政策工具及其组合与海上风电技术创新和扩散:来自德国的考察

发展低碳经济的核心在于低碳技术创新和扩散,低碳技术创新和扩散受政策工具及其组合的直接影响。总结归纳政策工具类型、设计要点及其组合特征,分析德国海上风电技术政策工具及其组合特征,并定性研究政策工具、组合特征及相应组织对德国海上风电技术创新和扩散的具体影响。结果表明,各政策工具对海上风电技术创新和扩散具有正向影响;全面性政策工具组合能够克服海上风电技术创新和扩散面临的市场失灵、制度失灵和其它瓶颈;政策工具组合特征在单个政策工具对海上风电技术创新和扩散的影响中起调节作用;政策工具组合全面性、可靠性、一致性程度与海上风电技术创新和扩散正相关;政策工具组合可靠性与全面性、一致性之间在对海上风电技术创新影响中存在互补关系。     

Prices versus quantities in the presence of a second,unpriced, externality

This paper analyzes whether the presence of a second unregulated externality influences the choice between a price and a quantity instrument to address an externality. The author studies a situation in which two goods jointly generate an externality but only one of them is regulated. The two instruments differ because of the presence of uncertainty regarding the private value of the two goods. To ignore the unregulated good and apply Weitzman's classical result on the comparison of the slopes of marginal benefit and cost could be misleading because of the randomness of the unregulated good's quantity. Beside the relative slope of the marginal damage, the substitutability and the distribution of shocks play a role in the comparison. If there is a “cocktail effect” and the regulated and unregulated goods' quantities are negatively correlated, which occurs if they are substitutes, this reinforces the appeal of a price instrument. Furthermore, if the two goods are weak substitutes with correlated demands, the variance of the quantity of the unregulated good is larger under a quota than a tax, which further reinforces the appeal of the tax instrument.     

Patent disclosure requirements and benefit sharing: A counterfactual case of Morocco's argan oil

This article uses the seemingly promising case of Morocco's argan oil to assess the value of patent disclosure requirements (PDRs) as a policy instrument aimed at improving the sharing of biodiversity benefits. After introducing the disclosure requirements debate and discussing relevant features of the argan oil case, I construct a simple counterfactual by asking: “How would PDRs have changed benefit sharing in the argan oil case?” From this case, three practical considerations emerge that shed a realistic, if cautious, light on the marginal value of PDRs as a benefit sharing mechanism: (1) PDRs require an accompanying national biodiversity regime but their relative value is inversely proportional to regime strength (2) PDRs should be assessed based on the additional compliance incentives they provide and median, not blockbuster, patent values and (3) the alternative to no PDRs and no regime is not zero benefits. While these considerations are inherently country-specific, PDRs should generally be assessed at the margin rather than in vague conceptual and aggregate ways.     

Monetary Policy Reaction in an Interdependent Instrument Setting

Policy reaction equations are fitted for the statutory reserve deposit (SRD) and open-market instruments (OMO). The interest rate is treated exogenously. The policy regime envisaged accommodates interdependencies between the instruments. The study is based on quarterly data over the period 1961-74. The results demonstrate a marked difference in the form of the policy response for the two instruments: the SRD instrument responds strongly to the domestic targets, inflation and, unemployment; but shows little response to external factors. The OMO instrument reacts to external influences, but not to the domestic targets, a result consistent with the policymaker's desire to sterilize exogenous influences on the cash-base of the economy. The OMO instrument has a strong association with the interest rate reflecting its market orientation and the political costs of adjusting it. The interest rate proxy is not significant in the SRD equation. There is some evidence for a harmonious association between the SRD and OMO instruments. Finally, the form of the response in each case varies according to the policy intent: contraction and expansion. This reflects a change in the weights attaching to the policy targets as the policy-intention alters.     

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE

This article studies environmental management policy when two fossil‐fuel‐consuming countries noncooperatively regulate greenhouse‐gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel‐price changes affects the tax‐quota equivalence. We explore each country's incentive to choose a policy instrument in a two‐stage policy choice game and find subgame‐perfect Nash equilibria. This sheds new light on the questions of which policy instrument is more stringent and of why adopted instruments could be different among countries. In particular, our result suggests a reason why developing countries tend to employ emission taxes whereas developed countries tend to adopt quotas.     

Second-best trade policies in Cournot oligopoly

In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.     

Exchange rate management when sterilized interventions represent signals of monetary policy

The signalling channel of foreign exchange market interventions suggests that sterilized interventions represent signals of future monetary policy and thus affect exchange rate expectations. Within a two-country game-theoretic framework, which incorporates two novel factors—partial credibility and non-rational expectations—that reduce the exchange rate effects of intervention operations, I derive non-cooperative and cooperative policies of exchange rate management. To retain credibility in the future, sterilized interventions must be accomodated by corresponding subsequent changes in the money supply. Thus, interventions do not represent an instrument independent from general monetary policy. It is shown that the implied tradeoff between internal and external policy objectives makes the coordination of intervention operations advantageous, even in the case of conflicting exchange rate targets.     

Using Non Market Valuation to Inform the Choice Between Permits and Fees in Environmental Regulation

The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.      

碳定价的政策工具选择争论:一个文献综述

二氧化碳等温室气体减排的政策工具选择问题是气候变化经济学中的一个重要研究领域。本文对该领域的最新研究进展作了全面的综述,试图梳理出在应对气候变化政策工具选择问题上各种不同主张的分歧所在,为中国碳减排的政策框架制定提供启示。通过对比分析关于传统的命令-控制工具和新型的基于市场的工具效率的几种不同观点,对处于政策工具选择争论核心的两种市场型工具——碳税和总量控制与交易制度在经济效率、政治可行性、执行成本、国际合作等方面各自的优劣性进行了重点评论,并讨论了更复杂的复合工具和双轨规制方法的特征。最后探讨了中国碳减排的政策工具选择问题,并指出了气候变化政策工具选择领域未来的研究重点。     

Prices vs. Quantities with fiscal cushioning

Enforcement of international environmental quantity regulations (e.g. tradable pollution permits) is often expected to be stricter than that of price regulations (e.g. emission taxes). While both instruments provide opportunities for misrepresenting actual pollution, enforcement of international price-based instruments is additionally hampered by potential fiscal cushioning, i.e. an adjustment of domestic fiscal policies offsetting the tax incentive to reduce emission reductions. The present paper extends the formal debate on Prices vs. Quantities by including the risk of fiscal cushioning. We find the level of the marginal benefit curve and the variance of costs become key elements for instrument choice and can render quantity regulations strictly preferable. Remarkably, in the latter case, the slopes of the marginal curves do not affect optimal instrument choice. Numerical calculations, using data taken from the international climate policy context, support the potential dominance of quantity regulations found in our formal analysis.     

Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.     

Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.     

Fresh surface water resource allocation between Bulgaria and Greece

This paper addresses the important issue of transboundary sharing of fresh surface water resources, including quantity and quality dimensions. It carves a simple economic model of the benefits which can be generated by maximizing the joint profits earned, when the resource is shared efficiently between two countries. The appropriate policy instrument towards this end is a bilateral agreement to charge the same water price to all water users in a given sector. Market clearance will then follow to determine the optimal water price. The case of the Nestos river flowing through Bulgaria and Greece, but overexploited by Bulgaria, in the Balkans is used as a case study. The empirical estimation of a fixed proportions production function for corn derives a marginal water value of the Nestos water for Greece. This value, which applies under the current non-cooperative solution, is higher than the optimal water price in the cooperative solution.     

Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument Under Uncertainty *

This Paper endogenizes the choice between import tariffs and quotas of two policy active countries in a duopsonistic world market. Without uncertainty, import quotas are welfare superior to import tariffs in equilibrium. If two importers can precommit to a type of instrument before deciding the level of the instrument to use in a future period, an import quota equilibrium emerges. We introduce asymmetric risk in the import demand schedule of the two importers. There exists a range of parameters in which a mixed equilibrium emerges, i.e. one country uses a tariff while the other restricts trade with an import quota. The likelihood that both importers choose a different trade instrument in equilibrium is increasing with the correlation coefficient of the two random shocks. [F13]     

Spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union: Why do fiscal instruments matter?

Using a two‐country DSGE model, we analyse the spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. Based on a non‐Walrasian labour market with a labour force participation decision and involuntary unemployment and a detailed fiscal sector, we focus on the relative cross‐border effects of different kinds of fiscal shocks (government expenditure and tax shocks). Among the major lessons from this analysis, five general and striking results are worth highlighting : (1) spillover effects differ widely according to the fiscal instrument, (2) all fiscal instruments produce positive spillover effects on foreign GDP except a rise in government consumption, (3) the response of unemployment is not always negatively correlated with the response of output (4) the different fiscal shocks trigger different effects on foreign inflation and the term of trade, which implies heterogeneous interest‐rate and trade channels, and (5) a more accommodative monetary policy and a scenario of ‘fiscal dominance’ alter greatly the effects of fiscal policy shocks.     

Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments

In many cases policy makers employ multiple instruments to address a single environmental problem, but much of the economics literature on instrument choice focuses on comparing properties of single policy instruments. We argue that under a fairly broad set of circumstances the use of multiple policy instruments can be justified as optimal in a second-best world. We examine two broad categories of second-best policy making: cases with multiple market failures only some of which can be corrected at any one time; and cases with exogenous (often political) constraints that cannot be removed. The fact that the use of multiple policy instruments can be justified economically in these two cases does not imply, however, that all multiple instruments employed in actual practice are economically justified.     

Optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical growth model

This paper provides a counterexample to the simplest version of the redistribution models considered by Judd (1985) in which the government chooses an optimal distortionary tax on capitalists to finance a lump-sum payment to workers. I show that the steady-state optimal tax on capital income is generally non-zero when the capitalists’ utility is logarithmic and the government faces a balanced-budget constraint. With log utility, agents’ optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of return, not any future rates of return or tax rates. This feature of the economy effectively deprives the government of a useful policy instrument because promises about future tax rates can no longer influence current allocations. When combined with a lack of other suitable policy instruments (such as government bonds), the result is an inability to decentralize the allocations that are consistent with a zero-limiting capital tax. I show that the standard approach to solving the dynamic optimal tax problem yields the wrong answer in this (knife-edge) case because it fails to properly enforce the constraints associated with the competitive equilibrium. Specifically, the standard approach lets in an additional policy instrument through the back door.     

Cross‐country asymmetries in monetary policy transmission: evidence from EMU members

This paper analyzes monetary policy asymmetries in EMU participating countries. In particular, we use a structural dynamic modelling approach to investigate asymmetric monetary transmission in Europe. Asymmetries are investigated in two different ways. First, we restrict the estimated structural models reflecting the monetary constraints each country faced during the EMS period. We obtain well‐behaved and comparable effects of monetary policy shocks. Second, efficiency frontiers for the selected EMU countries are estimated. In computing the optimal combinations of output gap and inflation volatility we use a weighted average of interest rate and exchange rate, i.e. the Monetary Condition Index (MCI), as a policy instrument. The impulse response analysis implemented with the MCI shows relatively small differences in the responses of the real economy to monetary policy shocks. Altogether the results suggest that, no matter which policy instrument is used, output gap and inflation respond to identical monetary shocks with a similar speed and movement, albeit with a different degree of effect.     

Measuring the effects of monetary policy in Pakistan: a factor-augmented vector autoregressive approach

This paper examines the effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic variables in Pakistan’s economy using a data-rich environment. We used the factor-augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) methodology, which contains 115 monthly variables for the period 1992:01 to 2010:12. We compared the results of VAR and FAVAR model and the results showed that FAVAR model explains the effects of monetary policy which are consistent with the theory and better than the VAR model. VAR model shows the existence of price puzzle and liquidity puzzle in Pakistan while FAVAR model did not provide any evidence of puzzles. Interest rate negatively influences prices, hence interest rate is a good instrument for controlling inflation in Pakistan but it takes a lag of 5 months. The transmission of monetary policy shock is faster in case of prices as compared to output in Pakistan. FAVAR model supports the effectiveness of interest rate channel in Pakistan.     

What triggers environmental management and innovation? Empirical evidence for Germany

It is frequently hypothesized that environmental management systems (EMSs) may improve firms' environmental innovation performance. Whether this hypothesis is true is as critical for environmental policy as questions pertaining to the relevant incentives for (1) a firm's voluntary adoption of an EMS and (2) its environmental innovation behavior. Based on ample empirical evidence for German manufacturing, this paper addresses the simultaneity of these issues on the basis of a recursive bivariate probit model that explores the hypothesis that a facility's decision on innovation activities is correlated with the decision on EMS adoption. Our empirical results, indicating that environmental innovation activities are not associated with EMS implementation nor any other single policy instrument, reflect the perceptions of the survey respondents and, hence, should be interpreted as correlations rather than causal relationships. According to these perceptions, innovation behavior seems to be mainly correlated with the stringency of environmental policy.