A model of money counterfeits

This note offers a game-theoretic analysis of the strategic interaction between a central bank and a counterfeiter. Counterfeit notes cause a potential loss for consumers because such notes are confiscated when detected. The central bank is assumed to choose a bank-note design that minimizes the sum of the production cost of the notes and of the expected loss to the noncounterfeiting part of the population. The counterfeiter maximizes his expected return. I find that this game has a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium, and this equilibrium is typically unique. Depending on parameter values (specifically on the face values of notes), there is either no counterfeiting or much counterfeiting in equilibrium. Intermediate cases are never an equilibrium.     

Giovanni Arrighi: Systemic Cycles of Accumulation,Hegemonic Transitions,and the Rise of China

This article surveys and critically assesses the life work of Giovanni Arrighi, a renowned historical sociologist and world-systems scholar who passed away in 2009. In a trilogy of books published between 1994 and 2007 Arrighi develops the master concept of his theoretical legacy, systemic cycles of accumulation, and advances an original reading of the history and dynamics of world capitalism as a succession of hegemonic episodes, each one more expansive than the previous and culminating in crises and chaotic transitions. He anticipated the rise of a Chinese-led East Asia as the emergent twenty-first century centre of a reorganised world economy and society. Arrighi is faulted for failing to develop any theory of politics, the state and collective agency in his construct, for his lack of attention to social forces from below, and for his dismissal of recent theorising on globalization.     

Mentor Bouniatian on cycles and equilibrium

Although Mentor Bouniatian's theory of the business cycle is no longer referred to, it used to be often cited for its emphasis on time-lags (wherein he anticipated Aftalion) and for its early use of the acceleration principle. There are, moreover, additional elements of interest: he identified the conditions for a moving equilibrium, with some traits similar to the so-called ‘Harrod-Domar model’, he introduced the exogenous/endogenous distinction in business cycle theory, he was among the pioneers of the idea that growth cannot be dissociated from cycles and crises, and he discussed aspects of the ‘fallacy of composition’ problem.This paper examines these features of Bouniatian's theory of cycles and crises (as well as some frankly unsuccessful ones), both in terms of their relationships with contemporary developments in this area of research and in terms of their internal logic and methodology and their role in Bouniatian's analytical construction. As an upshot it is argued that although Bouniatian attempted to couch his theory in terms of the marginalist toolbox, his views on cycles ranges were more akin to the tradition of heretics, for he thought of crises not as a temporary deviations from equilibrium but perceived instead equilibrium as a temporary state of affairs in a world where overcapitalization is the norm rather than an exception.     

Pitfalls in the Theory of Growth: An application to the balance of payments constrained growth model

In 1851 the French Social economist Auguste Ott discussed the problem of gluts and commercial crises, together with the issue of distributive justice between workers in co-operative societies. He did so by means of a ‘simple reproduction scheme’ sharing some features with modern intersectoral transactions tables, in particular in terms of their graphical representation. This paper presents Ott's theory of crises (which was based on the disappointment of expectations) and the context of his model, and discusses its peculiarities, supplying a new piece for the reconstruction of the prehistory of input–output analysis.     

银行危机与货币危机共生性关系的实证研究

1 997— 1 998年的亚洲金融风暴中 ,银行危机与货币危机的同时爆发 ,即共生性危机的发生引发国际社会与学术界对这种现象的重新思考 :这种共生性现象是否确实具有普遍性 ?从理论的角度来看 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着一定的联系 ,但到目前为止 ,很少有研究从实证的角度来证明这种联系的确存在。正是基于此 ,本文从实证的角度出发 ,旨在揭示出银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着相互影响 ,换言之 ,共生性危机的发生是具有显著性的。具体来说 ,本文以 1 975— 2 0 0 0年期间 53个国家危机的发生情况为研究对象 ,分别运用频率分布、信号法 ,以及概率回归模型来分析两种危机的共生性 ,并得到非常一致的结论 :在新兴市场国家中 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着明显的相互关系 ,同时银行危机更趋向于作为货币危机即将发生的同步或预警指标 ,而反之则不然。     

Stability periods between financial crises: The role of macroeconomic fundamentals and crises management policies

This study aims to identify which factors explain why some countries enjoy long durations of stability, while others experience crises in shorter intervals. We analyze the duration of stability periods between currency, debt, and banking crises by employing an innovative econometric strategy, the Finite Mixture Model (FMM). Real and financial variables show high predictive power for stability spells between currency crises. Regarding debt crises, the real interest rate is observed to be the best predictor. The time between systemic financial crises appears to be prolonged through government interventions and through IMF program participation, while bank recapitalization has a negative impact.     

Foreign investment, reparations and the proposal for an international bank: notes on the lectures of J M Keynes in Geneva, July 1929

Keynes's lectures to the Geneva School of International Studiesprovide substance to the intellectual linkages between the Cambridgedon and economists working in international economic agenciesduring the inter-war period. Keynes was keenly sought afteras a policy adviser; as the notes to these lectures indicate,he provided his audience with theoretical insights into thepressing issues of the day - reparations and the transfer problem,the economic foundations of the Dawes and Young Plans, and proposalsfor an international bank.     

Liberalization,Regulatory Delays and Vulnerability to Systemic Banking Crisis

This work aims at contributing to the improvement of the early warning systems of banking crises using a new approach accounting for model uncertainty. We show that a multinomial logit model based on Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is a good strategy to predict banking crisis. To do this, we argue that differences in vulnerability to banking crisis can be largely explained by an asymmetry between financial market evolution and regulation update on a sample of 49 developed and developing countries between 1980 and 2010. When markets are liberalized, competition pushes bankers to take more risks and take advantage of regulatory delays thus increasing crises probabilities. Our empirical evidence supports that crisis probability is higher in country liberalizing their banking system when regulation is not updated. We developed an early warning system for systemic banking crises based on the multinomial logit model. Its main difference to existing prediction models and its contribution to the literature is that it is intended to identify and resolve what is called by Bussiere and Fratzscher [(2006). Towards a new early warning system of financial crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, 25(6), 953–973] as post-crisis bias in binomial models and to develop a new methodology of leading indicators selection based on BMA. Overall, our model predicts all banking crises during our sample period.     

The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860

It is commonly believed that New Institutional Economics, particularly the theoretical innovations of Douglass North over the past 20 years and more, has lent scientific legitimacy to economic history. Yet, North is a prisoner of a very peculiar conception of historical development which is no more scientific than rival theories. Two particular aspects of his work underline this point. First, his presentation of class struggles and institutions as contractual relations, understood in economic terms, is highly questionable. Second, it remains to be seen whether or not his recent acceptance of the relevance of ideology is convincing: his account of Soviet stagnation and the crises of Muslim societies leads him into an idealist or culturalist deadlock.     

Do financial distress and liquidity crises affect value and size premiums?

This study investigates the impact of liquidity crises on the relationship between stock (value and size) premiums and default risk in the US market. It first examines whether financial distress can explain value and size premiums, and then, subsequently, aims to determine whether liquidity crises increase the risk of value and size premium investment strategies. The study employs a time-varying approach and a sample of US stock returns for the period between January 1982 and March 2011, a period which includes the current liquidity crisis, so as to examine the relationship between default risk, liquidity crises and value and size premiums. The findings indicate that the default premium has explanatory power for value and size premiums, which affect firms with different characteristics. We also find that liquidity crises may actually increase the risks related to size and value premium strategies.     

Banking,currency, stock market and debt crises in Spain, 1850–1995

What type of crisis is generated when debt increases? We extend the literature by framework by introducing currency and stock market crises in the analysis. We apply our proposal to the case of Spain, since this is a country that has experienced a very important amount of financial crises from the nineteenth century onwards. We find the same results as the previous literature for the determinants of banking and debt crises but substituting external and public debt with perpetual debt and where perpetual debt has a less important role than crises in the private sector. Moreover, we find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that currency crises depend strongly and positively on financial centre crises and negatively and mildly on perpetual debt. We justify the negative relalionship due to an inflation tax. We also find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that stock market crises depend only positively and strongly on financial centre crises.     

Transparency and currency crises

The role transparency plays in the prevention of currency crises is widely acknowledged. Nevertheless, the relationship between transparency and currency crises has rarely been subjected to systematic cross‐national scrutiny. This paper attempts to explore the effect of transparency on currency crises by focusing on a specific dimension of transparency: the public dissemination of aggregate economic data by governments. My analysis provides strong evidence that greater transparency is associated with a lower likelihood of currency crises, regardless of economic conditions. When I add economic and political determinants of currency crises, the estimate of transparency remains unaltered in magnitude or statistical significance.     

A Bayesian Signals Approach for the Detection of Crises

In this paper, we consider the signals approach as an early-warning-system to detect crises. Crisis detection from a signals approach involves Type I and II errors which are handled through a utility function. We provide a Bayesian model and we test the effectiveness of the signals approach in three data sets: (1) Currency and banking crises for 76 currency and 26 banking crises in 15 developing and 5 industrial countries between 1970 and 1995, (2) costly asset price booms using quarterly data ranging from 1970 to 2007, and (3) public debt crises in Europe in 11 countries in the European Monetary Union from the introduction of the Euro until November 2011. The Bayesian model relies on a vector autoregression for indicator variables, and incorporates dynamic factors, time-varying weights in the latent composite indicator and special priors to avoid the proliferation of parameters. The Bayesian vector autoregressions are extended to a semi-parametric context to capture non-linearities. Our evidence reveals that our approach is successful as an early-warning mechanism after allowing for breaks and nonlinearities and, perhaps more importantly, the composite indicator is better represented as a flexible nonlinear function of the underlying indicators.

     

On the dynamics of inequality

The dynamics of inequality are studied in a model of human capital accumulation with credit constraints. This model admits a multiplicity of steady state skill ratios that exhibit varying degrees of inequality across households. The main result studies equilibrium paths. It is shown that an equilibrium sequence of skill ratios must converge monotonically to the smallest steady state that exceeds the initial ratio for that sequence. Convergence is “gradual" in that the steady state is not achieved in finite time. On the other hand, if the initial skill ratio exceeds the largest steady state, convergence to a steady state is immediate.This paper is based on unpublished notes from 1990; see http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/debraj/DevEcon/Notes/incdist.pdf. Two considerations suggest that these results may be worth reporting in print. First, the existence of a sizeable recent literature indicates that these relatively early notes may have value outside a filing cabinet or a private webpage. Second, Mukul Majumdar’s own research on economic growth with a nonconvex technology is an even earlier precursor to some of this literature, so the current outlet – a special issue in his honor – seems appropriate. Conversations with Glenn Loury simplified the proof of the main result. I thank Dilip Mookherjee for many useful discussions, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Funding from the National Science Foundation under grant number 0241070 is acknowledged. This paper is dedicated with much affection and warm admiration to Mukul Majumdar – or to Mukulda, as I always think of him – on the occasion of his 60th birthday.     

Capital account openness and early warning system for banking crises in G20 countries

This paper develops an early warning system for banking crises in the G20 countries, with the inclusion of capital account openness indicators. Results suggest that the capital account openness demonstrates a significant predictive power on systemic banking crises, and the impact is related with the level of the economic development. For low-income countries, increased capital account openness has a significantly negative impact on the banking crises likelihoods, while for high-income countries it imposes a positive impact. For middle-income countries, however, the occurrence of banking crises is more indifferent to capital account liberalization.     

Scissor crises,value-prices,and the movement of value-prices under technical change

The paper defines and exemplifies scissor crises as untoward price movements and their social effects and looks for possible causes in historical developments and for the effects of differential movements in sectoral efficiencies on an important type of ‘rational’ prices. It establishes the parallelism of these price movements with what might be expected to occur in the realm of market prices in the same conditions and investigates the relative speed of causes and effects. The emphasis throughout is on the link between efficiencies and changes in values and thus on the link between physical phenomena and their social effects as mediated by values and prices, effects which in extreme cases could result in the trauma of scissor crises.     

Fire‐sale FDI? The Impact of Financial Crises on Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze the evolution of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to developing and emerging countries around financial crises. We empirically examine the Fire‐Sale FDI hypothesis and describe the pattern of FDI inflows surrounding financial crises. We also add a more granular detail about the types of financial crises and their potentially differential effects on FDI. We distinguish between mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and greenfield investment, as well as between horizontal (tariff jumping) and vertical (integrating production stages) FDI. We find that financial crises have a strong negative effect on inward FDI in our sample. Crises are also shown to reduce the value of horizontal and vertical FDI. We do not find empirical evidence of fire‐sale FDI; on the contrary, financial crises are shown to affect FDI flows and M&A activity negatively.     

Predicting Banking Crises with Artificial Neural Networks: The Role of Nonlinearity and Heterogeneity

Studies of the early warning systems (EWSs) for banking crises usually rely on linear classifiers, estimated with international datasets. I construct an EWS based on an artificial neural network (ANN) model, and I also account for regional heterogeneity in order to improve the generalization ability of EWS models. All of the banking crises in my test set are then predictable at a 24‐month horizon, using information from earlier crises. For some countries, estimation with a regional dataset significantly improves the predictions. The ANN outperforms the usual logit regression, assessed by the area under the receiver operating characteristics curve.     

Sudden stops and the Mexican wave: Currency crises,capital flow reversals and output loss in emerging markets

Sudden stops are the simultaneous occurrence of a currency/balance of payments crisis with a reversal in capital flows. We investigate whether sudden-stop crises are a unique phenomenon and whether they entail an especially large and abrupt pattern of output collapse (a “Mexican wave”). Using a panel data set over 1975–1997 and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we distinguish between the output effects of currency crises, capital inflow reversals, and sudden-stop crises. Sudden-stop crises have a large negative, but short-lived, impact on output growth over and above that found with currency crises. A currency crisis typically reduces output by about 2–3%, while a sudden stop reduces output by an additional 6–8% in the year of the crisis. The cumulative output loss of a sudden stop is even larger, around 13–15% over a 3-year period. Our model estimates correspond closely to the output dynamics of the ‘Mexican wave’ (such as seen in Mexico in 1995, Turkey in 1994 and elsewhere), and out-of-sample predictions of the model explain well the sudden (and seemingly unexpected) collapse in output associated with the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis.