物流服务创新网络的多代理人协同策略分析

多元主体行为的协同是提高物流服务创新网络绩效的有效途径,而信息不对称性降低了创新网络应有的协同放大效应。文章在假设多个创新主体所承担的任务具有互补性的条件下,将协同努力水平向量引入努力成本系数中,构建了物流服务创新网络的多代理人委托代理模型。分析结果表明,代理人努力成本、协同努力水平向量和创新绩效系数等参数对网络创新机制具有重要的影响,进而提出了整合多种创新资源,加强多元主体协同创新的策略建议。     

双边道德风险条件下的收益激励与信息租金——基于有信息委托人的视角

文章特征化了一个在投资能力方面具有私人信息的委托人,和一个在努力水平上具有私人信息的代理人,在联合生产产品时所面临的双边道德风险问题。为研究结构性信息不对称对收益激励的影响,建立了双边道德风险奈件下的收益激励模型。研究结果表明,在风险中性的委托人和严格风险规避的代理人联合生产产品时,激励努力的次优契约可以达到,只是不能为代理人提供完全的保险;在双边道德风险条件下,隐藏信息不再是有信息的局中人的最优策略,而私人信息的交换与共享可以促成次优转移均衡的实现,这说明和单边的信息不对称造成的单边道德风险相比较,结构性的信息不对称并不一定使得双边道德风险问题更严重。     

试论会计信息市场的特征与效率

现代公司制度的核心特征是:两权分离和股权分散。两权分离后,股东和经营者形成了一种委托代理关系。在这种关系下,由于委托人与代理人具有各自不同的利益;当代理人追求自身利益时,就有可能造成对委托人利益的损害,即代理问题。解决代理问题方法通常是建立一套约束机制,用以实施对代理人的有效监督和激励。委托人为了维护自身的利益,必然要对代理人进行某种程度的约束,也就有必要先对代理人的业绩进行恰当评价,而评价代理人行为效用,     

家族企业职业经理人激励契约研究

文章根据委托代理理论，模型化企业主与职业经理人的委托代理关系，分析所有权与经营权分离的家族企业中委托人与代理人利润分配的激励契约模型，得出信息非对称情况下双方最优的努力水平及激励强度，并对因双方努力而增加的利润进行“二次分配”。本研究为家族企业两权分离后获得帕累托最优改进提供了理论依据。     

稳定教师队伍的激励机制分析

<正> 根据委托代理理论,教师是代理人,即行为人;校方是委托人,是影响行为人的一方。从掌握信息的情况来看,代理人是掌握全面信息的一方,委托人则信息不足,即教师比校方掌握更多的教学、科研和学生的信息,更了解如何提高教学质量和科研水平。于是校方(委托人)与教师(代理人)之间的信息不对称产生了激励问题,现在,高等院校在办特色、创品牌等系列教育教学实践中,教师是关键。尤其是在经济欠发达地区,稳定师资队伍、留住优秀教师,提高教学、管理、服务质量,更是高职院校工作的重中之重。因此,必须高度重视师资队伍建设,确立教师在     

国有企业经营者的效用函数,行为倾向及行为优化

委托代理理论指出，委托人和代理人都是独立的经济人，具有不一致的目标函数，并且由于两者的地位不同而使他们之间存在信息不对称的情况。代理人拥有信息的优势，并因此而利用信息的不对称性，利用委托人不了解的信息去追求自身利益的最大化，而不是实现委托人的最大利益...     

委托代理框架下的薪酬及对经理人的激励

在委托代理问题当中,如何支付代理人的薪酬一直是研究的热点。本文考虑了信息对称(代理人行为可观测)和信息不对称(代理人行为不可观测)两种情况下经理人的最优努力程度及委托人支付给经理人的最优薪酬。文章还以若干封闭式基金的累计单位净值及管理人报酬等数据,分析了我国封闭式基金的业绩对薪酬的影响。     

董事会勤勉、管理者过度自信与企业过度投资

选取深沪A股上市公司2006-2010年数据为样本,对董事会勤勉及管理者过度自信与企业过度投资的关系进行理论与实证研究,分析了董事会勤勉对企业由于管理者过度自信所导致的过度投资的治理效应。结论表明:董事会勤勉与企业当年过度投资水平不存在显著相关性;董事会勤勉度的提高也不能改善企业下一年过度投资状况;管理者过度自信会引发企业过度投资;董事会勤勉对企业由于管理者过度自信所导致的过度投资没有显著治理作用。     

家族企业的“委托代理”困境

“业主权威”阻碍了委托代理机制的设立和运行委托代理关系是在存在不确定性和信息不对称情况下,委托人和代理人之间签订的一组契约,以促使代理人在追求自身效用最大化的同时,最大限度地增进委托人的利益。契约关系的确立和履行必然包含了一个前提,即签订契约的双方在地位上是相互平等的,这和“业主权威”所赋予的绝对权力的不可侵犯性严重抵触。目前,多数家族企业还是由第     

激励相容的金融监管机制初探

一、激励相容的金融监管的理论基础契约理论认为:经济活动中存在着广泛的不确定性和信息不对称,导致任何抉择策略与行为后果不存在一一对应关系。“帕累托最优”不能实现,因此,需要寻求一种契约和制度安排来规范当事者双方的经济行为。威廉·维克里和詹姆斯·米尔利斯在对该领域的研究过程中引入“激励相容”的概念,从而建立了委托代理理论。委托代理理论认为:无论是委托人还是代理人,其目的都是追求约束条件下的自身效用最大化;由于代理人的目标函数与委托人的目标函数不一致,在信息不对称的条件下,代理人可能做出偏离委托人目标函数的行为,而委托人受不对称信息的制约,无法进行有效监督与约束,从而出现代理人损害委托人利益的现象。在面对代理人问题的情况下,委托人需要做的是如何根据能够观测到的不完全信息来奖惩代理人,以激励其选择对委托人最有利的行动。此时,委托人面临着代理人的两个约     

Project Termination Decisions,Underinvestment and Overinvestment*

In this article, I use the principal‐agent framework to examine the incentives of risk‐and work‐averse agents to work on projects that are long‐term, multistage, and subject to abandonment. Periodic applications of effort by the agent are required. The agent also obtains private information as the project evolves, and he decides whether the project should be abandoned or continued. The principal not only seeks to provide incentives to induce the agent to take up such risky investments and work hard at them, but also seeks to provide incentives for the agent to abandon the project if the profit prospect is low. We show that the agent's decision to continue is not always aligned with the principal's desire. The result provides an economic rationale for the sunk cost phenomenon. There also exist conditions under which the agent chooses to prematurely abandon the project.     

Reciprocity information and wage personalization

This paper considers a modified principal-agent environment, where principals can use personalized offers based on agents' reciprocity-related information. With such information, principals can either impose stronger financial incentives or try to “trigger” agents' positive reciprocity by offering a higher fixed rate. Theory suggests that principals who believe in agents' reciprocity would personalize offers so that reciprocal agents increase their effort beyond the self-regarding benchmark. Using a lab experiment, we test the behavior of principals and agents. Our experimental market witnesses significant wage personalization when reciprocity information is available. However, agents' effort levels and principals' payoffs are lower under wage personalization, compared with the sessions where principals cannot personalize offers. Our structural analysis shows that, under wage personalization, agents expect higher fixed wages and reciprocate higher wages less. Information about agents' individual reciprocity is more correlated with the expected wages, rather than the strength of reciprocity toward higher or lower wages. Principals grant higher fixed wages to workers with lower wage expectations, but because principals cannot personalize offers effectively according to the strength of reciprocity, the performance of wage personalization is limited.     

身份认知与不对称冲突

不对称是国际关系的常态。在不对称的状态下,不同的理论流派对冲突双方为何爆发冲突这一问题提供了不同的解释路径,但对不对称冲突爆发的具体时机、冲突的形式与强度等细化的因素缺乏相应的研究。作者认为,在不对称状态下,行为体对于身份的认知大体可以分为两类:一类是行为体对于身份的认知大体上符合行为体的真实身份,在此种情况下,行为体之间不易爆发冲突;另一类是行为体对于身份的认知发生错误,这就导致了双方陷入冲突的困境之中,如中越边境冲突中的越南,伊拉克战争中的美国。国际环境的动态性与前瞻性导致了行为体身份认知的易错性与滞后性,身份认知错误是导致行为体过度反应并影响双方冲突具体表现形式的重要因素。     

Know Thyself: Competence and Self-awareness

Economic analysis of asymmetric information typically starts with the assumption that individuals know more about their own characteristics than outside observers. This assumption implies that individuals can accurately assess their own competence in a given domain. However, individuals can only judge their competence if they are sufficiently competent. Results from field experiments contradict predictions from economic theories that assume self-aware agents, but are consistent with predictions from theories that incorporate a positive correlation between competence and self-awareness in a given domain. This correlation explains some of the overconfidence observed among economic agents and implies a structure on decision errors that can be exploited to make novel predictions in important areas of economics.     

On the optimality of information sharing between integrated and vertically separated competitors

A manufacturer relies on an exclusive subcontractor for production and competes horizontally against an integrated rival that produces in-house. The exclusive agent is privately informed about the marginal cost of production. When marginal costs are correlated across companies, information sharing benefits both companies due to reduced uncertainty, but it affects the contracting terms within the vertical hierarchy and creates horizontal externalities between companies. We show that the manufacturer who suffers from agency cost benefits more from sharing information than his rival performing in-house production only when costs are highly correlated, and in this case, information sharing may actually benefit consumers.     

Improving performance through cost allocation*

Abstract. This paper considers an intrafirm resource allocation model with a single principal and n agents. Each agent represents a division manager who uses a centrally provided input together with other inputs, including effort, to produce and sell final products. The principal represents an owner who is responsible for providing an input to the divisions. It is assumed that each agent (division manager) knows the local profit function for the division and has disutility for effort. The principal seeks to maximize firm-wide profits net of the costs of the centrally provided input and compensation to the agents. In this setting, which incorporates divergence of preferences and asymmetric information, it is shown that the principal and the n agents can strictly improve their welfare by moving from a set of compensation functions that do not include any allocation of costs to compensation functions that are based on cost allocation. Résumé. Les auteurs se penchent sur un modèle de répartition des ressources intraentreprise en présence d'un seul mandant et de n mandataires. Chaque mandataire représente un directeur de division qui utilise un intrant, fourni par l'échelon central, en conjonction avec d'autres intrants, y inclus l'effort, pour fabriquer et vendre des produits finis. Le mandant représente un propriétaire à qui incombe la responsabilité de fournir un intrant aux divisions. L'on suppose que chaque mandataire (directeur de division) connaît la fonction de profit de sa division et a l'effort en aversion. Le mandant cherche à maximiser les profits globaux de l'entreprise, compte tenu des coûts de l'intrant fourni par l'échelon central et de la rémunération des mandataires. Dans cette situation, qui fait intervenir des préférences divergentes et de l'information asymétrique, l'on démontre que le mandant et les n mandataires peuvent strictement améliorer leur situation en passant d'un ensemble de fonctions de rémunération qui ne prévoient aucune ventilation des coûts à des fonctions de rémunération basées sur la ventilation des coûts.     

我国低保制度演进的经济学解析一个基于信息不对称的动态博弈模型

本文就城市低保制度建立以来,特别是"应保尽保"的要求提出以后,大量出现的骗保现象,建立了一个基于信息不对称的动态博弈模型.通过对模型中参数的讨论,对骗保的原因和政府采取的一些措施进行了相关评论.在实践中,基于公示制度,并引入"奖励邻里监督举报机制"的方法在一些地方取得了很好的效果.在本文的模型中,通过数理的方法证明了利用邻居的信息优势对申请低保者进行监督,可以保费节省、减少骗保的发生.最后,本文利用此模型尝试对经典的企业性质问题进行解释,提出物理位置的接近或专业领域的靠拢可以改善信息不对称的状况,从而达到节省交易费用,代替市场机制的目的.     

Forecast Accuracy and Consistent Preferences for the Timing of Information Arrival

We study a principal's choice of whether to produce an imperfect forecast about a firm's outcome either before or after an agent's effort choice. The early forecast affects the agent's effort choice, which means the forecast can also be used to infer information about the effect of the agent's effort on outcome. The late forecast is more accurate because, by working hard, the agent also learns about productivity, implying that the late forecast has an additional performance measurement role. With verifiable information, the principal prefers a late forecast when the agent's effect on the accuracy of the forecast is either large or small. The agent has consistent preferences when the agent's effect on the accuracy of the late forecast is not too large. With unverifiable information, the agent's information rents imply that the principal cannot use either forecast as a performance measure. Thus, the accuracy of the late forecast has no effect on the principal's preference. However, if the accuracy of the early forecast is low and its decision‐making function is diminished, the principal prefers a late signal.