Disorganization and financial collapse

Since the fall of communism, the former Soviet Union experienced a strong output decline and a dramatic increase in arrears and barter. We develop a model which explains how these three phenomena are connected. We introduce liquidity and credit constraints into a model of disorganization and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up problem. We argue further that barter creates a hostage that allows to deal with disorganization when credit enforcement becomes prohibitively costly. Based on a firm survey in Ukraine in 1997, we test how input shortages, financial shortages and barter affect output growth of firms.     

Barter, credit and welfare

This paper develops a model to investigate the welfare implications of barter in Russia and other transition economies during the 1990s. We argue that barter is a welfare‐improving phenomenon that acts as a defence mechanism against monetary instability. When firms react to tighter credit markets by switching to barter, the risk they face diminishes, allowing for a higher level of production.     

BARTER'S ROLE IN THE MONEY–INCOME RELATIONSHIP

Abstract.  This paper deals with a reassessment of the money–income relation and predictability of changes in GDP with innovations in money in the presence of barter. Organized barter as a method of transaction, through barter exchanges, has been growing rapidly in the US economy. With the introduction of computers and the use of a credit system which allows non-simultaneous transactions, barter exchanges have found new opportunities to offer an alternative to monetary transactions. Analysis of data from the 1974–96 period provides some evidence suggesting that inclusion of barter in the output function improves the marginal predictability of money.     

US domestic barter: an empirical investigation

This paper studies the barter industry developed in North America during the 1950s, pointing out some of its main characteristics. Thus, it examines its two main sectors: (i) corporate barter and (ii) commercial barter. Contrary to expectations, the analysis of official data shows that this phenomenon is essentially pro-cyclical for the commercial barter component. Moreover, commercial barter activity turns out to be complementary to the cash economy. While the two sectors display some differences in their pattern, they both help firms to increase their profits.     

Semi-core equivalence

Summary. The main requirements for equivalence of the core of an economy and the Walrasian equilibrium allocations are largeness and the freedom to form almost arbitrary coalitions in the Edgeworthian barter processes. We investigate whether constraints on coalition formation and coalitional barter alter these insights. Our notion of the semi-core imposes a restriction on the collection of formable coalitions that does not affect the fundamental equivalence property. Using our concept of the contract-core we show that additional constraints on coalitional barter can only be alleviated within an environment with sufficiently many formable coalitions: besides a contract-core equivalence theorem we show certain non-equivalence results.Received: December 11, 1995; revised version: September 17, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

The Role of Non-monetary Trade in Russian Transition

The appearance of significant non-monetary trade in the Russian transition of 1992-98 has been differently interpreted by analysts and observers. Some have seen barter as a symbol of passive resistance to reforms while others have blamed reformist policies for its development. We argue that non-monetary trade is best understood as a natural response of companies to market imperfections remaining from Soviet times. We provide an overview of market institutions that existed at the onset of the transition and conclude that market infrastructure was under-developed (especially trade and finance-related institutions). This fact became obvious after the liberalisation of trade in 1992. When the Central Bank of Russia stopped issuing direct credit to enterprises, newly established commercial banks were unable to fill the gap. Firms had to develop alternative means of financing trade and non-monetary trade was one of them. In our opinion barter, while an inefficient mode of trade, also played a positive role in the transition. Its high transaction costs offered ample opportunities to earn profits from trade and financial intermediation. The latter mushroomed as a result and at the time of the 1998 default the Russian economy had sufficiently developed trade, financial and legal systems to afford a switch from barter to money trade.     

The Conceptual Flaw in the Microeconomic Foundations of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models

First-generation dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have been criticized for their lack of financial markets but, more perceptively, for their barter properties. This note explains why the second of these criticisms is fundamental. All DSGE models are built on frictionless, perfect barter, Walrasian microeconomic foundations. Introducing money and banks into such models converts them into a ‘friction’ contra the fundamental principle that monetary exchange is more efficient than barter. This insoluble difficulty with the microeconomic foundations of DSGE models arises because theorists ignore the Hahn problem that applies to all monetary models based on Walrasian general equilibrium (GE) microeconomic foundations. The Hahn problem reveals three things. First, a perfect barter GE solution always exists in any ‘monetary’ model erected on Walrasian GE microeconomic foundations. Second, inessential monetary features are easily attached to perfect barter microeconomic foundations but as easily removed, leaving the perfect barter solution intact. Third, attaching such inessential additions leads to logical error; the misuse of language that produces invalid conclusions. A second-generation DSGE model that is intended to increase understanding of financial crises is then examined to show that it suffers from the Hahn problem; it converts banking and financial markets into ‘frictions’, and words and economic concepts take on different meanings. That renders the new DSGE model impossible to interpret or use as a basis for advice on monetary policy.     

MIRACLE OR MIRAGE? FOREIGN SILVER,CHINA'S ECONOMY AND GLOBALIZATION FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Abstract.   Ming–Qing China has been seen as positioned at the very centre of the process of early globalization partly due to China's huge appetite for foreign silver for its own commercialization. The findings of this study challenge this view head on by showing that not only did China not import and use nearly as much foreign silver as commonly imagined, silver moved into and also out of China. It served at best as a secondary currency and often worked on a barter basis. The sector which retained the lion's share was the pawnshop for short-term credit mainly for consumption.     

Barter in the Russian Economy: Classifications and Implications (Evidence from Case Study Analyses)

This article addresses Russia's barter economy. Using interview data, it examines the mechanics of barter settlements and classifies the main types of non-monetary transactions. The major reason for barter is lack of a competitive monetary system. In the 1990s barter represented a specific vehicle to perform settlements. Barter itself is not a way to evade taxes or to defraud enterprises of assets. But barter changed the motivation of enterprises and led to systematic distortion of accounting data. The low transparency of the barter economy creates barriers for investment and restructuring. The barter economy is an insider's economy. The lack of affiliated entity regulation and mechanisms for disclosure of transactions with related parties stimulates insiders to criminal application of barter and monetary surrogates. Barter has become a profitable business for a number of important economic agents including financial intermediaries affiliated with top managers of the biggest privatised enterprises and government agencies.     

THE SUPERIORITY OF MONETARY OVER BARTER EXCHANGE: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

William Stanley Jevons suggested that monetary exchange is socially superior to barter exchange because agents' optimization is simplified by the use of money. We experimentally study how subjects perform under monetary and barter exchange and find that a majority of subjects achieve a higher utility level in the monetized economy. The individual choices are statistically analyzed in order to track important elements of suboptimal decision making like the tendency to under‐ or over‐react to price signals. Our laboratory findings indicate that, at a minimum, government may have a role in promoting a common unit of account.     

Bargains,Barter, and Money

We examine a search money model in which there is a symmetric coincidence of wants in all barter matches. However, when bargaining outcomes are asymmetric across matches, the barter economy is inefficient. Then a robust monetary equilibrium exists provided that money holders enjoy adequate bargaining terms. Fiat money may be welfare improving. In contrast to the literature, it is the asymmetry in bargains across matches rather than asymmetry in demands that generates these results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, E40.     

A Neo-Ricardian Trade Model with Overlapping Generations*

This paper develops and examines a discrete-time two-by-two-by-two barter trading world which incorporates populations. composed of overlapping, life-cycle-maximizing generations; each provides an economically distinguishable factor of production. It is shown that free trade without compensation can be Pareto inferior to autarky for one country. Conditions for uncompensated free trade to take place under a majority voting system are derived. The model permits intergenerational borrowing and lending to take place domestically but not internationally.     

Money and Information

This paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply. When the fraction of high-quality producers in the economy is given, money promotes the production of high-quality goods, which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously. When this fraction is endogenous, however, we find that money can decrease welfare relative to the barter equilibrium. The origin of this inefficiency is that money provides consumption insurance to low-quality producers, which can result in a higher fraction of low-quality producers in the monetary equilibrium. Finally, we find that most often agents acquire more costly information in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium. Consequently, money is welfare-enhancing because it promotes useful production and exchange, but not because it saves information costs.     

Trust versus illusion: What is driving demonetization in the former Soviet Union?

The virtual economy argument for Russia suggests that barter allows the parties to pretend that the manufacturing sector is producing value added by enabling this sector to sell its output at a higher price than its market value. We confront this prediction with the actual pricing behaviour of industrial sectors in Ukraine in 1997. Based on the pricing data of 165 barter deals we find no systematic difference in the pricing behaviour in non-cash transactions across sectors. What appears to matter for the pricing behaviour is whether the firm is on the selling or buying end of the barter transaction. We offer a model that sees this pricing behaviour as a mechanism to deal with the absence of trust and liquidity in the economy.
JEL classification: D20, G30, O10, P30.     

Design and rating of risk-contingent credit for balancing business and financial risks for Kenyan farmers

Weather-related agricultural risks and limited access to credit are serious impediments to agricultural productivity and growth in developing countries. This paper describes a novel insurance linked credit model piloted in Kenya, where insurance markets are effectively absent, and farmers do not borrow because of the risk of losing their collateral. One of the challenges in deigning bundled credit products, in the absence of traded securities, is the actuarial pricing and risk rating of the insurance and the loan product. We develop a rainfall linked risk-contingent credit that transfers drought risk related perils from borrower to lender via insurance mechanism that provide a balance between business and credit risks for smallholder farmers. We describe the methodology used to design and rating of a risk-contingent structured operating agricultural credit instrument using CHIRPS rainfall data from 1981–2016 in Kenya. We illustrate the use of Monte Carlo methods to risk modelling that can be integrated within the general insurance and credit rating framework. The innovative design and methodology presented in this paper are as important as the product delivery mechanism and will be of interest to specialists in development economics and agricultural finance.     

Linking global economic dynamics to a South African-specific credit risk correlation model

In order to address practical questions in credit portfolio management it is necessary to link the cyclical or systematic components of firm credit risk with the firm's own idiosyncratic credit risk as well as the systematic credit risk component of every other exposure in the portfolio. This paper builds on the methodology proposed by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner [Pesaran, M.H., Schuermann, T., and Weiner, S.M., (2004), Modeling regional interdependencies using a global error correcting macroeconometric model, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 22, 2, 129–169.] and supplemented by Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler and Weiner [Pesaran, M.H., Schuermann, T., Treutler, B., and Weiner, S.M., (2006), Macroeconomic dynamics and credit risk: a global perspective, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Volume 38, Number 5, August 2006, 1211–1261.] which has made a significant advance in credit risk modelling in that it avoids the use of proprietary balance sheet and distance-to-default data, focusing on credit ratings which are more freely available.In this paper a country-specific macroeconometric risk-driver engine which is compatible with and could feed into the GVAR model and framework of PSW (2004) is constructed, using vector error-correcting (VECM) techniques. This allows conditional loss estimation of a South African-specific credit portfolio but also opens the door for credit portfolio modelling on a global scale, as such a model can easily be linked to the GVAR model. The set of domestic factors is extended beyond those used in PSW (2004) in such a way that the risk-driver model is applicable for both retail and corporate credit risk. As such, the model can be applied to a total bank balance sheet, incorporating the correlation and diversification between both retail and corporate credit exposures.Assuming statistical over-identification restrictions, the results indicate that it is possible to construct a South African component for the GVAR model that can easily be integrated into the global component. From a practical application perspective the framework and model is particularly appealing since it can be used as a theoretically consistent correlation model within a South African-specific credit portfolio management tool.     

COMPENSATION FOR QUALITY DIFFERENCE IN A SEARCH MODEL OF MONEY*

We study an economy in which there is always double coincidence of wants, agents have perfect information about qualities of goods, and there are no transaction costs. The hold‐up problem arises because efforts invested in improving quality prior to search may not be compensated in the market. Situations in which barter fails to motivate quality improvement are identified. With money, however, the extra effort in quality improvement will be compensated when high‐quality good producers trade with agents holding both the low‐quality good and money. Injection of money can induce almost all agents to produce the high‐quality good.     

Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia

This paper develops a model in which costly barter is used by firms to protect working capital against outside creditors. Although creditors could agree to postpone debt payments and to avoid destroying the firm's working capital, if the firm cannot commit not to divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater is the debt overhang, the more likely is the use of barter, with and without the possibility of debt restructuring. Empirical evidence from Russian firm-level data is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 635–656. New Economic School, CEFIR, CEPR, and WDI, Nakhimovsky pr. 47, Moscow 117418, Russia; Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142; and ROSES–CNRS and CEPR, Maison des Sciences économiques, 106–112 Bd de l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E41, G34, P31.     

Money and the gains from trade*

This article studies the role of money in environments where in each meeting there is a double coincidence of real wants. Traders who meet at random finance their purchases through current production, the sale of divisible money or both. It is shown that in the absence of valued money if traders have asymmetric tastes for each other's good, they produce and exchange socially inefficient quantities. With valued money, however, traders exchange efficient quantities if the asymmetry of tastes is not too large. It is shown that the gains from trade in the monetary economy are strictly greater than those in the corresponding barter economy, that the Friedman rule holds, and that the allocation of resources in the monetary economy converges to the allocation in the barter economy as the growth rate of the money supply is increased.     

An endogenous structural credit risk model incorporating with moral hazard and rollover risk

In this paper, we embed optimal contracting between the manager and equity holders into Leland-Toft endogenous structural credit risk model to study the impact of moral hazard on the firm's credit risk with rollover debts. Our model quantitatively shows that the agency costs induced by the moral hazard can endogenously have significant impacts on credit spreads, besides the costs of rolling over the maturing debts of the firm. It originates from the conflicts that these two costs should be covered by equity holders while both the manager and maturing debt holders are still paid in full. The numerical results show that the credit spread with the agency costs of moral hazard is larger than the one without the agency costs. Thus, the moral hazard could be used to explain “credit spread puzzle” as an endogenous factor. The explicit formulae of the equity value, the debt value, and the endogenous default boundary are also given.