Sweet Little Lies: Social Context and the Use of Deception in Negotiation

Social context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. We use a simulated negotiation to test how three dimensions of social context—dyadic gender composition, negotiation strategy, and trust—interact to influence one micro-ethical decision, the use of deception. Deception in all-male dyads was relatively unaffected by trust or the other negotiator’s strategy. In mixed-sex dyads, negotiators consistently increased their use of deception when three forms of trust (identity, benevolent, deterrent) were low and opponents used an accommodating strategy. However, in all-female dyads, negotiators appeared to use multiple and shifting reference points in deciding when to deceive the other party. In these dyads, the use of deception increased when a competitive strategy combined with low benevolence-based trust or an accommodating strategy combined with high identity-based trust. Deception in all-female dyads decreased when a competitive strategy was used in the context of low deterrence-based trust.     

Mutually Dependent: Power,Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. In order to trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators’ affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in the context of nonmutual or low dependence relationships. In these relationships, emotions that signaled certainty were associated with misrepresentation whereas emotions that signaled uncertainty were associated with concealment of information. Negotiators who expressed positive emotions in the context of a nonmutual or high dependence relationship also used less deception. Our results are consistent with a fair trade model in which negotiator increases deception when contextual and interpersonal cues heighten concerns about exploitation and decrease deception when these cues attenuate concerns about exploitation.     

East–West Differences in “Tricky” Tactics: A Comparison of the Tactical Preferences of Chinese and Australian Negotiators

How do Eastern and Western perceptions of “tricky” or ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics differ? We address this question by comparing 161 Chinese and 146 Australian participants’ ratings of the appropriateness of different types of negotiation tactics. We predict that their differing cultural values (e.g., individualism/collectivism, importance of face) as well as their different implicit theories of how negotiation ought to be conducted (i.e., mental models, such as captured in The Secret Art of War: The 36 Stratagems) will be salient in their perceptions of tactics. Examining 24 tactics falling into eight categories, we found that overall the Chinese respondents saw these tactics as more appropriate than did the Australian respondents. There were, however, differences across categories of tactics. Chinese participants rated tactics related to the 36 stratagems as significantly more appropriate than did Australian participants, including diverting attention, misrepresenting information and making false promises. In some cases, the Chinese also saw feigning positive feelings/emotions as more appropriate than did the Australian participants, while an Australian preference for feigning negative feelings/emotions was partially supported. The implications of these findings for practitioners are discussed, along with opportunities for future research.     

The Hidden Persuader: The Role of the Advisor in Negotiations and Group Decision Making—Perspectives from the European Union

Theoretical models of negotiation and group decision making often overlook or at least do not fully account for the important role played by persons who advise negotiators and participants in group decision making. Sight unseen, advisors are often “hidden persuaders,” important but unrecognized sources of influence on the negotiation dynamic. This article explores the roles and methods of advisors in the negotiation process, drawing on survey research conducted in 2013 among approximately seventy advisors at the European Union Council of Ministers. Defining advice as “\(\ldots \)a communication from one person (the advisor) to another (the client) for the purpose of helping that second person determine a course of action for solving a particular problem\(\ldots \)”, the author considers the nature of advice and the range of relationships that may exist between advisors and their clients. He argues that advising is much more than the mere transmittal of information from advisor to negotiator and that for advice to be effective a relationship must exist between the two parties. The author identifies three models of the advisor–negotiator relationship. Model I is the advisor as director, wherein the advisor tends to take control of the negotiating process, directing the negotiator in actions that the negotiator should take to achieve success at the negotiation. Model II is the advisor as servant in which the advisor merely responds to the demands of the client for help and guidance in the negotiation. Model III is the advisor as partner, wherein advisor and negotiator jointly manage the advising process and together take co-ownership of the problem to be solved. The author then explores the factors that lead advisors and negotiators to adopt each of these three models, the various advising styles that advisors adopt, and the differing effects on the negotiation process that these elements may have, drawing on historical examples as well as survey data from the EU Council of Ministers. He concludes by offering advice about advising to three important professional groups—scholars, negotiators, and advisors—on ways to carry out their respective functions more effectively.     

The effect of communication medium on negotiation performance

Concepts of media efficiency and media richness are employed to describe the impact of communication media on two key aspects of negotiation behavior—reducing uncertainty about the task, and managing equivocality about negotiator's bargaining orientation. A controlled experiment was conducted to examine how the use of either audio or text forms of verbal communication, and the presence or absence of visual communication, impacts negotiation performance in a bilateral monopoly task. Each member of a pair of negotiators received private instructions either to maximize joint profit (a cooperative bargaining orientation) or to maximize individual profit (an individualistic bargaining orientation). Negotiation performance was measured via the total amount of relative cooperativeness of verbal communication and joint profit. In the audio mode as opposed to the text mode, the total amount of verbal communication and joint profit was increased. In the presence of visual communication the relative cooperativeness and joint profit of pairs of individualistic negotiators was less than that of cooperative negotiators. In the absence of visual communication the relative cooperativeness and joint profit of pairs of individualistic negotiators was no less than that of cooperative negotiators. In sum the findings suggest that uncertainty regarding the logical structure of the task was reduced primarily via verbal communciation, while equivocality regarding the bargaining orientation of the other negotiator was reduced primarily via visual communication. The implications for group decision and negotiation research and practice are explored.     

Discrepant Values and Measures of Negotiator Performance

The thesis of the paper is that measuring negotiator performance correctly is difficult because the values that those of us who measure negotiator performance think negotiators are maximizing may differ from the values negotiators are actually maximizing. When such discrepant values exist, using performance measures that do not account for them can lead easily to incorrect conclusions about negotiator performance. Indeed, good performance may be judged poor, and vice-versa. This paper explores several related literatures, including the experimental-bargaining, behavioral-decision-making, and procedural-justice literatures, to demonstrate that discrepant values exist. It then demonstrates that whenever performance measures are used as dependent variables in negotiation experiments, the existence of discrepant values can lead to both Type I and Type II construct-validity errors.     

Deceitful when insecure: The effect of self-efficacy beliefs on the use of deception in negotiations

This article investigates if and how negotiators' self-efficacy beliefs affect their use of deception in negotiation. Specifically, we propose that self-efficacy can be interpreted as a threat to self-concept, which encourages individuals to temporarily bypass self-regulatory obstacles by morally disengaging their cognitive moral filters, thereby enabling them to use deception in negotiation. We test our hypotheses in three independent experimental studies involving an interactive negotiation simulation, totalizing 460 participants. We find that negotiators with low self-efficacy regarding their negotiation abilities are more likely to use deception than those with high self-efficacy beliefs. Furthermore, we find that moral disengagement mediates the effects of self-efficacy on deception. Our findings suggest that self-efficacy plays a key role in shaping negotiators' ethical behaviors and we identify the psychological mechanism underlying this relationship.     

Media Effects on the Formation of Negotiator Satisfaction: The Example of Face-to-Face and Text Based Electronically Mediated Negotiations

Recently, scholars have highlighted the importance of subjective negotiation outcomes such as negotiator satisfaction for future negotiations and the relationship between negotiators. This study considers the major antecedents of satisfaction formation in negotiation and analyses how the communication medium, i.e. the face-to-face (FTF) and the text based electronically mediated (TBEM) mode, influence satisfaction formation. Drawing on grounding in communication (Clark and Brennan in Perspectives on socially shared cognition. American Psychological Asociation, Washington DC, pp 127–149, 1991), hypotheses are developed and tested in an experimental gaming simulation in which graduate students negotiated in n = 52 dyads. The empirical analysis supports the notion that the communication medium has a mediated and a moderating effect on negotiator satisfaction. Aspirations, individual profit and positive relational messages mediate the medium’s effect on satisfaction. Furthermore, the impact of contentious behaviour and positive relational messages on negotiator satisfaction is stronger in TBEM than in FTF negotiations. This study also contributes to the wider negotiation literature by employing a context-rich gaming simulation for experimental purposes.     

Loose with the Truth: Predicting Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy, and as having integrity. Negotiators’ goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative, and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party’s trustworthiness, benevolence, and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic betrayal. Negotiators in all-cooperative and all-individualistic dyads used different information in deciding whether to leverage their indifference issues and used the same information (benevolence) differently in deciding whether to misrepresent the value of their indifference issue. Mara Olekalns is a Professor of Management (Negotiations) at the Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne. Her research focuses on communication processes in negotiation. In her research, she has investigated how strategy sequences shape negotiation outcomes. She is extending this research to investigate how impressions and communication shape trust in negotiation. Her work on communication processes in negotiation has been published in Journal of Applied Psychology, Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Philip L. Smith is a Professor in the Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne. His primary research interest is in building quantitative models of the human visual system. He also applies his modeling expertise to analyses of communication processes in negotiation, focusing on the relationships between situational and dispositional factors, strategy sequences and negotiation outcomes. It has been published in leading management and psychology journals, including Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Authors' Note The research reported in this paper was supported by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. We thank Ania Ratzik and Rudi Crncec for assistance with data coding. Correspondence should be addressed to Mara Olekalns, Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester St, Carlton, Victoria, 3053, Australia or via email to m.olekalns@mbs.edu     

The Interplay of Communication and Decisions in Electronic Negotiations: Communicative Decisions or Decisive Communication?

Whilst much research has been conducted on decision support for electronic negotiations and some research has been done on communication support in this area, there is a lack of research on the interplay between these two elements of negotiations. The questions whether both are equally important, whether one effects the other, or whether they show counter-effects are important both for negotiation training (i.e. what should be the focus for becoming a good negotiator) and for system research (i.e. which system support elements need to be developed). The current paper presents results of a controlled laboratory experiment with negotiators that were provided with decision support and communication support and negotiators that had only communication support available. The impact of decision support on the communication process and on outcome dimensions as well as the impact of communication behaviour on the negotiation process and the qualitative dimensions of the outcome will be discussed.     

Negotiator Satisfaction in NSS-Facilitated Negotiation

Negotiator satisfaction plays an important role in the adoption and diffusion of Negotiation Support Systems (NSS). There is little knowledge about what factors shape the negotiator satisfaction in the NSS context. In this study, we investigated this factor from the perspectives of negotiator and end-user of NSS. We proposed a research model of negotiator satisfaction by incorporating negotiation outcomes and negotiator perception of the system and negotiation process. The empirical findings with 116 data points indicated that objective confirmation, perceived fairness, perceived control and perceived collaborative atmosphere significantly influence negotiator satisfaction. The implications of this study are discussed.     

The Relationship of Cognitive Effort,Information Acquisition Preferences and Risk to Simulated Auditor–Client Negotiation Outcomes

The auditor–client relationship is a legally-mandated relationship in which one party, the auditor, is hired and paid by the auditee (client) to inform third party stakeholders as to whether the client firm’s financial statements are presented in conformity with national financial accounting standards. When these statements do not meet the criteria for acceptable financial statements, a negotiation situation may arise in which the auditor is presumed to act in the best interests of shareholders and creditors who have no independent knowledge of the auditor’s findings. The client management may then feel forced to defend its numbers. The result is a negotiation between the auditor and client (e.g., Salterio in Account Financ 52:233–286, 2012; Brown and Wright in Account Horiz 22(1):91–109, 2008). This study examines cognitive factors and risk preference factors that may impact the negotiation both in the setting of each side’s negotiation position and on the outcomes of that negotiation using simulated auditor–client negotiations. Questionnaire and simulated auditor–client negotiations were used to generate the data, with MBA and MS in Accounting students playing the role of client CEOs and auditor partners. We further explore the use of a tool, Structural Equation Modeling, to test the data, in the process highlighting its usefulness in auditor–client negotiation research. We find that the cognitive characteristic of need for cognition is significantly and positively related to achievement of the negotiator’s desired income objectives and reported willingness to argue strongly for his/her position. Actively open-minded thinking, a second cognitive variable studied, was not significantly related to success in the negotiations, nor to a reported willingness to argue strongly for his/her position. Finally, we find that perceived aggressive tactics by the other party to the negotiation had a negative impact on the counterpart negotiator’s success in the negotiation, and satisfaction with it. As expected, risk assessment-related variables were not related to outcomes of interest.     

Culture and negotiation

Negotiation has three elements: predisposing factors, process, and outcomes. Process is the art and outcomes is the science of negotiation. Culture adds a new consideration that affects each element. Culture's effects on negotiation are studied using Geert Hofstede's dimensional model of culture. The negotiation process and Hofstede's culture model are combined in four settings. The settings are defined by two factors, if the negotiation is within or between cultures and the role of the participant as a negotiator or intervener. The predicted effects of culture on the process and outcome are detailed for each setting. Then the outcomes of the negotiation decision are discussed in terms of Hofstede's model, especially “Uncertainty Avoidance” and “Masculinity-Femininity” dimensions. Culture clearly influences each aspect of negotiation. Understanding culture can make the participants more effective negotiators and interveners.     

Negotiation protocol based on ordered weighted averaging and Fuzzy metrics

ABSTRACT

Negotiation Support Systems are used to exchange offers and to improve the negotiation process. Some methods are based on perspectives like heuristics in order to bring the negotiation protocol gradually closer to reality. These approaches can be important in real negotiation as they can help to improve skillsespecially in distributive bargaining. This paper proposes a Negotiation Support framework to provide the negotiator with recommendations on making decisions in a negotiation process. To input this idea into negotiation protocols, this paper suggests that some concepts based on OWA (Ordered Weighted Averaging) and some of its metrics (Orness, Dispersion) be included in the heuristics of a structured negotiation schedule. It is expected that the support provided will aid the negotiator to make decisions during the negotiation process, to learn from the elicitation and his own behavior the results obtained can help the negotiator improving his skills in the negotiation process.     

Dancing on the Slippery Slope: The Effects of Appropriate Versus Inappropriate Competitive Tactics on Negotiation Process and Outcome

As negotiation is critical to all forms of organizational decision-making, researchers have shown an interest in understanding how the flow of information (valid and otherwise) influences this process. Often, competitive, questionable, and unethical tactics have been treated as interchangeable in these studies, despite presumed differences in appropriateness. The purpose of this study was to examine the similarities and differences in negotiators’ use and efficacy of appropriate competitive tactics (e.g., exaggerated offers) versus inappropriate competitive tactics (e.g., factual misrepresentations), primarily through a negotiation simulation. The study found that although these two categories of tactics were correlated in terms of overall use, appropriate competitive behaviors were used more frequently, especially early in negotiations, and these behaviors often resulted in comparable responses from counterparts. While ultimately increasing the likelihood of a negotiation impasse, the use of appropriate competitive tactics improved an individual’s substantive outcome where agreements could be reached. Inappropriate competitive tactics were likely to increase in number the sooner they were first employed in negotiations, with a response of inappropriate competitive tactics to the first use of competitive tactics increasing the likelihood of subsequent use of inappropriate tactics. The implications of these and other findings for both practitioners and future research are discussed.     

Improving the Effect of Guarantees: The Role of a Retailer's Reputation

This research examines the interaction of two cues, retailer reputation and guarantees on evaluations. Extending Mandler's (1982) incongruity framework, we illustrate across three studies how moderately incongruent signals can be combined to enhance evaluations. Unique to our application of moderate incongruity, however, is the fact that guarantee cues can be incongruent with the retailer's reputation, in terms of domain (e.g., price matching guarantee (PMG) offered by provider whose reputation is based on service, not pricing) or valence (e.g., PMG offered by retailer known for carrying expensive merchandize). This dual perspective on the source of incongruity (domain or valence) is important and highlights when guarantees enhance evaluations.     

Individual differences in emotional contagion of salespersons: Its effect on performance and burnout

This article explores the emotional contagion hypothesis, proposed by Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1994), in a sales context. Specifically, the emotional contagion hypothesis explains how the emotions of two people (e.g., salesperson and customer) during a conversation are transmitted from one to the other via facial cues, and that these emotions affect the outcome of that interaction. The emotional contagion hypothesis implies that there are definitive individual differences concerning whether someone is either sensitive to emotions from others or able to transmit his or her emotions onto others. This study explores whether these individual differences are assets or liabilities over the long term for salespersons in a sales organization. The data in this study show that a salesperson's ability to infect others with his or her emotions is an asset (because it can lead to higher performance). In addition, being sensitive to the emotions of others is an asset (it can also lead to better performance); at the same time it is a liability (because of the higher risk of burnout). This study further explores how emotionally sensitive salespersons develop burnout as a consequence of role stress, which then affects their performance. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Maybe It’s Right,Maybe It’s Wrong: Structural and Social Determinants of Deception in Negotiation

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables—regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness—interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission, whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators experience fit between power and regulatory focus, whereas affect-based trust influenced deception when negotiators experience misfit between these structural context variables. We conclude that regulatory focus primes different moral templates: promotion-focused negotiators’ decision to deceive is determined by moral pragmatism, whereas prevention-focused negotiators’ decision to deceive is determined by opportunism. Because each combination of power and regulatory focus was tied to a specific subcomponent of trust, we further conclude that negotiators engage in motivated information search to determine whether they should deceive their opponents.     

The Effects of Media and Task on User Performance: A Test of the Task-Media Fit Hypothesis

This research was designed to examine the task-media fit hypothesis, an extension to media richness theory that predicts the objective performance of various media for a number of task types. To examine this model, dyads communicating through face-to-face, videophone, telephone (i.e., audio-only communication), or synchronous computer-mediated communication worked in a laboratory experiment to address an intellective or negotiation task. The intellective task required that each dyad member effectively share factual information that each individual independently held. The negotiation task required that each dyad member effectively share preferences based on personal values and reach an agreement. The results of the study provide mixed support for the task-media fit hypothesis. In general, the results for the negotiation task largely supported the theory while the results for the intellective task did not support the theory. These results help to clarify limitations and provide extensions to the theory by demonstrating how variations in task processes and communication media act to mediate task performance. The implications of these results for future research and practice are discussed.     

Data-based negotiator allocation management

Negotiation abilities are difficult to assess, and negotiation outcomes are difficult to predict. This leads to possible deficiencies in resource allocation for negotiation tasks. In this article, we discuss the merits of a data-based approach for the allocation of negotiators to negotiation tasks. We provide a framework for negotiation allocation management that includes a method for assessing negotiator strength. The negotiator strength measure compares observable negotiation outcomes relative to similar outcomes in similar situations. We provide examples for using our framework and show evidence for its appeal when using industry data. We discuss implications for managers and provide key takeaways.