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1.
In an investment contest for environmental policy, polluters and victims of pollution invest in an increase of their marginal benefits of pollution and environmental quality, respectively. These investments influence time-consistent environmental policy. Investments will exceed their optimal level. The more victims there are, the lower aggregate investment, the lower payoffs for the victims and the higher payoffs for the polluters. The more polluters there are, the higher aggregate investment and the lower payoffs for polluters and victims. Asymmetries between polluter and victim result in less overinvestment and bias environmental policy in favour of the less productive side. 相似文献
2.
We introduce a new class of finite horizon stochastic decision problems in which preferences change over time, and provide a proof of the existence of a recursively optimal strategy. Recursive optimization techniques dominate many areas of economic dynamics. However, in decision problems in which tastes change over time, the solution technique most commonly applied is not recursive, but rather strategic (subgame perfection). In this paper we argue in favor of the recursive approach, and we take the necessary theoretical steps to make the recursive methodology applicable. 相似文献
3.
Hans Wijkander 《Journal of public economics》1985,28(1):111-125
Optimal corrective taxation is considered in the presence of externalities in cases where only related goods, i.e. complements to or substitutes for externality-creating goods, can be taxed. In the context of identical individuals and separable externalities, taxing and subsidizing complements and substitutes to externalities are analyzed. First, the circumstances under which it is optimal to operate on one market only for a related good are examined. Second, cases are identified where optimality requires taxes on substitutes for (or subsidies to complements to) a good which generates negative externalities. 相似文献
4.
Luca Lambertini 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2005,15(4):443-465
I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.JEL Classification:
C61, C73, D43, D92, L13Financial support within the project The post-entry performance of firms: technology, growth and survival lead by Enrico Santarelli, co-financed by the University of Bologna and MIUR, is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Uwe Cantner, Roberto Cellini, Roberto Golinelli, Helen Louri, Enrico Santarelli, Antonello Scurcu, Peter Thompson, two anonymous referees and the audience at the final workshop of the project (Bologna, November 22-23, 2002) for useful comments and discussion. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
5.
This article investigates the pricing-to-market (PTM) behaviour of Italian exporting firms, using quarterly survey data by sector and by region over the period 1999q1 to 2005q2. A partial equilibrium imperfect competition model provides the structure according to which the orthogonality of structural shocks is derived. Impulse response analysis shows non-negligible reactions of export-domestic price margins to unanticipated changes in cost competitiveness and in foreign and domestic demand levels, even though these effects appear to be of a transitory nature. For the period 1999 to 2001, a typical PTM behaviour emerges, while, during the most recent years favourable foreign demand conditions allowed firms to increase their export-domestic price margins in face of a strong deterioration of their cost competitiveness. Macroeconomic implications of the observed PTM behaviour are also discussed. 相似文献
6.
Javier Díaz-Gimnez Giorgia Giovannetti Ramon Marimon Pedro Teles 《Review of Economic Dynamics》2008,11(3):493-514
We characterize the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy in economies with either nominal or indexed debt. In a model where nominal debt is the only source of time inconsistency, the Markov-perfect equilibrium policy implies the progressive depletion of the outstanding stock of debt, until the time inconsistency disappears. There is a resulting welfare loss if debt is nominal rather than indexed. We also analyze the case where monetary policy is time inconsistent even when debt is indexed. In this case, with nominal debt, the sequential optimal policy converges to a time-consistent steady state with positive—or negative—debt, depending on the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Welfare can be higher if debt is nominal rather than indexed and the level of debt is not too high. 相似文献
7.
Dominique Tourigny 《Economics of Innovation and New Technology》2013,22(3):217-250
Using the findings of the 1999 Survey of Innovation in the Canadian manufacturing sector, we analyse the impediments, i.e. the problems and obstacles, that firms in the sector face when they innovate. In particular, we assess the factors which inhibit innovation, especially with regard to by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). First we try to establish the relationship between the impediments to innovation and various firm characteristics. Then we assess whether these impediments actually prevent firms from innovating or whether firms are able to overcome them. We find that the perception of impediments to innovation vary according to firm characteristics. For example, large firms are more likely to report the high cost of developing innovation and organizational rigidities as impediments than small firms. However, they seem to have less difficulty with regard to financing innovation projects compared to SMEs. Our results also show that firms seem to be able to overcome most of the obstacles to innovation. Therefore, the impediments featured in innovation survey(s) should not be interpreted as impenetrable barriers that prevent innovation. The sole exception is organizational rigidities. Firms facing organizational rigidities are less likely to become innovative, whether they are small, medium, or large. From our results, we conclude that small firms do not face particular impediments which prevent them from becoming innovative. 相似文献
8.
Jianjun Miao 《Economic Theory》2008,34(3):473-501
This paper adopts the Gul and Pensendorfer self-control utility model to analyze an agent’s option exercise decision under
uncertainty over an infinite horizon. The agent decides whether and when to do an irreversible activity. He is tempted by
immediate gratification and suffers from self-control problems. The cost of self-control lowers the benefit from continuation
or stopping and may erode the option value of waiting. When applied to the investment and exit problems, the model can generate
the behavior of procrastination and preproperation. In addition, unlike the hyperbolic discounting model, the model here provides
a unique prediction.
I thank Drew Fudenberg, Bart Lipman, Neng Wang, and participants in the BU theory lunch workshop and in the Canadian Economic
Theory Conference 2005 for helpful discussions. I am especially grateful for valuable suggestions from an anonymous referee
and coeditor Steve Williamson. The BU ISP Seed Grant has supported this research. 相似文献
9.
《Journal of public economics》2007,91(5-6):1071-1094
This paper empirically documents the effects of subsidizing private goods to the detriment of the government's supply of public goods. We use a new data set from the rural sector in fifteen Latin American countries over the period 1985–2001 collected using a methodology that allows us to separate government subsidies to private goods from expenditures in the provision of public goods. The econometric evidence shows that the government's decision to subsidize either private or public goods has dramatic consequences for economic development. Reducing the share of subsidies to private goods (or, equivalently, increasing the share of public goods) in the government's budget has, ceteris paribus, a large and significant positive impact on rural per capita income, reduces certain undesirable environmental effects associated with output expansion, and contributes to poverty reduction. 相似文献
10.
Do domestic firms learn to export from multinationals? 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
David Greenaway Nuno Sousa Katharine Wakelin 《European Journal of Political Economy》2004,20(4):1027-1043
Attracting inward investment is a major preoccupation of policymakers worldwide, and a wide range of instruments, including direct subventions, are deployed to attract multinational enterprises (MNEs). Intervention is predicated on the assumption that there are direct productivity spillovers associated with the presence of MNEs and the policy of attracting them is targeted at capturing these externalities. Yet robust evidence on direct spillovers is hard to find. An underexplored indirect channel for productivity spillovers is via exports. Exporting firms are more productive than nonexporting firms. Thus, if the presence of MNEs results in more indigenous firms exporting, an indirect productivity spillover will result. In this paper, we identify possible transmission mechanisms for export spillovers and test for their existence on a large panel of firms in the UK. Our results confirm positive spillover effects from MNEs on the decision to export of UK-owned firms as well as on their export propensity. 相似文献
11.
Ronald A. Edwards 《Economic Theory》2005,25(3):629-648
Summary. In a neoclassical growth model with many regions and a mobile factor, two federal arrangements are considered. In the first federal arrangement the central government chooses a uniform tax policy, whereas in the second each regional government chooses its own tax policy. The main result is that the first federal arrangement leads to high tax rates and economic stagnation, whereas the second leads to low tax rates and economic growth. This result stems from a time consistency problem. The lack of tax competition forces a time consistency problem on the central government under the first federal arrangement. In contrast, regional tax competition acts as a commitment device under the second federal arrangement. The fundamental feature in the environment that gives rise to different abilities of the state to commit is the different structure of authority within the state.Received: 10 February 2003, Revised: 2 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: H77, O41, E60, C73, E13.Ronald A. Edwards: This is a revision of Chapter 3 of my University of Minnesota Ph.D. I thank my advisor Edward C. Prescott for his encouragement and numerous helpful discussions. I also thank Tim Kehoe for many useful discussions as well as Beth Allen, Berthold Herrendorf, Arilton Teixeira and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This research was assisted by an International Predissertation Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the Ford Foundation. 相似文献
12.
Estimates of Soviet Bloc import elasticities and of the value of credit subsidies on loans to the bloc in 1981 are used in order to simulate the impact on OECD exports, if these subsidies had been eliminated in that year. The elasticity estimates indicate that price changes have little bearing on hard currency spent on a particular commodity by the Soviet Bloc. If subsidies had been eliminated in 1981, the total decline in OECD exports to the Bloc would have been less than 5%, and for any country, if proportionally distributed among suppliers, no more than 6%, no less than 2%. 相似文献
13.
This article examines the impact of start-ups (active for 1 up to 5 years) and young firms (active for 6 up to 10 years) on industry-level efficiency growth in six EU countries, covering the period 2002–2009. Using semi-parametric estimates of meta-frontier efficiency, it is found that surviving entrants gradually raise their efficiency level in all countries considered. Firm-level efficiency growth decreases with firm age, whereas reallocation towards efficient firms contributes more to industry-level growth as firms mature. The relative contribution of start-ups appears to have been important as they actually contributed positively to overall efficiency growth which, over the period under consideration, was negative in most countries, even before the ‘Great Recession’. There are indications of ‘cleansing’, due to the exit of less efficient firms, during the ‘Great Recession’. 相似文献
14.
Taxes and subsidies to change eating habits when information is not enough: an application to fish consumption 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stéphan Marette Jutta Roosen Sandrine Blanchemanche 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2008,34(2):119-143
A calibrated model is used to determine the welfare impacts of various regulatory instruments for improving health. The results
of a lab experiment are integrated in a partial equilibrium model representing demands for two kinds of fish, one with higher
nutritional benefits (canned sardines) and one with higher contamination risks (canned tuna) in France. In the laboratory,
information about health effects leads to a statistically significant decrease (increase) in the willingness to pay for tuna
(sardines). Simulations with the laboratory results show that, for most cases, a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy
on sardines without any information revealed to consumers lead to the highest welfare, because both the tax and subsidy directly
internalize health characteristics. The information policy combined with a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on
sardines is socially profitable only if a large proportion of consumers (greater than 95%) receives health information.
相似文献
15.
16.
This article provides an empirical model of the shadow of death in which the exit probability of a firm depends on the firm’s productive performance and the firm’s level of sunk costs, which are viewed as barriers to exit. The shadow of death effect is treated by assuming a relationship between the propensity to exit and both the contemporaneous and lagged values of efficiency and sunk costs. To estimate the unobserved productive efficiency, we use the Ackerberg et al. (2006) estimator extended by the addition of a correction for selection bias. We use an unbalanced sample of approximately 100 000 French firms over the period 1997 to 2002. Our results indicate that the probability of exit is negatively affected by unobserved individual efficiency and the level of sunk costs. The shadow of death effect applies mainly in manufacturing, where both productive efficiency and sunk costs decrease during several years before exit. In service sectors, the exit process seems to occur more suddenly. 相似文献
17.
George R.G. Clarke Robert Cull María Soledad Martínez Pería 《Journal of Comparative Economics》2006,34(4):774
Combining responses from a survey of firms operating in 35 developing and transition economies with data on the degree of foreign bank presence across these countries, we investigate whether higher foreign bank participation improves the accessibility of external financing for firms. The results suggest that all enterprises, including small and medium-sized ones, report facing lower financing obstacles in countries having higher levels of foreign bank presence. The results are robust to the inclusion of many controls and to econometric adjustments for the potential endogeneity of foreign bank presence and for the likely correlation of responses across firms within countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 774–795. 相似文献
18.
《Structural Change and Economic Dynamics》2007,18(3):348-369
Gibrat's law is a referent model of corporate growth dynamics. This paper employs Bayesian panel data methods to test Gibrat's law and its implications. Using a Pharmaceutical Industry Database (1987–1998), we find evidence against Gibrat's law on average, within or across industries. Estimated steady states differ across firms, and firm sizes and growth rates do not converge within the same industry to a common limiting distribution. There is only weak evidence of mean reversion: initial larger firms do not grow relatively slower than smaller firms. Differences in growth rates and in steady state size are persistent and firm-specific, rather than size-specific. 相似文献
19.
Many governments provide monetary transfers to low-income families. The mechanism through which these subsidies are distributed may contain several inefficiencies that diminish the net-value obtained by the recipients. In this paper, we build and estimate a behavioral dynamic model that allows us to evaluate the efficiency of current and alternative distribution mechanisms. The proposed model is simple and resembles the individual's decision to collect the transfer. To estimate it, we use data from a cash transfer program in Ecuador where recipients incur high transaction costs each time they collect their benefits. Despite its simplicity, our model is able to replicate the observed data remarkably well. We use it to simulate alternative payment mechanisms and show that an adequate design of the delivery of payments can substantially increase the value of cash transfer programs. 相似文献
20.
This paper examines the way that the exit behavior of entrepreneurial firms is shaped by their innovative capabilities, and
the technology environment in which they operate. We distinguish between exit by closing down activity and exit by merger
or acquisition (M&A). Using a large sample of Dutch manufacturing firms, we explore the relationship between firm exit, age
and innovative capabilities, in high and low innovation intensive industries. We find that for entrepreneurial firms, innovation
may go some way towards compensating for the liability of newness, but also makes them more attractive M&A targets. More specifically,
entrepreneurial firms in high-tech industries do not seem to improve their chances of survival by innovating; when technological
change is rapid, innovation, especially in products, is necessary to participate in the innovation race in an industry, but
is not sufficient to guarantee survival. In contrast, in low-tech industries, process innovation is a critical condition for
the survival of entrepreneurial firms. In this context, entrepreneurial firms that are able to bring new product ideas, introducing
‘exceptional’ variations into a stable environment, are most likely to exit by M&A, thereby transferring their knowledge and
capabilities to the incumbent firms. 相似文献