Do more competitive banks have less market power? The evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

Studies that have explored the competitive behaviour of banks frequently arrive at divergent conclusions because they use different measures of competition. This study first discusses these various measures of competition and their divergence from a theoretical perspective and then employs them to measure the competitiveness of Central and Eastern European banks and to investigate whether more competitive banks really have less market power. We find that these banks increase their market power when there is low banking concentration and do not necessarily become less competitive. Moreover, a more concentrated banking market does not enhance the market power of banks and does not make them less competitive, and more competitive banks do not necessarily have less market power. This latter outcome ensues because revenue and production reactions to cost evolution are either positively related – or completely unrelated – to the competitive behaviour of banks.     

How do banks price liquidity? The role of market power.

We empirically examine the effects of different measures of liquidity on interest margins of a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 2001 to 2018. Overall, the results reveal that liquidity ratios exert a positive influence on bank margins. Furthermore, the study investigates the role of market power in the relationship between liquidity and interest margins. It is documented that dominant banks incorporate the costs associated with investing in liquidity into the bank margins to a lesser extent than banks with less market power, suggesting that the cost of complying with regulatory liquidity standards is reduced when the competition in the banking sector is less intense. The study highlights that market competition might be important in the design and implementation of liquidity regulations.     

Does banking system transparency enhance bank competition? Cross-country evidence

There seems to be a consensus among regulators and scholars that in order to improve the functioning of a banking system it is necessary to raise the level of bank information disclosure. However, its influence on bank competition – which is an important factor affecting the efficiency and stability of the banking system – is left out of consideration. To test whether greater bank information disclosure is associated with both lower market power and lower concentration in the banking markets, we use country-level data covering the years 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2010. Our findings show that countries with higher levels of bank transparency have lower levels of bank concentration, while the link between transparency and market power is less pronounced. We also show that the reduction of competition due to stricter disclosure requirements depends on bank credit risks and the relationship is U-shaped.     

Assessing competition in the banking industry: A multi-product approach

This paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi-product banking operations. Extending Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) model to the case of a multi-product banking firm, we show that higher economies of scope in multi-product banking are associated with lower Panzar–Rosse measures of competition in the banking sector. To test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi-production on market power, we use a new dataset on the Brazilian banking industry. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that banks that offer classic banking products (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other banking products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi-output actions are not considered.     

The determinants of bank margins in European banking

Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on bank margins has dealt solely with interest margins. Applying the seminal Ho–Saunders model (JFQA, 1981) to a multi-output framework, we show that the relationship between bank margins and market power varies significantly across bank specializations. In this context, European banks are a better laboratory than US banks, since they have generally enjoyed a more flexible regulatory environment in which to provide a wider range of services. Using accounting margins and New Empirical Industrial Organization margins, we find that market power increases as output becomes more diversified towards non-traditional activities in European banking.     

Market structure and competitive conditions in the Arab GCC banking system

This paper investigates the market structure of Arab GCC banking industry during the years of 1993–2002 using the most frequently applied measures of concentration k-bank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and evaluates the monopoly power of banks over the ten years period using the ‘H-statistic’ by Panzar and Rosse. The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have moderately concentrated markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The measures of concentration also show that Qatar, Bahrain and Oman are highly concentrated markets. The Panzar–Rosse H-statistics suggest that banks in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate under perfect competition; banks in Bahrain and Qatar operate under conditions of monopolistic competition; and we are unable to reject monopolistic competition for the banking market in Oman.     

Factors explaining the interest margin in the banking sectors of the European Union

This study analyses the interest margin in the principal European banking sectors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) in the period 1993–2000 using a panel of 15,888 observations, identifying the fundamental elements affecting this margin. Our starting point is the methodology developed in the original study by Ho and Saunders [Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis XVI (1981) 581–600] and later extensions, but widened to take banks' operating costs explicitly into account. Also, unlike the usual practice in the literature, a direct measure of the degree of competition (Lerner index) in the different markets is used. The results show that the fall of margins in the European banking system is compatible with a relaxation of the competitive conditions (increase in market power and concentration), as this effect has been counteracted by a reduction of interest rate risk, credit risk, and operating costs.     

Restructuring,consolidation and competition in Latin American banking markets

This study examines the competitive conditions in the banking industries of eleven Latin American countries for the period 1993–2000. For these countries, the time interval under examination corresponds to an era characterized by substantial reforms to restructure their banking systems, increased consolidation and foreign bank penetration. The banks in our sample are found to be earning their revenues as if operating under monopolistic competition, as in many other developed and emerging financial systems. The results indicate that, overall, market concentration is not significantly related with competitive conduct. At the country level, however, we do observe a decline in competition for Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela in late 1990s which may be attributable to increased consolidation. Further, we observe that deregulation and opening up of the financial markets for foreign participation serves as an important catalyst to increase the competitiveness of banking markets. Higher degree of competition in the sector, in return, is associated with reduced bank margins and profitability but improved cost efficiency.     

The implication of banking competition: Evidence from African countries

This paper examines how bank efficiency and stability are affected by the market power in Africa. Our results show that the higher degree of market power is associated with high level of efficiency and profitability. The banks with more market power operating are able to be in command of the price and hence improve their profit. The market power has a benefit in both stability and risk. Hence, gain in market will increase the stability and reduce the risk for banking system. Our findings do not support the argument that competition should not be based on a “quiet life hypothesis”.     

How does competition affect bank risk-taking?

A common assumption in the academic literature and in the supervision of banking systems is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. A recent paper by Martínez-Miera and Repullo (MMR, 2010) shows that a nonlinear relationship theoretically exists between bank competition and risk-taking in the loan market. We test this hypothesis using data from the Spanish banking system. After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, we find support for this nonlinear relationship using standard measures of market concentration in both the loan and deposit markets. When direct measures of market power, such as Lerner indices, are used, the empirical results are more supportive of the original franchise value hypothesis, but only in the loan market. Overall, the results highlight the empirical relevance of the MMR model, even though further analysis across other banking markets is needed.     

Interest margins and bank regulation in Central America and the Caribbean

This paper examines empirically the determinants of bank interest margins in Central America and the Caribbean over the period 1998–2014. A particular focus is set on the impact of differences in the regulatory environment and market structure across countries in explaining the interest margins of individual banks. Our results suggest that bank market power, operating costs, credit risk, and liquid asset holdings increase the margin between loan and deposit rates, while increased income diversification and GDP growth are associated with lower loan-deposit spreads. When considering information on banking regulation, we find strong evidence to support our main hypothesis that improvements in market quality and liberalization have a significant effect on interest margins. More specifically, reductions in entry requirements to banking, higher involvement of foreign banks, and increased financial statement transparency are associated with significant reductions in interest margins.     

资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响研究

2004年《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》颁布后,我国开始真正意义上的资本监管。统一的资本监管标准．有利于银行业市场竞争的公平性。本文通过对资本监管与银行业市场竞争度的相关性分析和Granger因果检验,探讨了资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响。结果发现,资本监管与银行业市场竞争度存在相关性,但相关系数较低,且他们之间没有明显的因果关系,我国商业银行资本监管还有待进一步的改进和完善。     

我国商业银行市场结构分析

本文采用季度数据分析我国银行业市场结构,发现自2013年民营银行获得市场准入资格以来,我国银行业的市场结构竞争程度并未发生明显变化,仍然处于较低水平。建议通过增量改革,继续降低我国银行业市场集中度,促进银行业的竞争;完善相关法律和监管制度,规范银行市场退出机制;建立和发展存款保险制度。     

Competition for small firm banking business: Bank actions versus market structure

This paper addresses two questions related to the ongoing consolidation of the US banking industry and its effect on small firm financing. First, are conventional measures of market structure (e.g. geographic market size and deposit concentration) related to bank competition for small firm financial business? Second, does an increase in bank competition produce an improvement in bank services irrespective of market structure? To answer these questions we use a survey of small firm owners that asks them to report on changes in bank competition for their business. Our findings show that reports of increased competition by small firm owners are negatively related to the level of and change in deposit concentration. In addition, we find a significant positive association between changes in bank competition reported by small firms and their reports of changes in banking outcomes (e.g. service quality) that is independent of deposit concentration, firm risk, and credit usage.     

Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

Strategic online banking adoption

In this paper we study the determinants of banks’ decisions to adopt a transactional website for their customers. Using a panel of commercial banks in the United States for the period 2003–2006, we show that although bank-specific characteristics are important determinants of banks’ adoption decisions, competition also plays a prominent role. The extent of competition is related to the geographic overlap of banks in different markets and their relative market share in terms of deposits. In particular, banks adopt online banking services earlier in markets where their competitors have already adopted this technology. This paper is one of the first to construct local banking markets using the geographic market definitions delimited by the CASSIDI® Database compiled at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.     

Deregulation, liberalization and consolidation of the Mexican banking system: Effects on competition

This paper analyzes the evolution of competition in the Mexican banking system in the period 1993-2005, a period of deregulation, liberalization and consolidation of the sector. For this purpose we use two indicators of competition from the theory of industrial organization (the Lerner index and the Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic). The empirical evidence does not permit us to reject the existence of monopolistic competition. The Lerner index shows a decrease in competitive rivalry in the deposit market and an increase in the loan market, a cross subsidization strategy being observed. The results obtained call into question the effectiveness of the measures implemented hitherto, aimed at increasing the competition of the Mexican banking system.     

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state‐level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976‐2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non‐uniform effect on state‐level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.     

How do bank competition,regulation, and institutions shape the real effect of banking crises? International evidence

This paper studies the influence of bank competition on the real effect of 36 systemic banking crises in 30 countries over the 1980–2000 period and how this influence varies across countries depending on bank regulation and institutions. We find that bank market power is not on average useful for mitigating the negative real effect of a systemic banking crisis. Market power promotes higher growth during normal times in industries that are more dependent on external finance but induces a bigger reduction in growth during systemic banking crises. We also find a country-specific effect depending on bank regulation and institutions. Stringent capital requirements and poor protection of creditor rights increase the benefits of bank market power for mitigating the negative real effect of a systemic banking crisis because bank market power has a positive effect on economic growth during both crisis and non-crisis periods in these environments.     

Banking competition and economic growth: cross-country evidence

The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of banking competition on industry economic growth using both structural measures of competition and measures based on the new empirical industrial organisation perspective. The evidence obtained in the period 1993–2003 for a sample of 53 sectors in 21 countries indicates that financial development promotes economic growth. The results also show that bank monopoly power has an inverted-U-shaped effect on economic growth, suggesting that bank market power has its highest growth effect at intermediate values. The latter result is consistent with the literature on relationship lending, which argues that bank competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for companies that are informationally more opaque.