A note on vertical integration as entry

This paper examines the incentive for an intermediate product monopolist to integrate forward into a competitively-structured final product industry when that industry has failed to achieve a position of long-run equilibrium. It is shown that the upstream monopolist's profits are increased more by entering the downstream industry than are the profits of other firms unrelated to this industry. Consequently, the monopolist is more likely to overcome whatever entry barriers might exist at the downstream stage. The welfare effects of this form of integration are shown to be positive, and a theoretical foundation is provided for the policy distinction commonly made between vertical integration by a major acquisition versus integration through internal expansion or a toehold acquisition followed by expansion.     

Spillovers and the growth of local industries

In this paper we investigate the nature and directions of inter-industry dynamic linkages across Italian manufacturing sectors. We perform a very disaggregated analysis in order to identify, for each 3-digit industry, which composition of industrial activity is more conducive to growth. We find that diversity matters for growth, but each industry needs its own diversity. We provide some evidence of clustering of industries based on dynamic externalities. We find that many spillovers occur within input-output relationships. They often originate in downstream sectors favouring the growth of upstream industries. Lastly, the importance of spillovers does not depend on the technological intensity of the industry.     

Vertical integration and product differentiation

We study a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical integration: competition for integration. Innovative downstream firms create value and profit opportunities through product differentiation, which however affects an upstream monopolist’s incentive to vertically integrate. By playing the downstream firms against each other for integration, the upstream firm can extract even more than the additional profits generated by the downstream firms’ differentiation activities. To preempt rent extraction, the downstream firms may then reduce differentiation, which reduces social welfare. We show that this social cost of vertical integration is more likely to arise in innovative and competitive industries, and that the competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction is robust to upstream competition.     

Technology of upstream firms and equilibrium product differentiation

Using a Hotelling-type product differentiation model (linear city model), we investigate the location strategies of upstream and downstream firms. We show that when transport costs of upstream firms are large, higher transport costs decrease the level of product differentiation of downstream firms. We also show that more inefficient transport technologies of upstream firms may enhance welfare. We briefly discuss vertical mergers and show that vertical mergers occur if the transport costs of upstream firms are large enough.     

Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation

We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means in our model that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm, but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow for non-tariff discrimination by the upstream firm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbundling never yields lower quantities in the downstream market than ownership separation and integration. Therefore, typically, consumer surplus will be largest under legal unbundling. Outcomes under legal unbundling are still advantageous when we allow for discriminatory capacity investments, investments into marginal cost reduction and investments into network reliability. If access prices are unregulated, however, legal unbundling may be quite undesirable.     

Can Firms Benefit From Competition?

We typically assume that exit of competitors from an industry benefits those that remain. We show here that, when one accounts for the supply chain effects of exit, this need not be the case. Specifically, when exit downstream induces exit of upstream producers, input prices rise to the detriment of downstream firms. If mark-ups on inputs are large while downstream mark-ups are small, then exit of downstream competitors reduces the profits of non-exiting firms. We show that this result is quite general and argue that it has application beyond competition policy, being especially apt in the area of industry dynamics.     

Oligopoly intermediation,relative rivalry and market conduct

We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices.     

Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves

We develop a model of vertical merger waves and use it to study the optimal merger policy. As a merger wave can result in partial foreclosure, it can be optimal to ban a vertical merger that eliminates the last unintegrated upstream firm. Such a merger is more likely to worsen market performance when the number of downstream firms is large relative to the number of upstream firms, and when upstream contracts are non‐discriminatory, linear and public. On the other hand, the optimal merger policy can be non‐monotonic in the strength of synergies or in the degree of downstream product differentiation.     

国际石油公司一体化发展现状及趋势分析

埃克森美孚、壳牌、BP、道达尔、雪佛龙五大国际石油公司均采用上下游产业一体化发展模式,业务、产品和服务多元化,产业链各环节协同发展,提升整体竞争力,并适时对产业链进行优化调整,主动适应能源行业发展趋势和竞争环境变化。近年来,五大公司受益于产业一体化发展,较为平稳地应对了低油价冲击,并且通过降低成本、资产优化等措施,提升了产业经营能力和质量,盈利能力对油价的依赖程度明显下降。炼油、化工等中下游业务在低油价时期表现较为稳健,受到一体化公司的重视,主要国际石油公司油气产业链进一步完善,产业发展更趋于均衡。     

Leveraging who you know by what you know: Specialization and returns to relational capital

Research Summary: This paper investigates the interaction effects of specialization and relational capital on performance. We distinguish between upstream and downstream relational capital and theorize that higher levels of specialization will buffer against decreases in upstream relational capital, because of deeper domain expertise and stronger downstream relational capital. Conversely, higher levels of generalization permit greater gains from increases in upstream relational capital, due to leverage across a more diversified downstream portfolio of activities. We test and find support for these hypotheses in the context of the US lobbying industry. Our study contributes to the strategic human capital literature by isolating the dimension of specialization and relational capital embodied within individuals and providing performance implications of the interactions. Managerial Summary: Both “what you know” and “whom you know” impacts performance. Generalists and specialists are different on the “what you know” dimension. On the “who you know” dimension, we distinguish between upstream (supplier) and downstream (client) relationships. We show that specialists are buffered by deeper downstream relations from performance declines when their powerful upstream connections lose power. Generalists benefit from broader networks when their upstream connections gain power. Thus, when the value of their relationships change, specialists and generalists should each assess when they can reap performance benefits, and when they need to bolster against adversities. For firms, our study suggests hiring the right mix of specialists and generalists is important to reduce risks from relational losses while enjoying the performance benefits from relational gains.     

滨州市纺织业发展现状分析

面对全球经济略有回暖,人民币升值带来的劳动成本的增加及产生的一系列问题,对滨州市纺织业所面临的挑战及压力做了充分细致的阐述。从长远来看,走环保绿色的可持续发展道路是企业得以长期生存的命脉所在;加大国内与国外市场开发是企业长期利润来源的保障。在机遇与挑战并存的宏观经济条件下,能否与上游供应商及下游销售商建立完整的产业链,也是企业能否提高利润、降低成本的关键所在。     

A study on forward and backward linkage effects in South Korea's telecom industry across generations

The primary purpose of this study is to examine the spillover effect of South Korea's telecom industry on other industries until its evolution to the 4th generation. By using Input-Output Table Data to compute Forward and Backward Linkage Effects in South Korea's telecom industry throughout Generational Changes, this study aims to analyze South Korea's telecom industry's impacts and changes on upstream and downstream industries to offer implications for its evolution to the 5th generation. This study used empirical input-output data for the period between the years 2000–2014 to conduct input-output analysis to evaluate forward and backward linkages in South Korea's telecom industry for each generation of it. The results revealed that (1) Korea's telecom industry can be defined as a dependent manufacturing industry due to its below-average forward linkage and above-average backward linkage over the whole study period, and (2) backward linkage in South Korea's telecom industry was higher than the economy-wide average value during our study period although it decreased with the industry's generational shifts. The results indicate that telecommunications companies should create new markets in which they can propagate emerging technologies of the 4IR (4th Industrial Revolution) to other industries, in order to ensure that the 5th generation telecom industry maintain its position as a key industry. On the other hand, the government should make policies to support start-ups and SMEs in telecom industry and implement structural reforms in Korea's oligopolistic telecom market.     

论“中国制造”背后的定价权缺失及转移

进入二十一世纪以来,＂中国制造＂正成为经济全球化进程中,国际垂直分工体系不可或缺的一个重要环节。但是中国仍然处于这一国际分工体系的底层、全球价值链的低端,商品定价权的缺失日益成为制约中国制造业进一步发展和产业升级的瓶颈。文章对＂中国制造＂背后定价权缺失的原因以及定价权转移的路径选择进行了分析。认为,中国本土企业由于研发能力、营销能力不足,无法占据国际产业链高价值的两端——上游及下游环节,而是处在全球价值链的低端,即＂微笑曲线＂中产品附加值最低的中间区域。因此,中国企业一方面应向＂微笑曲线＂上游移动,提高企业的研发、设计及创新能力;另一方面,中国企业应向＂微笑曲线＂下游移动,通过特许经营、品牌租赁、自主品牌等路径提高企业的品牌营销能力。     

Strategy,structure and performance of major U. S. Oil companles: Evidence from line of business data

In this paper we assess the influence of size, market share, and vertical integration on upstream (oil and gas production) and downstream (refining and marketing) profit rates for twenty-five large petroleum companies. We use pooled time series and cross section line of business data collected by the Financial Reporting Service of the Energy Information Administration. We employ a fixed effects model which allows for firm specific characteristics and a proxy variable to control for firm efficiency. We find that firm structure has differential impacts on performance between upstream and downstream lines of business and that lending firms are differentially impacted by structural variables, compared to other firms in the industry. Firm specific factors are also found to be significant determinants of profit raten.     

Ratcheting Up: Linked Technology Adoption in Supply Chains

It is generally assumed that a firm will adopt complementary technologies simultaneously. Apparel industry data indicate that, because of the close links between suppliers and retailers, there was a ratchet-up adoption of complementary information technologies. The consequence was that a rapid regime shift occurred without explicit coordination or planning. One implication is that the study of technology adoption may need to be more widely conceptualized to incorporate the relationships between upstream manufacturers and downstream retailers.     

产业链纵向关系与分工制度安排的选择及整合

产业发展过程中的产业链现象越来越受到关注。产业链中上下游企业之间存在着高度的分工,分工制度安排的优化与产业链稳定性有着密切的关系。产业链中分工制度安排包括:企业分工、准一体化契约分工和市场分工。成本与收益的比较是决定分工制度安排选择的主要因素,成本与收益的变化又决定了分工制度安排的进一步整合。通过实施不同的产业链纵向关系可以实现不同分工制度安排的选择与整合。     

Non-Discriminatory Pricing,Partial Backward Ownership,and Entry Deterrence

This article demonstrates that entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier that does not price-discriminate. Such backward ownership implies a rebate on the input price for the incumbents and a competitive disadvantage for downstream entrants. An industry can use non-controlling ownership to change the pricing of a supplier in a way that appears to be accommodating but in fact deters entry. The supplier benefits from an obligation or a commitment to supply the customers under equal terms, as this induces profitable sales of ownership stakes to incumbent downstream firms.     

Vertical Contracts and Downstream Entry*

We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than exogenous. By triggering more entry than two-part tariffs, wholesale price contracts can generate higher aggregate output, consumer surplus, and welfare. In light of this, the upstream monopolist may prefer to trade with wholesale price contracts as well as to give up part of its bargaining power when it is high.     

Sales Promotion and Cooperative Retail Pricing Strategies

Supermarket retailers make strategic pricing decisions in a high-frequency, repeated game environment both in buying and selling fresh produce. In this context, there is some question as to whether a non-cooperative equilibrium can emerge that produces margins above the competitive level. Supermarket pricing results from tacitly collusive equilibria supported by trigger price strategies played in upstream markets. Upstream activities are, in turn, driven by periodic retail price promotions. This hypothesis is tested using a sample of fresh produce pricing data from 20 US supermarket chains. The results support the existence of tacitly collusive non-cooperative equilibria in upstream and downstream markets.     

Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over Knowledge‐based Resources

Research summary: Research shows that multimarket contact (MMC ) reduces rivalry involving downstream activities. Yet, studies showing that MMC can increase the threat of imitation suggest a need to better understand how MMC affects upstream rivalry over knowledge‐based resources. In this study, we argue that MMC increases rivalry over knowledge‐based resources since the deterrent threat of retaliation that typically leads to mutual forbearance in downstream activities will not be sufficient to restrain firms from protecting their knowledge from imitation in upstream activities. In support of these arguments we find that MMC increases the likelihood that a firm initiates patent litigation against a rival. This study suggests the relationship between MMC and rivalry may depend on the competitive domain and the type of resources over which firms are competing . Managerial Summary: How does market overlap or MMC affect rivalry between two competitors? Prior studies have largely found that an increase in market overlap decreases rivalry in less knowledge‐intensive context because of the deterrent threat of retaliation. However, in this paper, we argue that an increase in market overlap may not reduce rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive context because of heterogeneity in capabilities to protect knowledge. We find that a firm is more likely to initiate patent litigation against a rival as market overlap increases. Our findings suggest that the incentive to protect value across multiple product markets may surpass the motivation to cooperate with rivals and that managers should have a more nuanced view of how market overlap with competitors affects rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive contexts . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.