Political persistence and economic growth

Using data for a panel of 62 partly to fully democratic countries in the period 1984–2008, we provide evidence that political persistence (measured as the longest tenure in office of main political entities) is negatively associated with growth, after controlling for country and time fixed effects, and that this association is stronger in countries with low bureaucratic quality, where the cost of red tape is high. This evidence can be rationalized by means of a growth model with quality improvements where political connections with politicians can be exploited by low-quality producers to mitigate red tape costs, defend their monopoly position and prevent entry of higher-quality competitors. The model implies a negative relationship between persistence in office of politicians and economic growth in high red-tape countries, while no association is expected where red tape costs are low.     

Political instability and economic growth

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth.     

Product variety, competition and economic growth

In this paper, we study the relationship between competition and economic growth using a model of economic development through the creation of new sectors. In our model, competition has both an intra- and an inter-sector component. We find that the best conditions for economic development are achieved when a suitable ratio of inter- to intra-sector competition is achieved. This ratio constitutes a compromise between providing a temporary monopoly to the first entrepreneur (low inter-sector competition) and creating enough imitation to expand the sector (intra-sector competition).     

Franchise fee, competition and economic growth

This paper introduces the different kinds of franchise contract bargaining into a macroeconomic model and accordingly researches the relationship between competition and economic growth. In Nash bargaining model/vertical integration we find an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically increasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In bargaining of the right to manage model/vertical non-integration our result shows an inverted-U shaped or a monotonically decreasing relationship between the competitive degree of the intermediate goods market and economic growth. In addition, there is an overall negative relationship between the competitive degree of the final goods market and economic growth. Especially, our interesting findings that the pricing rule for intermediate goods firm depends not only on market power but also bargaining power are more general. Therefore, we can further explain the firms' vertical control strategy.     

Corruption, growth and ethnic fractionalization: a theoretical model

This paper analyzes the existing relationship between ethnic fractionalization, corruption and the growth rate of a country. We provide a simple theoretical model. We show that a nonlinear relationship between fractionalization and corruption exists: corruption is high in homogeneous or very fragmented countries, but low where fractionalization is intermediate. In fact, when ethnic diversity is intermediate, constituencies act as a check and balance device to limit ethnically-based corruption. Consequently, the relationship between fractionalization and growth rate is also non-linear: growth is high in the middle range of ethnic diversity, low in homogeneous or very fragmented countries.     

Multiple equilibria in a growth model with monopolistic competition

Summary The standard neoclassical growth model is modified by introducing a market structure characterized by monopolistic competition and variable demand elasticities. In equilibrium, the price elasticity of the demand schedule facing a typical firm is a function of the aggregate savings rate. The latter feature results from an assumed wedge between the elasticity of substitution across goods in productive activities and that in consumption. In contrast with most examples in the literature our model does not require increasing returns (internal or external) in order to generate multiple equilibria.Thanks are due to Jess Benhabib, Duncan Foley, Oded Galor and participants in seminars at the Econometric Society Summer Meetings (Boston, 1993), NBER 1993 Summer Institute, CORE, UAB, and European University Institute for helpful comments.     

Equity and economic growth,a theoretical and empirical study: MENA zone

In macroeconomic literature, it is widely held that persuasion of economic growth and more equitable distribution of income (wealth) is not possible at the same time. The basic reason put forward is that to aim for more equitable distribution will reduce total savings in short and medium terms by reducing the weighted average of propensities to save of the different strata of the society. Therefore, the main objective for countries in transitional period is to have a higher economic growth rather than a fairer distribution of income. Recent developments on economic growth studies from a longer perspective and with sustainability criterion has put above idea in real jeopardy. It is shown that by paying more attention to justifiable distribution especially among different generations will promote a higher genuine savings which results in a higher rate of steady economic growth. In this research we use dynamic optimization approach (optimal control) for studying the mechanics of this regularity and test the proposition for selected MENA zone countries and then compare with some developed countries. Our ultimate goal is suggesting a fair fiscal policy to have a high economic growth compatible with a fairer distribution of wealth and income. It seems that any attempt to provide a more equitable condition, will be eventually reached to a higher capital formation, higher saving and higher output per capita in MENA region compared with selected developed countries.     

The relationship between insurance and economic growth in Europe: a theoretical and empirical analysis

The role of insurance companies, although growing in importance in financial intermediation, has received less attention than bank and stock markets and if so, mainly as a provider of risk transfer in single country or very heterogeneous samples. We investigate both the impact of insurance investment and premiums on GDP growth in Europe. We conduct a cross-country panel data analysis from 1992 to 2005 for 29 European countries. We find a positive impact of life insurance on GDP growth in the EU-15 countries, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. For the New EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, we find a larger impact for liability insurance. Furthermore our findings emphasise the impact of the real interest rate and the level of economic development on the insurance-growth nexus. We argue that the insurance sector needs to be paid more attention in financial sector analysis and macroeconomic policy.

Political constraints to growth in an economic union

This paper studies the political economy of growth in an economic union such as the EU. In the spirit of Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti [Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P. and Zilibotti, F., 2006a, Distance to frontier, selection and economic growth, Journal of the European Economic Association, 4:1, 37–74; Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., and Zilibotti, F., 2006b, Growth, development and appropriate versus inappropriate institutions, mimeo MIT.], as the economy approaches the world technology frontier, structural reforms that increase competition in intermediate goods sectors are necessary to boost innovation and productivity growth. Reforms, however, raise the opposition of incumbents and, therefore, are politically difficult to implement. When there are important cross-border policy spillover effects, national governments are more easily captured by vested interests, as they fail to internalize the benefits of reforms on the rest of the union. In this situation, productivity growth may be sluggish and the economy can fail to converge to the frontier. On the other hand, when policy is chosen by a union government (or a collective body that takes into account union welfare), the internalization of spillovers raises the perceived benefit of reforms and, consequently, lowers the ability of lobbies to obtain high levels of protection.     

Political versus economic institutions in the growth process

After a decade of research on the relationship between institutions and growth, there is no consensus about the exact way in which these two variables interact. In this paper we re-examine the role that institutions play in the growth process using data for developed and developing economies over the period 1975–2005. Our results indicate that the data is best described by an econometric model with two growth regimes. Political institutions are the key determinant of which regime an economy belongs to, while economic institutions have a direct impact on growth rates within each regime. These findings support the hypothesis that political institutions are one of the deep causes of growth, setting the stage in which economic institutions and standard covariates operate.     

Nonlinear economic growth: Some theory and cross-country evidence

This paper aims to test the existence of different growth regimes, that is of different relationships between growth rate and income level. We propose a simple nonlinear growth model and test its empirical implications by estimating Markov transition matrices and stochastic kernels. We show that growth is indeed nonlinear: a first phase of slow or zero growth is followed by a take-off and, finally, by a phase of deceleration. We discuss the relevance of these results with respect to the issue of convergence and reversibility of development, in the light of models of structural change and technological diffusion.     

Political credibility and economic growth in less developed countries

While the mainstream of economic development theory focuses on the efficiency of policy measures, the role of the credibility of these measures is rarely analyzed. In this paper we argue that in less developed countries the problem of establishing the credibility of policy measures is at least as important as the problem of choosing the efficient policy solution. We claim that many of the difficulties less developed countries face can be understood in terms of lack of effective control on the discretionary power of governments, which ultimately leads to policies that are not credible. The private sector anticipates large swings in policies and reacts by withholding its resources. Symptoms of these credibility problems in less developed countries include the size of the informal sector, capital flight, and the reluctance of investors to commit capital. All of these reactions contribute to the slow economic growth in these countries. This paper concludes that establishing strategies for the control of state discretionary power is a crucial precondition for overcoming these problems and generating long term economic growth.     

Political regime type and variation in economic growth rates

Research about the effects of regime type on economic growth rates did not establish any robust differences in average growth rates between democracies and autocracies. Here, it is suggested that we may have asked the wrong question. There still might be a difference in variances. Democracy implies similar constraints on rulers and thereby might lead to quite similar economic performances. Among autocracies, however, constitutional and institutional constraints are likely to be weak and variable. Moreover, personal inclinations of autocrats might matter much more than personality differences between democratic rulers. Data from the 1960–87 period supply some evidence that there is indeed greater variation in growth rates among autocracies than among democracies.     

Fixed investment and economic growth: new results on causality

This study re-examines the issue of causality between investment shares and economic growth. A methodology is applied based on Arellano and Bond (1991), and Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) to quinquennial panel data on growth and investment shares for the post war period and shows that, contrary to previous results in the literature, causality between fixed investment and growth runs in both directions. Investment shares Granger-cause growth rates and growth rates Granger-cause investment shares. Granger causality from investment shares to growth rates is found to be negative. The result is in contrast with a capital fundamentalist view which sees fixed investment as the key to long run growth, but is fully consistent with the predictions of Solow-type growth models.     

Knightian uncertainty and poverty trap in a model of economic growth

This paper explores how Knightian uncertainty affects dynamic properties in an economic growth model. The decision-making theory employed in the analysis is the theory of expected utility under a non-additive probability measure, i.e., the Choquet expected utility model of preference. We apply this decision-making theory to an overlapping generations model where producers face “uncertainty” in their technologies. When the producer is averse to uncertainty, the firm's profit function may not be differentiable. Therefore, the firm's decision to invest and hire labor becomes rigid for a certain measurable range of real interest rates. In dynamic equilibrium, the existence of firm-level rigidity causes discontinuity in the wage function; this makes multiple equilibria the more likely outcomes under the log utility and Cobb–Douglas production functions. In this paper, we show that even if aversion to uncertainty is small, the “poverty trap” can arise for a wide range of parameter values.     

International trade and industrialization in a non-scale model of economic growth

The relationship between international trade, growth, and industrialization is analyzed in a two-sector non-scale growth model. The counterfactual prediction of new growth theories regarding a positive effect of population growth on per capita income growth is shown to be alleviated by allowing for international trade. While the growth-trade linkage is positive in most cases, it is negative if the rate of population growth is relatively large and the initial capital stock is relatively small. As the timing of the switch from autarky to free trade affects the process of industrialization, trade policy can influence structural change and long-run growth rates even in non-scale growth models.     

Brain drain and economic growth: A dynamic model

The problem of the international migration of educated people is analyzed in the context of a dynamic economy where individuals are faced with three basic decisions: education, acquisition of physical capital and migration. The paper discusses the transitional and steady-state behaviour of such an economy, and in addition incorporates a detailed dynamic analysis of the effects of minimum wages and of the implementation of a migration tax.     

Population growth and economic growth: a reconsideration

The relationship between population growth and development has long been a controversial topic in the economic development literature. Early work by Hoover and Coale and more recent work by Blanchet suggest that high fertility suppresses per capita income growth. However, recent work by Kelley and Srinivasan are ambivalent about such a neo-Malthusian relationship between population growth and economic growth. The authors examine these conflicting positions. They emphasize that the rates of both population growth and income growth are endogenous variables within a general equilibrium framework. An endogenous growth model with endogenous fertility is then developed. It is found that when all exogenous variables are controlled for, there exists an inverse relation between population growth and economic growth. However, when some exogenous factors change, such as an improvement in technological progress, the relation becomes ambiguous. This suggests that the conflicting findings in the literature may be because of the presence of substantial heterogeneity in unobserved variables across countries and over time in cross-country panel data sets.     

Some political determinants of economic growth: Theory and empirical implications

This work studies the effects of the political environs on economic growth. The theoretical result from a mathematical model suggests that regime instability, political polarization, and government repression all have a negative impact on economic growth. A cross-sectional analysis of 88 countries over the period of 1974–1990 provides preliminary confirmation of three implications derived from the theoretical model.     

Inflation and economic growth in Latin America: Some panel time-series evidence

In this paper we investigate the role of macroeconomic performance, mainly in terms of rates of inflation, in determining economic growth in four Latin American countries which suffered hyperinflationary bursts in the 1980s and early 1990s, but that also differ in terms of development levels. The data set covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and the empirical results, based on panel time-series data and analysis, confirm the anecdotal evidence which suggests that inflation has had a detrimental effect to growth in the region. All in all, we highlight the fact that excessive inflation has clearly offset the Mundell–Tobin effect and consequently the high costs that inflation has had on economic activity in the region.