Meta-Analytic Benefit Transfer of Outdoor Recreation Economic Values: Testing Out-of-Sample Convergent Validity

A benefit transfer approach to recreationeconomic valuation using meta-analysis isexamined. Since the meta- regression modeltakes into account some of the study specificeffects on willingness to pay (WTP) estimates,benefit transfer using meta-analysis couldyield a valid WTP estimate of unstudiedrecreation resources. The convergent validityof the meta-analytic benefit transfer is testedusing out-of-sample original studies from theU.S. The analyses are performed usingpercentage difference, paired t-test,regression and correlation tests. The testsreveal mixed results on convergence betweenestimated WTP using meta-analytic benefittransfer function (BTF) and out-of-sampleoriginal WTP values. There is a fairly highpercentage difference between the estimated andoriginal WTP values (80–88%), and the meandifferences are statistically significant asshown by paired t-tests. However, correlationand regression results consistently showsignificant positive relationships betweennational BTF estimated and original WTP valuesindicating some level of convergence. Theresults show that the national BTF outperformthe regional BTF indicating a potential of thenational BTF for recreation benefit transferwhen a first best primary valuation study isnot affordable.     

Asset ownership and market structure in oligopoly: Further results

How does the sale of assets from a small firm to a large firm affect the equilibrium price in oligopoly? Using the ‘cross-sectional differentiation’ technique introduced by Farrell and Shapiro (Rand Journal of Economics, 1990, 21, 275–292), I show that the equilibrium price rises if the common production technology is homogeneous of degree t, 0<t1.     

A Monte Carlo Analysis of the Fisher Randomization Technique: Reviving Randomization for Experimental Economists

Data created in a controlled laboratory setting are a relatively new phenomenon to economists. Traditional data analysis methods using either parametric or nonparametric tests are not necessarily the best option available to economists analyzing laboratory data. In 1935, Fisher proposed the randomization technique as an alternative data analysis method when examining treatment effects. The observed data are used to create a test statistic. Then treatment labels are shuffled across the data and the test statistic is recalculated. The original statistic can be ranked against all possible test statistics that can be generated by these data, and a p-value can be obtained. A Monte Carlo analysis of t-test, the Mann-Whitney U-test, and the exact randomization t-test is conducted. The exact randomization t-test compares favorably to the other two tests both in terms of size and power. Given the limited distributional assumptions necessary for implementation of the exact randomization test, these results suggest that experimental economists should consider using the exact randomization test more often. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Bargaining with a possibly committed seller

We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul [2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment.     

Testing structural benefit transfer: The role of income inequality

How the valuation of environmental goods is related to income is a key question for economics, but the role of income inequality is often neglected. We study how income inequality affects the international transfer of the estimated value of environmental goods from a study to a policy site—a practice called value or benefit transfer. Specifically, we apply theory-driven, structural transfer factors to test whether adjusting for income inequality affects errors made in benefit transfer, drawing on a multi-country valuation study on water quality improvement. Our convergent validity analysis shows that the structural income inequality adjustment reduces benefit transfer errors by between 1.5 and 1.8 percentage points on average across all transfers. We therefore find that adjusting for income inequality offers only a minor improvement of benefit transfers as compared to adjusting for differences in mean income. Overall, our results shed light on the potential of structural approaches to benefit transfer for environmental valuation and public policy appraisal.     

Local financial benefits of rain forests: comparative evidence from Amerindian societies in Bolivia and Honduras

Researchers generally express the local value of tropical rain forests in dollars/ha/year. The approach is problematic because it produces low values to local users, underestimating the importance of the forest expressed as a share of household consumption or earnings. Here we contribute to valuation studies of rain forests by estimating the financial importance of the forest measured in three ways: (1) the contribution of forests to annual household consumption and (2) earnings; and (3) the value of a hectare of rain forest to villagers measured through the biological goods consumed and sold. We collected panel data on consumption and earnings from 81 households in four villages of two Amerindian societies in two nations (Tsimane’, Bolivia; Tawahka, Honduras). Analyses suggest: (1) forests account for a large share of household consumption (median 38.5%; range 14.65–53.11%); (2) forests contribute more to household consumption than to household earnings (median 22.69%; range 16.56–44.81%); (3) the relative contribution of forests to household consumption and earnings falls among villages closer to towns; and (4) the range of values/year of rain forest/ha is US$7.10–9.70 using 1999 dollars or US$18.46–46.56 using purchasing power parity indexes, below previous estimates. Results show much variation in forest values; valuation methods and stakeholder perspectives affect the variation. Given the variation, a useful strategy to promote forest conservation would transfer income to villagers to compensate them for non-local forest values.     

The Effect of Protest Votes on the Estimates of WTP for Use Values of Recreational Sites

Contingent valuation studies are often characterized by a considerable number of protest responses, which may cause selectivity bias on the final estimates for WTP. Sample selection models can detect and – if necessary – correct selectivity bias. In economic applications where the relevant dependent variable is continuous, sample selection models are generally estimated using Heckman's 2-step method rather than the FIML estimator. Either method has its own drawback: computational complexity for the FIML method, susceptibility to collinearity problems for the 2-step method. Using data on valuation of forest resources for recreational use, we analyse the performance of the two estimators. In this application, given the presence of some collinearity, the FIML is preferred to the 2-step method. A procedure is outlined to deal with selectivity problems in similar settings.     

Altruism,Warm Glow and the Willingness-to-Donate for Green Electricity: An Artefactual Field Experiment

The ongoing liberalization of electricity markets in most western countries forms the background of our artefactual field experiment. Using a Cheap talk design [R.G. Cummings and L.O. Taylor. American Economic Review 89 (1999) 649–665] with supplementary monetary incentives, we test for presence of “warm glow” motivations [J. Andreoni. Journal of Political Economy 97 (1989) 1447–1458; Economic Journal 100 (1990) 464–477] in the willingness-to-donate for electricity generated from renewables. Our data from 200 participants supports impure altruism, that is, individuals benefit from both contributing to environmental quality and its current level when opting in favor of green electricity. Furthermore, we find evidence of crowding-out as well as crowding-in effects. Depending on the knowledge of people about electricity markets and the types of electricity contracts offered, “all-or-none” contracts are most likely to bring about crowding-out effects.     

Benefit Transfer Equivalence Tests with Non-normal Distributions

Equivalence testing reverses traditional null and alternative hypotheses—welfare estimates are assumed different unless tests demonstrate that the difference is smaller than a specified tolerance limit. Within benefit transfer, researchers have universally used the “two one-sided t-test” (TOST) equivalence test, an approach that is invalid for non-normal welfare distributions. This paper proposes an alternative based on the difference between independent empirical distributions, denoted the “two one-sided convolutions” (TOSC) test. The TOSC permits valid inference for non-normal distributions. Empirical assessments show large divergences between TOST and TOSC p-values when distributions are non-normal—demonstrating the likelihood of erroneous inference under the TOST.     

Leverage-reducing exchange offers and bondholder–stockholder wealth transfers: A re-evaluation

This paper re-examines the intersecurity wealth effects of leverage-reducing exchange offer (LREO) announcements. We show that previous studies may have been confounded by not distinguishing between two types of LREOs – swaps and exchange offers – and by the limited availability of bond data to properly test the wealth transfer effect. Contrary to extant research, we find evidence supportive of the wealth transfer hypothesis in the case of exchange offers but not swap offers. More detailed analysis of LREO exchange offers reveals a systematic relationship between bond returns and certain attributes that capture managerial inclination to accede to bondholder interests, consistent with a wealth transfer effect.     

Environmental Valuation – To Use or Not to Use? A Comparative Study of the United States and Europe

Valuation methods have been used for five main purposes in environmental decision-making. Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) of projects, CBA of new regulations, natural resource damage assessment, environmental costing, and environmental accounting. The relatively lower importance attached to economic efficiency in environmental decision-making in most European countries compared to the U.S.A., both legally and in practice, might account for our general finding that there are very few valuation studies in Europe which have served as a decisive basis for environmental policy and regulations. However, with EU's goal to establish environmentally adjusted national accounts and to apply CBA to environmental policy and regulations, time seems ripe for an increased use of valuation techniques in Europe.     

University education in future studies— a mark III critique: Part II

In 1970 an initial survey was made of futures courses at university level based on forty courses that could be located in the United States and Canada [Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 2, 133–148 (1970)]. This was replicated during 1970–1972 on approximately 200 North American courses and reported changes in the field at the Third World Future Research Conference in Bucharest, September 1972 (Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change, 4, 387–407 [1973]). A third interation was funded by the World Institute Council and published in abstracted form with their permission here. The conclusions to be drawn from some six years of analysis of such courses, and drawn especially from the specifics of the 300 courses in the third iteration, can be lumped under five main headings: (1) All disciplines are to some degree finally alerted to the future implications of both their research and their teaching. (2) There remains still much “froth and nonsense” in futures courses. How to control this and encourage lively creativity is a complex problem-especially since the intellectual image of futurism today is not that high! (3) There appears to be no reliable sociocultural change theory backing future studies and there is precious little solid theory backing future studies and there is precious little solid theory in the field itself-offset by some progress in methodology. (4) Despite these strictures, if all future-oriented courses in American/Canadian universities were lumped together (future Studies per se; technology forecasting/assessment; policy sciences; peace studies; demography; environmental/ecology courses; general systems theory/system analysis/system dynamics; mathematical modelling and game theory; eschatology; utopian literature and science fiction; even black studies and women's courses) the total might approach 5000 and it is still growing, as is popular and academic understanding of the necessity “to plan ahead” in this period of human malaise. (5) Informal education of varied worth, from free swinging communes to middle management cram courses conducted by think-tanks, may turn out to be more useful in future-oriented advanced education than that which takes place in formal “walled” traditional institutions.     

Using Non Market Valuation to Inform the Choice Between Permits and Fees in Environmental Regulation

The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.      

Bootstrapping the autoregressive distributed lag test for cointegration

We propose a bootstrap autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) test. By applying the appropriate bootstrap method, some weaknesses underlying the Pesaran, Shin and Smith ARDL bounds test are addressed including size and power properties and the elimination of inconclusive inferences. In addition, inferences based solely on the significance of the F-test and single t-test from the ARDL bounds test are not sufficient to avoid degenerate cases. The bootstrap ARDL test provides an additional test on the significance of coefficients on lagged levels of the regressors, which provides a better insight into the cointegration status of the model.     

Remarks on the application of statistical games to technological development forecasting

This work presents the probability of determining a quantitative forecast of technological development S(t) defined by a set m of parameters S⁽¹⁾(t),S⁽²⁾(t),…,S^(m)(t), based on statistical game theory. Assuming that the coordinates S⁽ⁱ⁾(t) (i = 1, 2,…,m) of a forecasted vector S(t) are stochastic processes with given probabilistic characteristics, a formula of a function forecasting the value of a coordinate S⁽ⁱ⁾(t) of this vector can be obtained. This formula permits to determine a vector of forecasts _τT(x) of technological development S(t) at a given moment t = τ+T.     

Inconsistency of estimate of the degree of freedom of multivariate student-t disturbances in linear regression models

A moment estimator for the degree of freedom of the jointly multivariate student-t distribution of the disturbances in a linear regression model has been suggested by Singh [Economic letters (1988) 27, 47–53]. In this paper we will show that the distribution of the moment estimate is independent of the true value of the degree of freedom and the estimate converges to infinite in probability as the sample size goes to infinite. Our results show that the moment estimate does not provide any information on the degree of freedom.     

The biological determinants of long-wave behavior in socioeconomic growth and development

In this paper, it is claimed that the effective causality of long-term macroeconomic rhythms, most commonly referred to as long waves or Kondratieff waves, is founded in our biological realm. The observed patterns of regularity in human affairs, manifest as socioeconomic rhythms and recurrent phenomena, are constrained and codetermined by our natural human biological clocks, themselves the result of instructions impressed in the human genome and human cognitive capacity by the physical regularity of fixed cosmic cycles. Considering that a long wave can be conceived as an evolving learning dissipative structure consisting of two successive logistic structural cycles, an innovation cycle and a consolidation cycle, and applying considerations from population dynamics, chaos theory and logistic growth dynamics, a Generational-Learning Model is proposed that permits comprehension of the unfolding and time duration of the phenomenon. The proposed model is based on two kinds of biological constraints that impose the rhythm of collective human behavior — generational and cognitive. The generational consist of biologically based rhythms, namely, the Aggregate Virtual Working Life Tenure and the Aggregate Female Fecundity Interval, both subsets of the normative human life span or human life cycle. The cognitive consist of a limiting learning growth rate, manifest in the alternating sequence of two succeeding learning phases, a new knowledge phase and a consolidation phase. It is proposed that the syncopated beats of succeeding effective generational waves and the dynamics of the learning processes determine the long-wave behavior of socioeconomic growth and development. From the relationship between the differential and the discrete logistic equations, it is demonstrated that the unfolding of each structural cycle of a long wave is controlled by two parameters: the diffusion-learning rate δ and the aggregate effective generation t_G, whose product maintained in the interval 3<δt_G<4 (deterministic chaos) grants the evolution and performance of social systems. Moreover, it is speculated that the triggering mechanism of this long-term swinging behavior may result from the cohesion loss of a given technoeconomic system in consequence of reaching a threshold value of informational entropy production.     

Are “Nearly Exogenous Instruments” reliable?

We show that when instruments are nearly exogenous, the two stage least squares t-statistic unpredictably over-rejects or under-rejects the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressor is insignificant and Anderson–Rubin test over-rejects the null. We prove that in the limit these tests are no longer nuisance parameter free.     

Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information

We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster than K^−t as t→∞. We show that every subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is efficient in any tapering-off game with perfect information. Applications include asynchronously repeated games, repeated games of extensive form games, asymptotically finite horizon games, and asymptotically pure coordination games.