Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands

This article assesses the predictive power of variables that measure market tightness, such as seller's bargaining power and sale probabilities, on future home prices. Theoretical insights from a stylized search‐and‐matching model illustrate that such indicators can be associated with subsequent home price appreciation. The empirical analysis employs listings data on residential units offered for sale through a real estate broker in the Netherlands and for certain U.S. regions. Individual records are used to construct quarterly home price indices, an index that measures seller's bargaining power and (quality‐adjusted) home sale probabilities. Using conventional time‐series models we show that current sale probabilities and bargaining power can significantly reduce home price appreciation forecast errors and help to predict turning points in local area housing markets. The measures and approaches in this article help to demonstrate ways in which researchers and practitioners can leverage listings data to gain knowledge about the current and future state of the housing market.     

Repeat Sales as a Matching Estimator

The most common approaches for constructing house price indices—hedonic price functions and the repeat sales estimator—focus on changes over time in mean prices. Though the hedonic approach is less wasteful of data than the repeat sales estimator, it relies on an accurate specification of the underlying econometric model. I suggest using a matching estimator as an alternative to the hedonic and repeat sales approaches. Like the repeat sales approach, a matching estimator uses pairs of sales from different dates to estimate the mean difference in sales prices over time. The matching approach preserves much larger sample sizes than the repeat sales estimator while requiring less preimposed structure than the hedonic approach. The matching approach makes it easy to characterize changes in the full distribution of house prices.     

Housing Attributes Associated with Capital Gain

Housing units are heterogeneous goods. Rates of change in housing prices are typically modelled as if they arise from factors unrelated to the housing unit itself. For example, housing price increases in the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s are argued to have arisen primarily from demographic factors and the differential effects of inflation on the effective rate of taxation on income from corporate capital and on owner-occupied housing. Cross-sectional variation in price inflation is not addressed. Consumers who purchased housing units are not indifferent to their attributes. To the extent that expectations vary within regional housing markets as a consequence of variation in housing attributes, standard linear hedonic price regression may generate biased estimates of implicit prices. This paper identifies sufficient conditions for the estimates of implicit prices in linear hedonic price regressions to be unbiased and generate unbiased estimates of implied price changes. Finally, this paper identifies living space (house size) as a significant attribute related positively to the increase in individual housing prices in a regional market.     

LISTING PRICES AS SIGNALS OF QUALITY IN MARKETS WITH NEGOTIATION*

We analyze markets where a buyer may pay the listing price or negotiate. We show that listing prices can signal quality to attract the right type of buyers. Prices are lower without quality uncertainty or without some of the lower qualities. In equilibrium, higher qualities/prices induce more bargaining, and thus more expensive goods are sold more often through bargaining.     

Mergers in Medicare Part D: Assessing market power,cost efficiencies,and bargaining power

We empirically examine horizontal mergers amongst Part D insurers with the aim of assessing how market power, cost efficiencies, and bargaining power affect premiums and coverage characteristics, including drug access and out-of-pocket (OOP) cost. Our results reveal that market power raises premiums, but this is only a local effect that occurs in markets where the merging firms overlap. Mergers alter the bargaining process with upstream suppliers at both local and national levels, affecting drug access and OOP cost. We find evidence of cost efficiencies when firms restructure by consolidating their plan offerings.     

An Empirical Examination of Traditional Neighborhood Development

This study analyzes the impact of the new urbanism on single-family home prices. Specifically, we explore the price differential that homebuyers pay for houses in new urbanist developments relative to houses in conventional suburban developments. Using data on over 5,000 single-family home sales from 1994 to 1997 in three different neighborhoods, hedonic regression results reveal that consumers pay more for homes in new urbanist communities than those in conventional suburban developments. Further analyses indicate that the price premium is not attributable to differences in improvement age and other housing characteristics.     

Price Dispersion in Mortgage Markets

Using transaction‐level data on Canadian mortgage contracts, we document an increase in the average discount negotiated off the posted price and in rate dispersion. Our aim is to identify the beneficiaries of discounting and to test whether dispersion is caused by price discrimination. The standard explanation for dispersion in credit markets is risk‐based pricing. Our contracts are guaranteed by government‐backed insurance, so risk cannot be the main factor. We find that lenders set prices that reflect consumer bargaining leverage, not just costs. The presence of dispersion implies a lack of competition, but our results show this to be consumer specific.     

Hedonic prices in the German market for mobile phones

This paper provides a hedonic price analysis of mobile telephones for the German market, based on data of 302 different handsets from 25 manufacturers over the period from May 1998 to November 2003. By measuring shadow prices for different product characteristics, the authors find that volume, for example, has a negative effect on the price of a mobile handset, while the number of ringtones and the talk time battery life relative to the handset's weight positively affect mobile phone prices. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, radiation is statistically insignificant. Also handsets have become cheaper over time, and handsets with additional features, such as MMS, MP3 or Bluetooth, command a higher price. In addition, there are positive brand name effects for some brands. According to the estimations presented in this paper the brand name premiums may range from 57 to 172 euro.     

The Gender Gap in Real Estate Sales: Negotiation Skill or Agent Selection?

This study examines differences in net selling price for residential real estate across male and female agents. A sample of 2,020 home sales transactions from Fulton County, Georgia, are analyzed in a two‐stage least squares, geospatial autoregressive corrected, semi‐log hedonic model to test for gender and gender selection effects. Although agent gender seems to play a role in naïve models, its role becomes inconclusive as variables controlling for possible price and time on market expectations of the buyers and sellers are introduced to the models. Clear differences in real estate sales prices, time on market and agent incomes across genders are unlikely due to differences in negotiation performance between genders or the mix of genders in a two‐agent negotiation. The evidence suggests an interesting alternative to agent performance: that buyers and sellers with different reservation price and time on market expectations, such as those selling foreclosure homes, tend to select agents along gender lines.     

Market Power and Multimarket Contact: Some Evidence from the Spanish Hotel Industry

This paper analyses the effect of multimarket contact on firms’ behaviour. According to Bernheim and Whinston [1990], firms that meet in several markets for an infinite number of periods may find it profitable to redistribute market power among markets where they are operating. We present evidence supporting this prediction by using data from the Spanish hotel industry. Moreover, we also find that the omission of variables measuring multimarket contact creates a downward bias on the effect of concentration on prices. This result questions previous conclusions about the role of competition in industries where multimarket behaviour is expected.     

Search and Liquidity in Single-Family Housing

A two-stage least squares model of housing prices is estimated with data collected from 3358 single-family home transactions. The results provide evidence for an optimal marketing period and indicate that a liquidity premium is priced in single-family home sales. Consistent with the hypothesis derived from economic search models, the model shows higher selling prices for houses having longer expected marketing periods. The model also shows a price premium for houses that sell faster than expectations. This effect supports the concept that liquidity is a value-enhancing characteristic.     

A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets

This paper examines the impact of brokers on buyers' and sellers' search behavior and on the transaction prices in real estate markets. It is shown that the seller and the buyer search less intensively if the house is listed with a broker. The seller gets a higher price when he employs a broker, but the increase in price is smaller than the commission fee. More specifically, the portion of the commission covered by the increase in price is directly related to the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller. In the special case where the price is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, the increase in price is shown to be half of the commission fee. It is also shown that an increase in the commission rate increases the equilibrium price but decreases the equilibrium search intensities.     

The competition effects of industry-wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly

This paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry-wide resale price maintenance (RPM) arrangements, such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against RPM. A bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services. Transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining. We do not find RPM to be universally undesirable. However where retailer power is strong, the social effects of RPM are likely to be adverse, since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising.     

Price Strategies for Idiosyncratic Goods—The Case of Housing

We determine the mechanism that a rational, profit-maximizing seller would use to revise his reservation price for a heterogeneous or infrequently exchanged good. For instance, while one dimension of a home's quality may be easily determined in competitive markets (e.g., the valuation of floor size, location, etc.), other dimensions of quality may be idiosyncratic (unit specific) and unobservable by the seller (e.g., aesthetics of the home). Here, a seller of a new or infrequently exchanged housing unit may use sales success information to revise his expectation of the unit's market-determined value and hence revise his reservation price. The rational seller will, upon arrival of the first buyer inspecting the unit, determine a sequence of reservation prices for this and expected subsequent buyers. This price sequence falls for subsequent buyers and starts from a lower initial price if the first buyer arrives later than expected. Through this mechanism, we offer an explanation for price dispersion and vacancy durations in housing markets. While we explicitly model the real estate market here, this price revision mechanism is also applicable to rental markets, labor markets, used car markets, and other markets characterized by heterogeneity and infrequent sales.     

Graduated Flood Risks and Property Prices in Galveston County

Our hedonic property analysis approach in Galveston County, Texas aims at estimating the impacts of flood risks and water‐related amenities in a more systematic way. First, we interact distance to the nearest coastline and flood risk in order to account for these impacts acting together on housing sales prices in our coastal community. Second, we use more granular flood risk measure in the analysis compared to the existing literature. Results show that the hedonic price effect is dependent upon the distance to the nearest coastline, and as expected the distance effect varies by flood risk type. We find that in this coastal housing market properties located in the highest risk flood area, for up to nearly a quarter mile from the nearest coastline, actually command a price premium. A recent movement toward risk‐based flood insurance premiums in the United States was deeply opposed by the real estate sector for fear of causing property values to steeply decline. This analysis sheds some further light on this depressed property value assertion highlighting its sensitivity to distance to the water.     

The Economic Impact of Anticipated House Price Changes—Evidence from Home Sales

If realized house prices have the wealth effect and the collateral effect on the economy, anticipated house price changes should have similar economic effects. This article empirically analyzes the effects of single‐family home sales, which are shown to be able to predict house prices in the literature, on economic production, using 372 metropolitan statistic areas in the United States from the first quarter of 1981 to the second quarter of 2008 in a panel vector error correction model. Changes in home sales are found to Granger because the growth rate of per‐capita gross metropolitan product and the dynamic effects are visualized with impulse response functions. Supporting evidence for the economic impact of home sales is also found in contemporaneous regressions.     

Buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets

Suppliers and consumer organizations have become increasingly concerned by the build-up of buyer power of retailers in many markets. A major concern is that strong retailers will abuse their power to exclude products and rival retailers from the market to be able to increase prices to consumers. As a consequence, remedies to limit buyer power are discussed and implemented in many countries. In this paper we compare the incentives for exclusion, and the effect on consumers prices, under both buyer and seller power. We study a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers offering their products to two differentiated downstream retailers. We compare the equilibrium outcome of this model when i) the dominant supplier holds all the bargaining power, and (ii) the retailers have all the bargaining power. We show that full or partial exclusion of either the competitive product or downstream retailers occurs when inter and intrabrand competition are strong. This is true both under seller and buyer power. However, in contrast to the received literature, we find that buyer power weakly enhances welfare compared to seller power because buyer power will lead to both more product variety (less exclusion) and lower retail prices.     

The Impact of Competition on Investment: Evidence From California Hospitals*

I examine the relationship between bargaining leverage and capital investment using data on California’s hospital markets. I find evidence that investment increases with bargaining leverage; a hospital whose bargaining position improves by one standard deviation will increase its investment rate by 16 percentage points. A positive causal relationship between bargaining leverage and investment fits the institutional details of the health care sector, where many firms have non-profit tax status, making it difficult to return monopoly rents to shareholders. Consistent with this explanation, I find that non-profit hospitals with bargaining leverage invest more than for-profit ones, all else equal. I do not find strong evidence that financing constraints matter disproportionately for hospitals operating in more competitive markets, supporting the hypothesis that the incremental investment may not be socially efficient.     

Union Decertifications's Impact on Shareholder Wealth

Recent research correlated share price declines in financial markets with union organizing. Investors seemingly anticipate a redistribution of earnings away from shareholder returns toward employee compensation. The markets discount security prices accordingly. But were that the case, union decertification activity should correlate with persistent, abnormally high returns on equity investments. Failure to find returns that are both abnormally high and persistent invites an alternative explanation that is consistent with the data from both studies. This study finds that firms that retained union representation in decertification cases actually outperformed those that ousted the bargaining agent in a partitioned sample comparison.     

Do House Price Levels Anticipate Subsequent Price Changes within Metropolitan Areas?

This research examines the relationship between hedonically controlled housing price levels and subsequent changes in those prices across locations within MSAs. Are areas with a high price relative to an “imputed rent” paying for higher appreciation? In an efficient market (e.g., Gordon Growth Model), as fundamentals (impute rent) differ across locations and change over time, anticipation of these should generate a positive correlation between (residual) price levels and subsequent price changes. We undertake these tests in four different MSAs using a panel of repeat‐sale house price indices that have been scaled to price levels with the hedonic attributes of the house and ZIP code. In three markets we find that identical houses in higher priced ZIP codes subsequently appreciate faster. In one market we find that there is little statistical difference.