The effect of mandatory auditor assignment and non-audit service on audit fees: Evidence from Korea

In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than freely selected auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.     

Internal control reporting differences among public and governmental auditors: The case of city and county Circular A-133 audits

We investigate potential differences in audit reporting outcomes between Circular A-133 audits performed by governmental auditors vs. those performed by certified public accounting (CPA) firms. Specifically, we investigate the association between auditor type and the likelihood of auditor-disclosed internal control concerns. We employ a cross-sectional sample of 13,386 single audit reports of US cities and counties during 2004–2006. In contrast to prior literature, the results indicate that in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley environment, CPA firms appear more likely to issue audit reports that identify internal control concerns than are governmental auditors in the context of Circular A-133 audits. The differences are more pronounced for larger CPA firms.     

事务所规模、审计行业专长与事务所审计质量传染效应

发生审计失败事务所的审计质量系统性低于未发生审计失败事务所的审计质量,即会计师事务所的审计质量存在传染效应,但该传染效应受到事务所自选择问题的影响;大规模事务所在审计质量传染效应中占据主导地位;事务所行业专长未能抑制审计质量传染效应。     

An analysis of Key Issues arising from Professor A. J. Briloff’s Paper entitled, “Garbage In/Garbage Out: A Critique of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997 (The COSO Report, 1999) The SEC Accounting Regulatory Process (AAERs)"

This paper examines the COSO Report (1999) in light of concerns raised by Professor Briloff in his critique (Briloff, 2001). I identify a number of limitations of using AAERs in research including the possibility that these releases reflect prevailing SEC agendas and therefore may not be representative of the population of financial statement frauds. I also question the sampling process used in the COSO Report which does not appear to capture many of the “high-profile" frauds of recent years. I evaluate three possible explanations for why Big 5 CPA firms are under-represented in the fraud sample used in that report: differences in audit quality; self-selection by the large audit firms away from risky firms; and the considerable financial resources of Big 5 firms discouraging the SEC from prosecuting them in all but the most blatant audit abuses for inadequacies. Following on from Professor Briloff’s remarks and earlier research, I also explore the broader issue of auditor independence.     

Mandatory audit firm rotation: Fresh look versus poor knowledge

Our aim in this paper is to investigate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAR) on companies’ investment decision and auditor choice in a capital market setting. We compare a MAR regime with a non-MAR regime in a setting in which auditors’ independence and companies’ opinion shopping are real concerns. To capture auditor independence and opinion shopping, we model auditor biases (a conservative bias or an aggressive bias) and client firms’ incentives to engage auditors with desired biases. We find that when firms engage in opinion shopping, MAR improves investment efficiency for some firms but impairs investment efficiency for other firms. More generally, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the real effects of auditing on corporate resource allocation decisions.     

资源控制权、控制权收益与会计师事务所合并

本文试图探讨产权对会计师事务所合并的影响。考察会计师事务所的产权关系,可以发现,由审计市场供求关系诱发的资源控制权的个人化,为大股东建立以资源控制权为导向的利益分配机制提供了机会。由于控制权主体的控制权收益的补偿成为谈判的条件之一,从而增加了合并的难度,因此控制权收益的补偿成为事务所合并的主要障碍。     

The Audit Report under Going Concern Uncertainties: An Empirical Analysis

This study explores the value of the audit report in the context of the going concern qualification (GCQ) decision along the joint dimensions of auditor competence and independence. Likelihood of company failure, auditor switch rates, the self-fulfilling prophecy argument and audit firm size are analysed as variables potentially affecting the value of the audit report in a GCQ situation. This study focuses on the outcomes of such decisions: the presence or absence of a GCQ, for a large sample of UK quoted companies over the decade 1977–86. Our results suggest that, unless the likelihood of failure is very high, the probability of a GCQ is very low. We find some evidence in support of an association between the presence of a GCQ and auditor switching but no support for the self-fulfilling prophecy argument. In addition, smaller UK audit firms do not appear to exhibit lower GCQ rates than do large firms. There is some evidence that the issues of auditor competence and independence may be a cause for concern in this context in the UK.     

Auditor Independence: A Nonparametric Test of Differences Across the Big‐5 Public Accounting Firms

This small sample study provides additional evidence on the unsettled question of auditor independence: Does the provision of non‐audit services by an auditor compromise independence resulting in a poor quality audit? We also examine whether these findings vary across the “Big‐5” public accounting firms. Most prior studies addressing this question, using parametric approaches and various measures of audit quality, have reported conflicting results. Contrary to these studies, we use a non‐parametric approach and the probability of GAAP violation as a new measure of audit quality to address this question. Using data from a sample of Fortune 500 companies for the year 2000, we find that firms whose auditors provide substantial non‐audit services tend to have a higher propensity to violate GAAP. At the firm‐level analysis, we find that these results are more likely driven by few of the Big‐5 public accounting firms. For the remaining firms, the association between non‐audit services and quality of audit could not be established, primarily because of small sample size and lack of power in the test. Our main finding is consistent with other recent studies that provide evidence that the rendering of significant non‐audit services by auditors creates conflict of interest resulting in poor quality audits. Furthermore, our result of differences in these levels of association among the Big‐5 accounting firms represents a new finding, and suggests that there is a need for controlling them separately in research studies examining auditor independence.     

Perceived auditor independence and audit firm fees

Regulations requiring the disclosure of fees paid to an auditor for audit and non-audit services (NAS) respond to concerns that such payments are potentially detrimental to auditors' actual or perceived independence. Although empirical studies have failed to produce unequivocal evidence of detrimental effects on auditor independence, the actions of regulators, audit firms and companies are consistent with the belief that economic bonding generated by fees can impair perceived levels of auditor independence.

Using a sample of UK companies over a six year period to March 2006, we study perceived impairment of auditor independence by examining the relationship between levels of total relative fees (combined audit and NAS fees payable by a company to its auditor as a proportion of the audit firm's UK income) and market value. This paper's methodological innovation is its use of a valuation framework in this setting. A further contribution lies in dropping the assumption of linearity found in most prior empirical studies. We provide evidence that shareholders perceive a threat to auditor independence only at high total relative fee levels. At lower levels, total relative fees are positively related to company value. These results suggest that disclosure of NAS and audit fees are of relevance to investors, as is information about auditor income. Our results support the view that regulation by reference to the threshold at which total relative fees are perceived negatively is more consistent with investor preferences than prohibition of the supply of NAS by auditors to their audit clients.     

Audit committee quality,auditor independence,and internal control weaknesses

In this paper we investigate the relation between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and the disclosure of internal control weaknesses after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We begin with a sample of firms with internal control weaknesses and, based on industry, size, and performance, match these firms to a sample of control firms without internal control weaknesses. Our conditional logit analyses indicate that a relation exists between audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. Firms are more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their audit committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. They are also more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness, if their auditors are more independent. In addition, firms with recent auditor changes are more likely to have internal control weaknesses.     

Board reforms and the cost of equity: International evidence

We examine the impact of corporate board reforms on the cost of equity (COE) using a sample of data in 41 countries for the period from 1992 to 2012. We find a significant increase in the COE after board reforms worldwide. This effect is eased for firms in countries under a comply-or-explain reform approach, as well as for firms in emerging countries. We further conclude that board reforms involving board independence, audit committee and auditor independence, and the separation of the CEO and Chairman positions, result in increases in the COE. Our results suggest that board reforms are considered inefficient to mitigate agency problems.     

The impact of revolving door practice and policy on nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of auditor independence

This study investigates whether an ex-auditor’s employment with an audit client impairs nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of auditor independence, and whether the strength of the US revolving door policy improves their perceptions of auditor independence. Despite nonprofessional investors owning over one-third of the US equity holdings, the literature has not examined how revolving door policy impacts their perceptions of auditor independence. Two between-subjects experiments examine these issues. The first experiment finds that investors perceive the ex-auditor’s integrity to be significant in explaining the firm’s decision to manage earnings, irrespective of the firm’s previous working relationship with the ex-auditor. The results from experiment two indicate that strengthening the revolving door policy above that of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ policy does not improve perceptions of auditor independence. Academics may be interested in triangulating the independence ‘in appearance’ results of this study to the independence ‘in fact’ results of other studies, since the Securities and Exchange Commission asserts that both facets of independence are equally important. The results may also be of interest to academics and practitioners, as prior research suggests that restricting auditors’ moves to management positions with the client impairs firms’ abilities to hire quality auditors.     

The pricing of audit and non-audit services in a regulated environment: a longitudinal study of the UK life insurance industry

This paper studies the relationship between audit and non-audit service fees paid to the statutory auditor by UK life insurance firms, utilising an extensive panel-data sample set for the period 1999–2009. Consistent with a knowledge spillover (impairment of independence) hypothesis, we predict and find that audit fees are positively (negatively) associated with actuarial (tax service) fees. Additionally, our results indicate that regulatory changes enforced after 2004 deterred UK life insurance firms from purchasing non-audit services that are perceived to impair auditor independence. Finally, we find evidence concerning the inter-temporal determination of audit fees.     

Consulting revenue sharing,auditor effort and independence,and the regulation of auditor compensation

The joint provision of audit and non-audit services by audit firms to their audit clients has posed a threat to auditor independence. To mitigate the independence problem, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a regulation (SEC, 2003) that prohibits audit partners from receiving compensation for the sale of non-audit services to their audit clients. This study examines the effects of this regulatory change on the effort and reporting decisions of audit partners. We show that partners in an audit firm strategically change the firm’s liability-sharing rule. As a consequence, the regulation restores truthful reporting but has an undesirable negative effect on audit effort. The effect of the regulation on the welfare of the economy (defined as the total payoff to both audit firms and their clients) hinges on the tradeoff between the benefit of the regulation, which is derived from the inducement of truthful reporting, and the cost of the regulation, which results from less diligent audit work. We show that the regulation is more likely to increase the welfare in a strong legal regime (where the legal liability cost of auditor litigation is high) than in a weak legal regime.     

Belief perseverance among accounting practitioners regarding the effect of non-audit services on auditor independence

We hypothesize, based on management control processes in large firms (Covaleski et al., 1998), that large-firm practitioners will be less likely than small-firm auditors to report beliefs that non-audit services (NAS) impair auditor independence. Based on Goldman and Barlev’s (1974) analysis of auditor-firm conflict of interests and procedural independence safeguards, we also predict that auditors will report less concern over impairment than non-auditors. We investigate also belief perseverance – whether practitioners tend to maintain prior reported beliefs after reading research on the relationship between NAS and auditor independence.     

Audit committee financial expertise,corporate governance,and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

A prime objective of the SOX is to safeguard auditor independence. We investigate the relation between audit committee quality, corporate governance, and audit committees' decision to switch from permissible auditor-provided tax services. We find that firms with more independent boards, audit committees with greater accounting financial expertise, higher stock ownership by directors and institutions, that separate the CEO and Chairman of the board positions, and with higher tax to audit fee ratios are more likely to switch to a non-auditor provider. Further, we document that firms are more likely to switch prior to issuing equity. We find no evidence that broad financial expertise on audit committees is related to the switch decision, suggesting that the SEC's initial narrow definition of expertise is more consistent with the objective of the SOX. Overall, our results suggest that accounting financial expertise and strong corporate governance contribute to enhanced audit committee monitoring of auditor independence.     

Effects of auditor-provided tax services on book-tax differences and on investors' mispricing of book-tax differences

Over the last decade, the joint provision of audit and non-audit services has been criticized for compromising auditor independence and affecting audit quality. Since 2005, the SEC has enacted rules restricting the types of non-audit services audit firms can provide clients. While most non-audit services are prohibited, a range of tax services are still allowed. Therefore, if compromises can emerge from allowing non-audit services, permitting tax services could be problematic. This study investigates the effect of auditor-provided tax services (ATS) on firms' levels of book-tax differences and on investors' mispricing of book-tax differences. Using a propensity-score matched sample from 2000 to 2013, I find strong evidence that firms acquiring ATS exhibit a low level of temporary book-tax differences, which in turn mitigate investors' levels of firms' mispricing. These results do not support regulators' claim that the provision of ATS compromises auditor independence. Instead, it suggests that purchasing ATS can improve overall accounting quality through knowledge spillover and thus help investors better price the value of firms.     

Does auditor tenure affect accounting conservatism? Further evidence

Accounting regulators are concerned about the potential threat of long-term auditor–client relationships on auditor independence, leading to lower audit quality. Jenkins and Velury (2008, hereafter JV) document a positive association between the conservatism in reported earnings and the length of the auditor–client relationship. A primary objective of this study is to extend JV by providing evidence that the relationship between conservatism and auditor tenure is not unique for all firms. In particular, this study finds that the positive association only exists for large firms or firms strongly monitored by their auditors, while for smaller firms or firms weakly monitored by their auditors, I observe a significantly negative association between auditor tenure and conservatism.     

The rise of regulatory capitalism and the decline of auditor independence: A critical and experimental examination of auditors’ conflicts of interests

This study investigates the decline of auditor independence coinciding with the rise of regulatory capitalism. A critical analysis supported by experimental evidence reveals regulatory capitalism's influence on auditor independence. Regulatory capitalism began in the United States during the 1970s when state enforced neo-liberal free-market doctrines of competition and deregulation commercialized the profession. Since then, regulatory capitalism's economic neo-liberal agenda has transformed the auditing profession and the employer firms into a transnational network of professional services firms that now promote and diffuse regulatory capitalism worldwide. Regulatory capitalism is further facilitated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the PCAOB that provide interconnections of powerful non-democratic private regulators such as the IFAC and IAASB. An experiment reveals auditors’ ethical predisposition to provide consistently high quality independence judgments required by IFAC's code of ethics. The majority of this sample of 174 Danish auditors was not consistently independent in the context of client economic factors, indicating that the code of ethics’ appeal to auditors’ altruistic behavior has failed. Moreover the transformed profession has become the transformer but at a price, the loss of public confidence and the decline of auditor independence. Conflicts of interests still abound.     

财务报表重述公司审计质量研究

以财务报表重述公司为研究对象,考察财务报表重述公司年报审计质量。结果表明:财务报表重述的幅度对非标审计意见的出具有显著的影响力;初始差错年和报表重述年,注册会计师都能在一定程度上识别上市公司的盈余管理动机,并在审计意见中有所反映;审计师任期和对财务报表重述公司出具非标审计意见之间没有显著的相关性;事务所规模和非标审计意见的相关性并不显著,结论没有支持大事务所更有可能对重述公司出具非标审计意见。