关系型借贷与中小企业融资的实证分析

本文通过一个计量经济学模型来检验企业贷款是否存在关系型借贷，结果发现：大型企业的确存在关系型借贷行为，且对企业的贷款量有显著性影响；中小企业关系型借贷对于贷款量的影响较小，且并不明显。原因可能是商业银行在审批中小企业贷款时，注重对“硬”信息的考察，同时中小企业并没有同某一家或几家商业银行保持长期关系。为改善中小企业融资状况，商业银行应建立起一套完整的信用记录体系，并实现信息共享，在贷款过程中增强对“软”信息的考察，积极培育一批资质较好的中小企业客户并建立密切的联系；中小企业则应该规范财务制度并增强财务信息的透明度，同银行建立长期关系。     

浅谈利率市场化背景下中小企业融资中的关系型借贷

中小企业发展对国民经济总体发展起到至关重要的作用,但融资困难一直是制约中小企业发展的绊脚石,关系型借贷应运而生。本文从现有的对关系型借贷与中小企业融资的研究成果出发,分析了这种新型借贷模式的优势和实施关系型借贷的基础条件,并对我国在利率市场化背景下发展中小企业关系型借贷的一些不足提出了相关的建议。     

发展福建省中小企业关系型借贷探索

中小企业已成为改革开放以来福建省国民经济发展的支柱之一,在扩大就业、活跃城乡经济、维护社会稳定等方面发挥着积极作用。然而,目前中小企业资金短缺问题严重困扰并制约其进一步发展。造成中小企业融资难的主要原因在于信息不对称,而关系型借贷能够较好地解决银企之间的信息不对称,提高融资效率,是中小企业摆脱融资困境的有效途径。本文拟结合中国发展关系型借贷的本土特征以及福建经济发展的实际情况,对充分发挥关系型借贷的作用,促进福建省中小企业的发展进行探讨。     

关系型借贷与中小企业融资的实证分析

本文通过一个计量经济学模型来检验企业贷款是否存在关系型借贷,结果发现:大型企业的确存在关系型借贷行为,且对企业的贷款量有显著性影响;中小企业关系型借贷对于贷款量的影响较小,且并不明显。原因可能是商业银行在审批中小企业贷款时,注重对“硬”信息的考察,同时中小企业并没有同某一家或几家商业银行保持长期关系。为改善中小企业融资状况,商业银行应建立起一套完整的信用记录体系,并实现信息共享,在贷款过程中增强对“软”信息的考察,积极培育一批资质较好的中小企业客户并建立密切的联系;中小企业则应该规范财务制度并增强财务信息的透明度,同银行建立长期关系。     

关系型借贷对中小企业融资成本的影响——基于广西中小企业调查的实证研究

文章在研究关系型借贷理论的基础上,分析了中小企业的关系型借贷与融资成本之间的关系,通过构建计量经济模型实证研究了合作的银行数量、银企合作时间、企业的人情消费和银企关系的满意度等因素对中小企业融资成本的影响.研究发现：银企关系的满意度和企业销售额与贷款利率呈显著的负相关关系;银企合作时间等其他因素符合假设但并不显著.最后,从企业、银行和政府的角度,提出了降低中小企业融资成本的相关政策建议.     

发展中小企业关系型借贷的探索

中小企业在改革开放后已成为福建经济发展的支柱之一,但资金短缺问题始终困扰和制约其进一步发展。本文认为,造成中小企业融资难的关键因素在于信息不对称,而关系型借贷能够较好地解决这一问题。文章结合中国发展关系型借贷的本土特征以及福建经济发展的实际情况,对如何发挥关系型借贷的作用、促进福建中小企业的发展进行了探讨。     

基于关系型借贷的小企业融资研究

与大型企业相比,小企业创业时间短、缺乏历史信用记录、其财务经营状况和未来发展前景不易判断。关系型借贷实质上是银行和企业为克服金融交易中的市场失效而共同构建的一种制度安排。     

关系型贷款与中小企业融资

本文认为中小企业融资难的根本原因在于其信息的不可得性和不可控性。文章简要介绍了国外银行开发的多种形式的贷款技术,着重分析了“关系型贷款”(相对于其他形式贷款而言)能更好服务于中小企业融资的原因。最后,文章指出了“关系型贷款”在实际运用过程中存在的问题,并就“关系型贷款”在我国中小企业融资中的推行提出了相关政策建议。     

关系型融资与中小企业信贷发展研究

本文通过揭示中小企业融资困难的原因,进一步引出而关系型信贷是解决"信贷配给"矛盾的一种方式。本文以深圳中小板32家中小企业为研究样本,实证分析银企关系与中小企业成长的相关性。     

关系型借贷、银行竞争与中小企业融资研究述评

目前,银企关系、银行竞争对中小企业信贷融资的影响还存在争议。本文系统梳理了银企关系和银行竞争对中小企业融资影响的相关文献,从中小企业借贷可得性、成本和风险的角度,全面考察了银企关系和银行竞争的影响,同时分析了两者的相互作用。结果显示,银企关系、银行竞争会对中小企业信贷融资产生影响,且银企关系与银行竞争之间存在交互作用,但银企关系、银行竞争对中小企业融资的具体影响方向、大小存在显著的国别差异。在考察我国中小企业信贷融资过程中,需要结合宏观经济和信贷市场实际情况,区分不同理论的适用性,以期为缓解中小企业融资难题的研究和实践提供借鉴。     

Changes in Non-Local Lending to Small Business

In this paper, I use recently collected Community Reinvestment Act loan data to examine how small business lending in local geographic areas (defined as markets) by lenders not physically located in those areas changed between 1996 and 2001. The results show that the importance of outside lending increased substantially over this period when measured in terms of the number of loans rather than the dollar volume of loans. The levels and rates of growth in out-of-market lending are more modest if the share of out-of-market lending is expressed in dollar volumes and almost insubstantial if organizations that engage in substantial credit card lending are excluded as out-of-market lenders. Using a fixed-effects model and an extensive panel data set, I find that the share of outside lending into local geographic markets is positively associated with local market concentration and the average wage of tellers in the market, consistent with the hypothesis that outside loans are to some degree substitutes for in-market loans.     

Lock‐In Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans

Do prior lending relationships result in pass‐through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor‐in‐possession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock‐in effects using a sample of 348 DIP loans. We account for endogeneity using the instrument variable (IV) approach and the Heckman selection model and find consistent evidence that prior lending relationship is associated with higher interest costs and the effect is more severe for stronger existing relationships. Our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock‐in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.     

Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior

This paper utilizes bank Call Report and FDIC receivership data from 1987 to 1991 to examine the impact of a failed bank acquisition on the growth rate of commercial and industrial (C&I) lending at the acquiring institutions. Using a two-stage least squares model with fixed effects, we find that banks acquiring a failed bank's assets experience a significant decline in both the growth rate of C&I lending and their capital asset ratios in the period of the acquisition. The results support anecdotal evidence that failed-bank borrowers may experience difficulties in accessing credit once their bank fails and underscores the importance of bank-borrower relationships in C&I lending. Finally, the paper provides an alternative explanation for banks' stagnant or declining business lending activity during this period of financial turmoil.     

Trade Credit,the Financial Crisis,and SME Access to Finance

Mounting evidence indicates that firms, particularly SMEs, suffered from a significant credit crunch during this crisis. We analyze for the first time whether trade credit provided an alternative source of external finance to SMEs during the crisis. Using firm‐level Spanish data we find that credit constrained SMEs depend on trade credit, but not bank loans, and that the intensity of this dependence increased during the financial crisis. Unconstrained firms, in contrast, are dependent on bank loans but not on trade credit.     

Transmission Effects of ESG Disclosure Regulations Through Bank Lending Networks

This paper studies whether and how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations imposed on banks generate transmission effects along the lending channel. I use a setting of U.S. firms borrowing from non-U.S. banks and exploit the staggered adoption of ESG disclosure regulations in banks’ home countries. I find that exposed borrowers of affected banks improve their environmental and social (E&S) performance following the disclosure mandate. Consistent with banks enhancing both their engagement and selection activities, affected banks impose more environmental action covenants in loan contracts, and they are more likely to terminate a borrower with bad E&S records following the regulation. Further evidence shows that the transmission effects are stronger when a disclosure regulation is well-enforced (as indicated by a greater increase in banks’ disclosure) and among borrowers with greater switching costs. Collectively, the findings document the role of lending relationships in transmitting the real effect of ESG disclosure regulations from banks to borrowing firms.     

Uncertainty and the Cost of Bank versus Bond Finance

How does uncertainty affect the costs of raising finance in the bond market and via bank loans? Empirically, this paper finds that heightened uncertainty is accompanied by an increase in corporate bond spreads, whereas spreads on bank loans remain unchanged. This finding can be explained with a model that includes costly state verification and in which banks maintain long-term relationships with borrowers and acquire information beyond what is publicly available. After an unexpected increase in uncertainty, the probability of borrower default increases. Banks leave the loan spread unchanged to maintain the relationship. In contrast, bond spreads increase because investors demand compensation for the increased default risk.     

The Role of Collateral in the Credit Acquisition Process: Evidence from SME Lending

This study tests the simultaneous impact of observed characteristics and private information on debt term contracts in a multi‐period setting, using a dataset of 12,666 credit approvals by one major Portuguese commercial bank during 2007–2010. The main results show that borrowers with good credit scores that know they have a high probability of success and are unlikely to default are more willing to pledge collateral in return for a lower interest rate premium (IRP). Furthermore, lenders tailor the specific terms of the contract, increasing both collateral requirements and the IRP from observed risk, for borrowers operating in riskier industries and with less credit availability. The results are robust to controls for joint debt terms negotiation and the degree of collateralization offered by the borrower.     

政府的多重利益驱动与银行的信贷行为

本文以我国转型经济下政府、国有银行和国有企业的紧密联系作为研究的背景,深入分析了政府多重利益驱动下的银行目标函数,并以会计稳健性标准作为衡量银行对债务人信贷要求的指标,实证检验了这一制度安排下的银行信贷行为。研究结果表明:总体而言,随着一系列商业化改革的完成,国有银行的经营理念正在向现代商业银行趋近,对于没有政府干预或干预较少的贷款,其信贷要求能够根据债务人的风险作出相应的调整。然而,仍然存在的政治性贷款又使其信贷行为出现了一定程度的异化,即使得银行对债务人的贷款标准不能根据风险作出相应的调整,并且造成了其对国有企业和非国有企业信贷标准的差异。此外,来自政府提高资产质量的压力和向非国有企业发放信贷时潜在的政治成本迫使国有银行为了控制信贷风险对非国有企业要求过于严格的信贷标准。