On the effects of human capital and R&D policies in an endogenous growth model

We introduce an external effect of existing technologies in human capital accumulation in an endogenous growth model and describe its steady-state and transition. We numerically solve the model to compare the quantitative effects of R&D policy with the quantitative effects of human capital policy in wealth and welfare. Although R&D subsidies have now an overall positive effect on growth, wealth and welfare, the calibration exercise shows that for plausible values for the parameters, human capital policy is simultaneously the most income and welfare-improving and the less expensive to the government.     

Can R&D-inducing green tariffs replace international environmental regulations?

This paper investigates the link between trade and environment by exploring the effects of green tariffs on innovation, location of production and the environment. It shows that tariffs levied on polluting goods could result in less world pollution than global harmonization of environmental standards by inducing more pollution-abatement R&D effort and generating lower unit emissions from production. Specifically, green tariffs reduce pollution by (1) shifting production to the region where environmental standards are respected, (2) inducing the firm in the clean country to engage in more abatement R&D by granting it a higher market power/share in its home market, (3) instigating green R&D investment by deterring delocation. When these outweigh the R&D-creating effect of environmental harmonization in the dirty country, green tariffs bring about a cleaner environment.     

Joint R&D projects: Experiences in the context of European technology policy

Joint R&D projects have emerged as a significant model for the development of research and technological activities. Our study examines, through an exploratory analysis, the typology of joint R&D projects and the characteristics of R&D networks in which the projects are developed. In addition, the interrelation between the R&D projects in the context of European Technology Policy is analysed. Findings from survey data collected on joint R&D projects carried out in the context of European Framework Programmes indicate that three groups of R&D projects can be identified (invention, innovation and diffusion projects), and that each of these projects is managed inside the R&D network with a different degree of structuring and external opening. The analysis of interrelations between R&D projects also shows a low, non-linear and non-progressive interrelation. This conclusion is an important question to bear in mind in the design of scientific and technological policies.     

How to promote R&D-based growth? Public education expenditure on scientists and engineers versus R&D subsidies

This paper compares the positive and normative implications of two alternative measures to promote R&D-based growth: R&D subsidies to firms and publicly provided education targeted to the development of science and engineering (S&E) skills. The model accounts for the specificity of S&E skills, where individuals with heterogeneous ability choose their type of education. Although intertemporal knowledge spillovers are the only R&D externality, the analysis suggests that R&D subsidies may be detrimental to both productivity growth and welfare. Moreover, they raise earnings inequality. In contrast to R&D subsidies, publicly provided education targeted to S&E skills are found to be unambiguously growth-promoting and neutral with respect to the earnings distribution.     

Too much of a good thing: Endogenous business cycles generated by bounded technological progress

Following Jones and Williams [Jones, C.I., Williams, J., 2000. Too much of a good thing? The economics of investment in R&D. Journal of Economic Growth vol. 5 (no. 1), 65–85], we assume that R&D is simultaneously subject to positive and to negative external effects (e.g., the non-rival nature of technology conflicts with congestion externalities). This observation allows to conceive an economy where two R&D sectors evolve without departing significantly from each other in terms of their productive results (society tends to penalize imbalances in technical progress, making negative external effects to appear associated to a sector when this outstands relatively to the other sector; the second sector, in turn, will be subject to positive externalities that reflect a catching up effect). The proposed framework, when associated to a growth setup, is able to replicate the existence of endogenous fluctuations and, therefore, it intends to be a contribution to the literature on endogenous business cycles.     

Input and output additionality of R&D subsidies

This article analyses the effects of public R&D subsidies on R&D input and output of German firms. We distinguish between the direct impact of subsidies on R&D investment and the indirect effect on innovation output measured by patent applications. We disentangle the productivity of purely privately financed R&D and additional R&D investment induced by the public incentive scheme. For this, a treatment-effect analysis is conducted in a first step. The results are implemented into the estimation of a patent production function in a second step. It turns out that both purely privately financed R&D and publicly induced R&D show a positive effect on patent outcome.     

Government Subsidies of R&D in a Product Cycle Framework: US–Japan Simulations

The welfare effects of R&D subsidies are examined using a product cycle model of trade between two developed countries. Simulations are done for steady-state welfare in Japan and the USA for high- and low-skilled labor over different combinations of subsidy rates. Japanese subsidies to R&D usually benefit Americans owing to an increase in product variety. However, because Japanese R&D reduces wages in the US high-tech sector, American high-skilled workers are hurt if Japanese subsidies are too large. Large American subsidies may cause Japanese innovation to cease. However, Japanese steady-state welfare would be maximized in this case.     

不同监督情境下政府创新支持对企业研发投入的影响——基于农业上市公司的实证研究

近年来,“三农”问题受到极大关注。为了应对外部资源、环境、科学技术等多重压力对农业升级与发展的影响,政府出台了诸多政策支持农业企业的技术研发与创新。本文从政府干预视角分析政府补助和税费返还两种形式的政府创新支持政策对农业企业研发投入的影响,重点分析机构投资者与大股东参与公司内部治理以及社会审计事务机构参与公司外部治理这两者所发挥的不同监督作用。研究发现：第一,不同形式的政府创新支持（政府补助和税费返还）对农业企业研发投入的影响并不一致。政府补助产生替代效应,税费返还则产生互补效应。第二,持股监督（机构投资者和大股东的持股比例上升）能增强政府补助对农业企业研发投入的替代效应,也能增强税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。第三,审计监督（社会审计事务机构的审计意见）会减弱政府补助支持对农业企业研发投入的替代效应,也会减弱税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。本文的研究发现为政府制定适宜的创新支持政策,以及合理发挥持股监督与审计监督的内外部治理作用,提供一定的决策依据和理论支持。     

An Empirical Evaluation of The Effects of R&D Subsidies

R&D subsidies are a common tool of technology policy, but little is known about the effects they have on the behavior of firms. This paper presents evidence on the effects that R&D subsidies have on the R&D effort of recipients, and on the probability that a firm will participate in a program granting R&D subsidies. The empirical model consists of a system of equations: a participation equation; and an R&D effort equation. Endogeneity of public funding is controlled for. Estimates are obtained with a cross-section sample of Spanish firms. The main findings are that: 1) small firms are more likely to obtain a subsidy than large firms, probably reflecting one of the public agency's goals; 2) overall, public funding induces more private effort, but for some firms (30% of participants) full crowding out effects cannot be ruled out, and 3) firm size remains related to effort, whether or not a firm gets public funding.     

Effectiveness of R&D subsidies during the crisis: firm-level evidence across EU countries

This paper is one of the first attempts in the literature to evaluate the effectiveness of R&D policies in Europe during the great crisis of the late 2000s. Using homogenous firm-level data for the largest EU Member States over the period 2007–2009, we test whether manufacturing firms receiving public subsidies spent more on R&D. The analysis is performed using both non-parametric techniques and parametric estimation methods accounting for the possible endogenous selectivity of R&D subsidies. The hypothesis of full crowding-out is rejected in all countries under exam as firms did not replace their own resources with public grants. However, these firms did not allocate additional funds to research and hence, differently from earlier works, we do not find evidence for additionality effects of R&D subsidies. Our estimates indicate that, albeit not expansive, public subsidies to R&D thwarted the reduction of firm R&D efforts in the aftermath of economic crisis.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Leveraging resistance to change and the skunk works model of innovation

We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an innovation that results in costly re-adjustments for production workers. In response, the production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. Resistance to change triggers competition between departments, which, in turn, spurs effort. We show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. As a negative effect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department's effort away from radical innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called skunk works model of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the organization. Several implications for managing resistance to change and for the optimal design of R&D activities are derived.     

Public R&D subsidies,outside private support,and employment growth

In the aftermath of the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the employment effects of public subsidies have been scrutinized because of new emphasis on public accountability and transparency. In this paper, we investigate conditions in which public subsidies of research and development (R&D) in small firms stimulate employment growth. We find, based on an empirical analysis of employment growth induced by US Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research program awards, that the stimulated employment growth is greater under two conditions: one, the presence of outside investors providing additional funding for the R&D and, two, when an exceptional amount of intellectual property is created by the publicly subsidized R&D. In addition to outside investors, other firms that make commercial agreements with the subsidized firm appear important for the employment growth of the subsidized firm. Cooperation between the small business doing the R&D and other firms is an important determinant of the commercial success of the technologies created with the support of public funds.     

Effects of a blocking patent on R&D with endogenous survival activities

This study analyzes the effect of strengthening patent protection for innovation and economic growth by introducing a blocking patent into the endogenous growth model developed by Furukawa (Econ Lett 121(1):26–29, 2013a), which features survival activity of patent holders in the R&D sector with a variety-expansion model. Results show that strengthening patent protection can raise the economic growth rate and social welfare through an endogenous survival investment. Additionally, this study examines the effects of increasing subsidies for R&D. We find that increasing R&D subsidy rate can negatively affect economic growth and social welfare because of the investment for survival activities. This result shows the novel role of a blocking patent in determining innovation effects of R&D subsidies. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of patent breadth which is another patent instrument in this model on innovation and economic growth. Results show that the growth and welfare effects of the profit-division rule and the subsidy rate for R&D may vary with the size of patent breadth.     

Occupational choice and entrepreneurship: effects of R&D subsidies on economic growth

Most R&D-based growth models fail to explicitly account for the role of entrepreneurs in economic growth. By contrast, this study accounts for this factor and constructs an overlapping-generations model that includes entrepreneurial innovation and the occupational choice of becoming an entrepreneur or a worker. For the role of entrepreneurs, even a policy intended to encourage innovation can negatively affect economic growth. For the effect of such policies, I focus on the role of R&D subsidies. I show that while R&D subsidies promote entrepreneurs’ R&D activities, they increase workers’ wages by boosting labor demand. Thus, it is more attractive to be a worker, which reduces the number of entrepreneurs. Subsidies can have both a negative and positive effect on growth, which results in an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D subsidies and growth. In addition, a growth-maximizing R&D subsidy rate exists, although this rate is too high to maximize the welfare level of any one generation. When individuals are heterogeneous in their abilities, R&D subsidies reduce intra-generational inequalities.     

Will Italy meet the ambitious European target for R&D expenditure? Natura non facit saltus

The paper addresses the issue as to whether the Italian scientific and technological system can achieve the Barcelona targets set by the heads of state and government (3% of GDP devoted to R&D by the year 2010) and by the R&D guidelines set by the Italian Ministry for Education, University, and Research (MIUR) (to achieve the level of 1.75% of the ratio in the year 2006).The projections built in the paper show that such objectives are well beyond Italy's potential, and that according to a “natura non facit saltus” (NNFS) projection, the country will be able to raise the ratio from 1.04% in 2002 to 1.55% in 2010. Such projection rests on rather optimistic assumptions: higher priority attached to R&D in the government budget, an increasing propensity of firms to invest their value added in R&D, and an increase of researchers' salaries.The difficulty to achieve the objectives set at the European and national level is due to the low starting point, to the lack of additional investment from 2001 to 2003, and to structural factors such as insufficient supply of qualified human resources, the small size of high-tech industry, and constraints imposed by the reduction of public spending.The attainment of R&D policy objectives is more and more dependent on education, industrial, and public budget policies; the issue of a thorough review of the governance of the whole S&T system at the national level is therefore raised. The situation is accentuated by the fact that decisions taken at national level are conditioned by the European union (through the Framework Program, the regulations regarding state aid to firms, etc.) by multinational enterprises, which operate on a global scale, and by regions in the framework of their autonomy.     

The Long-Run Growth Effects of R&D Subsidies

This article presents a generalized versionof Howitt's (1999) model of R&D-driven growth withoutscale effects and a complete characterization of the long-rungrowth effects of R&D subsidies. R&D subsidiescan either promote or retard long-run economic growth, and surprisingly,the growth-retarding outcome occurs for a wide range of plausibleparameter values. This article also presents a new intuitiveexplanation for why R&D subsidies can have long-rungrowth effects (both positive and negative).     

Education,Innovation and Long‐Run Growth

We extend a second‐generation Schumpeterian growth model to incorporate human capital accumulation to clarify the general equilibrium effects of subsidy policies on human capital accumulation and R&D activities in a unified framework. Despite the conventional argument that subsidies always stimulate these growth‐promoting activities, we find that subsidies asymmetrically affect human capital accumulation and R&D activities. Our theoretical results suggest that research using standard models of human capital might find false negative relationships between education subsidies and economic growth.     

Incorporating innovation subsidies in the CDM framework: empirical evidence from Belgium

ABSTRACT

This paper integrates innovation input and output effects of R&D subsidies into a modified Crépon–Duguet–Mairesse (CDM) model. Our results largely confirm insights of the input additionality literature, i.e. public subsidies complement private R&D investment. In addition, results point to positive output effects of both purely privately funded and subsidy-induced R&D. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of a premium or discount of subsidy-induced R&D in terms of its marginal contribution on new product sales when compared to purely privately financed R&D.