公共选择理论与交易成本政治学的比较分析

作为当代西方新政治经济学的重要组成部分,公共选择理论与交易成本政治学存在着共识,但是,兴起于公共选择理论之后的交易成本政治学增进了对政治领域的交易及制度的理解,弥补了公共选择理论的不足。换言之,交易成本政治学提高了对于政治世界的理解水平。通过对公共选择理论与交易成本政治学的比较分析,厘清二者之间的共识与差异,有助于辨析政治学和经济学整合发展的趋势。     

Income inequality, democracy and growth reconsidered

Persson and Tabellini (Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992a. Growth, distribution and politics. Eur. Econ. Rev. 36, 593–602; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992b. Growth, distribution and politics. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3–22; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1994. Is inequality harmful for growth? Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 600–621) as well as Alesina and Rodrik (Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1992. Distribution, political conflict, and economic growth. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 23–50; Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1994. Distributive politics and economic growth, Q. J. Econ. 109, 465–490) have argued that income inequality reduces economic growth rates among democracies because it promotes distributional struggles. In this paper I question the supportive evidence for a number of reasons. Measures of income distribution and democracy are unreliable and permit only very tentative conclusions. Changes in data sources or recoding of some influential cases affect results. It is questionable whether equality effects on growth apply only within democracies, as a median voter interpretation of this relationship should make one expect. The general idea that distributional struggle hurts the growth prospects of nations, however, receives some empirical support.     

How elections affect fiscal policy and growth: revisiting the mechanism

This paper reconsiders the popular result that the lower is the probability of reelection, the greater is the incentive of incumbent politicians to choose short-sighted, inefficient policies. The set-up is a general equilibrium model of economic growth, in which fiscal policy is endogenously chosen under electoral uncertainty. Political parties can value possible economic benefits differently depending on whether they are in or out of power, and—by contrast with the literature—the relevant preference coefficient is a choice variable rather than an exogenous taste parameter. The main result is that, when political parties choose both economic policy instruments and preference coefficients, the fundamental reason for short-sighted policy is the extra rents from being in power per se.     

Behavioral political economy: A survey

In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research.     

The use of knowledge about society

Selection of efficient institutions or policies in politics requires constituents to estimate the net benefits of political reforms. Political competition fails to inform constituents of the costs of forgone political alternatives. Ignorance of ‘political opportunity costs’ prevents the adoption of welfare enhancing reforms of public institutions and policies. The empirical record supports this contention.     

What laws determine progress? An Indian contribution to the idea of progress based on Mahadev Govind Ranade's works, 1870–1901

By the late nineteenth century, the school of “Indian Political Economy” was founded to understand India's extreme poverty and deindustrialisation. This paper examines how Mahadev Govind Ranade (the school's founder) conceptualised progress by tracing its origins and evaluating how it was formulated to reconcile theory with India's political and socio-economic reality. Ranade identified specific Indian determinants of progress: the centrifugal nature of Indian politics; the dependence of a colonial economy; and its refutable role within the international division of labour theory.     

The “second economy” and resource allocation under central planning

A formal model of intermediate product reallocation through Second Economy markets in a centrally planned economy is discussed. The principal result is that there exists an equilibrium allocation determined in these Second Economy markets in spite of fixed official prices and centrally monitored trading at these prices. It is always a constrained Pareto optimum with respect to the initial plan-generated allocation. Hence, Second Economy markets can effectively and “second best” efficiently ration the intermediate-product “sellers' market” of a centrally planned economy.     

Transfers and Bailouts: Institutions for Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline

The growing importance of local and provincial governments as providers of public services and the importance of those services for the overall performance of the national economy has led to a careful re-examination of how public resources are allocated by decentralized governments. While the Tiebout model promises efficient local resource allocations, the conditions necessary for such outcomes—many local governments, fully informed and costlessly mobile households, no spillovers, residential head taxes—are rarely met in practice. Lacking a sufficient number of competitive local governments, however, other institutional safeguards must be found. Four such institutions are identified here. First, a stable central government managed by nationally elected political parties or presidents capable of making (second-best) efficient interpersonal redistributions of income while at the same time denying inefficient intergovernmental transfers and /or access to non-resident taxation. Second, a mature banking system and fully integrated national capital markets to minimize the economic consequences of a single government's failure to repay its local debts. Third, informed and sophisticated municipal bond and local land markets capable of evaluating local services and finances so as to shift back onto local residents the full economic consequences of inefficient local government fiscal choices. Fourth, a politically independent judiciary capable of enforcing constitutional rules for spending and tax assignment, local debt repayment, and balanced local budgets. Efficient central governments and efficient land and capital markets are seen here as necessary institutional pre-conditions for an efficient local public sector.     

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: A comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

Our comment on Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] addresses the equilibrium concept used in the game with imperfect information, Section 4 of the original paper. The solution represented in the original paper does not constitute a perfect Bayesian Nash-equilibrium. We develop an alternative solution of the game given the assumptions made by Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] and find that the results concerning the optimal amount of over-evaluation of income and the existence of a pooling or separating equilibrium are altered.     

Socially optimal monetary policy institutions

Research on the interaction between wage setters and central banks has shown that the classical dichotomy of monetary policy models in the tradition of Barro and Gordon [Journal of Political Economy 91 (1983) 589] does not hold if an inflation motive of wage setters is introduced. In this paper, the conditions for this result are re-examined under different assumptions concerning the exact timing of the strategic game, and the consequences for the socially optimal delegation rules and incentive contracts for central bankers are derived. It is shown that the relationship between central bank conservativeness and macroeconomic performance—and hence the design of optimal monetary policy institutions—is sensitive to the modelling choice. In particular, the case for an ultra-populist central banker is valid only under assumptions that appear to be quite unrealistic.     

Brexit and the Politics of UK Growth Models

Brexit has reopened and repoliticised the debate about future growth models for the UK economy. This contribution argues that this debate is built around historically specific path dependencies that reflect the particular character of public debate about British political economy, while also suggesting that the debate around Brexit takes place at a very distinctive moment in the history of democratic capitalism in Europe. This combination gives the renewed politicisation a specific and perhaps perverse character. The paper considers how we should approach debates about growth models, paying particular attention to the importance of the politics of support. It suggests that recent debate about growth models has been largely subsumed within the politics of Brexit, which has politicised that debate, albeit through the emergent political economy frames that Brexit has provoked. The paper explores the ways in which the demise of three key props of European democratic capitalism – a sustained period of economic growth, a governing philosophy that subordinated the market to wider social purposes and strong political parties – play out in the context of Brexit and the search for a new politics of support.     

Agglomeration, innovation and international research mobility

This paper discusses a model of the New Economic Geography, in which the seminal core-periphery model of Krugman [Krugman, P., 1991, Increasing returns and economic geography, Journal of Political Economy 99, 483–499.] is extended by endogenous research activities. Beyond the common ‘anonymous’ consideration of R&D expenditures within fixed costs, this model introduces in an analytically tractable approach vertical product differentiation in combination with a de-integrated R&D sector. In the context of international factor mobility, the destabilizing effects of a mobile scientific workforce are analyzed. Based upon a simple welfare analysis, a consideration of R&D promoting policy instruments and their spatial implications, this paper makes a contribution to the brain-drain debate.     

Mill’s radical end of laissez-faire: A review essay of the political economy of progress: John Stuart Mill and modern radicalism

Can John Stuart Mill’s radicalism achieve liberal egalitarian ends? Joseph Persky’s The Political Economy of Progress is a provocative and compelling discussion of Mill’s economic thought. It is also a defense of radical political economy. Providing valuable historical context, Persky traces Mill’s intellectual journey as an outspoken proponent of laissez-faire to a cautious supporter of co-operative socialism. I propose two problems with Persky’s optimistic take on radical social reform. First, demands for substantive equality have led past radicals to endorse exclusionary nationalist and eugenics policies. It pushes some contemporary radicals towards illiberal interventions into intimate social life. Second, the radical critique of capitalism relies on an account of profit that neglects the epistemic function of private-property markets. Once this is acknowledged, capitalism retains some progressive credentials against radical alternatives.     

Precautionary saving under liquidity constraints: Evidence from rural Pakistan

This paper investigates precautionary saving under liquidity constraints in Pakistan using household panel data. In particular, while it estimates Kimball's [Kimball, M.S. Precautionary saving in the small and in the large. Econometrica 1990; 58; 53–73.] prudence parameter based on a framework that is similar to Dynan [Dynan, K.E. How prudent are consumers? Journal of Political Economy 1993; 101; 1104–1113.], this study deviates from the framework by explicitly considering liquidity constraints, as in Zeldes [Zeldes, S.P. Consumption and liquidity constraints: an empirical investigation. Journal of Political Economy 1989; 97; 305–346.]. By doing so, this paper attempts to differentiate the standard precautionary saving caused by uncertainty from that caused by liquidity constraints. Furthermore, endogenous liquidity constraints are used in order to resolve issues of selection biases. We find substantial evidence of the presence of precautionary saving in Pakistan. More specifically, the estimated prudence is significantly higher for liquidity-constrained households as compared with unconstrained ones. The finding suggests that the precautionary saving motives appear stronger when households see that their access to credit markets is limited.     

Audited reputation

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854–882].     

The Structure of the ‘EU’ropean Ensemble of State Apparatuses and Its Geopolitical Ambitions

Against the backdrop of the international political and economic system’s increasing fragmentation, this article attempts to analyse the geopolitical ambitions of the EU. Currently, the EU strives to become an independent global power. For this purpose, the EU tries to establish greater independence from the US and, to a certain degree, from its Member states. This is closely linked to (a) the emergence of the Euro as a currency competing with the US dollar for the status of the ‘global reserve currency’ and (b) the construction of a common foreign and ‘security’ policy. Taking the German literature on the political economy of the state and on the European Integration, insights from neo-Gramscian International Political Economy, and the ‘scale debate’ in Anglophone geography as point of departure, I analyse the European ensemble of state apparatuses and demonstrate that these ambitions have failed, due to the status quo of a fragmented Europe.     

Don’t let your robots grow up to be traders: Artificial intelligence, human intelligence, and asset-market bubbles

Researchers who have examined markets populated by “robot traders” have claimed that the high level of allocative efficiency observed in experimental markets is driven largely by the “intelligence” implicit in the rules of the market. Furthermore, they view the ability of agents (artificial or human) to process information and make rational decisions as unnecessary for the efficient operation of markets. This paper presents a new series of market experiments that show that markets populated with standard robot traders are no longer efficient if time is a meaningful element, as it is in all asset markets. While simple two-season markets with human subjects reliably converge to an efficient equilibrium, markets with minimally intelligent robot traders fail to attain this equilibrium. Instead, these markets overshoot the equilibrium and then crash below it. In addition to firmly establishing the role of trader intelligence in asset-market equilibrium, these experiments also provide insights into why bubbles and crashes are consistently observed in many asset-market laboratory experiments using human subjects.     

Alberta and the 200-year present

This article was written as background for a presentation to the conference “Reflections on Caring,” held in Edmonton, Alberta, from April 28 to May 1, 1986, under the auspices of Edmonton Catholic School Services. In it, I tried to summarize what seemed to me the more important long-term influences on Alberta's future in general and of one of its social institutions in particular. Some might be surprised by the relatively little space allocated to energy markets, given Alberta's extreme dependence on the petroleum industry. The deemphasis of this subject was deliberate and was driven by a desire to talk about values, rather than economics, to an audience for whom values are the more important subject. I also chose the emphasis on values because in our day and age they are so seldom discussed. We rely in our discussions of public policy so much on the “value- free” social sciences that we have quite lost sight of the crucial role that values play in determining what are public issues and how they should be discussed and addressed. More particularly, we have lost sight of the value set that underlies the sciences, social and otherwise, and in consequence we have lost our ability to be discriminating in our choice of subjects to which the sciences are capable of rendering a useful answer. I would argue that that value set is no longer a reliable guide for the future—that it identifies the wrong issues and cannot deal with the real ones even if it could identify them. In one sense, the article is an attempt to justify that viewpoint, although I did not set out to write the article with that in mind.     

Feuding,arbitration, and the emergence of an independent judiciary

Constitutional Political Economy - Anthropologists, historians, and political economists suggest that private violence—feuding—provides order and enforces agreements in the absence of a...