What's behind the rise in profitability in the US in the 1980s and 1990s?

Profitability in the US has been rising since the early 1980sand by 1997 was at its highest level since its post-World WarII peak in the mid-1960s, and the profit share, by one definition,at its highest point. In this paper, I examine the role of thechange in the profit share and capital intensity, as well asstructural change, on movements in the rate of profit between1947 and 1997. Its recent recovery is traced to a rise in theprofit share in national income, a slowdown in capital–labourgrowth at the industry level, and employment shifts to relativelylabour-intensive industries.     

Class struggle and economic fluctuations: VAR analysis of the post-war US economy

Building on Marx’s insights in Chapter 25, Volume I of Capital, an augmented version of the cyclical profit squeeze (CPS) theory offers a plausible explanation of macroeconomic fluctuations under capitalism. The pattern of dynamic interactions that emerges from a 3-variable (profit share, unemployment rate and nonresidential fixed investment) vector autoregression estimated with quarterly data for the postwar U.S. economy is consistent with the CPS theory for the regulated (1949Q4--1975Q1) as well as for the neoliberal periods (starting in 1980 or in 1985). Hence, the CPS mechanism seems to be in operation even under neoliberalism.     

Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.     

Trade Liberalization or Oil Shocks: Which Better Explains Structural Breaks in International Trade Ratios?

Ben‐David and Papell's (1997 ) tests for structural breaks in trade ratios over the postwar period revealed that trade ratios exhibited structural breaks in their paths and that postbreak trade averages exceeded prebreak averages. They attributed these breaks to trade liberalization measures carried out during this period. We re‐evaluate their results and find that for most countries the averages of actual postbreak ratios were below the averages of the extrapolated prebreak ratios and that a large share of the breaks coincided with the 1970s oil shocks. This would suggest that the oil shocks rather than trade liberalization may account for the breaks.     

The simple analytics and empirics of the cyclical profit squeeze and cyclical underconsumption theories: Clearing the air

This paper examines the controversies that exist between the cyclical profit squeeze (CPS) and nutcracker theories of cyclical crisis. The simple analytics and empirics of both theories are examined. It is shown that the criticisms of the CPS advanced by Sherman (1997) are invalid, and that the two components of the nutcracker theory—a cyclical underconsumption crisis plus a non-labor cost-induced decline in profits—have little relevance for explaining postwar U.S. business cycles.     

Income Distribution,Econophysics and Piketty

Piketty, Atkinson and Saez have put the analysis of income distribution back on center stage. The distinction between property income and labor income plays a central role in this framework. Property income derives from the rate of return on stocks of income-earning wealth and is more unequally distributed than labor income. Piketty argues that, because the rate of return (r) is generally greater than the rate of growth of the economy (g), property income tends to grow more rapidly than labor income, so that rising income inequality is an intrinsic tendency of capitalism despite interruptions due to world wars and great depressions. This article argues the exact opposite. The rise of unions and the welfare state were the fruits of long-term historical gains made by labor, and the postwar constraints on real and financial capital arose in sensible reaction to the Great Depression. The ‘neoliberal’ era beginning in the 1980s significantly rolled back all of these. The article uses the econophysics two-class argument of Yakovenko to show that we can explain the empirical degree of inequality using two factors alone: the profit share and the degree of financialization of income. The rise of inequality in the neoliberal era then derives from a reduction in the wage share (rise in the profit share) in the face of assaults on labor and the welfare state, and a sharp increase in the financialization of incomes as financial controls are weakened. These are inherently socio-political outcomes, and what was lost can be regained. Hence, there is no inevitable return to Piketty’s ‘patrimonial capitalism’.     

Profit-sharing versus interest-taking in the Kaldor–Pasinetti theory of income and profit distribution

Abstract

This paper reformulates the Kaldor–Pasinetti model of income and profit distribution by introducing the interest rate from the very outset of the model but maintaining other Kaldor–Pasinetti assumptions intact. It is shown that the profit rate and the share of profits in national income are not independent from either the capitalists' or workers' propensity to save. Many contributors to the theory of income and profit distribution have erred in attributing a potentially positive impact of the interest rate upon profits. The interest rate is always and everywhere a tax on functional and personal incomes together. This result explains Schumpeter's observation that ‘Interest acts as a tax upon profit.’ In an alternative model, workers receive a share of profits instead of fixed contractual interest. It is shown that the profit rate and share are not independent from either propensity to save. Furthermore, the workers' share of profits has a positive impact on the rate and share of profits. This implies that a profit sharing regime could be more conducive to capital accumulation and job creation. It is found that Pasinetti's Cambridge Equation is more akin to a profit sharing regime.     

Investment-specific technological change, skill accumulation, and wage inequality

Wage inequality between education groups in the United States has increased substantially since the early 1980s. The relative number of college-educated workers has also increased dramatically in the postwar period. This paper presents a unified framework where the dynamics of both skill accumulation and wage inequality arise as an equilibrium outcome driven by measured investment-specific technological change. Working through equipment–skill complementarity and endogenous skill accumulation, the model does well in capturing the steady growth in the relative quantity of skilled labor during the postwar period and the substantial rise in wage inequality after the early 1980s. Based on the calibrated model, we examine the quantitative effects of some hypothetical tax-policy reforms on skill accumulation, wage inequality, and welfare.     

Profitability Capital Accumulation and Crisis in the Greek Economy 1958–2009: a Marxist Analysis

Abstract

This study examines the behavior of the main Marxian variables in the postwar Greek economy. The different phases of the capital accumulation process are distinguished and analyzed according to the movement of the rate of profit. The ‘golden age’ of the 1958–74 period of high profitability and strong growth was followed by the stagflation crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s. After 1985, and especially after 1991, the ‘neoliberal solution’ to the crisis resulted in a modest recovery of profitability, capital accumulation and output growth based exclusively on the huge increase in the rate of exploitation for labor. When the stimulus to aggregate demand provided from debt driven personal consumption and state deficit spending was removed, the underlying structural crisis in the real economy manifested itself fully in 2009 and after.     

A SYNTHETIC ESTIMATE OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH OF JAPAN 1885–1973*

This article present estimates, in current prices, of the national wealth of Japan and of about a dozen components for twelve benchmark dates between 1885 and 1973, the distance ranging, with one exception, from five to twelve years. The estimates are derived by a combination of (a) Ohkawa's perpetual inventory estimates of reproducible fixed assets for the period from 1885 to 1940 and Economic Planning Agency censuses for 1950 to 1965, roughly extrapolated to 1973; with (b) estimates of other components of national wealth (land, inventories, consumer durables and net foreign assets) taken for the pre-war period chiefly from census-type data and derived for the postwar period from miscellaneous, mainly official, sources. As in most countries the current value of Japan's national wealth increased until World War II considerably more slowly than its national product, which expanded with extraordinary rapidity. In the postwar period, however, the ratio showed a slight upward trend reaching by 1973 fully 3 1/2. The ratio of all reproducible assets to national product showed a similar pattern at a lower level, reaching 2 1/2 in 1973. In contrast the ratio of so-called productive assets (non-residential buildings, equipment and inventories) failed to show a definite secular trend remaining between 1.5 and 2.2 at all but one benchmark date. Changes in the structure of national wealth over the past century were pronounced, but very different before and after World War II. Up to the 1940's, the share of land declined sharply from about one-half to less than one-fourth, to the benefit primarily of producer durables and non-residential structures. In the last quarter of a century, in contrast, the extraordinary rise in urban land prices brought the share of land in national wealth back to one-third (though the share of agricultural land continued to decline rapidly), while that of producer and consumer durables continued to increase.     

Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with Wage Bargaining: Implications for Equilibrium Unemployment

We analyze the relationship between profit sharing, employee effort, wage formation and unemployment under different relative timings of the wage and profit sharing decisions. The optimal profit share under commitment exceeds that under flexibility, because through a profit share commitment the firm can induce wage moderation. The negotiated profit sharing depends positively on the bargaining power of trade union and it has both effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. Higher profit sharing is shown to reduce equilibrium unemployment under ``sufficiently rigid' labor market institutions, but it can harm employment when labor market ``rigidities' are ``small enough'.     

A Quantitative Exploration on the Determinants of (De-)Industrialisation: The case of Greece

The aim of this paper is to explore the main determinants of (de-) industrialisation, taking Greece as a case study. Industrialisation in postwar Greece measured in terms of manufacturing industry's share of output was not impressive. It reached its peak (20.2% of GDP) in the mid 1970s and, since then, it followed a declining path. Relevant theory relates the evolution of industry to macro and micro variables, stressing the role of structural change or 'trading up' within manufacturing. The regression results underline that the reasons behind the unimpressive Greek industrialisation performance, compared with advanced capitalist economies, are to be found in the low GDP per capita, the deep and long economic recession and the unfavourable manufacturing trade conditions. The preponderance of traditional, low technology, consumer goods sectors over high technology industries is also found to affect negatively the share of manufacturing, but its statistical significance is relatively small. The implications for industrialisation policies are that macro-variables should preferably be used, since micro-tools are not likely to be particularly effective.     

Gender Employment Disparities,Financialization, and Profitability Dynamics on the Eve of Italy's Post-2008 Crisis

This study explores aggregate profitability in Italy from 1994 to 2008 in its connection with structural change and gender employment disparities. Using decomposition analysis, the study finds that aggregate profit rate declined, but the profit share did not. Male variables – such as earnings, output, employment, and working hours – tended to have more weight than female ones in explaining aggregate outcomes. Structural change also played a major role, as the economy specialized in sectors with falling real wages and wage shares, especially the financial sector and construction. Further falls in the wage share and widening wage gaps may not guarantee a rise in profitability. This result entails that “neo-mercantilist” approaches to solve the crisis might only prepare the next crisis, while a coordinated expansion of demand could be more successful. Moreover, gender issues should not be neglected in terms of favoring women's employment and entrepreneurship.     

收入分配、需求体制与经济增长*——基于“马克思-凯恩斯-卡莱茨基”理论的经验研究

本文运用1978—2015年省级面板数据分析了我国劳动收入份额变动对消费、投资、净出口以及总需求的长期效应及其与经济增长的关系，对“马克思-凯恩斯-卡莱茨基”（MKK）理论进行检验。结果显示：（1）我国的国内需求体制为工资拉动型，但是包括净出口在内的总需求体制为利润拉动型。（2）劳动收入份额上升对消费具有明显的促进作用，对净出口有明显的抑制作用，但对投资的影响不显著。其原因在于我国政府和国企主导的“逆周期”投资和非利润导向型投资。（3）随着国企改革的深化、民间投资占比提升，我国的国内需求体制有向利润拉动型转型的趋势。相比中部和西部地区，东部沿海地区的需求体制更偏向于利润拉动型。     

基于波特模型的农民专业合作社竞争力分析

20世纪90年代初开始,在全国掀起的以农民专业合作社为组织的农业产业化经营热潮成功地缓解了农民小生产与大市场的矛盾,但农民专业合作社竞争力尚未能从根本上改变农民在市场交易中的弱势地位,农民仍然无法分享产业链条中的加工增值和销售利润。文章以农民专业合作社为研究对象,寻找影响农民专业合作社在社会主义市场经济中的各种竞争因素,以提升农民专业合作社竞争力。     

Marx and Kalecki on aggregate instability and class struggle

Abstract

Michal Kalecki developed his original model of the business cycle in the early 1930s. Several versions referred as versions I, II and III have been developed until the late 1960s from which Kalecki draw three central propositions on instability and class struggle: (1) the capitalist system “cannot break the impasse of fluctuations around a static position” unless it is shocked by “semi-exogenous factors”, (2) the dynamics of the profit rate and investment – as in version I and II – may be disconnected from “class struggle” and (3) when class struggle impacts the dynamics of the economy – as in version III – this is happening in a context in which expected profitability of new investment projects is negatively related to the profit share. In this article, we want to show that each of these three proposals represents key differences with Marx.     

Military expenditure and investment in OECD countries, 1954–1973

This paper, using data for 14 large OECD countries between 1954 and 1973, tests the hypothesis that reduced investment has been a major opportunity cost of military expenditure in the postwar period. The share of investment in potential output is made a function of the share of military expenditure, growth rate, and demand pressure. Whether the data are treated as a set of cross sections, time series, or pooled, and under various assumptions about dynamic and error covariance structure, the results indicate a clear negative effect of military expenditure on investment, with a coefficient on military expenditure not significantly different from ?1.     

PROFIT MARGINS INQUIRY: Note on alternative hypotheses as to the determination of Profit Margins

This paper surveys the various accounts offered by Marxian economists for the ending of the long postwar boom. All focus on the decline in profitability, but they offer different expalanations. Three principal categories of crisis theory are distinguished: underconsumption; Marx's ‘Volume III’ falling rate of profit analysis; and several versions of overaccumulation theory, in particular the French regulation school and the North American discussion of the social structure of accumulation. A separate section deals with the relationship between the capitalist state and the crisis. Some general conclusions are drawn concerning the current nature of Marxian economic theory.     

How Germany’s anti-Keynesianism has brought Europe to its knees

This paper investigates the (lack of any lasting) impact of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory on economic policy-making in Germany. The analysis highlights the interplay between economic history and the history of ideas in shaping policy-making in postwar (West) Germany. The paper argues that Germany learned the wrong lessons from its own history and misread the true sources of its postwar success. Monetary mythology and the Bundesbank, with its distinctive anti-inflationary bias, feature prominently in this collective odyssey. The analysis shows that the crisis of the euro today is largely the consequence of Germany’s peculiar anti-Keynesianism.     

To root or not to root? The economics of jailbreak

We construct a structural model that allows us to jointly estimate the demand for smartphones and paid apps using a Bayesian approach. Our data comes from more than 500 college students in Hong Kong and Shanghai. We find that the utility cost rather than the upfront monetary cost of jailbreaking smartphones determines its prevalence. Users mainly jailbreak smartphones to use paid apps for free, a reason more important among Android users than iPhone users. Paid apps contribute the lion’s share of the profits (between 66% and 59%) for both the Android and iPhone. Strictly prohibiting jailbreaking would decrease the aggregate market share of smartphones in the cell phone market. Apple, however, would sell even more iPhones at the expense of Android smartphones.