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1.
Empirical evidence suggests that prices do not always reflect fundamental values and individual behavior is often inconsistent with rational expectations theory. We report the results of fourteen experimental asset markets designed to examine whether the interactive effect of subject pool and design experience (i.e., previous experience in a market under identical conditions) tempers price bubbles and improves forecasting ability. Our main findings are: 1) price run-ups are modest and dissipate quickly when traders are knowledgeable about financial markets and have participated in a previous market under identical conditions; 2) price bubbles moderate quickly when only a subset of traders are knowledgeable and experienced; 3) the heterogeneity of expectations about price changes is smaller in markets with knowledgeable and experienced traders, even if such traders only represent a subset of the market; and 4) individual forecasts of prices are not consistent with the predictions of the rational expectations model in any market, although absolute forecast errors are smaller for subjects who are knowledgeable of financial markets and for those subjects who have participated in a previous market. In sum, our findings suggest that markets populated by at least a subset of knowledgeable and experienced traders behave rationally, even though average individual behavior can be characterized as irrational.  相似文献   

2.
A rational expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price—contrary to a wide-held conjecture. Whereas a continuum of investors is inconsistent with fully revealing equilibrium, finitely many investors with average portfolios demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size in an additive signal-return model. More information diminishes the expected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off. Under fully revealing price, information market equilibria both with and without information acquisition are Pareto efficient.  相似文献   

3.
过度自信、流动性和资产定价   总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5  
本文研究了过度自信的投资者在一个多阶段金融市场中是如何影响均衡价格和投资者要求的期望收益的.结论表明,由于投资者过度自信,容易低估风险,从而在一段时期内会使得价格急剧上升.投资者人数实际上是股票市场流动性的一个表征,我们的结论表明,由于过度自信的投资者的存在,他们实际上充当了流动性提供者的角色,从而使得一段时期内即使对理性投资者来说,依然导致了风险的暂时降低,他们也会接受比较高的资产价格,要求相对比较低的期望收益.  相似文献   

4.
This paper characterizes the market data which, if observed by traders in a stochastic exchange environment, will permit the general existence of (rational) expectations equilibria. It is proved that if a trader observes and conditions his expectations on some nonconstant market data, he must observe at least the equilibrium price and his own equilibrium trade. Any data which do not satisfy this requirement, such as the price alone, or the price and the volume of trade, will fail to permit the existence of an expectations equilibrium for some otherwise well-behaved stochastic environment.  相似文献   

5.
Laboratory asset markets provide an experimental setting in which to observe investor behavior. Over more than a decade, numerous studies have found that participants in laboratory experiments frequently drive asset prices far above fundamental value, after which the prices crash. This bubble-and-crash behavior is robust to variations in a number of variables, including liquidity (the amount of cash available relative to the value of the assets being traded), short-selling, certainty or uncertainty of dividend payments, brokerage fees, capital gains taxes, buying on margin, and others.

This paper attempts to model the behavior of asset prices in experimental settings by proposing a "momentum model" of asset price changes. The model assumes that investors follow a combination of two factors when setting prices: fundamental value, and the recent price trend. The predictions of the model, while still far from perfect, are superior to those of a rational expectations model, in which traders consider only fundamental value. In particular, the momentum model predicts that higher levels of liquidity lead to larger price bubbles, a result that is confirmed in the experiments. The similarity between laboratory results and data from field (real-world) markets suggests that the momentum model may be applicable there as well.  相似文献   

6.
In any voluntary trading process, if agents have rational expectations, then it is common knowledge among them that the equilibrium trade is feasible and individually rational. This condition is used to show that when risk-averse traders begin at a Pareto optimal allocation (relative to their prior beliefs) and then receive private information (which disturbs the marginal conditions), they can still never agree to any non-null trade. On markets, information is revealed by price changes. An equilibrium with fully revealing price changes always exists, and even at other equilibria the information revealed by price changes “swamps” each trader's private information.  相似文献   

7.
农产品期货市场套利并不充分,交易者也不是完全理性的。本文假设农产品期货市场有限套利、交易者异质信念并遵循“经验法则”预期,构建了农产品期货投机均衡定价模型,并认为集中竞价规则下产生的农产品期货价格是由交易者的预期决定的;前期期货价格水平、现货价格和前期期货价格的变动趋势、不同类型交易者的比例结构及其预期模式共同影响农产品期货价格的形成与波动;基本分析法交易者占主导地位的农产品期货市场具有更高的套期保值与价格发现效率。针对中国七种主要农产品期货的实证结果显示,农产品期货投机均衡定价模型对解释中国农产品期货价格的形成与波动是有效的。这意味着在期货行情系统中实时披露现货价格信息,培育和引导交易者运用基本分析法预测期货价格走势,有助于提升农产品期货市场的效率。  相似文献   

8.
We present a dynamic asset pricing model that incorporates investor sentiment, bounded rationality and higher-order expectations to study how these factors affect asset pricing equilibrium. In the model, we utilize a two-period trading market and investors make decisions based on the heterogeneous expectations principle and the “sparsity-based bounded rational” sentiment. We find that bounded rationality results in mispricing and reduces it in next period. Investor sentiment produces more significant effects than private signals, optimistic investor sentiment increases hedging demand, thus causing prices to soar. Higher-order investors are more rational and attentive to the strategies of other participants rather than private signals. This model also derives the dampening effect of higher-order expectations to price volatility and the heterogeneity expectation depicts inconsistent investor behavior in financial markets. In the model, investors' expectations about future price is distorted by their sentiment and bounded rationality, so they obtain a biased mean from the signal extraction.  相似文献   

9.
Will traders in a risky asset market learn Muthian expectations when they initially lack the necessary information? If some traders learn from their observations, will market dynamics depend only on “fundamentals,” as implied by the Efficient Market Hypothesis? This paper shows that at any finite point in time the answer to these questions is “no”. The context is a constant absolute risk aversion model with two kinds of traders and asymmetric information. The market converges asymptotically to a rational expectations equilibrium where prices depend only on fundamentals and the market is efficient.  相似文献   

10.
Do physically deliverable futures contracts induce liquidity pressure in the underlying spot market? The answer is believed to be no since the asset is delivered sometimes after the expiration of the contract so that the futures trader's payoff does not clearly depend on the price of the underlying stock at expiration. We construct a rational expectations equilibrium model in which a strategic uninformed trader induces liquidity pressure in the underlying spot market at the expiration of a physically deliverable futures contract. Liquidity pressure is the result of a pure informational advantage: if it is known that futures traders hedge their position in the spot market then a strategic trader with no information about the fundamental value of the underlying has an incentive to create noise in the futures market in order to gain information on the composition of the spot order flow at future auctions. We show that informed traders benefit from this form of strategic noise and that the efficiency of the prices remains unaffected.  相似文献   

11.
In an experimental setting in which investors can entrust their money to traders, we investigate how compensation schemes affect liquidity provision and asset prices, two outcomes that are important for financial stability. Compensation schemes can drive a wedge between how investors and traders value the asset. Limited liability makes traders value the asset more than investors. To limit losses, investors should thus restrict liquidity provision to force traders to trade at a lower price. By contrast, bonus caps make traders value the asset less than investors. This should encourage liquidity provision and increase prices. In contrast to these predictions, we find that under limited liability investors increase liquidity provision and asset price bubbles are larger. Bonus caps have no clear effect on liquidity provision and they fail to tame bubbles. Overall, giving traders skin in the game fosters financial stability.  相似文献   

12.
Summary. We examine price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information, an infinite number of risk neutral traders and no noise traders. Here we re-examine four results associated with rational expectations models relating to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium prices, the advantage of becoming informed, the costly acquisition of information, and the impossibility of having equilibrium prices with higher volatility than the underlying fundamentals. Received: August 27, 1997; revised version: February 11, 1998  相似文献   

13.
Accommodating asymmetric information in a dynamic asset pricing model is technically challenging due to the problems associated with higher-order expectations. That is, rational investors are forced into a situation where they must forecast the forecasts of other agents. In a dynamic setting, this problem telescopes into the infinite future and the dimension of the relevant state space approaches infinity. By using the frequency domain approach of Whiteman [Linear Rational Expectations Models: A User's Guide, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983] and Kasa [Forecasting the forecasts of others in the frequency domain, Rev. Econ. Dynam. 3 (2000) 726-756], this paper demonstrates how information structures previously believed to preserve asymmetric information in equilibrium, converge to a symmetric information, rational expectations equilibrium. The revealing aspect of the price process lies in the invertibility of the observed state space, which makes it possible for agents to infer the economically fundamental shocks and thus eliminating the need to forecast the forecasts of others.  相似文献   

14.
We present an asset pricing model with investor sentiment and information, which shows that the investor sentiment has a systematic and significant impact on the asset price. The equilibrium price's rational term drives the asset price to the rational, and the sentiment term leads to the asset price deviating from it. In our model, the proportion of sentiment investors and the information quality could amplify the sentiment shock on the asset price. Finally, the information is fully incorporated into prices when sentiment investors learn from prices. The model could offer a partial explanation of some financial anomalies: price bubbles, high volatility, asset prices' momentum effect and reversal effect.  相似文献   

15.
Nonrevealing fully rational expectations approximate equilibria exist in microeconomic pure exchange economies in which uninformed agents have suitably dispersed noisy price observations. Such traders maximize a state-dependent expected utility conditional on the price vector they observe, the distributions of noisy price observations, and the correct equilibrium relationship between states of the world and prices. In equilibrium, aggregate excess demand is small with high probability in every state of the world (and its expectation is also small); this magnitude diminishes as the noisy price observations become more accurate. Equilibria are obtained by applying a fixed point argument to state-dependent excess demand functions which are smooth because of the noisy price observations.  相似文献   

16.
This paper is devoted to the question of whether traders can learn rational expectations from repeated observations of market data in a stationary environment with finitely many exogenous states of the world. The learning problem is placed in the context of an iterative adjustment process which achieves equilibrium if traders have rational expectations. The main result is that even if traders begin with no knowledge of their environment, there exists an estimation procedure which converges to rational expectations when the environment satisfies a certain regularity condition. The regularity condition is shown to be generic.  相似文献   

17.
We study the extent to which self-referential adaptive learning can explain stylized asset pricing facts in a general equilibrium framework. In particular, we analyze the effects of recursive least squares and constant gain algorithms in a production economy and a Lucas type endowment economy. We find that (a) recursive least squares learning has almost no effects on asset price behavior, since the algorithm converges relatively fast to rational expectations, (b) constant gain learning may contribute towards explaining the stock price and return volatility as well as the predictability of excess returns in the endowment economy but (c) in the production economy the effects of constant gain learning are mitigated by the persistence induced by capital accumulation. We conclude that in the context of these two commonly used models, standard linear self-referential learning does not resolve the asset pricing puzzles observed in the data.  相似文献   

18.
19.
We analyze the existence of equilibrium in an asset market under asymmetric information. Price formation is modeled as a bilateral sealed bid auction where uninformed and informed traders submit limit orders to a computerized specialist. The computerized specialist is programmed to sell to the highest bidder and buy from the seller asking the lowest price. We show that this mechanism — which is designed to model the Globex and RAES trading institutions used in Chicago, London, New York, Paris, and Germany — yields an equilibrium in which the bid-ask spread is endogenously random and the passive specialist earns nonnegative profits.  相似文献   

20.
The purpose of this paper is to show how modern techniques of Temporary competitive equilibrium analysis can be applied to models of the “pure consumption loan model” type. One considers Samuelson's simplest model where traders live two periods and where money is the only store of value. It is proved that a temporary equilibrium exists if price expectations are sufficiently independent of current prices. A stationary market equilibrium is shown to exist if there is a set of traders (i) whose total resources are greater when they are young than when they are old, (ii) who are indifferent between present and future consumption. It is proved that this existence theorem still holds if the economy is sufficiently “close” to an economy which has this property. A stationary market equilibrium is shown to be Pareto optimal if all traders hold positive cash balances. It may be inefficient if this condition is not satisfied, for some traders may then be willing to borrow, which they cannot do in this model.  相似文献   

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