The recursive approach to time inconsistency

We introduce a new class of finite horizon stochastic decision problems in which preferences change over time, and provide a proof of the existence of a recursively optimal strategy. Recursive optimization techniques dominate many areas of economic dynamics. However, in decision problems in which tastes change over time, the solution technique most commonly applied is not recursive, but rather strategic (subgame perfection). In this paper we argue in favor of the recursive approach, and we take the necessary theoretical steps to make the recursive methodology applicable.     

An investment contest to influence environmental policy

In an investment contest for environmental policy, polluters and victims of pollution invest in an increase of their marginal benefits of pollution and environmental quality, respectively. These investments influence time-consistent environmental policy. Investments will exceed their optimal level. The more victims there are, the lower aggregate investment, the lower payoffs for the victims and the higher payoffs for the polluters. The more polluters there are, the higher aggregate investment and the lower payoffs for polluters and victims. Asymmetries between polluter and victim result in less overinvestment and bias environmental policy in favour of the less productive side.     

Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model

How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.     

Correcting externalities through taxes on/subsidies to related goods

Optimal corrective taxation is considered in the presence of externalities in cases where only related goods, i.e. complements to or substitutes for externality-creating goods, can be taxed. In the context of identical individuals and separable externalities, taxing and subsidizing complements and substitutes to externalities are analyzed. First, the circumstances under which it is optimal to operate on one market only for a related good are examined. Second, cases are identified where optimality requires taxes on substitutes for (or subsidies to complements to) a good which generates negative externalities.     

Optimal subsidies to declining industries: Efficiency and equity considerations

This paper considers equity versus efficiency in a small economy that subsidizes an industry facing falling world market prices. Subsidies keep up output in the short run when wages and factors are rigid. But once introduced, subsidies become permanent, because of pressures from vested interests. This creates missalocation of resources in the long run. An optimal efficiency subsidy balances the short-run gains and long-run losses. It should be raised when prices fall if there is full employment initially and lowered if there is unemployment. An optimal distribution subsidy, which aims at maintaining the existing income distribution, should always be raised.     

Stackelberg leadership in a dynamic duopoly with stochastic capital accumulation

I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.JEL Classification: C61, C73, D43, D92, L13Financial support within the project The post-entry performance of firms: technology, growth and survival lead by Enrico Santarelli, co-financed by the University of Bologna and MIUR, is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Uwe Cantner, Roberto Cellini, Roberto Golinelli, Helen Louri, Enrico Santarelli, Antonello Scurcu, Peter Thompson, two anonymous referees and the audience at the final workshop of the project (Bologna, November 22-23, 2002) for useful comments and discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Democracy favors access to credit of firms

Access to credit is one of the main obstacles for the growth of firms. We test the hypothesis that democracy exerts an impact on access to credit. We perform regressions at the firm-level on a large dataset of 46,000 firms in 108 countries. We find evidence of a negative relationship between democracy and credit constraints for firms. We further establish that democracy contributes to reduce borrower discouragement and leads to more bank loan approval decisions. Our key finding is therefore that democracy favors firms' access to credit. Our work contributes to the debate on the impact of democracy on economic development by considering one firm-level channel of transmission.     

Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy

We characterize the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy in economies with either nominal or indexed debt. In a model where nominal debt is the only source of time inconsistency, the Markov-perfect equilibrium policy implies the progressive depletion of the outstanding stock of debt, until the time inconsistency disappears. There is a resulting welfare loss if debt is nominal rather than indexed. We also analyze the case where monetary policy is time inconsistent even when debt is indexed. In this case, with nominal debt, the sequential optimal policy converges to a time-consistent steady state with positive—or negative—debt, depending on the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Welfare can be higher if debt is nominal rather than indexed and the level of debt is not too high.     

Pricing to market of Italian exporting firms

This article investigates the pricing-to-market (PTM) behaviour of Italian exporting firms, using quarterly survey data by sector and by region over the period 1999q1 to 2005q2. A partial equilibrium imperfect competition model provides the structure according to which the orthogonality of structural shocks is derived. Impulse response analysis shows non-negligible reactions of export-domestic price margins to unanticipated changes in cost competitiveness and in foreign and domestic demand levels, even though these effects appear to be of a transitory nature. For the period 1999 to 2001, a typical PTM behaviour emerges, while, during the most recent years favourable foreign demand conditions allowed firms to increase their export-domestic price margins in face of a strong deterioration of their cost competitiveness. Macroeconomic implications of the observed PTM behaviour are also discussed.     

Option exercise with temptation

This paper adopts the Gul and Pensendorfer self-control utility model to analyze an agent’s option exercise decision under uncertainty over an infinite horizon. The agent decides whether and when to do an irreversible activity. He is tempted by immediate gratification and suffers from self-control problems. The cost of self-control lowers the benefit from continuation or stopping and may erode the option value of waiting. When applied to the investment and exit problems, the model can generate the behavior of procrastination and preproperation. In addition, unlike the hyperbolic discounting model, the model here provides a unique prediction. I thank Drew Fudenberg, Bart Lipman, Neng Wang, and participants in the BU theory lunch workshop and in the Canadian Economic Theory Conference 2005 for helpful discussions. I am especially grateful for valuable suggestions from an anonymous referee and coeditor Steve Williamson. The BU ISP Seed Grant has supported this research.     

Knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies to new,emerging technologies

Is knowledge spillover a rationale for supporting R&D on new, emerging technologies more than R&D on other technologies? In this paper, I analyze whether innovation externalities caused only by knowledge spillovers differ between technologies of different maturity. I show that R&D should not be subsidized equally across industries when the knowledge stocks differ. This is because knowledge spillovers depend on the size of the knowledge stock and the elasticity of scale in R&D production. R&D in the emerging technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is smaller than one. However, R&D in the mature technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is larger than one.     

Impediments to innovation faced by Canadian manufacturing firms

Using the findings of the 1999 Survey of Innovation in the Canadian manufacturing sector, we analyse the impediments, i.e. the problems and obstacles, that firms in the sector face when they innovate. In particular, we assess the factors which inhibit innovation, especially with regard to by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). First we try to establish the relationship between the impediments to innovation and various firm characteristics. Then we assess whether these impediments actually prevent firms from innovating or whether firms are able to overcome them.

We find that the perception of impediments to innovation vary according to firm characteristics. For example, large firms are more likely to report the high cost of developing innovation and organizational rigidities as impediments than small firms. However, they seem to have less difficulty with regard to financing innovation projects compared to SMEs. Our results also show that firms seem to be able to overcome most of the obstacles to innovation. Therefore, the impediments featured in innovation survey(s) should not be interpreted as impenetrable barriers that prevent innovation. The sole exception is organizational rigidities. Firms facing organizational rigidities are less likely to become innovative, whether they are small, medium, or large. From our results, we conclude that small firms do not face particular impediments which prevent them from becoming innovative.     

Barriers to innovation in young and mature firms

This paper examines how firm age can affect a firm’s perception of the obstacles (deterring vs. revealed) that hamper and delay innovation. Using a comprehensive panel of Spanish firms for the period 2004–2011, the empirical analysis conducted shows that distinct types of obstacle are perceived differently by firms of different ages. First, a clear-cut negative relationship is identified between firm age and a firm’s assessment of both the internal and external shortages of financial resources. Second, young firms seem to be less sensitive to the lack of qualified personnel when initiating an innovative project than when they are already engaged in such activities. By contrast, the attempts of mature firms to engage in innovation activity are significantly affected by the lack of qualified personnel. Finally, mature incumbents appear to attach greater importance to obstacles related to market structure and demand than is the case of firms with less experience.     

R&D subsidies in a duopoly market with outsourcing to the rival firm

This paper investigates the effects of a public uniform R&D subsidy policy in a downstream duopoly market in which a nonintegrated firm, which faces a lower marginal cost, outsources inputs from its vertically integrated rival. The findings show that, in this market structure, such a policy has relevant effects largely differentiated between downstream competitors, as it can significantly modify the relative market shares and profitability of competing firms. Unlike the standard Cournot setting augmented with R&D, results show that the subsidy policy can have different (counterintuitive) effects on R&D investments, output, and profits of the vertically integrated producer and the vertically separated firm, which hold in both cases of exogenous and endogenous (optimal) subsidy. Our findings offer some testable implications and suggest that a subsidy policy in a market with outsourcing to a rival should also consider the different effects of this approach on competitors.     

Should governments stop subsidies to private goods? Evidence from rural Latin America

This paper empirically documents the effects of subsidizing private goods to the detriment of the government's supply of public goods. We use a new data set from the rural sector in fifteen Latin American countries over the period 1985–2001 collected using a methodology that allows us to separate government subsidies to private goods from expenditures in the provision of public goods. The econometric evidence shows that the government's decision to subsidize either private or public goods has dramatic consequences for economic development. Reducing the share of subsidies to private goods (or, equivalently, increasing the share of public goods) in the government's budget has, ceteris paribus, a large and significant positive impact on rural per capita income, reduces certain undesirable environmental effects associated with output expansion, and contributes to poverty reduction.     

The structure of authority, federalism, commitment and economic growth

Summary. In a neoclassical growth model with many regions and a mobile factor, two federal arrangements are considered. In the first federal arrangement the central government chooses a uniform tax policy, whereas in the second each regional government chooses its own tax policy. The main result is that the first federal arrangement leads to high tax rates and economic stagnation, whereas the second leads to low tax rates and economic growth. This result stems from a time consistency problem. The lack of tax competition forces a time consistency problem on the central government under the first federal arrangement. In contrast, regional tax competition acts as a commitment device under the second federal arrangement. The fundamental feature in the environment that gives rise to different abilities of the state to commit is the different structure of authority within the state.Received: 10 February 2003, Revised: 2 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: H77, O41, E60, C73, E13.Ronald A. Edwards: This is a revision of Chapter 3 of my University of Minnesota Ph.D. I thank my advisor Edward C. Prescott for his encouragement and numerous helpful discussions. I also thank Tim Kehoe for many useful discussions as well as Beth Allen, Berthold Herrendorf, Arilton Teixeira and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This research was assisted by an International Predissertation Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the Ford Foundation.     

Do domestic firms learn to export from multinationals?

Attracting inward investment is a major preoccupation of policymakers worldwide, and a wide range of instruments, including direct subventions, are deployed to attract multinational enterprises (MNEs). Intervention is predicated on the assumption that there are direct productivity spillovers associated with the presence of MNEs and the policy of attracting them is targeted at capturing these externalities. Yet robust evidence on direct spillovers is hard to find. An underexplored indirect channel for productivity spillovers is via exports. Exporting firms are more productive than nonexporting firms. Thus, if the presence of MNEs results in more indigenous firms exporting, an indirect productivity spillover will result. In this paper, we identify possible transmission mechanisms for export spillovers and test for their existence on a large panel of firms in the UK. Our results confirm positive spillover effects from MNEs on the decision to export of UK-owned firms as well as on their export propensity.     

The returns to exporting: evidence from UK firms

Abstract The question of learning versus self‐selection has dominated the micro‐econometric literature on firm export decisions without leading to any firm conclusions. In part this reflects the limited information content of the data typically used. In this paper we use survey data on UK firms to offer some new insights into this debate. We find that the majority of firms report benefits to exporting across a wide range of performance measures, including size, profitability, and the introduction of new products. These effects do not decline as the number of years of exporting rises if the export intensity of the firm rises.     

Difficulties for small firms to invest in research prerogatives. An empirical analysis of a sample of Italian firms

It is a commonly accepted fact that a quite strong relation exists between research investments and the general wealth of a given area. The main goal of this study is to analyse and determine which financing sources better serve this need for innovation, taking a sample of 1000 private firms in current economic downturn. Small firms from Southern Italy often have no access to debt capital on nondeterministic research activities, and more importantly, it still seems like banks cannot afford to finance these kinds of operations, mainly because of their indeterminate nature. This research draws the conclusion that only self-evidently solvent firms have a chance of getting the financial help needed to innovate.     

Finance constraints and technology spillovers from foreign to domestic firms

Scholars have suggested that externalities such as technology spillovers to domestic firms from the entry and presence of foreign firms – i.e., Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) spillovers – arise only when domestic firms possess adequate absorptive capacity. But they have also maintained a predominantly technological focus in their conceptualization of absorptive capacity, treating it mostly as a function of domestic firms' technological investments. Yet, several anecdotes point to finance constraints being equally important hurdles to absorbing technology. Given the comparatively scant attention to finance constraints in the FDI spillover literature, we present theoretical arguments and a counterfactual simulation for how finance constraints influence firms' realization of FDI spillovers. In the process, we identify two mechanisms underlying why firms facing high finance constraints experience lower FDI spillovers. (125 words).