Laboratory Testbeds and Non-Market Valuation: The Case of Bidding Behavior in a Second-Price Auction with an Outside Option

Researchers now use the lab to examine the behavioral underpinnings of valuation before the field application which some argue has less experimental control. But lab valuation work raises its own set of concerns when it uses private goods to explore non-market valuation behavior because private goods have substitutes often unaccounted for in the lab. Therefore, the lab as a tool to testbed field valuation work may be limited. Herein we design an induced valuation experiment to explore bidding behavior in a second-price auction with an outside option that is a perfect substitute for the auction commodity. Theory predicts that rational bidders will consider the prices of outside options when formulating bidding strategies, and will reduce their bids whenever their resale value exceeds the price of the outside option. Our results suggest that bidders account for outside options when formulating bids with behavior following comparative static predictions. In addition, we provide evidence concerning hypothetical versus actual behavior with induced values – the data suggesting a hypothetical bias in the level of bids but not in bid shaving.     

When Cultures Collide: Social Security and the Market

In his 1999 State of the Union address, President Clinton raised the possibility of investing social security funds in the equities market. In this article, two anthropologists who have studied the culture of the financial world assess the President's proposal. The analysis focuses on the vast cultural gap between the private-sector participants in the equities market and the federal bureaucrats who would inevitably manage social security investments. The authors examine similar arrangements at the state level, the cultural differences among the entities involved, and how those differences interfere with fiduciary decision-making. They conclude that the gap is simply too wide for the proposal to be workable, and as a result, the adverse consequences likely outweigh the potential benefits. Although some consequences are foreseeable, more threatening consequences can be envisioned only in the most general terms.     

Doing Away with the Sovereign: Neoliberalism and the Promotion of Market Discipline in European Economic Governance

ABSTRACT

This article proposes a critical reading of market discipline and its limitations as a mechanism in European economic governance. Consistent with neoliberal beliefs about market-based governance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is premised on the functioning of the government bond market as a fiscal-policy discipliner. However, the operation of market discipline requires that neither governments nor their private creditors can rely on an authority to bail them out. It, therefore, precludes the kinds of intervention by Eurozone’s supranational institutions witnessed during the euro crisis. In the post-crisis context, efforts to strengthen market discipline continue to be frustrated by the growing reliance of financial institutions on government bond markets as well as the European Central Bank’s (ECB) active participation in those markets. Having undermined the credibility of the market as an autonomous and apolitical mechanism of discipline, European economic governance struggles to come to terms with the rise of a supranational ‘economic sovereign’ in the Eurozone.     

Emission Taxes and Optimal Refunding Schemes with Endogenous Market Structure

The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free-entry market where the production process generates emissions. We consider the regulation by a three-part tax policy: the government sets an emission tax, a refunding scheme, and an entry-license tax. In contrast to the case of the two-part tax-refund policy under no entry, we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside, the first-best outcome is always attained. Further, the government’s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes. Our result implies that the tax-refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry.     

An Optimal Ad Valorem Tax/Subsidy with an Output-Based Refunded Emission Payment for Permits Auction in an Oligopoly Market

In this paper, we explores a hybrid mechanism of output-based refunded emission payment and an ad valorem tax/subsidy to remove the distortions emerging in the permit auction market and the product market. We find that first best outcomes can be achieved under such a hybrid mechanism. A clearing price equal to a Pigouvian tax will endogenously result in the permit auction market. Moreover, we extend the analysis to take into consideration the investment in abatement technology.     

Optimal Tariffs and Subsidies and Changes in Market Structure

The paper presents a unified treatment of optimal trade policy for a small country. The well‐known results for duopoly and competitive markets emerge as benchmark cases of the authors’ model. In addition, it is shown that changes in market structure have nonmonotonic effects on optimal tariffs. The results suggest that the recent reduction of tariffs in eastern Europe is consistent with welfare‐maximizing trade policy in response to the substantial changes in the market structure of these countries.     

Optimal Policy with Tradable and Bankable Pollution Permits: Taking the Market Microstructure into Account

This paper analyzes how the way emission permits are traded—their market microstructure—affects the optimal policy to be adopted by the environmental agency. The microstructure used is one of a quote driven market type, which characterizes many financial markets. Market makers act as intermediaries for trading the permits by setting an ask price and a bid price. The possibility of bank permits is also introduced in our dynamic two‐period model. We consider two models whether the market makers are perfectly informed about the technology of the producers or not. When the market makers have complete information, the equilibrium price of permits is the same as if the market is walrasian. When they are imperfectly informed, they may set a positive spread between bid and ask permit prices, which creates some inefficiency as the marginal abatement costs of polluters do not equalize. By allowing more flexibility in the use of the permits, banking may reduce the spread. Moreover, it may introduce price rigidities due to intertemporal arbitrage. In this framework, the circumstances under which banking should be allowed or not depend crucially on the evolution of the marginal willingness to pay for the environment.     

Optimal Policy for Financial Market Liberalizations: Decentralization and Capital Flow Reversals

Financial market liberalizations are an integral part of economic development. While initial booms in investment and output are commonly seen as signs of successful deregulation, they often reverse at a later stage as international capital flows turn negative and economic growth slows markedly. Such reversals of fortunes have commonly been attributed to incorrect policies that supposedly followed the initial, appropriate measures. It is unclear, however, if capital flow reversals are actually the result of policy reversals, or if they occur as part of the normal transition when financial liberalization is accompanied by a single suboptimal policy. The later hypothesis has not been explored in the theoretical literature
We construct a general equilibrium growth model of a small open economy, in which capital flow reversals are the result of a single, suboptimal policy imposed at the beginning of the financial liberalization. We show how improper taxation of foreign borrowing initially leads to strong growth fuelled by an investment boom and foreign borrowing. Still along the transition, however, the model predicts that capital flows must reverse endogenously at a later stage, as the debt burden rises and the country-specific risk premium increases. Our data on the Latin American and East Asian countries provide strong support for our hypothesis.     

A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking

In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations and discuss the large firm’s stock-holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

在创新中实现企业与农户双赢——江苏富安茧丝绸公司农业产业化发展调查

近年来,在全国蚕桑行情有所下跌的状况下,富安地区的蚕农们却没有卖难的担忧,扩桑、采用新技术、加强管理的积极性仍然十分高涨。这主要得益于富安茧丝绸股份有限责任公司大胆创新,采取了一系列有效的改革措施,如组建蚕农合作社、增加龙头企业竞争力、完善基地建设、建立健全社会化服务体系等,形成了茧丝绸一条龙生产和贸工农一体化管理的特色。富安的实践为我国农业产业化发展实现企业与农户双赢,探索了一条有效的实现途径。     

When Borch's Theorem Does Not Apply: Some Key Implications of Market Incompleteness,with Policy Relevance Today

Markets are incomplete when the assets available to the agents do not span the space of future contingencies. In that case, competitive equilibria on the markets for assets and commodities fail (generically) to be constrained efficient. Pareto‐superior allocations can be implemented through price/wage rigidities and quantity constraints. However, nominal rigidities are conducive to multiple equilibria, implying endogenous macroeconomic uncertainties that compound the primitive (exogenous) uncertainties. This paper defines a temporary general equilibrium for which there exists a set of equilibria defining an inflation – unemployment locus. Various policy implications are drawn, with relevance to the current crisis.     

Optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency with an externality in an overlapping generations model

This paper examines optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency, integrating them in a second-best world with pollution by using an overlapping generations model. The second-best world is characterized by the comparative statics of green preferences. The main results obtained are as follows. First, the marginal cost of public funds may be reduced by the externalities, regardless of the choice of taxes. Second, optimal environmental and non-environmental tax rules are additively and directly affected by the dynamic efficiency of capital accumulation per unit labour (DECAL), and indirectly by it, through the efficiency of the public sector. Environmental taxes going beyond Pigovian ones may be welfare-improving if the DECAL is improved by the environmental tax. Even optimal non-environmental tax rules should additively and directly counter the dynamics of pollution to consider the income effects of the optimal tax system for the future. Third, the “additivity property,” or the “principle of targeting,” does not hold even in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints. The essential reasons for this are clarified as follows: distortions that should be countered by taxes; that is, the income effects of the optimal tax system and the DECAL in this model, break the equality between optimal environmental taxes and the externalities measured by governments. Finally, growing environmental concerns may, in fact, increase pollution. The inverse relationship between environmental and labour income taxes may not hold.     

Optimal fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model with public capital: a note

This note presents an investigation of the optimal tax rule in endogenous growth models with public capital. It is presumed that the government levies only an income tax in addition to financing public investment. Furthermore, a household’s saving is deducted from the income tax. We find the optimal tax rule whereby the social optimum is attainable. The manner by which a government imposes a tax on income and administers tax deductions is important for attaining a socially optimal situation.      

Average-cost Pricing, Increasing Returns, and Optimal Output: Comparing Home and Market Production

We employ a model with both market production and home production to show that, ignoring administrative costs and indirect effects (such as rent-seeking), even if both the home and the market sectors have the condition of increasing returns and there are no pre-existing taxes, it is still efficient to tax the home sector to finance a subsidy on the market sector to offset the under-production of the latter due to the failure of price-taking consumers to take account of the effects of higher consumption in reducing the average costs and hence prices, through increasing returns or the publicness nature of fixed costs. Within market production, it is efficient to subsidise more the sector with a higher fixed cost, a lower elasticity of substitution between goods (higher value of diversity), and a lower degree of importance in preference, which all increase the degree of increasing returns.     

Optimal accumulation in an endogenous growth setting with human capital

This paper considers a three-overlapping-generations model of endogenous growth wherein human capital is the engine of growth. It first contrasts the laissez-faire and the optimal solutions. Three possible accumulation regimes are distinguished. Then it discusses a standard set of tax-transfer instruments that allow for decentralization of the social optimum. Within the limits of our model, the rationale for the standard pattern of intergenerational transfers (the working-aged financing the education of the young and the pension of the old) is seriously questioned. On pure efficiency grounds, the case for generous public pensions is rather weak.     

Optimal taxation in an endogenous growth model with variable population and public expenditure

In this paper we analyze second-best optimal taxation in an endogenous-growth model driven by public expenditure, in presence of endogenous fertility and labor supply. Normative analysis shows positive taxes on the number of children, which are necessary to correct for congestion in the publicly provided input (such as education and healthcare), negative public debt. Results on capital and labor income taxation depend on whether the public input is optimally provided.     

Arbitrator Decision-Making in the Transfer Market: an Empirical Analysis

This paper analyses data generated by the annual round of arbitrated settlements of disputed transfer fees for end-of-contract players in the English Football League. Using information on final-offers of the disputant clubs and data on a variety of player and club characteristics we analyse arbitrated fees and final-offers, and the relative importance of final-offers and case facts in fashioning outcomes. Our analysis suggests that a large proportion of the variation in settlements can be accounted for by certain case facts rather than a mechanical compromise of final-offers, with the latter receiving a relatively low weight. In general, our findings are consistent with the view that conventional arbitration systems generate little useful information in terms of final-offers from the disputant parties.