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1.
We study two allocation models. In the first model, we consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, we study the allocation of an indivisible object to a group of agents. We consider rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and in addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property population-monotonicity. We show that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. We also provide characterizations of all rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or population-monotonicity. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-dictatorship components, we can interpret the characterizations as impossibility results. Received: September 29, 1999; revised version: March 22, 2000  相似文献   

2.
We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.  相似文献   

3.
In this paper we consider a class of economies with a finite number of divisible commodities, linear production technologies, and indivisible goods and a finite number of agents. This class contains several well-known economies with indivisible goods and money as special cases. It is shown that if the utility functions are continuous on the divisible commodities and are weakly monotonic both on one of the divisible commodities and on all the indivisible commodities, if each agent initially owns a sufficient amount of one of the divisible commodities, and if a “no production without input”-like assumption on the production sector holds, then there exists a competitive equilibrium for any economy in this class. The usual convexity assumption is not needed here. Furthermore, by imposing strong monotonicity on one of the divisible commodities we show that any competitive equilibrium is in the core of the economy and therefore the first theorem of welfare also holds. We further obtain a second welfare theorem stating that under some conditions a Pareto efficient allocation can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium allocation for some well-chosen redistribution of the total initial endowments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D4, D46, D5, D51, D6, D61.  相似文献   

4.
We introduce a general class of rules for claims problems, called the difference rules, and demonstrate that a rule satisfies composition down and composition up if and only if it is a difference rule. We show that these rules are very simple to describe when there are two agents. In a variable population framework, we introduce a family of rules satisfying consistency, composition down, and composition up, which we term the logarithmic-proportional rules. These rules satisfy neither symmetry nor homogeneity.  相似文献   

5.
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21].  相似文献   

6.
A way of establishing the stationary Pareto optimality of asset equilibria in stochastic settings with age diversity among the agents is suggested. Difficulties in obtaining such results arise because agents' behavior is affected by random future state variables while Pareto optimality, defined in terms of expected lifetime utility of representative agents conditioned on their first period state, involves redistributions of consumption among agents with different histories of realized states. Frobenius' theorem is used to establish the existence of weights for which the so-weighted sum of representative agents' (conditional) expected utilities is maximized at the asset equilibrium allocation.  相似文献   

7.
We study desirability axioms imposed on allocations in indivisible object allocation problems. The existing axioms in the literature are various conditions of robustness to blocking coalitions with respect to agentsʼ ex ante (individual rationality and group rationality) and ex post (Pareto efficiency) endowments. We introduce a stringent axiom that encompasses and strengthens the existing ones. An allocation is reclaim-proof if it is robust to blocking coalitions with respect to any conceivable interim endowments of agents. This is an appealing property in dynamic settings, where the assignments prescribed by an allocation to be implemented need to be made in multiple rounds rather than all in one shot. We show that an allocation is reclaim-proof if and only if it is induced by a YRMH–IGYT mechanism (introduced by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999) and if and only if it is a competitive allocation.  相似文献   

8.
Bribe-proof rules in the division problem   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S., Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1–21].  相似文献   

9.
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among “interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.  相似文献   

10.
We study the impact of fiscal constitutions on intergenerational transfers in an overlapping generation model with linear technology. Transfers represent outcomes of a voting game among selfish agents. Policies are decided one period at a time. Majoritarian systems, which accord voters maximum fiscal discretion, sustain all individually rational allocations, including dynamically inefficient ones. Constitutional rules, which give minorities veto power over fiscal policy changes proposed by the majority, are equivalent to precommitment. These rules eliminate fluctuating and dynamically inefficient transfers and sustain weakly increasing transfer sequences that converge to the golden rule. The golden rule allocation is the unique outcome of Markov constitutional rules. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, H55.  相似文献   

11.
We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent an amount of decisive power, unlike the case of trees. Rules for this case can be described in terms of a subclass of such rules for trees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78.  相似文献   

12.
Nanyang Bu 《Economic Theory》2016,61(1):115-125
We study the problem of assigning objects to buyers. Monetary transfers are allowed. Each buyer’s preference space contains, but is not limited to, the linear additively separable preferences. A rule maps each preference profile to an allocation. We are concerned about the possibility that a group of buyers may engage in the following kind of manipulation: They make side payments internally and then carry out a joint misrepresentation. A rule is strongly group strategy-proof if no group can gain by engaging in such operations. We also consider several other appealing requirements. We find that the posted-price rules are the only one that satisfies non-triviality, non-imposition, envy-freeness, and strong group strategy-proofness.  相似文献   

13.
A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a close structural connection between Pareto optimality and perfection that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. Based on this insight, we formulate the Preference Refinement Algorithm (PRA) which computes an individually rational and Pareto optimal outcome in hedonic coalition formation games. Our approach also leads to various results for specific classes of hedonic games. In particular, we show that computing and verifying Pareto optimal partitions in general hedonic games, anonymous games, three-cyclic games, room-roommate games and B-hedonic games is intractable while both problems are tractable for roommate games, W-hedonic games, and house allocation with existing tenants.  相似文献   

14.
We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence classes of beliefs, giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D61.  相似文献   

15.
We provide a refoundation of the symmetric growth equilibrium characterizing the research sector of vertical R&D-driven growth models. We argue that the usual assumptions made in this class of models leave the agents indifferent as to where targeting research: hence, the problem of the allocation of R&D investment across sectors is indeterminate. By introducing an “?-contamination of confidence” in the expected distribution of R&D investment, we prove that the symmetric structure of R&D investment is the unique rational expectations equilibrium compatible with ambiguity-averse agents adopting a maxmin strategy.  相似文献   

16.
We study house allocation problems introduced by L. Shapley and H. Scarf (1974, J. Math. Econ.1, 23–28). We prove that a mechanism (a social choice function) is individually rational, anonymous, strategy-proof, and nonbossy (but not necessarily Pareto efficient) if and only if it is either the core mechanism or the no-trade mechanism, where the no-trade mechanism is the one that selects the initial allocation for each profile of preferences. This result confirms the intuition that even if we are willing to accept inefficiency, there exists no interesting strategy-proof mechanism other than the core mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78, D89.  相似文献   

17.
Hart (J. Econ. Theory9 (1974), 293–311) gave conditions for equilibrium to exist in a securities model where each agent undertakes asset transactions to maximize expected utility of wealth. These conditions rule out agents wanting to undertake unbounded balanced transactions to reach a Pareto superior allocation given their expectations. With mild extra assumptions to make agents unwilling to risk incurring unbounded losses on their portfolios, Hart's conditions become equivalent to an assumption of “overlapping expectations,” which is comparable to a much weaker form of Green's “common expectations” (Econometrica41 (1973), 1103–1124).  相似文献   

18.
Strictly proper scoring rules are designed to truthfully elicit subjective probabilistic beliefs from risk neutral agents. Previous experimental studies have identified two problems with this method: (i) risk aversion causes agents to bias their reports toward the probability of \(1/2\), and (ii) for moderate beliefs agents simply report \(1/2\). Applying a prospect theory model of risk preferences, we show that loss aversion can explain both of these behavioral phenomena. Using the insights of this model, we develop a simple off-the-shelf probability assessment mechanism that encourages loss-averse agents to report true beliefs. In an experiment, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this modification in both eliminating uninformative reports and eliciting true probabilistic beliefs.  相似文献   

19.
This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing efficient allocation consistent rules. We also explore whether such rules may in addition respect the Condorcet criterion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D7, D71.  相似文献   

20.
One possible justification for a stabilization policy is that there is volatility in macro variables that individual agents cannot insure against. We study the simplest possible extension of the stochastic two-period, one agent and one commodity OLG model, where we have added one more period, with only one potential activity, namely, trading of contingent commodities. We assume, however, that markets are incomplete. In this case the Monetary equilibrium is not Pareto Optimal and for an open set of economies an allocation where fluctuations in realized savings are removed, Pareto dominates the monetary equilibrium. This allocation may be implemented by means of a monetary/fiscal policy. The policy considered has a simple rationale, namely that it removes some of the uncertainty that agents face by reducing price, i.e interest rate volatility. We consider two fundamental sources of such volatility, namely, respectively an objective and a subjective signal about the distribution of future endowments. The first case is when agents have rational expectations while the second case is studied in the context of agents having rational beliefs, beliefs which are consistent with empirical observations but not (necessarily) correct.  相似文献   

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