Public infrastructure,production organization,and economic development

We develop a political economy model of growth to examine economic development led by the interactions between an economic decision concerning a firm’s production technology (CRS vs. IRS technology) and a political decision concerning public infrastructure. We show that multiple equilibrium growth paths occur due to differences in expectations regarding the quality of public infrastructure. These multiple paths illustrate why economies with poor initial conditions can catch up to and, furthermore, overtake economies with better initial conditions. Our result could explain the experiences of some East Asian countries where the co-evolution of public infrastructure and industrial transformation spurred economic development.     

On the relationships between the effectiveness of national planning and the state of technical, economic, social and political structures

This paper examines the French economic development after WW II by viewing the different stages of government planning and the background conditions under which these plans were implemented. Technical, economic, social and political conditions have to be taken into account. In the first stage, the Monnet Plan, there existed a background of political splintering and general economic catastrophe. The goal was clear to everyone: things had to return to normal. Therefore, financial aid applied in the appropriate areas helped to achieve the set goal, since personal and national interest coincided on a large scale. In the next stage political cohesion existed, but interests were diversified to such an extent that no single goal could be defined. In order to coordinate the different interest groups, a common language had to be found, which was chosen to be that of national accounting. While this allowed better communication between civil servants and business, it left out the unions and consumers. As a result, this stage of the plan had only limited success. It did strengthen national cohesion and the language of national accounting was accepted by many. Plan VII for 1975 to 1980 therefore should take into account all the factors of the past plans. The goal should be to obtain political cohesion and to adapt the economy to the new energy crisis. That is, the economy should not be based on the present trajectory: more and better. Three main areas must be included: (1) Economic development (not necessarily growth); (2) Social progress; (3) New social accounting with a new language. It should be remembered that objectives, resources, planning methods and an effective language are closely dependent upon the state of economic, social and political conditions as well as current events.     

HETEROGENEOUS BORROWERS IN QUANTITATIVE MODELS OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULT*

We extend the model used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default, allowing policymakers of different types to stochastically alternate in power. We show that a default episode may be triggered by a change in the type of policymaker in office, and that such a default is likely to occur only if there is enough political stability and if policymakers encounter poor economic conditions. Under high political stability, political turnover enables the model to generate a weaker correlation between economic conditions and default decisions, a higher and more volatile spread, and lower borrowing levels after a default episode.     

Do Political Factors Cause the Regional Inequality in the Reform‐Era China?

We construct a political variable—the number of ministers of all national government departments born in each province weighted by provincial population—to examine its effect on economic growth in China during 1981–2010. We find that the lagged per capita political variable has a significant, positive effect on economic growth in both ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation. We also find that the lagged per capita political variable has a significant, positive effect on financial deregulation policies distributed across provinces, which offers a possible mechanism for the political variable to impact growth.     

Political regimes and foreign intervention

We present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations. We characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur. We highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices. Foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias and to be directed at destinations where FDI is highly profitable and where income inequality is high. Foreign-sponsored coups d'état are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries. In destinations where FDI is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak, foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships. We relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world.     

The Role of Political Instability in Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: The Case of Greece

This article examines empirically the relationship between stock market development, political instability and economic growth in Greece. We measure socio-political instability by constructing an index which captures the occurrence of various phenomena of political violence using time-series data. The main advantages of analysing political instability in a case study framework using time-series, in contrast with the widely used cross-country empirical studies, are: (a) a more careful and in-depth examination of institutional and historical characteristics of a particular country; (b) the use of a data set comprised of the most appropriate and highest quality measures; and (c) a more detailed exposition of the dynamic evolution of the economy. The empirical results indicate the existence of a strong negative relationship between uncertain socio-political conditions and the general index of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) and support the theoretical hypothesis that uncertain socio-political conditions affect economic growth negatively, is true for the Greek case.
(J.E.L.: G10, G14, O40, C32)     

Fifty years of fiscal planning and implementation in the Netherlands

Using real-time data from the annual budgets over the period 1958–2009, we explore budgetary planning and implementation in the Netherlands. Three fiscal policy regimes are distinguished. Our key findings are the following. First, plans are on average unbiased, although they are overoptimistic during earlier parts of our sample and overly pessimistic during the later parts of our sample, when revenues are under-projected. Second, general economic conditions and the state of the public finances are important determinants of both plans and their implementation. Third, this is also the case for political and institutional factors. Expenditure overruns are partly related to political factors, whereas cautious revenue forecasts relate to the institutional setting. Fourth, under the most recent regime of “trend-based budgeting” implementation was strongest relative to planning. In fact, this regime may contain some elements that are useful for designing national fiscal arrangements elsewhere.     

Political instability and economic growth

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth.     

Understanding political−economic development in the American South

We propose an empirical strategy to adjudicate between competing explanations of political–economic development in the American South. This strategy evaluates the dynamic relationship between partisan control of representative institutions and economic performance, both before and after major partisan realignment forces and economic conditions had structurally transformed the American South. The political–economic development of low‐capacity Southern states since the early 1980s reflects a “virtuous cycle” of rising income growth and partisan balance of state legislatures mutually reinforcing one another. These findings reconcile conflicting claims regarding the catalytic nature of political–economic development coevolution in the American South and have broader implications for the study of comparative political–economic development.     

Energy exports,globalization and economic growth: The case of South Caucasus

We examine the effect of energy exports and globalization on economic growth using the bias-corrected least square dummy variable model in a panel of five South Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Turkey) over the period of 1990–2009. We provide evidence that higher energy exports and globalization expand economic growth. Also, we find that higher economic, political and social integrations are associated with higher growth rates. Furthermore, we find that greater energy exports contribute to higher growth rates in the course of globalization. In particular, higher energy exports lead to higher growth rates in the period of increasing economic and political integration. We therefore emphasize that energy exports, global integration, and their interaction effects are important determinants of economic growth in the South Caucasus region.     

European influence and economic development

The development accounting literature identifies political institutions as fundamental development determinants. Forms of government or executive constraints are thought to shape economic institutions (e.g., property rights) that provide necessary incentives for economic growth. One strand of the literature suggests that European influence is a crucial economic development determinant, presumably through the adoption of European institutions. But how exactly did European influence in the distant past induce positive economic outcomes today? Previous approaches rely on “language,” “settler mortality,” “legal origins” or the “number of European settlers” as indirect proxies of European influence. We propose a direct and quantifiable mechanism: the adoption of European constitutional features. We construct a dataset of all constitutional dimensions from 1800–2008 for all countries and find that nations experience growth accelerations after adopting features of European constitutions. The growth effects are influenced (negatively) by periods of political turmoil, but they are independent of colonial backgrounds. These results show how European influence may have fostered growth, and they imply that countries were able to overcome adverse initial conditions over the last 200 years by adopting European constitutional features. Our constitutional dataset is sufficiently detailed to identify the specific dimensions of European constitutions that matter most for development: legislative rules and specific provisions that curtail executive powers.     

Rent‐Seeking,Market Structure,and Growth

We study the role of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship in economic growth, in a setting where firms compete in both economic and political markets. Specifically, firms compete for market share through cost‐reducing technological innovation, and they vie for influence over government transfer policy through rent‐seeking activities. We find that rent‐seeking affects growth in two ways: it allows firms to ignore economic competition, leading to less innovation, and it alters the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium. The former effect is negative, while the latter is ambiguous. We show how these effects depend on various characteristics of economic and political markets.     

Politico-economic inequality and the comovement of government purchases

This paper explores the implications of economic and political inequality for the comovement of government purchases with macroeconomic fluctuations. We set up and compute a heterogeneous-agent neoclassical growth model, where households value government purchases which are financed by income taxes. A key feature of the model is a wealth bias in the political aggregation process. When calibrated to U.S. wealth inequality and exposed to aggregate productivity shocks, such a model is able to generate weaker positive comovement of government purchases than models with no political wealth bias. The wealth bias that matches the cross-sectional campaign contribution distribution by income is consistent with the mild positive comovement of government purchases in the aggregate data. We thus provide an empirically relevant example where economic and political heterogeneity matter for aggregate dynamics.     

Political stability and growth: An application of dynamic GMM and quantile regression

This paper studies the effect of political stability on economic growth by taking 120 developing countries over the period of 1996–2014. We apply relatively advanced dynamic two step system-GMM and quantile regression. Political stability is found to be a key determinant of economic growth. More importantly, political instability (or risk) is found to be higher in the OIC countries and is a deterrent to economic growth. Also, for the lower and middle income OIC countries, political instability appears to affect economic growth more severely perhaps due to the absence of strong economic and political institutions. Moreover, political instability is also found to be significantly higher in the oil-dependent OIC countries. Notably, political instability is likely to affect growth through the channels of investment and human capital accumulation in the developing countries. Finally, the impact of political stability and political instability on growth is found to be equally distributed across the OIC countries with higher or lower growth level. Therefore, the development of political and economic institutions along with human capital development is recommended for all the developing countries in general and the OIC countries in particular.     

Borders and Growth

This paper presents a framework to understand and measure the effects of political borders on economic growth and per capita income levels. In our model, political integration between two countries results in a positive country size effect and a negative effect through reduced openness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Additional effects stem from possible changes in other growth determinants, besides country size and openness, when countries are merged. We estimate the growth effects that would have resulted from the hypothetical removal of national borders between pairs of adjacent countries under various scenarios. We identify country pairs where political integration would have been mutually beneficial. We find that full political integration would have slightly reduced an average country's growth rate, while most countries would benefit from a more limited form of merger, involving higher economic integration with their neighbors.     

The growth of public expenditure in the United Kingdom, 1960-86

This paper investigates the growth of government expenditure in the United Kingdom over the period 1960-86. Three features of this growth stand out. First, general government expenditure has grown, in real terms, over the past 25 years, at a rate faster than real GDP; as a consequence it has also grown as a percentage of GDP. Second, the impetus for expenditure growth has been provided by transfer payments and spending on health and defence, and finally attempts to control expenditure have fallen mainly on investment plans. The paper then goes on to examine various explanations for this growth in expenditure. After examining the role of demographic, social, economic and political factors, the paper concludes that an important additional reason lies in the failure to control expenditure. Thus a large part of the expenditure growth has not been planned but instead has arisen out of a failure of the institutional machinery designed to control such expenditure to ensure that expenditure outturns do not exceed plans.     

“The people want the fall of the regime”: Schooling,political protest,and the economy

We provide evidence that economic circumstances are a key intermediating variable for understanding the relationship between schooling and political protest. Using the World Values Survey, we find that individuals with higher levels of schooling, but whose income outcomes fall short of that predicted by their biographical characteristics, in turn display a greater propensity to engage in protest activities. We discuss a number of interpretations that are consistent with this finding, including the idea that economic conditions can affect how individuals trade off the use of their human capital between production and political activities. Our results could also reflect a link between education, “grievance”, and political protest, although we argue that this is unlikely to be the sole explanation. Separately, we show that the interaction between schooling and economic conditions matters too at the country level: Rising education levels coupled with macroeconomic weakness are associated with increased incumbent turnover, as well as subsequent pressures toward democratization.     

转型期中国县级政府的客观治理绩效与政治信任——从“经济增长合法性”到“公共产品合法性”

善治是中国政府的执政要务,政治信任反映着公民对政府治理的认可和支持。文章利用2008年中国公民意识调查及政府统计数据,实证分析了政府治理绩效的主观和客观维度对政治信任的影响。研究发现,公民对政府在经济增长、民生福利、纯公共产品领域治理绩效的回顾性和前瞻性积极评价都正相关于政治信任;纯公共产品提供的主观评价对政治信任的影响大于经济增长和民生福利。县级政府的客观治理绩效对政治信任有重要影响,在高人均福利支出、低基尼系数和低失业率的县级单位,政治信任更高,而人均GDP反而微弱地负作用于政治信任。因此,尽管经济增长仍然是政治信任的重要来源,但民生福利和纯公共产品正赶上并超越经济增长,成为公民提供政治信任的新源泉。     

Political freedom and the response to economic incentives: labor migration in Africa, 1972-1987

This study examines the thesis that political institutions and the freedoms and civil rights generated by these institutions affect migration decisions. The hypothesis is based on one stated by Adam Smith in 1776, that economic conditions that reflect greater political freedoms and civil liberties harbor higher levels of resource mobility in response to economic incentives. Pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis is based on data from the World Bank for 32 African countries during 1972-87. Findings support the hypothesis that migration rate is more affected by the expected returns ratio to labor in countries where civil liberties are greater than in nations with fewer civil liberties. The implication, from the inclusion of institutional factors in the model, is that civil liberties have an indirect impact on the rate of labor migration out of agriculture in Africa. The impact is a mix of economic incentives and civil liberties. In the political rights model, the most free countries had the largest migration elasticity. The findings on political rights impacts support findings by Friedman and McMillan that civil liberties are a more important determinant of economic growth than political rights. Further testing for measurement error confirmed that the data were flawed, but not so greatly that the basic findings were overturned. The migration out of African agriculture was found to be sensitive to the effect of price signals, which were conditioned by the degree of political rights and civil liberties. Policy makers are urged to consider both changes in pricing and institutions.     

Do Institutions Cause Growth?

We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.