Robert Brenner on political accumulation and the transition to capitalism

This paper is an immanent critique of Robert Brenner’s writings on the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The concept “immanent” is defined as a logic of implication, according to which a text or theory is evaluated within the terms that it sets for itself, to determine whether its objectives and assumptions are true in the way they are said to be true. Using this method of critique, the paper shows how Brenner’s concept of “political accumulation” undermines his own initial claim that the balance of class forces between lords and peasants determined the long-term trends of preindustrial Europe, in that this concept points toward intralord struggles dominated by military interests. The paper also discusses why Brenner’s account of France’s tax/office state seriously weakens his postulate that “surplus extracting relations” were the “fundamental” relation of fuedalism, on the grounds that office-holding reflected an unequal distribution of property based upon status. Finally, the paper draws out the theoretical implications of these contradictory instances, to delineate ways in which Brenner’s basic theory may be sublated within a more comprehensive account.     

The Arrow-Debreu model: How math can hide a fatal conceptual error

I argue that math, like love, can cover a multitude of sins, and I use the neoclassical object of adoration, the Arrow-Debreu model, as the case in point. It is commonplace that the Arrow-Debreu (AD) model of general equilibrium does not describe the real world, but it is equally commonplace to accept it as representing the pure logic of the competitive capitalist economy in an idealized world free of transactions costs. I show that the AD model fails even as an idealized model; it actually mistakes the logic of pure capitalism. Unlike McKenzie’s model of idealized general equilibrium under constant returns to scale, Arrow and Debreu claim to have shown the existence of competitive equilibrium under decreasing returns to scale and positive pure profits. The AD model (again unlike the McKinzie model) needs to assign the profits to individuals and this is done using the notion of “ownership of the production set.” But this notion suffers from a fatal ambiguity. If Arrow and Debreu interpret it to mean “ownership of a corporation” then a simple argument in the form “labor can hire capital or capital can hire labor” defeats the alleged necessity of assigning residual claimancy to the corporation. A given corporation may or may not end up exploiting a set of production opportunities (represented by a production set) depending on whether it hires in labor and undertakes production or hires out its capital to others (all by assumption at the parametrically given prices). In the latter case, residual claimancy is elsewhere. There is no such property right as “ownership of a production set” in a private property market economy. The legal party which purchases or already owns all the inputs used up in production has the defensible legal claim on the outputs: there is no need to also “purchase the production set.” At any set of prices that allow positive pure profits, anyone in the idealized AD model could bid up the price of the inputs and thus try to reap a smaller but still positive profit. Therefore,pace Arrow and Debreu, there could be no equilibrium with positive pure profits. In the Appendix, the property rights fallacy that afflicts the AD model is shown to also afflict orthodox capital theory and corporate finance theory.     

Local Import Competition in a Lumpy Country

This paper examines the effects of a fall in the price of an imported good in a region of a country that is specialized in producing that good. The context is a “lumpy country” model in which factors are unable to move between locations, although in this case I assume that only labor is immobile, and that the other factor, capital, is perfectly mobile between regions. With mobile capital, the lumpy-country equilibrium can be anywhere in the factor-price equalization set, but my focus is on a region that initially produces only one good, on the border of that set. When the price of that good falls due to import competition, it would be possible for both factors to reallocate partially into production of the other good, but I assume instead that some capital simply leaves the region, so that it continues to produce only the same good that it did before. The result of this is a fall in the real wage of labor, just as under Stolper-Samuelson assumptions. I then look at production also of a non-traded good, and find that the same import competition that cheapened the traded good also cheapens the nontraded good. The result is that the region shrinks, losing capital and producing less of both goods unless the substitution in favor of the nontraded good expands its consumption out of a smaller income.     

The transition to a globalized economy: Poverty,human capital and the informal sector in a structuralist CGE model

Recent econometric evidence suggests that trade liberalization has an elusive relationship to growth and income distribution. This paper provides an explanation for these results via numerical simulations of a dynamic structuralist CGE. The conclusion is that if families become too poor to finance human capital accumulation, or the state too stingy to supply it at a reasonable cost, exports of skill-intensive goods can become uncompetitive and the transition to openness may involve increasing poverty, unemployment and stagnation. The model design incorporates an informal sector as well as accumulation of human capital. The paper simulates two trajectories, a “green” path in which per capita income grows steadily with a rapid rate of human capital accumulation and a reduction in the level of economic informality. A second, or “red” path is also possible, however, with a growth rate that is much lower, an expanding informal sector and an inadequate rate of human capital formation.     

Political economy and the closet: heteronormativity in feminist economics

Abstract

Returning to a question raised by M. V. Lee Badgett in the first issue of Feminist Economics, this paper traces the persistence of heteronormativity in feminist economics to assumptions that kinship is organized around conjugal bonds. These assumptions let “the family” stand automatically for a husband, wife, and their children. “Heteronormativity” is not a synonym for heterosexual privilege, but rather names tacit conceptions about what is socially normal, conceptions that make it possible to think of heterosexuals or homosexuals as essential categories of people. Critique of heteronormativity makes visible a pattern of state repression that makes proper citizens by opposing them to improper ones, a process that simultaneously shapes gender, sexuality, citizenship, and race. Such critique opens the opportunity to better understand gender, integrate scholarship on lesbians and gays, link gender analysis more directly to racializing processes, and reopen the category of heterosexuality.     

Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model

How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.     

Truth,self, and feminism

Humanistic economics is founded on the reality of human needs. One of those needs is for truth. According to the correspondence theory, that truth is a relation between statement and objective reality. This reality serves as a constraint on the (ego) self. Therefore, it can also be shown that self-interest is an independent principle from the commitment to truth, and that these two principles can clash. These two principles of the self, or the “higher” and “lower” self, constitute what we call the dual self. In a critique of humanistic economics from a feminist direction, Julie Nelson has claimed that such dualisms form a hierarchy that is sympathetic of patriarchal hierarchies. In a previous response to that criticism we showed that Nelson’s own work involved similar hierarchies. Here we attempt to show how Nelson's conception of value hierarchies involving the feminine and masculine and our conception can be resolved into one coherent framework.     

Neuroeconomics: Infeasible and Underdetermined

Advocates of neuroeconomics claim to offer the prospect of creating a “unified behavioral theory” by drawing upon the techniques of neuroscience and psychology and combining them with economic theory. Ostensibly, through the “direct measurement” of our thoughts, economics and social science will be “revolutionized.” Such claims have been subject to critique from mainstream and non-mainstream economists alike. Many of these criticisms relate to measurability, relevance, and coherence. In this article, we seek to contribute to this critical examination by investigating the potential of underdetermination, such as the statement that testing involves the conjunction of auxiliary assumptions, and that consequently it may not be possible to isolate the effect of any given hypothesis. We argue that neuroeconomics is especially sensitive to issues of underdetermination. Institutional economists should be cautious of neuroeconomists’ zeal as they appear to over-interpret experimental findings and, therefore, neuroeconomics may provide a false prospectus seeking to reinforce the nostrums of homo economicus.     

社会资本可以增进企业风险资本获取能力吗

以2009年10月到2015年12月在中国创业板上市的495家上市公司为研究对象，验证了社会资本对企业融资能力的影响。首先，将社会资本划分为政治关系资本和行业关系资本，然后，将其中的政治关系资本进一步细分为官员型政治关系资本和代表委员型政治关系资本，更加细致深入地验证了社会资本对企业融资能力的影响。研究结果如下：①无论是政治关系资本还是行业关系资本都有助于企业获得风险投资，表明社会资本可以向外界传递出反映企业高质量的信号，从而帮助其获取风险投资以缓解融资约束；②官员型政治关系资本同样有助于企业获得风险投资；③代表委员型政治关系资本对企业获得风险投资没有显著影响。     

“Love of wealth” and economic growth

In a Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth framework it is shown that for an optimum a benevolent social planner cannot have an excessive “love of wealth”. With a “right” “love of wealth” an optimum exists and implies higher long‐run per‐capita capital, income, and consumption relative to the standard model. This has important implications for comparative development trajectories. The optimum implies dynamic efficiency with the possibility of getting arbitrarily close to the golden rule where long‐run per‐capita consumption is maximal. It is shown that the optimal path attains its steady state more slowly. Thus, the beneficial effects of love of wealth materialize later than in the standard model. Furthermore, the economy can be decentralized as a competitive private ownership economy. One can then identify “love of wealth” with the “spirit of capitalism.” The paper thus implies that one needs a “right” level of the “spirit of capitalism” to realize any beneficial effects for the long run.     

Dualistic Discourse and Immigration Policy

Abstract:

The central question in immigration policy is whether to support less immigration through more “restrictive” laws and procedures or whether to support more immigration through a “relaxation” of existing laws. Recently, however, a second debate has arisen on one side of this debate regarding the appropriate types of arguments that may be used to support “restrictive” immigration. Ross Douthat refers to this dispute as the “race versus economics” question: using “race-based” arguments is not legitimate; while an “economic” or a “fact-based” argument is regarded as legitimate. We argue that this distinction in anti-immigration rhetoric is more apparent than real. Using the two most common historical “tropes” in immigration policy, “criminal” and “worker,” we find that racist, anti-ethnic, and classist assumptions pervade U.S. immigration law and policy and have been far more influential in formulating actual policy than either economic or “fact-based” analysis. The central problem with restrictive immigration policy is that its primary purpose is to determine who is eligible to be an American, and who is not; in other words, immigration policy is, by its fundamental intent, invidious. The question is whether it is possible to exclude individuals on these “legitimate” grounds without relying on “illegitimate” invidious distinctions?     

The Role of Natural Resources in Economic Development

Economists now recognize that, along with physical and human capital, environmental resources should be viewed as important economic assets, which can be called natural capital. Three recent debates have emerged over the role of natural capital in economic development. First, as many ecological services are unique, does the environment have an “essential” role in sustaining human welfare, and if so, are special “compensation rules” required to ensure that future welfare is not worsened by natural capital depletion today? Second, the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis has fostered empirical estimations of an “inverted U” shaped relationship between a variety of indicators of environmental pollution or resource depletion and the level of per capita income. Does the existence of such EKC relationships suggest that environmental degradation will eventually decline with growth? Finally, recent economic theories and empirical evidence have questioned whether lower income economies that are endowed with abundant natural resources develop more rapidly than economies that are relatively resource poor. Is it possible that resource abundant economies are not reinvesting the rents generated from natural resource exploitation into productive assets, or that resource booms actually divert economic resources from more productive and innovative sectors?     

On the missing equation: Comment

Canto and Miles (CM) present and analyze graphically “a third, alternative method for closing the IS-LM system of equations”—the ‘wedge model’. According to CM, “the result is a more general set of results” and “the two traditional alternatives are only special cases.” The CM model, however, is logically inconsistent. Because CM implicitly assume simultaneous capital market equilibrium and disequilibrium, CM's assumptions are mutually inconsistent. Thus, none of the reported results logically follow. Furthermore, the CM model is not very general. This paper proves analytically that GNP is determined without the IS and LM equations both in the CM model and in the obvious logical patchups of the CM model. Therefore, for example, in the CM model exogenous changes in business-fixed investment or consumption have no predicted effect on national income.     

On the Phelps–Koopmans theorem

We examine whether the Phelps–Koopmans theorem is valid in models with nonconvex production technologies. We argue that a nonstationary path that converges to a capital stock above the smallest golden rule may indeed be efficient. This finding has the important implication that “capital overaccumulation” need not always imply inefficiency. Under mild regularity and smoothness assumptions, we provide an almost-complete characterization of situations in which every path with limit in excess of the smallest golden rule must be inefficient, so that a version of the Phelps–Koopmans theorem can be recovered. Finally, we establish that a nonconvergent path with limiting capital stocks above (and bounded away from) the smallest golden rule can be efficient, even if the model admits a unique golden rule. Thus the Phelps–Koopmans theorem in its general form fails to be valid, and we argue that this failure is robust across nonconvex models of growth.     

OPTIMAL TRANSITION DYNAMICS IN THE LEONTIEF TWO‐SECTOR GROWTH MODEL WITH DURABLE CAPITAL: THE CASE OF CAPITAL INTENSIVE CONSUMPTION GOODS*

We present results on undiscounted optimal policies in the Leontief two‐sector growth model with durable capital. Unlike the results with a labour intensive consumption goods sector, we show that a monotonic optimal programme is only one special case out of many richer possibilities of transition dynamics. Depending on the initial capital stock, and a key parameter ζ that could be interpreted as a marginal rate of transformation of capital between today and tomorrow, an optimal programme may converge to a period‐two cycle; and even when it converges to the golden rule stock, it can do so (damped) cyclically or with a “jump”.     

Time,Arbitrage, and the Law of One Price: The Case for a Paradigm Shift

Consider a Competitive, Efficient, and Frictionless Economy (CEFE) where resources are scarce at any date, and hence money as a valid claim against scarce resources is also scarce. In this economy, there is always price competition, which can at any date generate an unlimited number of arbitrage opportunities. For example, at any date, opportunities can exist to buy and sell each one of the contracts for delivery of the same good or asset at multiple prices currently as well as on an infinite number of future dates. I prove all arbitrage transactions, including “spot” transactions, tie up arbitrageurs’ capital representing money, good or asset such that this capital cannot be used for any other purpose for a non-zero quantity of time. This makes it impossible to exploit all arbitrage opportunities with the scarce capital available at any date and leads to an infinite number of unexploited opportunities and a non-negligible opportunity cost of the capital tied-up in arbitrage transactions, represented by each arbitrageur’s best missed arbitrage opportunity, if no better opportunity exits, hence the breakdown of the law of one price in its standard sense. This helps construct a new paradigm of CEFE which resolves long-standing theoretical, empirical, and experimental puzzles.     

Is Gerard Debreu a Deductivist? Commentary on Tony Lawson's Economics and Reality

Tony Lawson has argued that the methodology of neoclassical economics is deductivist: in constructing their formal models, economists hope to be able to provide explanations based on laws, as described by the deductive-nomological model of explanation. This article argues in contrast that neoclassical economics cannot be understood as following just one methodology. It is argued that neoclassicism exhibits two methodologies, one “official” and one tacit. The former is empiricist, and corresponds to the practice that has been described by Lawson. The latter, which can be called “hypothetico-deductive rationalism”, amounts to the position that knowledge of the world can be obtained without any empirical verification of one's assumptions, simply by exploring the implications of the assumptions one makes.     

人力资本制度与区域创新绩效*——基于模糊集定性比较分析（fsQCA）的研究#br#

基于中国原始创新型人力资本制度理论，以我国30个省级行政区为样本，使用模糊集定性比较分析（fsQCA）方法，研究了六项人力资本制度对区域创新绩效的联合效应及互动关系。研究表明：任何单一制度都不是高创新绩效的必要条件，也不足以构成充分条件，只有多项制度的组合才能有效提高创新绩效。我国存在五种引致高创新绩效的人力资本制度路径，这五种路径可以进一步归类为金融本位模式、创新者本位模式和绩效维持模式。金融本位模式中，发达的人力资本信用制度客观上保护了超常型默示知识，部分替代了产权制度和定价制度的功能；创新者本位模式中，保障制度、产权制度、定价制度三者间存在互补关系；绩效维持模式中，培育制度能够一定程度上弥补产权制度的缺失，但由于人才流失而难以持续。本文补充和发展了中国原始创新型人力资本制度理论，并为各地政府提供了有益启示。     

Marx's critique of “eternal” political economy: how Mill is alien to Marx's attacks

Marx deplored political economy's claims to establish “eternal” – or “natural” – laws. This paper seeks to defend John Stuart Mill from his critique. It argues that, contrary to what Marx alleged, these two economists have a great deal more in common on this topic than is frequently realised. Both on the theoretical level and on the political one, Mill's views about the relativity of capitalism seem very close to Marx's. This paper also suggests that Marx may have ignored Mill's insistence on the relativity of economic theories because it may have challenged his own “scientific socialism”.