对三资企业转让定价避税分析

转让定价是跨国集团公司进行国际避税的最主要手段,绝大多数跨国公司的子公司都将转让定价视为其最重要的国际税收问题。这种避税行为严重侵害了我国的税收权益,直接造成我国税收流失,损害国家财政利益;我国转让定价税制存在许多问题,如关联企业的认定标准不够明确,转让定价的调整方法过于简单,有关纳税人报告和举证义务的规定强制性不够等。针对这些问题应在完善细化税制、加强对跨国纳税人的约束面寻找解决办法。     

外商投资企业的纳税调整中转移定价税制及APA的应用

<正> 随着经济的发展,国际投资活动逐渐增多,跨国公司得到了迅猛发展。跨国公司的出现,对于加强国际分工与合作、实现资源的有效配置起到了积极作用。但另一方面,也出现了一些问题,比如国际税收问题。而转移定价则是国际税收问题的关键,跨国公司往往利用转移定价来逃避税收、转移财富。一、转移定价制转移定价(transfer pricing)是指跨国公司内部企业之间所制定的交易价     

我国跨国公司转移定价问题探讨

随着改革开放的深入,中国企业对外贸易迅速发展。与此同时,各国政府的反避税行动变得越来越积极。中国企业想要在国际市场获得成功,必须解决转移定价这一税收问题。根据调查,我国跨国公司已经对转移定价有一定认识,但认识上仍存在偏差,并且实际应对能力还有所欠缺。本文在作出对转移定价问题进行深入研究必要性分析的基础上,阐述了我国跨国公司目前在转移定价方面存在的问题,并提出解决措施。本文旨在探讨通过针对性强、具有实际应用价值的企业转移定价策略,增加企业经营行为与东道国政府税收政策的匹配度,减少国际贸易税款支出。     

美国转让定价税制的研究

转让定价是当今跨国公司利用关联企业躲避税收的主要途径。各国政府都给予了极大关注,并寻找对策加以防范。美国在这方面处在世界领先地位,包括它的税制立法和税务实践。本文对美国转让定价税制的概况和其税务处理方法等方面进行了研究,以推动我国转让定价税制体系的构建和完善。     

谈上市公司关联方交易与信息披露问题

转移定价问题最先引起注意的是跨国公司的出现,导致税收的国际分配问题。但随着经济的发展,尤其是企业集团的不断增多,转移定价已不仅仅是一个国际税收问题。企业利用关联方交易转移定价来粉饰财务报表、转移上市公司资金和利润,已成为各方关注的问题。     

预约转让定价的博弈分析

国际关联交易中,跨国公司常常根据各国税制差异利用转让定价套取税收利益,逃避税收。我国作为吸引外国直接投资最多的国家之一,也面临由此产生的税收大量流失的严重问题。本文通过构建预约定价中参与人之间的博弈模型,对其进行分析,提出相应措施,对进一步完善反避税制度具有重要意义。     

预约定价与税收公平原则关系之探究

预约定价作为调整跨国公司转移定价的新制度体现了税收效率原则,但这一制度是否同样体现了税收公平原则值得认真研究。本文通过对预约定价与税收公平原则相互关系的剖析,重点考察了预约定价影响税收公平原则的若干因素,并结合我国预约定价的实践,得出了相应的结论。     

我国转让定价的税务管理现状及对策研究

跨国关联企业为了实现其全球战略目标,赚取最大利润,通常都利用企业间的转让定价来规避税收.关联企业转让定价问题一直是国际上关注的热点.随着经济全球化的不断发展和我国改革开放的日益深入,外商投资企业在我国不断发展壮大.如何有效控制这些企业利用转让定价避税,建立和完善我国现行的转让定价税制成为我国税收征管中亟待解决的问题.本文从转让定价定义及其危害入手,结合我国实际情况,阐述了我国现行转让定价税务征管中存在的问题和不足,并对我国转让定价税务管理提出了建议.     

跨国公司转让定价的主要表现形式及非税务动机

转让定价不仅与跨国公司内部的资源配置和激励约束机制密不可分,并且与国际税收和国际贸易关系密切。本文阐述了跨国公司在我国实施转让定价的主要表现形式,分析了跨国公司转让定价的非税务动机、跨国公司间各子公司及母公司的利润分配,及其对所在国政府税收的影响,并对我国如何控制转让定价提出了建议。     

我国跨国公司应用国际转移定价策略分析

国际转移定价是跨国公司调节利润，降低税负，规避风险的有效策略之一，但在我国新兴的跨国公司中的应用尚十分有限，本文针对国际转移定价的制定方法及其在我国跨国公司应用中应注意的问题进行了分析。     

Transfer Pricing: Strategies,Practices, and Tax Minimization

Using a survey of tax executives from multinational corporations, we document that some firms set their transfer pricing strategy to minimize tax payments, but more firms focus on tax compliance. We estimate that a firm focusing on minimizing taxes has a GAAP effective tax rate that is 6.6 percentage points lower and generates about $43 million more in tax savings, on average, than a firm focusing on tax compliance. Available COMPUSTAT data on sample firms confirm our survey‐based inferences. We also find that transfer pricing‐related tax savings are greater when higher foreign income, tax haven use, and R&D activities are combined with a tax minimization strategy. Finally, compliance‐focused firms report lower FIN 48 tax reserves than tax‐minimizing firms, consistent with the former group using less uncertain transfer pricing arrangements. Collectively, our study provides direct evidence that multinational firms have differing internal priorities for transfer pricing, and that these differences are strongly related to the taxes reported by these firms.     

国际关联方交易内部结转价格的所得税税收和会计策略

国际关联方交易的内部结转价格是指跨国公司内部各个实体之间销售产品或者提供劳务所使用的一种内部划拨价格。跨国公司利用内部结转价格可以达到缴纳最少所得税等目的,国际上为了有效地对跨国公司国际关联方交易的内部结转价格在所得税方面进行税务和会计监督,执行着＂局外价格＂、＂比较价格＂和要求跨国公司揭示更多的财务信息的三种方法。文章认为,无论哪种方法都存在缺乏在世界范围内的统一规范、统一运作和统一监督的问题,应该成立一个由经济专家、会计专家和税务官员组成的全世界范围内的协会或组织予以协调。在我国应该结合具体国情选择相应的方法,并逐步向＂局外价格＂和＂比较价格＂过渡。     

产业集群下在华跨国公司转移定价行为路径选择

本文系统归纳总结了跨国公司转移定价的产生、发展、定价方法,结合我国产业集群背景下跨国公司转移定价管制的现状,阐述了我国的应对政策。     

Transfer pricing in the multinational corporation: A critical appraisal

A distinguishing characteristic of the multinational corporation is its ability to determine with some discretion the prices at which intra-firm transfers of goods and services are recorded. The incentives to manipulate such transfer prices in pursuit of global corporate objectives are often substantial. This paper examines the potential for abuse of the transfer pricing tool by multinational corporations, considers the adequacy of legal rules or guidelines for the setting of transfer prices and the extent to which corporate practice conforms with such guidelines, and assesses the prospects for more effective governmental control of transfer pricing policies.     

跨国公司逆向避税的博弈分析

逆向避税损害了东道国的税收管辖权,影响了东道国的国际收支平衡,造成东道国的资本外流和境内外厂商之间的不公平竞争。逆向避税的形成既有利益驱动原因、规避风险原因,也有战略驱动原因,文章基于博弈论视角,分析了逆向避税所采用的转让定价、资本弱化等主要手段,提出了反逆向避税的转让定价、资本弱化策略。     

Language,knowledge transfer and firm’s strategic assets: the strategic role of language in knowledge transfer to China

This article is intended to examine the exact role of language in intra-firm cross-country knowledge transfer from the perspective of developing firm’s strategic assets. We find that inadequate language ability can lead to communication failures and cultural misunderstanding, and has the potential to destroy the process of knowledge transfer. Hence, language is not an operational issue but of strategic importance to the transfer of knowledge within multinational enterprises. As language ability is uniquely related to the specific technical, managerial and cultural aspects of a firm, hard to substitute and imitate, it should be regarded as one of the firm’s strategic assets and be dealt at strategic level.     

Who Benefits from Inconsistent Multinational Tax Transfer‐Pricing Rules?*

This paper uses a strategic tax compliance model to examine taxpayer reporting and tax authority audit strategies in an international setting with two tax authorities. The setting features both information asymmetry between the taxpayer and the tax authorities and inconsistent tax transfer‐pricing rules. The latter creates the possibility of each country trying to tax the same income. We study the effect of the probability of transfer‐price rule inconsistency on the strategies and payoffs of the taxpayer and the tax authorities. We find that an increase in the probability of transfer‐price rule inconsistency induces more aggressive auditing by governments. It therefore deters taxpayers from shifting income to the country with the lower tax rate in situations in which the transfer‐pricing rules are consistent, and can either increase or decrease the income reported to the low‐tax‐rate country in cases in which the transfer‐pricing rules are inconsistent. We find that an increase in transfer‐price rule inconsistency could either increase or decrease the taxpayer's expected tax liability and could either increase or decrease the deadweight loss from auditing. Our results call into question the conventional wisdom that the prospect of double taxation due to transfer‐price rule inconsistency increases a firm's expected tax liability and governments' expected audit costs.