Deception Performance in Online Group Negotiation and Decision Making: The Effects of Deception Experience and Deception Skill

Deception in computer-mediated group Negotiation and decision making presents a variety of risks. Gaining a better understanding of online deception has important implications for both individuals and organizations. Despite the rapidly increasing number of online deception cases reported in recent years, extant deception research has not considered the context beyond individuals or small groups. Additionally, there has been a mismatch between the important role of individual characteristics of the deceiver in theory and the lack of empirical investigation of their impact in research. This study aims to assess deception performance in mid-sized online groups by building a model of individual differences in deception experience and deception skill. We conceptualize deception performance in terms of deception success and two other new constructs, namely survivability and productivity. The model has been tested with a dataset collected from a real-world online community. The results show that deception skill has a positive effect on deception success, but deception experience has a negative effect. Although deception experience and deception skill are found to have opposite effects on the success of deceivers, both contribute positively to the survivability of deceivers. The findings of this study have significant implications for future deception research in online group communication and negotiation.     

Ethics, Deception and Labor Negotiation

There has been widespread emphasis on the importance of trust amongst parties to the employment relationship, associated with a call for increased "integrative bargaining". Trust is bound up with ethical action, but there has been some debate about the ethics of deception in bargaining. Because it is possible for cooperative bargainers to be exploited, some writers contend that deceptive behavior is ethical and established practice. There are several problems about that view. It is questionable how clear and uniform such a practice has been. An appearance of deceptive bluffing can often be explained as exchange of genuine concessions. Recent trends have seen increased devolution of bargaining from professionals to non-professionals, which dilutes any shared understandings there have been in the past, while practices that do exist may not be freely or voluntarily accepted and the existence of such practices is not enough to compensate for inequalities of power and skill. It is questionable to what extent bluffing and deception are necessary for self-defense. There other techniques available by which parties can guard themselves against exploitation.     

Loose with the Truth: Predicting Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy, and as having integrity. Negotiators’ goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative, and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party’s trustworthiness, benevolence, and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic betrayal. Negotiators in all-cooperative and all-individualistic dyads used different information in deciding whether to leverage their indifference issues and used the same information (benevolence) differently in deciding whether to misrepresent the value of their indifference issue. Mara Olekalns is a Professor of Management (Negotiations) at the Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne. Her research focuses on communication processes in negotiation. In her research, she has investigated how strategy sequences shape negotiation outcomes. She is extending this research to investigate how impressions and communication shape trust in negotiation. Her work on communication processes in negotiation has been published in Journal of Applied Psychology, Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Philip L. Smith is a Professor in the Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne. His primary research interest is in building quantitative models of the human visual system. He also applies his modeling expertise to analyses of communication processes in negotiation, focusing on the relationships between situational and dispositional factors, strategy sequences and negotiation outcomes. It has been published in leading management and psychology journals, including Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Authors' Note The research reported in this paper was supported by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. We thank Ania Ratzik and Rudi Crncec for assistance with data coding. Correspondence should be addressed to Mara Olekalns, Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester St, Carlton, Victoria, 3053, Australia or via email to m.olekalns@mbs.edu     

Sweet Little Lies: Social Context and the Use of Deception in Negotiation

Social context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. We use a simulated negotiation to test how three dimensions of social context—dyadic gender composition, negotiation strategy, and trust—interact to influence one micro-ethical decision, the use of deception. Deception in all-male dyads was relatively unaffected by trust or the other negotiator’s strategy. In mixed-sex dyads, negotiators consistently increased their use of deception when three forms of trust (identity, benevolent, deterrent) were low and opponents used an accommodating strategy. However, in all-female dyads, negotiators appeared to use multiple and shifting reference points in deciding when to deceive the other party. In these dyads, the use of deception increased when a competitive strategy combined with low benevolence-based trust or an accommodating strategy combined with high identity-based trust. Deception in all-female dyads decreased when a competitive strategy was used in the context of low deterrence-based trust.     

Mutually Dependent: Power,Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated two-party negotiation, we examined how trustworthiness and power balance affected deception. In order to trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties. We found that high cognitive trust increased deception whereas high affective trust decreased deception. Negotiators who expressed anxiety also used more deception whereas those who expressed optimism also used less deception. The nature of the negotiating relationship (mutuality and level of dependence) interacted with trust and negotiators’ affect to influence levels of deception. Deception was most likely to occur when negotiators reported low trust or expressed negative emotions in the context of nonmutual or low dependence relationships. In these relationships, emotions that signaled certainty were associated with misrepresentation whereas emotions that signaled uncertainty were associated with concealment of information. Negotiators who expressed positive emotions in the context of a nonmutual or high dependence relationship also used less deception. Our results are consistent with a fair trade model in which negotiator increases deception when contextual and interpersonal cues heighten concerns about exploitation and decrease deception when these cues attenuate concerns about exploitation.     

Criminal Identity Deception and Deception Detection in Law Enforcement

Criminals often falsify their identities intentionally in order to deter police investigations. In this paper we focus on uncovering patterns of criminal identity deception observed through a case study performed at a local law enforcement agency. We define criminal identity deception based on an understanding of the various theories of deception. We interview a police detective expert and discuss the characteristics of criminal identity deception. A taxonomy for criminal identity deception was built to represent the different patterns that were identified in the case study. We also discuss methods currently employed by law enforcement agencies to detect deception. Police database systems contain little information that can help reveal deceptive identities. Thus, in order to identify deception, police officers rely mainly on investigation. Current methods for detecting deceptive criminal identities are neither effective nor efficient. Therefore we propose an automated solution to help solve this problem.     

Lying and intentions

In this essay I criticize recent attempts to prove that the concept of lying does not include the intent to deceive. I argue that examples by Isenberg and Carson fail to prove that one can lie without intending to deceive and, furthermore, that untoward consequences would follow if these authors were correct. I conclude that since intending to deceive is indeed a necessary condition of lying, the class of statements that constitute lies is smaller than what Isenberg et al. would suggest. Hence the class of deceptive advertisements is also correspondingly smaller. Gary E. Jones is Associate Professor at the Philosophy Department of the University of San Diego. He won the Review of Metaphysics Dissertation Essay Contest, 1977 and he holds fellowship of the University of Cincinnati and the University of Tennessee. His most important publications are The State and the Right to Health Care (in Philosophical Quarterly), Rights and Desires (in Ethics), Vindication, Hume, and Induction (in Canadian Journal of Philosophy), Engelhardt on Abortion and the Euthenasia of Defective Infants (in Linacre Quarterly) and Clendinnen, Jackson and Induction (in Philosophy of Science).     

Lying in business: insights from Hannah Arendt's ‘Lying in Politics’

The political philosopher Hannah Arendt develops several arguments regarding why truthfulness cannot be counted among the political virtues. This article shows that similar arguments apply to lying in business. Based on Hannah Arendt's theory, we distinguish five reasons why lying is a structural temptation to businessmen: business is about action to change the world and therefore businessmen need the capacity to deny current reality; commerce requires successful image‐making and liars have the advantage to come up with plausible stories; business communication is more often about opinions than about facts, giving leeway to ignore uncomfortable signals; business increasingly makes use of plans and models, but these techniques foster inflexibility in acknowledging the real facts; and businessmen easily fall prey to self‐deception, because one needs to act as if the vision already materializes. The theory is illustrated by a case study of Landis, which grew from a relatively insignificant organization into a large one within a short period of time, but ended with outright lies and bankruptcy.     

Negotiation Engineering: A Quantitative Problem-Solving Approach to Negotiation

Although they are often complex, negotiations are practical problems that can be solved with the aid of specialized, ad hoc methods. We introduce a problem-solving approach to difficult negotiations inspired by the established solution-oriented discipline of engineering, which we term “Negotiation Engineering”. It is based on the reduction of problems to their most formal structures and the heuristic application of quantitative methods for problem solving. We argue that mathematical language in negotiations helps to increase logical accuracy in negotiation analysis and allows for the use of a variety of existing helpful mathematical tools to achieve a negotiation agreement. We demonstrate the practicability and usefulness of this approach using four case studies in the area of international diplomacy in which Negotiation Engineering was applied to achieve negotiation solutions.     

Deception in commercial negotiation

Buyers and sellers of inputs of production, to the degree that they must negotiate directly with each other and cannot have recourse to more impersonal markets, share in certain aspects of bilateral monopoly. Under these circumstances, and assuming profit maximizing goals for each, deception often seems to be an unavoidable characteristic of negotiation.... I hate, detest, and can't bear a lie, not because I am straighter than the rest of us, but simply because it appalls me. There is a taint of death, a flavor of mortality in lies ... — JOSEPH CONRAD, Heart of Darkness.     

Confident and Cunning: Negotiator Self-Efficacy Promotes Deception in Negotiations

Journal of Business Ethics - Self-confidence is associated with many positive outcomes, and training programs routinely seek to build participants’ self-efficacy. In this article, however, we...     

Justifications and Questions in Detecting Deception

Truth-tellers and deceivers use justifications to bolster their credibility, but given their different motivations, truth-tellers and deceivers may use justifications differently. Participants were assigned the role of allocator or recipient in an ultimatum game. Allocators received money based on their performance on a task and made an offer. Recipients did not have information about allocator’s task performance or amount the allocator received, and therefore, allocators could deceive. Liars provided more plausible details to support their offer by stating the structure of their task; this strategy backfired and led to more detection of lies. Truth-tellers were more likely to disclose advantageous information about their endowment of money in their justifications, and this reduced suspicion in their offers. Deceivers used more wrap-up questions to end the interaction; this did not help reduce partner suspicion. Asking questions in general did not improve detection accuracy.     

Deception in Computer-Mediated Communication

An integrated model of interpersonal deception, focusing on the particular characteristics and impacts of computer-mediated modalities, is derived and presented. Although there is a wealth of research investigating both mediated communication and deception, there has been relatively little empirical work at the intersection. Our purpose is to provide a model that spans these areas, to summarize relevant literature, and to advance a set of empirically testable propositions to guide future work.     

Marketing tactics discouraging price search: Deception and competition

Retailers attempt to assure consumers that their deals are bargains using a variety of marketing tactics. Because consumers continue information and price searches until satisfied with the amount of the information to make a purchase, such bargain assurances (BAs) can change consumers' shopping behavior. This article identifies twelve common BAs and reviews extant marketing literature to derive evidence of how BAs affect consumers' purchasing behavior. It then examines how these practices are regulated to prevent consumer deception or a reduction in competition. This article concludes by offering three policy recommendations: BAs influence consumers and require regulation; the regulation of BAs demands a comprehensive rather than a piecemeal approach; and consumer policy should facilitate and encourage accurate price comparisons.     

Justice and Fairness in Negotiation

In this special issue we display a variety of approaches to the study of justice. Articles from scholars working on questions involving justice and fairness in decision making exchanges calls attention to variety of research approaches, issue domains, cases and hypotheses used to explore these questions. All of the contributions emphasize analysis, using quantitative and qualitative methods including simulation-experiments, comparative case studies, statistical analyses and game theory. The articles in this collection reveal that justice and fairness concerns extend from the negotiation process to the outcome and into the implementation stage. They share the underlying expectation that individuals and groups gravitate toward fairness and justice in their exchanges with others. Therefore, a full understanding of group decision processes will be incomplete if justice and fairness issues are not considered alongside issues such as power distributions and alternatives to an agreement. The authors also suggest that outcomes built on justice and fairness principles will enhance the efficiency, stability and implementation of the negotiated agreements.