Dynamics and comparative statics in the theory of residential location

This paper introduces a dynamic adjustment mechanism of residential boundaries among a finite number of household classes in a circular city model. First we derive some meaningful conditions for all the residential boundaries to be locally stable. Then, assuming that the stability conditions are satisfied, we examine the comparative static properties of equilibrium boundary positions, e.g., the effects of changes in a land tax, an income subsidy, the number of households, etc.     

Aggregate comparative statics

In aggregative games, each playerʼs payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players. Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. This paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games. We focus on two classes of games: (1) aggregative games with strategic substitutes and (2) nice aggregative games, where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies. We provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate. The results are illustrated with applications to public good provision, contests, Cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly.     

Welfare variations and the comparative statics of demand

By employing order-theoretic comparative statics, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the direct utility function (alternatively, on the indirect utility function) to guarantee that the compensating and equivalent variations are monotonically increasing in income. We also show that these conditions are sufficient to guarantee normal demand. Our results do not depend on the smoothness or strict quasiconcavity of the utility function, and can be extended to a setting with non-linear prices.     

Strong comparative statics of equilibria

Some results in the monotone comparative statics literature tell us that if a parameter increases, some old equilibria are smaller than some new equilibria. We give a sufficient condition such that at a new parameter value every old equilibrium is smaller than every new equilibrium. We also adapt a standard algorithm to compute a minimal such newer parameter value and apply this algorithm to a game of network externalities. Our results are independent of a theory of equilibrium selection and are valid for games of strategic complementarities.     

Weak and strong monotone comparative statics

Summary This paper develops necessary and sufficient conditions for the set of solutions to an optimization problem to be nondecreasing in a weak sense still strong enough to guarantee the existence of an increasing selection, and thus strong enough to guarantee monotonicity when the solution is unique, as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for the set of optimizers to be nondecreasing in a strong sense which is strong enough to rule out the possibility of a decreasing selection. These necessary and sufficient conditions are variations of quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property introduced in Milgrom-Shannon [13]. Moreover, to determine when an objective function satisfies these conditions, this paper develops several characterizations of quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property and their variants, both in terms of differential conditions and in terms of restrictions on the structure of the level sets of these functions. Several examples are given to choice theory under loss aversion and to an auction problem.I am grateful to Don Brown and Paul Milgrom for numerous helpful conversations concerning earlier versions of this paper. This paper is a revised and expanded version of the paper An Ordinal Theory of Games with Strategic Complementarities (Shannon [15]). I am pleased to acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation, and an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship.     

Topics in nonparametric comparative statics and stability

This paper presents the analysis of the Jacobian matrix of a small, macroeconomic model to determine the robustness of the model's comparative statics. The values of the model's coefficients are assessed with respect to seven alternative estimation strategies such as ordinary least squares or two-stage least squares. For each alternative version, the invertibility and stability of the Jacobian matrix is studied. The model is robust to the degree that these characteristics are shared by any matrix with the same sign pattern or other similar nonparametric conditions on its entries. One way to address the relative success of the different estimation strategies is through the robustness of the comparative statics of the resulting model.     

Necessary conditions for comparative statics under uncertainty

We investigate the comparative static properties of three classes of CDF changes: first and second degree stochastic dominant shifts, and mean preserving contractions. For each class, we provide conditions that are necessary and sufficient for a dominating shift to cause an unambiguous change in the choice variable. This allows us to see the trade-offs one must make between restrictions on preferences and CDF changes to obtain interesting comparative statics results. We then investigate the implications of our results for the two-period consumption-savings models and for distinguishing agents that do and do not obey the expected utility hypothesis.     

A note on comparative statics and dynamics of stationary states

Certain results are communicated regarding effects of parameter changes, when the stationary state is stable, on the stationary state and an optimal paths in its neighbourhood in discrete time multi-sectoral optimal growth models where period utilities are discounted.     

Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market

Flexible firms compete by means of wages in the Assignment market while rigid firms have no flexibility over terms of appointment in the Marriage market. Workers trade with both kinds of firms in the hybrid market.Examples show that standard results that characterize the core of the Marriage market (respectively, Assignment market) are not robust to the entrance of flexible (respectively, rigid) firms to this market. A new algebraic structure provides a different characterization for the core of the hybrid model and reflects a sort of robustness to the exit of rigid (respectively, flexible) firms from this market. Meaningful comparative static results are derived.     

A program for algebraic and qualitative comparative statics and stability analysis

This paper presents a computer program designed by the author which determines algebraically and qualitatively both short- and long-run comparative statics multipliers for standard linear or linearized economic models. When the model is dynamic, i.e., when it involves linear of linearized differential equations, the program also provides the algebraic expressions and the qualitative signs for the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial.     

A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments

The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative statics results for (i) the Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff functions, (ii) the quantal response equilibrium, (iii) level-k reasoning. I also relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection concepts.     

Uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a tariff retaliation model

This paper considers uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium of a tariff retaliation model. The approach to the problem is geometrical and reminiscent of the analysis for the free trade competitive equilibrium. If the countries have constant elasticity of substitution utility functions, some simple conditions can be used to prove uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the tariff retaliation game. The welfare effects of endowment changes are analyzed in terms of the standard terms of trade and volume of trade effects. If the elasticity of substitution of one of the countries is sufficiently high, immiserizing growth will not occur.      

Existence,uniqueness and some comparative statics for ratio and Lindahl equilibria

We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public good model. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public good model, lends itself to a transparent geometric representation. Moreover, it can handle the more general concept of the cost share or ratio equilibrium. Finally, we indicate how it may be exploited to facilitate comparative static analysis of Lindahl and cost share equilibria.      

Disaggregation of excess demand and comparative statics with incomplete markets and nominal assets

Summary. We prove that locally, Walras' law and homogeneity characterize the structure of market excess demand functions when financial markets are incomplete and assets' returns are nominal. The method of proof is substantially different from all existing arguments as the properties of individual demand are also different. We show that this result has important implications and is part of a more general result that excess demand is an essentially arbitrary function not just of prices, but also of the exogenous parameters of the economy as asset returns, preferences, and endowments. Thus locally the equilibrium manifold, relating equilibrium prices to these parameters has also no structure. Received: September 17, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1997     

Fixed-price equilibria in a two-country model of trade: Existence and comparative statics

The Barro-Grossman-Malinvaud model of fixed-price equilibrium is extended to a two-country model of trade with a fixed exchange rate. There are various possible types of fixed-price equilibria for the international economy, depending on the structure of rationing. The existence and uniqueness of one type of fixed-price equilibrium are proved. Indeed the extension of ‘the simple macroeconomic model’ to a two-country economy allows a new treatment of the problem of uniqueness of the type of fixed-price equilibrium. At last, some comparative statics results are derived. Among others the model allows to meet on new grounds (i.e., with some microfoundations) some well known results of the conventional Keynesian approach. But much more general results can be derived, applying to a class of market states not already dealt with in international-trade theory.