“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

Disclosure “Bunching”

This paper studies managers' preferences among information acquisition and disclosure policies when their firms are required to engage in “real‐time” or “continuous” financial reporting. The paper predicts that for many, but not all, processes describing the distribution of their firms' cash flows, when subject to such reporting requirements, managers will engage in disclosure “bunching,” that is, they will bunch the discretionary component of the information they acquire and disclose into a single point in time rather than spread the acquisition and disclosure of that information over time. We show that managers' preferred bunching period depends on managers' strategy for trading in their firms' shares, managers' risk aversion, the risk premium the capital market attaches to firms' shares, and the size of managers' initial ownership stakes in their firms. We also study and characterize how the equilibrium prices of firms' shares vary over time and also how managers' optimal trading strategies vary with their most preferred “bunching” strategies. Several extensions confirm the robustness of the optimality of disclosure “bunching.”     

“Lucas” in the Laboratory

We study the Lucas asset pricing model in a controlled setting. Participants trade two long‐lived securities in a continuous open‐book system. The experimental design emulates the stationary, infinite‐horizon setting of the model and incentivizes participants to smooth consumption across periods. Consistent with the model, prices align with consumption betas and comove with aggregate dividends, particularly so when risk premia are higher. Trading significantly increases consumption smoothing compared to autarky. Nevertheless, as in field markets, prices are excessively volatile. The noise corrupts traditional generalized method of moment tests. Choices display substantial heterogeneity, with no subject representative for pricing.     

The accounting of “The Meeting”: Examining calculability within a “Fluid” local space

This study traces events in an empirical setting where a key local space, “The Meeting”, was made calculable. Building on field data from interviews and documentary sources at ABB Industry/Finland, the study theorizes in the interpretive genre, elaborating on the notion of the calculable space. It argues the following: Accounting can be extended into un-formalized and more elusive local spaces – into “fluid” spaces which are not clearly mapped within the organizational hierarchy, and which lie beyond recognized responsibility units or physically distinct cells at the factory floor. By opening visibility into the discretion of these “fluid” local spaces, a tighter alignment between programmatic ideals and real action at the organizational grass-root can be achieved. Self-devised non-financial measurement, mediating local tensions and the interests of “autonomous” actors, becomes the technology of government in this process of normalization – which is, however, not to be acknowledged as being unproblematic.     

Recruiting new “huddled masses” and “wretched refuse”: a prolegomenon to the human colonization of space

This paper is offered as an introduction to some of the personnel problems we are likely to face when substantial off-Earth colonization becomes feasible. Most of the literature to date on the subject portrays future colonies as similar in population and community structure to contemporary North American or European communities. A consideration of the history of colonization and of human population movements in general indicates the likelihood that future space colonization will also be hard to control and will take unexpected turns not always to the liking of those in supposed charge. Thus, the greatest impetus to move to the new colonies will come, as in the past, most likely from those throughout the world with the most desperate needs. Again, many nations may, as in the past, take the opportunity to use the new colonies as places to jettison unwanted or undesirable subgroups.