Privatisation,corporate control and employment growth: Evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1996–2002

Using data on Polish firms this paper examines the relationship between corporate control structures, sales growth and the determinants of employment change. Privatised and de novo firms are the main drivers of employment growth; in the case of de novo firms, it is foreign ownership which underpins the result. Being privatised has a positive impact on employment but this is concentrated within a range of 3–6 years after privatisation. There are no systematic differences in employment response to negative sales growth across the ownership categories. Employment in state firms is less responsive to positive sales growth. From these results we infer that the behaviour of state firms is affected by both insider rent sharing and binding budget constraints.     

Ownership structure and firm performance in emerging markets: A comparative meta-analysis of East European EU member states,Russia and China

Using a total of 4425 estimates collected from 204 previous studies, this paper presents a meta-analysis performed to compare East European EU member states, Russia and China in terms of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. The results indicate that, as the standard theory predicts, state ownership negatively influences the performance of firms the state invests in, while the presence of domestic outside investors and foreign investors as company owners positively affects firm performance irrespective of the difference in country/region. Furthermore, we also found that ownership of managers tends to exert a positive impact on the performance of their owned firms. Overall, however, the linkage between corporate ownership and performance is weak. This finding implies that, in comparison with advanced economies, management discipline by investors is less sufficient in emerging markets.     

Ownership Concentration,Institutional Development and Firm Performance in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper analyzes the relationship of ownership concentration and firm performance in the context of different institutional environments in 28 Central and Eastern European transition economies. We focus on private, non‐listed firms that have been largely neglected by the extant literature. Using the BEEPS data for the period from 2002 to 2009 we find an inverted u‐shaped relation of ownership concentration and firm performance for those firms that operate in non‐EU‐member countries as well as those firms that are situated in less developed institutional systems. We interpret these findings as evidence for a classic agency problem in the lower part of the ownership concentration distribution that is dominated by a ‘private benefits of control’ problem with rising ownership concentration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of state ownership and institutions in the innovation performance of emerging market enterprises: Evidence from China

Although it has been suggested that institutional context influences a firm's innovation performance, the role of regulatory institutions has been underexplored. Extending previous research, this study investigates whether and how regulatory institutions (i.e. state ownership, region-specific marketization and industry-specific institutional policy) affect innovation performance of emerging market enterprises (EMEs). Evidence derived from a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms demonstrates that state ownership positively moderates the effect of R&D intensity on innovation performance. However, state ownership is not equally beneficial for all firms. Our analysis shows that region-specific marketization and industry-specific institutional policy enhance the innovation-enhancing effect of state ownership. By revealing the role of regulatory institutions, our study points to the importance of looking beyond firm boundaries to understand why EMEs are able to innovate despite their weak internal capabilities.     

Reprint of "The role of state ownership and institutions in the innovation performance of emerging market enterprises: Evidence from China"

Although it has been suggested that institutional context influences a firm's innovation performance, the role of regulatory institutions has been underexplored. Extending previous research, this study investigates whether and how regulatory institutions (i.e. state ownership, region-specific marketization and industry-specific institutional policy) affect innovation performance of emerging market enterprises (EMEs). Evidence derived from a large sample of Chinese manufacturing firms demonstrates that state ownership positively moderates the effect of R&D intensity on innovation performance. However, state ownership is not equally beneficial for all firms. Our analysis shows that region-specific marketization and industry-specific institutional policy enhance the innovation-enhancing effect of state ownership. By revealing the role of regulatory institutions, our study points to the importance of looking beyond firm boundaries to understand why EMEs are able to innovate despite their weak internal capabilities.     

Privatisation or Competition?

Market competition is essential for any economy to be efficient. In order to develop competition in a transition economy, it is conventionally thought that privatisation should take place first. This wisdom has been challenged by the Chinese reform experience of the last two decades, which modified the incentive structure of state enterprises and created markets and market competition in the absence of large scale privatisation. China's experience, however, raises the question of whether its chosen type of reform is sufficient to promote competition in a market dominated by public firms. To answer this, we need to know what kind of markets were created – regional markets closed to trade or unified markets with easy access – and whether or not improved incentives for state firms have led to competition. This paper investigates these questions on the basis of a survey of both theory and empirical evidence; and finds that the Chinese reform policies did succeed in stimulating competition among state firms.     

Family and Lone Founder Ownership and Strategic Behaviour: Social Context,Identity, and Institutional Logics

There is controversy in the literature about the effects of ownership on strategy and performance. Some scholars have taken agency explanations as definitive, arguing that closely held firms outperform. Empirical studies, however, show conflicting findings for firms with concentrated ownership: lone founder firms outperform, family firms do not. Such conflicts may be due to the failure of agency theory to distinguish between the social contexts of these different types of owners. We argue that explanations of performance must take into account not simply ownership, but who are the owners or executives and how their social contexts may influence their strategic priorities. Family owners and CEOs, influenced by family stakeholders in the business, are argued to assume the role identities and logics of family nurturers and thus strategies of conservation. By contrast, lone founders, influenced by a wider set of market‐oriented stakeholders, are argued to embrace the identities and logics of entrepreneurs and strategies of growth. Family founders and founder‐executives are held to blend both orientations. These notions are supported in a study of Fortune 1000 companies.     

Government Engagement,Environmental Policy,and Environmental Performance: Evidence from the Most Polluting Chinese Listed Firms

This study empirically examines the implementation of environmental policies and how government engagement impacts on a firm's environmental performance based on a sample of Chinese listed firms in the eight most polluting industries over a 10‐year period. The findings of the study demonstrate that government engagement, measured as ownership structure, is positively correlated with environmental performance, measured by environmental capital expenditure, for state‐owned firms, but no significant relation is found for non‐state‐owned firms. In addition, non‐state‐owned firms are more likely to perform better in terms of environmental investment after the 2006 enactment of a new policy explicitly linking environmental issues with political incentives to regional governments. This study also reports that corporate environmental performance impairs firm value for state‐owned firms but has no impact on firm value for non‐state‐owned firms, suggesting that investors negatively respond to environmental investments made by state‐owned firms as a result of government engagement/political pressure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

金融发展对企业技术创新模式影响研究——基于中国高技术产业的实证分析

运用中国高技术产业统计数据,实证分析了金融发展对不同技术创新模式的作用机制,并探讨企业所有权性质对这种作用机制是否存在以及存在何种影响。实证分析结果表明：我国信贷市场发展比股票市场发展对自主创新的促进作用更大,并且这种促进作用并不受到企业所有权性质的影响;信贷市场发展对于增加国有企业R&D经费进而促进自主创新的作用更大,而股票市场发展对于增加民营企业R&D经费进而促进自主创新的促进作用更大、更显著;我国金融发展对于国有企业的自主创新与模仿创新的促进作用较大,而对民营企业的促进作用相对较小。     

Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China's Economic Transition

China has sought to improve enterprise performance not through privatisation as in other transition economies, but through corporatisation as means of improving corporate governance. Actual governance practices of corporatised Chinese firms are however seriously defective, characterized by excessive power of CEOs, insider control and collusion, lack of safeguards for minority shareholders and weak transparency. These shortcomings are attributable to factors such as cultural and political traditions, uncompetitiveness of markets, poor legal enforcement, weak debt and equity markets, but above all to continued state dominance in ownership and control of the corporate sector and listed companies. Corporatisation, nevertheless, has created a regime conducive to implementing measures for improving corporate governance.     

Post‐privatisation industrial relations in the UK rail and electricity industries

Commercial firms in industries once under public ownership generally have well‐organised trade unions with significant disruptive capacity, yet overt confict is often low despite major change. This paper examines the experience of two major rail and energy companies after privatisation. The results demonstrate the importance of sectoral characteristics, and the form of privatisation itself, in shaping industrial relations. The exercise of strategic choice at firm level also undermines any general industrial relations ‘theory of privatisation’.     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.     

Strategic human resource management,firm performance,and employee relations climate in China

We examined strategic human resource management (SHRM) and human resource practices in the People's Republic of China to assess the impact of these practices on firm performance and the employee relations climate. We also tested whether firm ownership moderates the above relationships. Empirical results from a sample of Chinese firms from various industries and regions showed that the levels of adoption of SHRM and HR practices were lower in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) than in foreign‐invested enterprises (FIEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs). Both SHRM and HR practices were found to have direct and positive effects on financial performance, operational performance, and the employee relations climate. However, the moderating effect of ownership type was significant for financial performance only. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Markets, Culture and Institutions: The Emergence of Large Business Groups in Taiwan, 1950s–1970s

Business groups are a special type of enterprise system existing in almost every market economy. Member firms do not operate as isolated units in the markets but have institutionalized relationships with each other and work coherently as an entity. Groups play a central role in economies in which they operate. For Taiwan, the largest 100 groups produced one third of the GNP in the past 20 years. Why does this organizational form exist in the first place? This paper reviews three relevant theories, market‐centred theories, culturalist perspective, and the institutional approach, and employs the data of 150 Taiwanese groups for the answer. The market‐centred theories and the institutional arguments are examined statistically and the latter is supported by the data. Following this evidence, the Boolean comparison of group firms with non‐group firms confirms that lacking a coherent core in ownership and management makes firms unable to respond to institutional incentives promptly. Finally, the structure of family ownership network in business groups refutes the cultural perspective which argues that the equal inheritance pattern of family property drives entrepreneurs to establish separate firms rather than single hierarchies. While both markets and culture play a distinct part in the story, it is regulatory institutions that lead to group formation.     

Does Ownership Matter? Evidence from the Zaibatsu Dissolution Program

In 1985, Demsetz and Lehn argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm-specific, and that market competition would drive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns would yield insignificant results. To test this hypothesis, we use the zaibatsu dissolution program from late-1940s Japan as a natural experiment: an exogenous shock to the equilibrium ownership structure. Through that program, the US-run occupation removed the more prominent shareholders from many of the most successful Japanese companies. By focusing on the way firms and investors responded to the mandated selloff, we accomplish two goals: (a) we avoid the endogeneity problem that has plagued much of the other research on the subject, and (b) we clarify the equilibrating dynamics by which competitive markets move firms toward their optimal ownership structure. With a sample of 637 Japanese firms for 1953 and 710 for 1958, we confirm the equilibrating mechanism behind the Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis: between 1953 and 1958, the ex-zaibatsu firms did retructure their ownership patterns. As of 1953, the unlisted ex-zaibatsu and new firms still had not been able to negotiate the transactions necessary to approach their profit-maximizing ownership structures. Even the listed firms had not fully undone the effect of the occupation-induced changes on managerial practices. By 1958 the firms had done this, and the earlier correlation between profitability and ownership disappeared. By then, firm profitability showed no correlation with ownership, whether under linear, quadratic, or piecewise specifications. We further find no evidence that ex-zaibatsu firms sought to strengthen their ties to banks over 1953–1958.     

Institutional antecedents and performance consequences of employment security and career advancement practices: Evidence from the people's republic of China

In this study, we examine the provision of employment security and career advancement opportunities in firms of diverse institutional ownership and the impact of such practices on employee and firm outcomes. The sample included 478 state‐owned and non‐state‐owned firms (i.e., domestic private firms, Sino‐foreign joint ventures, and wholly‐foreign‐owned firms) in the People's Republic of China. We found that the provision of employment security was greater in state‐owned than in non‐state‐owned firms. The provision of career advancement opportunities in domestic private firms and Sino‐foreign joint ventures was similar to that in wholly foreign‐owned firms, but greater than that in state‐owned firms. The provision of career advancement opportunities was positively related to employee organizational commitment, citizenship behaviors, and firm performance. The provision of employment security was positively related to employee organizational commitment, but not to citizenship behaviors or firm performance. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Determinants and Valuation Implications of Compulsory Stock Option Disclosures in a Weak Regulatory Setting—The Case of France

Using a sample of listed French firms in 2005, the year of mandatory IFRS adoption in the European Union (EU), we investigate the determinants of disclosure compliance of stock option expenses under IFRS 2, Share‐based Payment. Stock options are a popular means of executive compensation in France relative to other EU countries. Prior to 2005, French accounting standards and corporate governance regulations did not require recognition of option expense amounts and required minimal supplementary disclosures. There was also a perception that enforcement was imperfect, in particular with respect to IFRS 2. Given this setting, we explore what factors influence the willingness of firms to follow compulsory IFRS requirements in a weak regulatory setting. We find that overall compliance with IFRS 2 disclosure requirements increases with U.S. and U.K. institutional ownership, U.S. cross‐listing, provision of English language statements, and decreases with CEO and family ownership of the firm. We also investigate how stock market prices are affected by the recognition and disclosure of stock option expenses according to IFRS 2 in this regulatory setting and find that investors value option expenses positively, particularly when accompanied by high‐disclosure compliance. Our findings have implications for other jurisdictions in the process of adopting or converging to IFRS.     

Upstream market structure and downstream partial ownership

Existing studies on partial ownership usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper highlights the importance of the upstream market on downstream firms' incentives to acquire partial ownership and the consequent welfare implications. In the main model, we assume that there are three firms in the downstream market, two of which may form a partial ownership arrangement. We find several results that are in contrast to those in the literature. First, the two firms will engage in partial ownership if the upstream market is an oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly). Second, partial ownership may raise total production, consumer surplus, and social welfare. This happens when the upstream market consists of a duopoly and the two firms involved in partial ownership are supplied by different suppliers. Third, the outsider, commonly known as a free rider in the literature, may become a victim of partial ownership. Our results are robust to several extensions, including a general $n$-firm framework, product differentiation, and uniform pricing by upstream firms. We also provide the conditions under which the curvature of the demand function and the convexity of the cost function motivate firms to form partial ownership.     

Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China

This paper investigates whether and to what extent ownership structure and corporate governance affect productive efficiency in a sample of 744 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2006. The paper finds that firm efficiency, as estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis, is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped, indicating that the largest shareholder may engage in tunneling activities. As the identity of the largest shareholder changes from government, government-controlled legal entity to other types of legal entity, firm efficiency significantly improves. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. Moreover, firms with more independent board are more efficient, supporting the argument that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, the findings illustrate that restructuring state-owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China.     

Common ownership,institutional investors,and welfare

This study evaluates the effects of institutional investors' common ownership of firms competing in the same market. Overall, common ownership has two opposing effects: (a) it serves as a device for weakening market competition, and (b) it induces diversification, thereby reducing portfolio risk. We conduct a detailed welfare analysis within which the competition‐softening effects of an increased degree of common ownership is weighted against the associated diversification benefits.