Economic instruments and the environmental accounts

The Nordic countries have now had experience with environmental taxes and subsidies as a major component of their environmental policy over an extensive period of time. The Swedish System of Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA) include environmental taxes and subsidies as part of the official statistics. This article presents the accounts for taxes and subsidies, linked to the accounts for emissions data by industry. It demonstrates disparities between emissions and environmental taxes, as well as where industries or environmental problems are not regulated. The data show that in Sweden economic instruments are always aimed at particular actors or areas, and are never quite as comprehensive as recommended by economic theory. The environmental taxes are primarily aimed at fossil fuel use and related emissions, and have been mostly applied to the household sector and services sector, while industry often has been given exemptions due to concerns about international competition. The environmentally motivated subsidies are mainly directed to agriculture, fishing and research on renewable resources. A fully developed international data set on taxes and subsidies would provide a sound base for comparing the impact on international competitiveness. Eurostat is promoting the use of environmental accounts data for its member countries by harmonizing methods and engaging in publication of international comparisons.     

Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance

Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

Foreign trade, environmental protection and sustainable economic growth in China

Since the 1990s, China has exhibited growth in both foreign trade and the economy. Promoting environmental protection and sustainable economic growth are main concerns in the academic profession in the country. This paper makes an empirical analysis of trade and environmental pollution, and discusses the inherent relationship between foreign trade, environmental protection and sustainable economic growth. In addition, this paper makes several policy suggestions with a view to adjusting trade structure, enforcing environmental protection and promoting sustainable economic growth in China.     

贸易、环境污染与经济增长——基于开放经济下的一个内生增长模型

通过构建一个开放经济条件下的内生增长模型,文章探讨了国际贸易、环境质量与经济持续增长三者的内在关系以及相互作用的动力机制。首先,通过对模型的竞争性市场均衡分析,给出了平衡增长路径的经济增长率,并系统地分析了在环境污染进入效用函数的情形下长期经济增长的内在机理。其次,通过对最优增长路径进行比较静态分析,分别讨论了贸易自由化对环境质量、经济增长、福利效应的影响;污染外部性对长期经济增长的约束等。最后给出了模型的综合结论及其现实涵义。     

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY WITH INTERNATIONALLY OWNED FIRMS*

The consequences of international firm ownership for strategic trade policy are examined both in a general and in a simple linear model of an international duopoly with two governments using production subsidies as policy instruments. At first sight, the case for strategic trade policy seems to be weakened, because international ownership reduces a government's incentive for rent-shifting. Closer inspection shows, however, that there are ownership structures leading to optimal policies which induce the duopolists to behave more collusively. This tends to resolve the conflict between national and international rationality in a policy game with retaliation and makes strategic trade policy look more attractive.     

The modern welfare state: Problems and suggested reforms

This article examines some of the major market failures and government failures at work in the modern welfare state and investigates the political reasons for ignoring these failures in formulating welfare state policy. Next, the article examines some recent economic developments that endanger the welfare state: the expansion of international trade, skill-biased technological change, and the restructuring of firms. Finally, it suggests some policy approaches that may help make the welfare state more efficient and equitable.     

国际服务贸易促进我国经济增长的实证分析及对策研究

随着全球经济的重点正从货物贸易转向服务贸易,服务贸易在我国经济高速持续增长中能够发挥重要支持和源泉作用。通过对1985-2001年的统计数据进行实证分析国际服务贸易对我国经济增长的作用,对我国服务贸易开放度与国际竞争力进行实证分析探讨服务贸易对经济增长带动不足的原因。提出引进、消化国外先进的生产性服务;发挥服务业传统优势,提高服务业知识技术含量,不断创造出新的优势;用竞争优势理论,努力增强我国服务贸易的国际竞争力;充分发挥政府在服务业竞争能力培育中的作用等增强服务贸易国际竞争力、支撑经济增长的政策建议。     

The economics of poverty traps part one: Complete markets

This paper lists theoretical reasons why neoclassical models of one-sector growth imply that nations with identical economic structures need not converge to the same steady state or balanced growth path, and outlines the empirical significance and policy implications of conditional nonconvergence. We survey poverty traps in both convex and nonconvex economies with complete market structures. Among the potential causes of traps are subsistence consumption; distorted international trade in intermediate inputs; demographic transitions when fertility is endogenous; technological complementarities in the production of consumption goods, financial intermediation services, manufactures, or human capital; coordination failures among voters; various restrictions on borrowing; indivisibilities in human capital formation or child rearing; and monopolistic competition in product or factor markets.     

On the Efficiency of Green Trade Policy

The paper derives conditions for second best environmental policy when there are foreign countries which fail to implement appropriate environmental regulations. It is shown that in such cases, efficiency in the global economy will not be achieved unless domestic environmental regulations are supplemented by trade provisions. The result is independent of whether environmental problems are local or international. Furthermore, when trade provisions are implemented, efficiency requires that domestic environmental taxes are fixed at the Pigouvian tax rate. The results imply that there is an economic rationale for regulating the trade between signatories and non-signatories of international environmental agreements. Efficient trade regulations will either take the form of trade restrictions or trade promotions, depending on whether the environmental problem is created by production or consumption activities, and whether the net import of the relevant commodity is positive or negative. It is argued that an efficient climate agreement, signed by a group of fuel-importing countries (e.g., the OECD countries), should include a subsidy on the import of fossil fuels.     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

Fossil fuel subsidies and environmental constraints

Fossil fuel subsidies are applied in many countries for different policy reasons such as maintaining jobs in fossil fuel sectors, securing national energy supply or lowering the energy costs of selected industries to strengthen competitiveness. The current economic costs of fossil fuel subsidy policies can be substantially increased by future environmental constraints. We illustrate this point in the framework of a general equilibrium analysis for Germany where we quantify the economic costs of alternative hard coal subsidy policies at different CO₂ reduction levels. Our calculations show that German hard coal subsidies as a means of retaining jobs can get very expensive with additional specific costs of up to annual 70 000 DM per job for a given CO₂ reduction target of 35%. Though the empirical analysis is focused on Germany the general conclusion that current subsidy policies of fossil fuels must be fundamentally reconsidered in view of forthcoming environmental constraints is also relevant for other countries.     

Merger Profitability and Trade Policy

We study the profitability incentives for merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez‐faire economy. A key element is a change in the governments’ incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not.     

后危机时期中国经济安全面临的风险与挑战

后危机时代,中国经济安全面临着严峻的挑战:中国贸易争端增多;中国经济面临巨大的金融风险;中国能源资源瓶颈凸显;气候环保压力空前强化;信息安全存在着极大的隐患;中国对非洲等落后地区的援助引起了国际争议。面对挑战,中国应积极主动地调整战略与策略:优化贸易结构,减少对外贸易摩擦;加强金融监管,抵御金融风险;尊重国际惯例,积极发挥建设性作用;回应国际社会诉求,高度重视气候环保问题;推动加强国际互利合作,确保资源能源安全;重视信息化建设,增强经济信息安全;加强境外投资的政府管理和引导,确保海外资产安全;对外经济援助要努力做到原则性与灵活性的统一。     

Dynamic Games of Environmental Policy in a Global Economy: Taxes versus Quotas

The effects of environmental policy on the global environment as an international public good with a stock externality and national welfare are examined in a model with trade in a polluting commodity. The welfare effects of environmental policy, decomposed into terms of trade, abatement cost, and environmental damage effects, induce governments to adopt a strategic use of their policy measures. In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, it is demonstrated that the emission tax game brings about larger strategic distortions than the emission quota game.     

Technology Transfer and the South's Participation in an International Environmental Agreement*

We develop a North–South model of international trade and transboundary pollution to analyze the relationship between environmental technology transfer and the South's incentive to join an international environmental agreement (IEA). We find necessary and sufficient conditions under which technology transfer will increase the South's incentive to join the IEA. We also find necessary and sufficient conditions under which the South's participation in the IEA will increase the market incentive for technology transfer. Results have clear policy implications for (i) the sequence of technology transfer and the South's IEA membership, and (ii) the legitimacy of the South's subsidies for technology transfer.     

Trade Costs and the Open Macroeconomy

Trade costs are known to be a major obstacle to international economic integration. Following the approach of New Open Economy Macroeconomics, this paper explores the effects of international trade costs in a micro‐founded general equilibrium model that allows for different degrees of exchange rate pass‐through. Trade costs are shown to create an endogenous home bias in consumption and the model performs well in matching empirical trade shares for OECD countries. In addition, trade costs reduce cross‐country output and consumption correlations, and they magnify exchange rate volatility. Trade costs turn a monetary expansion into a beggar‐thy‐neighbor policy.     

外贸对经济增长的影响分析:理论与经验模型验证

国际贸易理论的核心问题是探究贸易利益的产生及其分配,国际贸易与经济增长具有密切联系。理论分析和经验证据均表明,一国外贸规模对经济增长有着重要作用,对外贸易的变动往往成为决定一国经济增长趋势的关键因素。文章从理论和经验模型上对我国近10多年来外贸和经济增长的关系给出了相关的实证检验,旨在探讨并揭示国际贸易促进经济增长的内在机制。     

Heterochrony,industrial evolution and international trade

This paper uses the biological concepts ofheterochrony andK- and r-strategies to construct an economic theory about industry life cycles and trade policy. Relations between various types of heterochrony and different competitive environments provide a general explanation for the Japanese and Korean successes in international trade, the decline of the U.S. and E.U. performance and the relative failures of some Latin-American states.     

Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries

This paper explores the links between international trade theory and the practice of trade and industrial policy in open economies, with special attention to three areas where theoretical lessons have been misunderstood in policy debates. I argue that the "concertina rule" for tariff reform justifies reductions in high tariffs but not moves towards uniformity and particularly not increases in low tariffs. I show that the basic principles of tariff reform are the same in unilateral, multilateral and customs union contexts. Finally, I suggest that the theory of strategic trade policy does not justify subsidies to high-technology industries.