存款保险制度与市场约束的激励兼容机制研究

目前,中国实现以“国家信誉”为担保的隐性存款保险制度,对银行业的市场约束造成挤出和替代效应。在国有银行股权过度集中且国家对国有银行特殊支持的背景下,公众对银行的选择形成了“规模偏好”,致使存款的资金价格和可获得性的信号指引从“风险导向”扭曲为“规模导向”,削弱了市场监控和市场影响的有效性,进而导致市场约束异化。本文对存款保险对于市场约束的影响因素和机理进行学理剖析,设计优化的显性存款保险制度及其相关配套机制,以促进显性存款保险与市场约束的激励兼容。     

我国建立存款保险制度的必要性及模式选择

存款保险制度具有稳定金融体系、保护存款人利益、降低金融风险等功能。本文从隐性存款保险制度的缺陷以及建立显性存款保险制度的重要性两方面分析了我国建立存款保险制度的必要性;并从存款保险组织机构的形式选择、存款保险范围及方式的确定、存款保险最高限额的确定以及存款保险费率的设定等方面,探讨了选择符合我国国情和经济发展状况的存款保险制度模式。     

存款保险制度与存款保险定价研究

存款保险制度是保护存款人利益，稳定金融体系和机制的事后补救措施。美国最早引入存款保险制度。其后，世界上大多数国家都已采用存款保险制度以避免存款者挤提风潮带来的危害。存款保险关键在于防止存款人的挤提行为，有效防止银行系统风险的扩大化，避免由存款人行为而导致银行业经营失败。而存款保险定价问题实质上是如何协调处理银行监管工具之间搭配的问题，因此，存款保险定价就应以采取易操作、低成本的固定险费的定价策略。具体到中国存款保险制度体系的建立，本文提出：我国存款保险制度也应采用固定费率；另外，在初期可采取强制投保方式，待条件成熟后可向自愿投保过渡。     

存款保险制度如何影响公众对不同银行的信心？——来自中国的证据

在政府对于银行具有隐性担保的经济体中,引入存款保险制度会对不同的银行带来什么影响,是个有待学术界研究的重要问题。本文利用中国推出存款保险制度这个准自然实验, 首次通过事件研究法实证检验和识别了市场对于隐性担保和存款保险的看法。研究发现,短期内,存款保险制度让公众对于某些银行的存款更加不放心: 存款保险制度的推出对于规模较大、全国性的国有银行和股份制银行的冲击并不显著,而对于规模较小、地方性的城市商业银行有较为显著的负向效应。一个可能的解释是,存款保险制度将政府隐性担保显性化; 这种冲击对小银行更明显,而公众还是相信大型国有银行和全国性股份制银行会“大而不倒”。     

存款保险制度的理论分析及借鉴意义

现代银行体系在承担流动性保险功能时所固有的脆弱性,而存款保险制度则是提供类型存款人取款保证一种有效的制度安排;但存款保险缺席的实施,不可避免地会加剧道德风险、逆向选择以及代理问题.随着银行经营透明度要求的提高,必须尽快建立显性的款保险度;建立激励相容的保险机制,尽量减少存款人和银行的道德风险等问题;在存款保险的制度设计中,要尽量减少代理问题的出现;实施资本充足性管制、维护银行特许权价值;实行适时关闭规则,减少存款保险制度的负面作用.     

存款保险制度实施中商业银行市场退出机制的国际经验、存在问题及建议

我国存款保险制度的实施为商业银行市场退出奠定了基础,完善的商业银行市场退出机制有利于问题银行风险出清,进而维护银行系统稳定和有序竞争.存款保险制度在处置银行风险中具有稳定预期、防止挤兑、保护利益相关者权益等正向作用,但也存在市场约束弱化、道德风险等问题.目前,绝大多数国家已经实施了存款保险制度,积累了不少可参考借鉴的经验.结合当前我国经济发展和金融市场化实际,需要进一步完善存款保险制度,更加注重审慎监管与存款保险早纠机制的有机结合,完善存款保险制度的市场化风险处置平台作用,健全商业银行风险退出处置法律框架.     

存款保险、市场竞争与银行经营稳健性

本文基于银行存款市场空间竞争模型,探讨存款保险制度的实施效果和福利效应,及其与市场竞争政策的交互作用。研究表明,政府隐性担保尽管能够保障存款人利益,但会降低存款人对银行经营稳健性的要求,使得银行追求高风险高收益资产从而降低经营稳健性;而市场化的存款保险制度通过费率与风险挂钩的激励机制,能够有效提升银行经营稳健性,同时避免过高政策成本负担,实现较高的社会福利水平。随着市场竞争强化,引入风险差别费率保险制度,在提升银行经营稳健性和增进社会福利方面的效果逐渐增强。模型分析表明,当长期允许机构自由进出市场时,政府强化竞争政策短期可能降低银行的经营稳健性,但长期内高风险银行逐渐退出市场而更有效率的低风险银行进入市场,这种柔性市场退出机制使得银行业整体经营稳健性增强。因此,在金融市场中强化竞争政策,推行并完善当前市场化的风险差别费率存款保险制度,长期内有助于在保护存款人利益的同时,提升银行稳健性和社会福利。     

国际存款保险的运作模式及借鉴

经济全球化背景下，银行业面临更大的风险，需要建立存款保险制度，存款保险的目的是为银行体系提供一张安全网，保护存款的利益和防止挤兑与引发金融危机，世界各国为了充分发挥存款保险制度的作用，根据本国的不同情况精心设计存款保险体系，以提高银行安全网的效率，借鉴国际经验，中国需要采用存款保险的方法，对金融机构存款人的存款予以保护和维持社会的稳定。     

存款保险制度的理论依据和实施效应分析

近年来,关于我国建立存款保险制度的讨论已有明确的结果,我国存款保险的推出也似乎仅仅只是时间问题。在此背景下,本文通过对海外存款保险制度实施效应进行分析,从金融发展、金融稳定、市场惩戒和风险管理等方面,探讨了存款保险制度在处理银行倒闭、保护存款人利益、维护金融体系稳定方面的有效性及设计不当的存款制度存在的各种风险,旨在为我国存款保险制度的构建给予启示。     

市场约束对中国银行监管的实证研究

本文认为,四大国有银行的隐性存款保险制度破坏了市场约束,并产生了道德风险。不同所有制结构的银行对市场约束的破坏程度取决于隐性存款保险的覆盖范围。中国银行监管机构应进行改革以强化市场约束。     

The pricing of deposit insurance in the presence of systematic risk

Based on the Merton (1977) put option framework, we develop a deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates asset correlations, a measurement for the systematic risk of a bank, to account for the risk of joint bank failures. Estimates from our model suggest that actuarially fair risk-based deposit insurance that considers only individual bank failure risk is underpriced, leaving insurance providers exposed to net losses. Our estimates also capture the size premium where big banks are priced with higher deposit insurance than small banks. This result is particularly relevant to the current regulatory concerns on big banks that are too-big-to-fail. Above all, our approach provides a unifying framework for integrating risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based Basel capital requirements.     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.     

国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险问题研究

存款保险制度的道德风险问题是指商业银行在存款保险制度的保护下有动机承担过度风险、追求超额利润、从而可能导致银行业危机的问题,是存款保险制度的核心理论问题,也是存款保险制度能否持续的关键问题,更是一国政府如何对商业银行进行监管的重大问题。对国外银行存款保险制度的道德风险的相关文献进行综述和分析的基础上,认为传统的存款保险制度存在严重的道德风险,其制度运行成本高昂,需要对存款保险制度进行改革和加强对商业银行的监管。建议我国建立存款保险制度需要考虑避免道德风险问题。     

Deposit Insurance Reform in Japan: Better Late Than Never?

Introduced in 1971 as a response to the intensification in competition in the deposit-taking sector induced by the adoption of a program of liberalization and globalization, the deposit insurance system in Japan has since undergone a number of significant changes to accommodate developments in the local financial sector. The pace of such reform accelerated markedly in recent years to help stabilize the Japanese financial system in the face of systemic risk, be it due to the failure of the housing loan companies (the jusen) or other major institutions, such as Yamaichi Securities and the city bank Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. The evolution of local deposit insurance arrangements to cope with such events is explained here and an assessment of the policy responses is provided. The part played by deposit insurance in alleviating the pressures currently experienced by the Japanese banking sector also is addressed. Finally, the extent to which the Japanese authorities have learned from the U.S. experience with deposit insurance is examined.     

我国商业银行危机处置与存款保险立法模式选择

本文对我国商业银行风险处置的价值定位及有关市场退出的法律体系进行了梳理,探讨提出了我国存款保险机制的主要框架,对存款保险立法的四种模式进行了比较选择,建议尽快制定《存款保险条例》,并通过司法实践逐步完善存款保险机制与银行破产退市程序的有效衔接。     

存款保险研究新进展:定价和制度效应

存款保险制度的主要作用是应对挤兑风险,加强公众对银行体系的信心。通过对现有关于存款保险定价和存款保险制度效应的文献进行梳理发现：基于期权定价法的存款保险定价方法虽较少在实践层面应用,但促进了存款保险制度的完善;存款保险制度受金融环境、制度设计及银行自身等影响而产生不同的效应,良性的制度运转与金融体系的完善相辅相成。未来的研究将着重考虑中小银行费率的厘定及存款保险制度与金融安全网之间的协同作用。     

建立存款保险制度对地方性金融机构的影响研究——以延边州农村金融机构为例

建立存款保险制度是成熟市场经济国家的通行做法，我国存款保险立法的步伐也正在加紧。建立存款保险制度对地方性金融机构到底有何影响，本文以延边州农村金融机构为例，通过定性定量分析，提出若干建议，以期既能保证存款保险制度的适时推出，又尽可能减少政策对地方性金融机构的震动。     

Deposit insurance and the stock market: evidence from Denmark

Previous studies of the relationship between deposit insurance and bank market values have usually been limited to consideration of minor changes in bank regulations, but the 1987 initiation of deposit insurance in Denmark permits examination of a potentially major policy shift. It is found that the market values of large Danish banks exhibited a modest positive reaction to the announcement of insurance, but that small risky banks responded negatively. These results partially contrast with those previously found for the USA, an outcome that seems likely to reflect the interaction of deposit insurance with the particular characteristics of the pre-existing Danish regulatory system.     

The pricing of deposit insurance considering bankruptcy costs and closure policies

The paper aims to study the pricing issue of deposit insurance with explicit consideration of bankruptcy costs and closure policies. Full coverage from deposit insurance is imposed by many regulators to stabilize the banking system in the current financial crisis, despite of the potential moral hazard problems. We argue that bankruptcy cost is an important factor in pricing deposit insurance, especially when the insured institution is insolvent. Applying the isomorphic relationship between deposit insurance and put option, we first derive a closed-form solution for the pricing model with bankruptcy costs and closure policies. Then, we modify the barrier option approach to price the deposit insurance in which the bankruptcy cost is set as a function of asset return volatility and more realistic closure policies considering possible forbearance can be accounted for. The properties of the models are supported by numerical simulations and are consistent with the risk-based pricing scheme.     

存款保险制度能否抑制银行个体风险承担?

基于2008-2019年我国30家上市银行的财务数据,研究了存款保险制度实施对银行风险承担行为的影响.对选取的经济变量进行单位根检验发现,变量均为平稳变量.利用固定效应模型进行实证回归分析,结果表明:总体上看,存款保险制度的推出增加了银行的风险承担行为;在将银行进行分类后,存款保险制度的实施对大型商业银行的风险承担影响...