CFO权力与企业债务违约

本文从组织权力、专家权力、声誉权力、所有权权力四方面构建CFO综合权力指数,基于2008~2017年沪深A股数据,分析了CFO权力对企业债务违约概率的影响及作用机制。研究结果显示,CFO权力越大,企业债务违约概率越低,在控制内生性影响后,该结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,具有较大权力的CFO通过降低业绩波动性和缓解融资约束来抑制企业发生债务违约。本文从CFO权力视角拓展了债务违约影响因素研究,对企业完善人力资源制度安排和降低债务违约风险具有一定的借鉴价值。     

论电力企业文化

文章论述了当前许多电力企业需要不断探讨的问题,即在市场经济环境下,如何保持电力企业文化建设与时俱进,建设和谐的电力企业文化。     

论电力企业文化

文章论述了当前许多电力企业需要不断探讨的问题,即在市场经济环境下,如何保持电力企业文化建设与时俱进,建设和谐的电力企业文化.     

管理层权力与公司现金持有竞争效应

本文以中国A股上市公司2006—2015年数据为样本,结合产品市场竞争实证研究公司管理层权力对现金持有竞争效应的影响。研究发现,管理层权力弱化了公司现金持有竞争效应,而产品市场竞争对管理层权力之于现金持有竞争效应的负向作用有一定的抑制效果。进一步研究管理层权力弱化公司现金持有竞争效应的渠道发现,管理层权力在加剧公司高额持有现金导致发生在职消费和过度投资行为的同时,降低了研发投入,而产品市场竞争能够抑制这种在职消费和过度投资行为。上述结论不仅补充和丰富了现金持有竞争效应的相关研究,也为鼓励市场竞争以监督管理层行为和提高公司现金持有的战略价值提供了参考。     

管理层权力、高管薪酬差距与公司绩效

薪酬结构的合理是影响公司绩效众多因素中不可忽视的原因之一,然而上市公司中高层管理人员的权力正逐渐控制合理薪酬契约的制定,进而影响公司绩效水平,本文实证研究分析了2012-2014深沪A股上市公司的样本数据,结果发现高管人员薪酬差距对公司绩效的关系符合锦标赛理论的预期,但是管理层权力这一变量却改变了之前的预期,进一步检验之后发现,相对于管理层权力较大的公司,在管理层权力较小的公司中,这一关系却仍然存在。     

The Coal Mine Mafia of India: A Mirror of Corporate Power

An investigation of the source of power of mafia‐type organizations may reveal how other non‐state actors can operate as if they are independent of the state. This study of the coal mafia in Dhanbad, India shows that power often derives from socially hierarchical relationships involving debt and/or caste. It also demonstrates how state policies that are thoughtlessly implemented may solidify existing hierarchies. By analogy, modern corporations gain some of their power by behaving as if they were semi‐sovereign institutions that draw their strength informally from social networks and other extralegal relationships. The mafia in the Dhanbad coalfields emerged through a series of institutional changes. Labor shortages were initially resolved by labor intermediaries, who eventually controlled the labor through linkages associated with debt, caste, and social obligations. These intermediaries eventually assumed official positions in labor unions, which gave them a platform for electoral politics. When the coal industry was nationalized, the union leaders further solidified their position in the nationalized corporation. In this way, private labor intermediaries became local political leaders who controlled the state apparatus to some extent. Corporations follow similar patterns. Both mafias and corporations exploit weak governments, collude with them, and often operate with a high degree of independence. Like mafias, corporations often derive their power from socially embedded networks that they craft in local communities and populations. Because the roots of their influence are embedded in social networks, simple legal and regulatory changes are often insufficient to limit their power. Transnational corporations engaged in extraction of natural resources share with mafias the ability to leverage monopoly power in one domain into control of other domains. As a result, this case study of the coal mafia in India offers a unique entry point to understand corporate sovereignty.     

Controlling Corporate Power in China: Case Studies of Seed Companies and Water Distribution

In the course of China's economic transition, the government set up a policy goal to gradually withdraw from the market, while, at the same time, increasing the intensity of anti‐corruption actions. This article reviews the development of Chinese modern corporations and corresponding policy changes. The development and expansion of modern corporations as a result of reforms that occurred after 1978 reveals the government's decision not to fully withdraw from the market. When private companies are allowed to pursue maximum profits, especially in areas of public resources and services, society and the environment suffer severe negative consequences. Case studies of corporate control of seed companies and water utilities demonstrate in detail the damage caused by privatization. In order to protect the interests of society from corruption, government must concentrate on reducing the rent‐seeking behavior of corporations and collusion between businesses and government officials. The Chinese government's fight against corruption in recent years has been based on its market involvement, as well as on its determination to confine the power of corporations, which is a tough game.     

Corporate Power and Expansive U.S. Military Policy

Military defense is generally treated in economics texts as a “public good” because the benefits are presumed to be shared by all citizens. However, defense spending by the United States cannot legitimately be classified as a public good, since the primary purpose of those expenditures has been to project power in support of private business interests. Throughout the course of the 20^th century, U.S. military spending has been largely devoted to protecting the overseas assets of multinational corporations that are based in the United States or allied nations. Companies extracting oil, mineral ores, timber, and other raw materials are the primary beneficiaries. The U.S. military provides its services by supporting compliant political leaders in developing countries and by punishing or deposing regimes that threaten the interests of U.S.‐based corporations. The companies involved in this process generally have invested only a small amount of their own capital. Instead, the value of their overseas assets largely derives from the appreciation of oil and other raw materials in situ. Companies bought resource‐rich lands cheaply, as early as the 1930s or 1940s, and then waited for decades to develop them. In order to make a profit on this long‐range strategy, they formed cartels to limit global supply and relied on the U.S. military to help them maintain secure title over a period of decades. Those operations have required suppressing democratic impulses in dozens of nations. The global “sprawl” of extractive companies has been the catalyst of U.S. foreign policy for the past century. The U.S. Department of Defense provides a giant subsidy to companies operating overseas, and the cost is borne by the taxpayers of the United States, not by the corporate beneficiaries. Defining military spending as a “public good” has been a mistake with global ramifications, leading to patriotic support for imperialist behavior.     

企业内部控制执行力自评价

本文基于执行力理论从企业管理的层面研究包括内控制度本身以及除制度之外的人员、制度运营等因素来探讨制约其发挥作用的原因,构建了内部控制执行力指标体系,并且结合模糊评判的思想,给出一个评判企业内控执行力的定量方法,并结合案例给予具体说明.     

Unleashing the Power of Networks: Shareholder Activism,Sustainable Development and Corporate Environmental Policy

In recent years, a new trend has emerged in which shareholder activists have formed networks to empower shareholders and magnify shareholder voices. This study explores the structural patterns and effectiveness of shareholder activism networks and shows how those networks affect corporate sustainability policies. We draw upon stakeholder influence theory, stakeholder network management theory and recent studies on activism networks to examine a shareholder activism network formed around environmental issues. The study found that (1) the structure of shareholder activist networks is largely driven by organizational attributes such as organization type, organizations’ human resources, media visibility and history; and (2) activist organizations with high centralities and eigenvector centralities enjoy more efficient results. This study contributes to our understanding of the business responses to shareholder demands on improving environmental performance and paves the way for future research on sustainable development through partnerships with shareholder networks. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

“人民当家作主”之于民主——读《中国民主政治建设白皮书》

人民当家作主,以准确的政治学词语表述这一主张,即主权在民或人民主权。虽然"民主"一词现在无论是在理论界还是实践领域都是一个混乱得可能让人上当的词,但民主意味着主权在民这一点是没有争议的,存有争议的是如何解读这个术语。究竟"主权在民"意味着什么?如果厘清了何谓人民主权,是否它就意味着民主的全部?并且,通过什么方式能使当家人成为真正做主的人?这些问题都是至关重要的。本文试图通过对《中国民主政治建设白皮书》(以下简称白皮书)一些章节的解读,从"人民当家作主"这一角度入手评价我国民主政治中关于"人民主权"的含义和地位之理解。     

三一“变相裁员”事件背后的企业社会责任思辨

企业社会责任由经济责任、法律责任、伦理责任、慈善责任四个层次构成,但最基本的社会责任还是经济责任。三一裁员本身并不是企业社会责任的缺失,采用"变相裁员"的方式才是缺乏企业社会责任的体现。三一需要增加战略决策的理性和周延并建立可预见收入与就业计划,在履行经济责任的基础上更好地履行其余的企业社会责任。     

加大我国企业信息化力度提升企业软实力

企业信息化是企业面对新的竞争环境的必然要求,在全球经济趋向信息化的时代背景下,加快我国企业的信息化水平是提高企业竞争力的有效途径,研究企业信息化对组织模式变革的影响,将有利于充分发挥信息技术在组织变革中的使能作用,促进企业的管理变革,提高企业的综合竞争力。     

对新《企业会计准则》的基于EVA分析

从EVA的视角分析了新准则,指出新准则理论与EVA理论存在共同点的同时,更多的是新准则体系在许多方面受到EVA理论的冲击,它是一个有待不断创新和完善的准则理论。     

“聚财之神”蔡万霖的企业理念

蔡万霖曾长期占据台湾富豪排行榜首位.1979年,蔡万霖创办霖园集团,他旗下的国泰建设公司和三井工程公司,分别是台湾建筑投资业和营建业中的两大霸主.     

Democracy and trade: an empirical study

The theoretical discussion on globalization has suggested that there are linkages between democracy and trade, although the direction of influence is less certain. Formal empirical studies remain scarce, and have often focused on the question of whether democratic regimes influence trade policy, as opposed to the actual relationship between democracy and trade. This paper seeks to answer the question, “Do democracies trade more?” by applying the gravity equation to a large dataset of bilateral trade data for the period 1948–1999, while taking into account the role of democracy. It finds that democracy is positively related to trade flows, but only after controlling for trade pair heterogeneity. In addition, it makes the case for studies of this nature to draw a distinction between trade flows in the pre- and post-1990s period of rapid democratization as well as between developed and developing countries.     

以特色企业文化打造一流桥电企业

企业文化是企业中长期形成的共同理想、基本价值观、作风、生活习惯和行为规范的总称,是企业在经营管理过程中创造的具有本企业特色的精神财富的总和。文章结合笔者工作实际,阐述了如何以特色企业文化打造一流桥电企业的做法。     

公司愿景与品牌建设

公司愿景是企业发展的指路明灯,对品牌战略产生深远的影响.对许多正在迈向品牌经营型企业来说,企业如何设计自己的品牌形象,期望顾客怎样看待自己的品牌,品牌应具有怎样的个性,都与公司愿景有着密切的关系.本文通过公司愿景与品牌关系的分析,提示在公司品牌的建设中,创造顾客价值、定义事业领域以及增强品牌认同的重要性.     

小布什执政时期输出民主与美国软实力的关联

美国的民主输出战略主要是基于现实主义考量,认为其他国家的政体性质对美国的安全和经济利益具有巨大的影响。小布什执政时期"新保守主义"思潮的影响促成了美国输出民主战略的升级,给目标国造成了严重危害。虽然民主被视为美国软实力的源泉,但美国的民主输出实践却导致了美国软实力的衰退。