer resistance, and the like will lead to imposed changes by regulatory authorities.
Supply management is an acceptable regulatory tool that should be employed to achieve a myriad of policy objectives.     

Capitalization of Farm Policy Benefits and the Rate of Return to Policy-Created Assets: Evidence from California Dairy Quota

The rate of return to ownership of California dairy quota is about 27% per year—well above that of typical financial assets, but in line with other measured returns to agricultural quotas. Ownership of dairy quota does not contribute positively to total variation of typical portfolios, including those of dairy farm assets, and so contributes little or no portfolio risk. A plausible alternative hypothesis for the high rate of return is that quota owners see significant risk of policy change that would reduce future quota values. That is, they face default risk in quota ownership.     

地方政府土地管理绩效评价方法研究

研究目的：探讨地方政府土地管理绩效评价方法。研究方法：理论分析与实证分析相结合。研究结果：提出了地方政府土地管理绩效评价方法,建立了一套地方政府土地管理绩效评价指标体系,提出了等权法和基于内容分析法的评价指标赋权方法,并根据公开途径数据可得性,评价了2008年省级政府土地管理绩效。研究结论：所建立土地管理绩效评价指标体系合理和可行,评价方法科学,目前中国地方政府土地管理水平还处于中等及中等以下水平。     

中国农村乡镇机构改革研究

本文通过分析中国农村乡镇机构现状,指出了乡镇机构改革中存在的问题,提出乡镇机构改革分两步走的设想:先用3～5年时间转变职能,再用3～5年时间取消乡镇政府,改设乡镇公所。     

中国农业发展银行确定2002棉花年度标准级皮棉收购贷款最高限额为390元/担

中国农业发展银行日前发出紧急通知,经国家批准,2002棉花年度标准级皮棉收购贷款最高限额确定为390元/担。通知规定,2002棉花年度标准级皮棉收购贷款基准为380元/担(新疆棉为360元/担),允许在此基础上上下浮动10元/担。收购期间,农发行总行将按旬通报全国标准级皮棉贷款收购的平均价,作为下一旬新的贷款基准。农发行各分支机构     

Farm Level Supply of Short Rotation Woody Crops: Economic Assessment in the Long‐Term for Household Farming Systems

In this paper, we propose an analysis and modeling of farmers’ decision to convert a part of their annual crops area into woody crops: short rotation coppices (SRCs). Different criteria—technical, economic, and financial—are highlighted in the farmers’ decision to adopt this production. A farm‐level model is proposed and incorporates these decision criteria. The objective is to test several incentive scenarios to encourage risk‐averse cereal farmers to plant trees. A multiperiod model of investment is built and tests possible adoption by farmers based on financial and structural parameters and according to the outlook of agricultural markets. The simulations show that if the cash crop prices fluctuate in the future and if farmers are risk averse the strategy of on‐farm diversification toward woody crops under contractual arrangements could be relevant for farmers to mitigate the risks in the long run. Cet article présente une analyse et une modélisation de la décision d’un agriculteur céréalier qui souhaite convertir une partie de sa surface en grande culture en Taillis à Courte Rotation (TCR). Un modèle multi‐périodique d’investissement est construit et incorpore différents critères techniques, économiques et financiers qui entrent dans la décision d’adopter ces nouvelles cultures pérennes. Le modèle permet de tester le rôle de différents types de soutiens, proposés aujourd’hui dans le cadre de la Politique Agricole Commune européenne, permettant d’encourager les agriculteurs averses au risque à planter des arbres. Les simulations montrent que si les prix des grandes cultures annuelles fluctuent à l’avenir, si la plantation d’arbres est soutenue et si les agriculteurs sont averses au risque, la stratégie de se diversifier vers la plantation d’arbres à croissance rapide, sous contrat, peut permettre d’atténuer le risque à long terme.     

省级粮食储备管理体制改革研究

“入世”已成现实,粮食购销市场化势在必行,与此相应,必须用新思路,新方法改革省级储备粮管理体制,使之规模适中,布局合理;市场取向,优化结构;引入竞争机制,实现制度创新,屏障粮食安全;呈现出制度创新与技术创新相结合,计划与市场相结合,现货交易与期货交易相结合,粮食内外贸相结合的新局面,改变传统体制下“活粮死储”的僵化办法,实现储备粮在保质,保量前提下的低成本轮换更新,趋于保值;或通过参与进出口贸易有所升值,以稳定和减少财政补贴。     

论渔业自然资源特性对ITQ制度交易成本的影响

本文在阐述我国海洋捕捞渔业自然资源特性的基础上,通过剖析它对个体可转让配额制度交易成本的影响,提出相应建议:我国单一鱼种产量低的特征会使得渔民在遵守该制度时的守法者成本上升;海洋生物组成复杂多样的特征会使当局确定总可捕量的信息搜寻成本、分配配额的决策成本和执行成本上升,会使渔民因兼捕性增强而需要为完成交易多付固定交易成本、信息搜寻成本和讨价还价成本;资源的地域差异性较大一方面将增加专用资产的投资而增加交易成本,另一方面将降低区域间配额分配难度而降低交易成本;海域的宽阔和海岸带广延性将导致当局的监督成本增加.     

A Market-Forces Policy for the New Farm Economy?

This paper first discusses the changes that are bringing about the New Farm Economy. A wave of consolidation has shifted agricultural production to larger, lower cost producers in almost all sectors of agriculture. At the same time, supply chains represent a new form of ownership and control that is replacing commodity markets as the preferred way to market farm output. Both consolidation and the development of supply chains offer the possibility of producing a greater variety of safer, cheaper food. The paper argues that farm policy, crafted for the agriculture of the 1930s, is no longer necessary to raise or stabilize farm incomes, and is largely ineffective anyway. Moreover, farm policy impedes the market forces driving innovation and efficiency in the farm economy. Letting market forces guide the evolution of the farm economy, unfettered by outdated government programs and unnecessary farm subsidies, is the best way to harness the benefits of the New Farm Economy. Getting rid of government subsidies and control will lead to dramatically fewer farmers in agriculture: a policy to deal explicitly with those who will leave agriculture is needed. A transition policy is described that focuses on helping reduce the number of farmers by offering a buyout to farm producers which subsidizes their exit from farming and prevents reentry.