Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

De novo venture strategy: arch incumbency at inaugural entry

By definition, de novo industry ventures do not share many market‐contact points with incumbents—itself an important source of competitive ‘stability’ through mutual forbearance. As such, these ventures are often subject to aggressive retaliation at the outset, which could threaten their very survival. In this study, the notion of an arch incumbent is developed, hypothesizing that, in general, a large market overlap with an incumbent lowers the survival odds of a de novo entrant. However, a large market overlap with the arch incumbent combined with an aggressive inaugural market entry or a different market positioning reduces the probability of retaliation by the arch incumbent (and subsequently other incumbents as well), and hence increases the probability of survival for a de novo entrant. The empirical experience of de novo ventures in the intra‐European passenger airline industry supports these hypotheses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incumbency and market share within European mobile telecommunication networks

The structure of mobile telecommunication markets varies considerably across Europe, ranging from monopolies with a handful of subscribers to markets with five operators and many millions of subscribers. Where competitive markets occur, there is also an incumbent operator possessing substantial first mover advantages. This paper explores these advantages, asking whether the incumbent has remained the largest operator as the market has developed. This question is investigated using data from 49 European countries. The analysis finds that in most countries the incumbent continues to be the largest operator measured by market share. In some countries, later entrants into the market have struggled to gain market share, contributing to the highly concentrated nature of many mobile markets. The extent to which the geographical footprint of an operator influences its market share is also examined.     

Business model innovation and competitive imitation: The case of sponsor‐based business models

This paper provides the first formal model of business model innovation. Our analysis focuses on sponsor‐based business model innovations where a firm monetizes its product through sponsors rather than setting prices to its customer base. We analyze strategic interactions between an innovative entrant and an incumbent where the incumbent may imitate the entrant's business model innovation once it is revealed. The results suggest that an entrant needs to strategically choose whether to reveal its innovation by competing through the new business model, or conceal it by adopting a traditional business model. We also show that the value of business model innovation may be so substantial that an incumbent may prefer to compete in a duopoly rather than to remain a monopolist. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the competition enhancing effects of exclusive dealing contracts

Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case, an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracts but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale price than absent exclusive contracts, leading to lower final consumer prices and higher welfare.     

PERSISTENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP: EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND INCREMENTAL INNOVATION*

In a model of competitive innovation, I derive theoretical conditions for an entrant to displace the incumbent firm by innovating in an undeveloped, substitute (emerging) technology. The main result presents conditions on profitability and innovation speed that yield a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which the entrant pursues the emerging technology, while the incumbent chooses to persist with the established technology and collect short‐run profits. Notably, this result does not require the entrant's superiority to the incumbent for innovation. Finally, when the model is calibrated to hard drive industry data, its predictions are consistent with the observed outcomes.     

Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power

An incumbent seller contracts with a buyer under the threat of entry. The contract stipulates a price and a penalty for breach if the buyer later switches to the entrant. Sellers are heterogenous in terms of the gross surplus they provide to the buyer. The buyer is privately informed on her valuation for the incumbent’s service. Asymmetric information makes the incumbent favor entry as it helps screening buyers. When the entrant has some bargaining power vis-à-vis the buyer and keeps a share of the gains from entry, the incumbent instead wants to reduce entry. The compounding effect of these two forces may lead to either excessive entry or foreclosure, and possibly to a fixed rebate for exclusivity which is afforded to all buyers.     

Paradoxical impact of asymmetric regulation in Taiwan's telecommunications industry: Restriction and rent seeking

The mobile penetration rate in Taiwan has climbed from 6.86 to 112.15. Mobile phone accounts per 100 capita in the first 6 years of market competition, during this time the state-owned incumbent Chunghua Telecom has been dethroned by a new entrant, Taiwan Cellular Corp. This paper addresses the cause of Taiwan's unprecedented mobile growth, and provides policy solutions for countries that strive to improve their telecommunications sectors in a short time scale. The authors highlight the fundamental role of asymmetric regulation, rather than pure liberalization, in the creation of the deregulated telecommunications industry in Taiwan. The asymmetric regulation in Taiwan is manifested in a twofold framework: the dominant carrier vs. competitors, and the fixed-line carrier vs. mobile companies. Econometric analysis concludes that dualistic asymmetric regulation leads to higher growth for mobile competitors and raises the total mobile penetration rate. However, the authors warn against the paradoxical consequences of dualistic asymmetric regulation. The regulatory benefits which mobile entrants received evolved into rents when they successfully lobbied to end the follow-me call service, the pricing scheme of which contradicts the asymmetric revenue-sharing constraint. The paper calls for a sunset clause for dualistic asymmetric regulation in order to take full advantage of its strengths, while at the same time preventing rent seeking by the firms, which benefit.     

Regulation and efficiency in transition: The case of telecommunications in Italy

In regulating the telecommunications industry, the separation between network and retail functions, which is designed to countervail the market power of incumbent operators, is a relevant issue. Despite its importance, little empirical research has addressed the effects of such a separation. Accordingly, this paper provides insights into the consequences of the Italian communications regulatory authority's (AgCom) decision to impose this type of separation on the incumbent telecommunications operator, Telecom Italia. In particular, the studied separation is between the firm's network-related functions, and those used for provision of its communication services. The present research finds that the type of separation implemented by AgCom allows a provider to maintain the advantages of operational scale in its network structure without dampening competition in the existing market for communications services. The study also offers further empirical evidence on the advantages of a composite vs. translog function in analyzing the multiproduct cost structure of a telecommunications operator.     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.     

Spawned with a silver spoon? Entrepreneurial performance and innovation in the medical device industry

Entrepreneurs in high‐technology industries often have prior experience at incumbent firms, but we know little about how knowledge obtained at the prior employer impacts entrepreneurial performance. Drawing on previous work from strategy, economics, and organizational sociology, I assess the impact of industry experience on entrepreneurial performance and innovation in medical device start‐ups. I find that spawns (ventures started by former employees of incumbent firms) perform better than other new entrants. Interestingly, my findings suggest that this superior performance is not driven by technological spillovers from parent to spawn, but rather by nontechnical knowledge related to regulatory strategy and marketing. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ENTRY DETERRENCE BY NON‐HORIZONTAL MERGER*

We study when and how pure non‐horizontal mergers, whether cross‐product or vertical, can deter new entry. Organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition. Because heightened competition deters entry, mergers can occur in equilibrium even when, absent entry considerations, they do not. We show that, in order to prevent a flood of entrants, mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant.     

The Influence of Regulation and Disruptive Potential on Incumbents' Submarket Entry Decision and Success in the Context of a Network Industry

This paper uses the theoretical perspectives of disruptive innovation, network externalities, and regulation to study the submarket strategies of incumbent firms that operate in a regulated network industry. In this setting, the impact of potentially disruptive innovations might be different because of the tighter regulation of incumbent firms. By analyzing the entry and success patterns of incumbent mobile network operators (MNOs) in the public hotspot markets in 17 Western European countries, we focus on how regulation and network effects as well as disruption factors influence the incumbent firms' strategies. In doing so, this paper departs from prior research that has primarily focused on unregulated industries and combines contradicting explanations from disruptive innovation theory, the motivation/ability framework, regulation theory, as well as network effects to provide a comprehensive analysis on how incumbents behave in a regulated network industry that is being confronted with a potentially disruptive innovation. In particular, while disruptive innovation theory predicts that the incumbents' vast experience in an industry could cause them to avoid entering new submarkets created by potentially disruptive innovations, the desire to avoid regulation could encourage such submarket entry. Furthermore, in regulated network industries, incumbent firms might have a stronger motivation to enter new submarkets as the importance of single customers and high market shares could be substantially different. These contrasting insights are used to develop an integrative research model and to derive hypotheses on incumbents' submarket entry decision and success. Drawing on cross‐sectional, multicountry data of 62 MNOs that operate in 17 Western European countries, this study uses logit and tobit regressions to test the impact of disruption factors, regulation, and network externalities on the entry decision and success of incumbent firms. The results reveal that the incumbent MNOs are caught in an area of conflict between the regulated industry context and their international technology strategy. The findings suggest that the incumbent MNOs' motivation and ability to escape regulation positively influenced their submarket entry and success in the public hotspot market. Thus, the potentially disruptive scenario was successfully turned into a potentially sustaining one as the incumbent MNOs could enhance their presence in the mobile broadband market. The testing on a multicountry basis as well as the positive influence of ethnocentric technology strategies for public hotspots, which are devised in the headquarters' location and are then brought out internationally, shed new light on an industry that has typically been characterized by country‐by‐country decisions. These findings may also reveal challenges for future research on disruptive innovations in multinational industries and expose future challenges for regulative authorities and managers. This paper thereby adds to the theory of disruptive innovation as it includes the influence of regulation on incumbents in network industries. Additionally, this study expands on previous findings on the disruptive potential of wireless local area network technology by employing a multi‐country analysis in 17 Western European countries.     

Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent's installed base guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications of this result.     

Economic implications of a co-investment scheme for FTTH/PON architectures

Due to the high costs associated with the deployment of the passive infrastructure of FTTH networks, a few alternative operators have pondered the possibility of making co-investments based on a network sharing model. The purpose of this article is to explore economic aspects of a co-investment scheme for present and future FTTH/PON architectures. The article describes the cost reductions that can be achieved when a co-investment scheme is used, as well as the relationship between market shares and the cost per home connected. A cost model was employed to calculate the investment per home passed and the investment per home connected. The investment per home passed for an alternative operator indicates significant cost reductions when a co-investment scheme is used. On the other hand, the results show that when the incumbent's market share is equal or higher than the total market share of all the alternative operators that share the network infrastructure, the investment per home connected for an alternative operator is higher than that for the incumbent operator. Moreover, to be cost competitive with the incumbent operator, the necessary market share that each alternative operator should achieve is much lower than that of the incumbent operator.     

Strategic financial signalling

In an entry game, the entrant and financial markets are uninformed about the incumbent's costs. The entrant wishes to enter the market if and only if the incumbent has high costs. Therefore, a low cost incumbent would like to signal its cost to the entrant to deter its entry. Simultaneously, it would like to reveal its private information to financiers to obtain actuarially fair financial prices. We suggest that financial structure may act as a common signal in financial and output markets. In equilibrium, a low cost incumbent's highly leveraged financial stucture becomes an effective entry deterrent as it reveals private information to the entrant (and financiers).     

Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence

I investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two-period model of a durable-goods monopolist. There exists an incumbent that is of two types, that is, high and low quality types. They differ in terms of their R&D capabilities, and the incumbent's type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant. If the entrant decided to enter the market, Nash–Bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant. I show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent's quality type, which serves to discourage entry. In the prestige pricing, the high-quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price. I also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint, the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing.     

Decoupling market incumbency from organizational prehistory: Locating the real sources of competitive advantage in R&D for radical innovation

The creative destruction literature has argued that differences in R&D performance of incumbent vs. entrant firms can be explained through organizational change theories about established vs. de novo firms. A disconnect exists between these theories and the available empirical evidence because often the best performing firms are established firms as well. I propose to resolve this disconnect by distinguishing between market incumbency (presence in a market prior to a discontinuity) and organizational prehistory (organizational experience prior to a transition, whether between technologies or between markets). Doing so allows me to contrast incumbent vs. entrant and de alio vs. de novo studies, and to suggest more robust future research designs. I illustrate my proposition using qualitative data from the anticancer and AIDS‐treatment drug markets. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D in markets with network externalities

This paper studies the consequences of network externalities on R&D rivalry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all differences between the R&D projects chosen in market equilibrium and the socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in equilibrium than in the social optimum.     

Predation by noisy advertising

The paper considers a market where heterogeneous consumers are imperfectly informed about product characteristics, and an incumbent firm has developed a clientele. In this context, the paper addresses the following question: Can the incumbent advertise in such a way as to make survival by a recent entrant infeasible? The main conclusion is that such a policy, which is termed noisy advertising, can generally succeed in driving the recent entrant from the market, and is likely to prove attractive to the incumbent.