Expressive behavior in economics and politics

Expressive behavior is the self-interested quest for utility through acts and declarations that confirm a person's identity. Expressive voting is an example of expressive behavior. I introduce expressive behavior in the forms of expressive rhetoric and expressive generosity. The questions for society and for public policy are whether expressive behavior affects others, and if so whether beneficially or disadvantageously. In experiments, expressive behavior often benefits others. There are adverse social consequences when, in real-life decisions, expressive behavior results in unwanted public policies of expressive-policy traps. I consider the prospects for avoiding or exiting expressive-policy traps.     

Religion,economics and politics: The Bishops and Keynes in the post-Keynesian ERA

This paper makes a proposal for reintroducing sociological or social economics into contemporary economic science. Such a reintroduction is proposed to be substantive, by analyzing the social structuring of the economy, and formal, by including sociological/social economics in the current (JEL) classification system of economic disciplines (code A.15). Both epistemological and ontological arguments can be presented to support the proposal. Epistemological arguments invoke the presence of essential components of sociological economics in the development of economic thought, and ontological arguments stress the role of social factors in economic life. In this paper I present primarily epistemological (theoretical-methodological) arguments for sociological economics, and secondarily ontological ones. I show that the present designation, sociology of economics, is something different from sociological or social economics in that the former refers to economic epistemology (knowledge) and the latter to economic ontology (reality). I conclude that, in addition to a sociology of economic science, we need a sociology of economic life.     

The impact and politics of entry regulation on intrastate telephone rates

This paper examines the effects of regulatory barriers to the entry of the interstate long-distance carriers into the intraLATA toll service market. With these barriers, the local telephone companies can charge supracompetitive rates for intraLATA toll calls and use the excess revenues to price local exchange service below cost. We use a reduced form econometric price model to see whether these entry barriers have increased intraLATA toll rates. The results indicate that intraLATA toll rates in states that enjoin all types of long distance carriers from providing intraLATA service are about 7.5 per cent higher than in states that allow some sort of competition. In contrast, only preventing the entry of the largest facilities-based carriers does not affect intraLATA rates.     

Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. We examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. We consider two relevant services accounting for different amounts of transaction costs: water and solid waste delivery. Our results show that privatization is less common for water, which has higher transaction costs. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation may be a suitable organizational form for some municipalities.     

Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Summary. We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to “sell out” to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.Received: 20 Februay 2003, Revised: 25 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D72, H2.Nicolas Sahuguet: Correspondence toWe thank Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite for their comments. We also thank the editor Dan Kovenock and an anonymous referee. The second author is grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under grant SES-0078870.     

The new institutional economics and its relevance to social economics

There has been a quiet revolution in economic theory, led by the New Institutionalists. Pioneered by Douglass C. North, this group argues that institutions are the main determinants of economic performance, yet neoclassical economics has no role for institutions. Contrary to many misconceptions, this theory of institutions can be integrated with neoclassical economics, leaving mainstream economic theory in tact, but broader and more relevant. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the main arguments of the New Institutionalists are summarized. Second, the bridge between institutions and social economics is explored. The article concludes by arguing that the New Institutional approach is fruitful, and that the theory will gradually be integrated with neoclassical economics, until the two merge into a single body of theory.     

The law and economics of sycophancy

Tullock (in: Rowley (ed) The selected works of Gordon Tullock, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, pp 399–455, 2005) was skeptical of the presumed economic efficiency of the common law, as adversarialism, apparently inherent to common law procedures, allowed for and was prone to litigiousness. Common law litigations accord to patterns of rent-seeking, as litigants invest ever more resources to assure victory. This paper asks if viable institutional solutions can emerge to resolve the problem Tullock identified. I survey the historical development of the term sycophancy within ancient Greek law as a revealing case study. Though a relatively innocuous pejorative in contemporary parlance, the term’s etymological roots stem from a formative process of ancient legal and institutional change within Athenian Greece. In the wake of specific legal reforms that expanded the scope of governmental authority under Solon (born 638–558 BCE), citizens were given explicit financial incentive to report violators of newly implemented public laws. Thereafter, social stigma surrounding third party legal representation leveraged the term sycophancy in reference to prosecutors motivated by private interests over the public welfare. Forgone social status and eventually formal criminal sanction emerged as offsetting differentials against the incentives of sycophancy.     

Social economics and economics imperialism

Address delivered at a session on April 2, 1993 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics, Indianapolis, IN.     

职业安全规制问题研究:基于法经济学的视角

控制和减少职业伤害,救济遭受职业伤害的劳动者,维护职业安全,是任何一个民主、法制、健康和谐的社会必须高度重视的社会经济问题,也是政府实施社会性规制的重要领域。我国国民经济高速增长的背后隐藏着巨大的社会成本,包括越来越严重的职业安全问题。各类生产安全事故的频繁发生,职业病发病人数的不断增加,折射出我国劳工状况不容乐观、劳动者权利未能得到有效保护的现实。在建设社会主义和谐社会的大背景下,应该从完善政府社会性规制入手寻求破解之道。     

The pareto rule and welfare economics

It is [my] contention... that the wake for all welfare economics is premature, and that welfare economics can be reconstructed with the aid of the concept of demonstrated preference. This reconstruction, however, will have no resemblance to either of the “old” or “new” edifices that preceded it. In fact...our proposed resurrection of the patient may be considered by many as more unfortunate than his demise.     

The hermeneutical invasion of philosophy and economics

This article is adapted from a paper delivered at a Conference on Recent Trends in Philosophy and the Social Sciences held by the London Academic and Cultural Resources Fund and the Institute of Philosophy of the Jagellonian University of Krakow at Krakow, Poland, in April 1987.