An experimental study of prosocial motivation among criminals

The fact that criminal behavior typically has negative consequences for others provides a compelling reason to think that criminals lack prosocial motivation. This paper reports the results from two dictator game experiments designed to study the prosocial motivation of criminals. In a lab experiment involving prisoners, we find a striking similarity in the prosocial behavior of criminals and non-criminals, both when they interact with criminals and when they interact with non-criminals. Similarly, in an Internet experiment on a large sample from the general population, we find no difference in the prosocial behavior of individuals with and without a criminal record. We argue that our findings provide evidence of criminals being as prosocially motivated as non-criminals in an important type of distributive situations.     

Socioeconomic stratification and stereotyping: lab-in-the-field evidence from Colombia

In this study, we test the hypothesis that the Colombian system of socioeconomic stratification (SES), which ranks dwellings from one to six to calculate utility (public services) rates, may induce discrimination. To this end, a field experiment with around 1000 participants from Bogotá is carried out. The design includes a combination of a trust game and a dictator game and SES-contingent decisions. Results exclude the presence of pure preferences for discrimination, yet they confirm that low strata are associated with stereotypes of low trustworthiness. We also observe significant prosocial behavior in the low-income population, and most strikingly, we do not observe any difference in trustworthiness across different income levels.     

The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization

A variety of experimental and empirical research indicate that prosocial behavior is important for economic success. There are two sources of prosocial behavior: incentives and preferences. The latter, the willingness of individuals to “do their bit” for the group, we refer to as internalization, because we view it as something that a group can influence by appropriate investment. This implies that there is a trade-off between using incentives and internalization to encourage prosocial behavior. By examining this trade-off we shed light on the connection between social norms observed inside the laboratory and those observed outside in the field. For example, we show that a higher value of cooperation outside the laboratory may lower the use of incentives inside the laboratory even as it increases their usage outside. As an application we show that the model calibrated to experimental data makes reasonable out-of-sample quantitative forecasts.     

辱虐管理与员工主动创新行为研究：基于动机和能力信念视角

基于动机和能力信念视角，构建辱虐管理与员工主动创新行为的多重中介模型，并以成渝双城经济圈内保险、证券、银行等金融行业中的336名企业基层员工为研究对象，对该理论模型进行实证检验。结果发现：辱虐管理对员工主动创新行为具有显著负向影响。其中，内在动机、亲社会动机、自我效能感在两者之间均发挥部分中介作用。即辱虐管理会降低员工内在动机、亲社会动机及自我效能感，而较低水平的内在动机、亲社会动机及自我效能感又会进一步降低员工的主动创新行为。     

On the behavioral impacts of violence: Evidence from incentivized games in Kenya

Political violence is a major impediment to economic development, damaging social, physical and human capital. By contrast, the manner in which violence influences prosocial behaviors is less clear cut, even though these behaviors likely contribute to post-conflict outcomes at individual and aggregate levels. We propose that the standard routes through which the experience of violence is thought to increase prosocial behaviors offer different theoretical explanations under heterogeneous conflict exposure histories and for different behavioral domains. We test these hypotheses using incentivized behavioral experiments, collected in the context of electoral violence in Kenya. While we provide some evidence that exposure to violence increases prosocial behaviors, results display significant heterogeneities relating both to the dimensions of behavior analyzed and whether or not individuals were personally injured.     

Making a difference matters: Impact unlocks the emotional benefits of prosocial spending

When does giving lead to happiness? Here, we present two studies demonstrating that the emotional benefits of spending money on others (prosocial spending) are unleashed when givers are aware of their positive impact. In Study 1, an experiment using real charitable appeals, giving more money to charity led to higher levels of happiness only when participants gave to causes that explained how these funds are used to make a difference in the life of a recipient. In Study 2, participants were asked to reflect upon a time they spent money on themselves or on others in a way that either had a positive impact or had no impact. Participants who recalled a time they spent on others that had a positive impact were happiest. Together, these results suggest that highlighting the impact of prosocial spending can increase the emotional rewards of giving.     

A comparative dynamic analysis of a growth model under alternate policy regimes

Comparative dynamic analysis is conducted on a growth model with variable price levels and wage rates. A perturbation technique is used to compare the economy's time paths near a balanced growth path in response to alternate policy regimes. Various dynamic policy multipliers are calculated in response to some of the alternate policy regimes such as the balanced-budget fiscal regime, the constant price regime, the full-employment regime, etc., to examine their dynamic implications on the economy's behavior. Temporary deviations in the fiscal variables are found to leave no permanent effects under all but one of the regimes examined.     

Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism,image, and incentives

We examine motivations for prosocial behavior using new data on volunteer firefighters that contain a dictator game based measure of altruism, surveyed measures of other behavioral factors, and call records that provide an objective measure of time spent volunteering. Controlling for a variety of other explanations, we find that the decision to volunteer is positively correlated with altruism as well as with concern for social reputation or “image.” Moreover, by utilizing variation in the presence and level of small stipends paid to the firefighters, we find that the positive effect of monetary incentives declines with image concerns, supporting a prediction that extrinsic incentives can crowd out image motivation for prosocial behavior.     

James Andreoni and the quest for others in our utility functions

Over the past 30 years, James Andreoni has produced a body of work like few others in public economics. Motivated by a personal need to understand the determinants of prosocial behavior, and by offering a rare blend of insights from formal theory, controlled experiments, and field data, Andreoni has succeeded in elucidating the broader relevance of prosocial motives and their far‐reaching economic implications. This article offers an overview of his work on prosociality, highlighting some of his seminal contributions and placing them in a historical context. We argue that James Andreoni has had a unique role in the quest to ensure that others have a place in our utility functions.     

Economics and emotion: Institutions matter

In two different types of institutions, English and Dutch auctions, we collect heart rate data, a proxy for emotion, to test hypotheses based on findings in neural science about the effect of emotion on economic behavior. We first demonstrate that recording heart rates does not distort prices in these auctions. Next we ask if knowledge of the intensity of a participant's emotional state improves our ability to predict price setting behavior beyond predictions of price based on usual economic variables. Our answer is that “institutions matter.” In the Dutch (English) auctions we find (no) evidence that knowledge of emotional intensity affects our ability to predict price setting behavior. We then entertain the proposition that the cardiac system is an information system that processes economic events. We are able to show that this hypothesis is consistent with our observations and furthermore that the processes differ across institutions.     

On the optimal exploitation of interacting resources

The paper demonstrates — partly analytically and partly numerically — that traditional results in resource economics obtained from the study of only one resource do not carry over to ecologically interacting resources. As in the traditional approach, we also employ dynamic optimization. The limiting behavior of the trajectories is first studied analytically by letting the discount rate approach infinity. A numerical study is then undertaken by means of a dynamic programming algorithm in order to explore the fate of the resources for various finite discount rates. The relation of our results to results in optimal growth theory is also discussed.     

Can government's choice of a high inflation policy be rational?

Out of the two inflation tax equilibria—i.e., the two inflation rates which bring the same revenue to the government—the higher one is not infrequently chosen. It is shown that such a choice may not be irrational for a government whose policy includes a financial repression and exchange rate controls and which is trying to maximize public sector expenditures. However, such policy is not sustainable in the long run, whatever its short-term advantages may be. Hence, policy makers should always weight advantages of higher public sector expenditures today against hardships of inevitable stabilization programs in the future.     

When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both “intentions” and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees, request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, can threaten sanctions to enforce their requests. Decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by investors are compared to decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount less than the investor requested. When threatened this decision becomes least common. If the request is large relative to the sanction then most trustees return nothing. If the request is small, trustees typically return the requested amount. These results do not vary with investors' intentions.     

Do Subjects Separate (or Are They Sophisticated)?

In many experiments, particularly individual choice experiments, experimenters ask many questions to the subjects and use the random lottery incentive mechanism to give an incentive to the subjects. That is, the experimenter, at the end of the experiment, picks just one of the questions, plays out that question, and pays the subject on the basis of this one question. The idea is that subjects should separate the various questions and reply to each as if it were a separate question—in isolation from all the other questions in the experiment. This procedure is methodologically sound if the subjects behave in accordance with Expected Utility (EU) theory, since this theory says that the best procedure for the subjects is to separate the various questions. However, if there is any doubt as to whether the subjects obey EU theory, and particularly if the experiment is designed to test whether the behaviour of the subjects is in accordance with EU, this incentive mechanism is open to criticism. Indeed many referees use this argument against the research. The response that the subjects may not respect EU, yet still separate the various questions, is obviously open to objection and generally it is not clear whether this response is valid or not. There have been two direct tests of this separation hypothesis (by Starmer and Sugden (1991) and by Cubitt et al. (1998), which suggest that it is valid, but further evidence is required. This paper provides a further, stronger, test of this hypothesis: we confront the two stories—(1) that the subjects answer the various questions separately, and (2) that the subjects respond to the experiment as a whole—using experimental data from an experiment in which the random lottery incentive mechanism was used. Our analysis shows that it would appear that subjects do answer as if they were separating the questions. This should be considered reassuring for those experimenters who use the random lottery incentive mechanism.     

Fairness versus efficiency: An experimental study of (mutual) gift giving

Fairness is a strong concern as shown by dictator and ultimatum experiments. Efficiency, measured by the sum of individual payoffs, is a potentially competing concern in games, such as the prisoners’ dilemma. In our experiment, the participants can increase efficiency by giving gifts. In the one-sided treatment, this is only possible for one of the two partners. The two-sided treatment allows for mutual gift giving. In both cases, decisions can be conditioned on whether there is or there is not an efficiency gain by gift giving. Our results indicate that efficiency concerns are dominated by fairness concerns that are less stringent in mutual exchanges than in one-sided gift relationships.     

Development Dynamics: Economic Integration and the Demographic Transition

This paper examines the influence of economic integration—widening of the trading area—on economic development and the demographic transition. Economies produce with different technologies depending on their scale. Greater integration between regions (greater extensive scale) is instrumental in changing rates of return, which generates an industrial revolution and provokes changes in child bearing behavior. The demographic transition follows from the mortality response to income and birth response to greater scale. The model is calibrated and simulated using historical data from Europe. Historical evidence is cited to support the idea that integration precedes the dramatic rise in economic growth rates.     

On the methodology of the holistic experiment: An approach to the conceptualization of large-scale social experiments

Presupposing Churchman's and Ackoff's definitions of a system, the notion of a holistic experiment is defined. A holistic experiment is an experiment on a nonseparable system for the purpose of determining the properties (measures of effectiveness) of the systems components. The basic problem of a holistic methodology is that of conceptualization: (1) the conceptualization of the systems “components,” (2) the conceptualization of the “teleological” standard that defines the systems components; and (3) the assessment of the degree of systems “separability.” Various guidelines for conceptualization are offered. These guidelines derive from such disparate disciplines of knowledge as the sociology of knowledge, the psychology of science, the philosophy of science, law, epistemology, ethics, and systems science. It is argued that the problem of defining an adequate methodology for holistic systems constitutes an “ill-structured” problem. The methodology for dealing with ill-structured problems is not the same as the methodology for dealing with well-structured problems. To date, the methodology of the management sciences has been overwhelmingly preoccupied with well-structured problems. Large-scale social experiments require a fundamentally different approach.     

公众循环经济认知率调查：思想与行为认知差异

公众对循环经济的认知水平是保障区域循环经济发展的关键因素之一。文章将公众对循环经济的认知分解为＂思想认知＂和＂行为认知＂两个维度,以全面反映公众对循环经济的认知水平。以上海市闵行区为例,采用问卷调查方法,分析了公众对循环经济的＂思想认知率＂和＂行为认知率＂。研究发现,公众对循环经济的＂思想认知率＂较低,平均值为57.24%,而＂行为认知率＂较高,平均值为72.27%。探讨了＂思想认知率＂低于＂行为认知率＂的原因,并从思想和行为两方面提出了提高公众循环经济认知率的措施建议。     

Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game (which we interpret as a borrower–lender relation), we study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching setup, and we test its predictions. The theoretical model provides conditions for changes in qualitative aggregate behavior in response to variations in structural parameters. While it turns out that Nash equilibrium is not a reliable predictor of average aggregate behavior, the experiment seems to confirm the qualitative predictions of the evolutionary model under structural changes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9, E3.     

The validity of the contingent valuation method: Perfect and regular embedding

This article deals with one aspect of the validity claim of the contingent valuation method, namely: to what extent does the method produce different values in situations for which economic theory claims different values. Two aspects of this validity test — perfect and regular embedding — were tested in a field experiment comprising six samples of the Dutch population. Perfect embedding occurs when the value for a specific good is similar to the value for a more inclusive good. Perfect embedding did not manifest itself in the experiment. Respondents considered a package of six goods as well as a package of two goods more valuable than one of these goods. It is argued that this supportive evidence of the method's validity claim occurred because the goods involved were well-defined. Regular embedding occurs when the same good receives a lower value if the value for it is inferred from the value for a more inclusive good rather than if that good is valued on its own. Regular embedding was only found when respondents were given the opportunity to value the inclusive good before valuing the specific good. Respondents who were given information on the inclusive good without valuing it did not state different values than respondents who were not given that information. It seems that respondents perceive an inclusive good as being relevant to their valuation decision only when they are asked to value it. Further research is necessary to shed more light on the underlying processes that may account for this.