Do Powerful CEOs Determine Microfinance Performance?

Recently, microfinance has been coming under public and media attacks. The microcredit crisis following from microfinance‐induced suicides in 2010 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh indicates that weak corporate governance and imprudent risk taking have far‐reaching consequences. Yet, analyses of corporate governance mechanisms among microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain underdeveloped. As a response, this study examines the impact of CEO power on MFI risk taking by deriving explicit predictions of this effect from a characterization of the microfinance industry. Based on a sample of 280 microfinance institutions, our results suggest that powerful CEOs of microfinance non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) have more decision‐making freedom than powerful CEOs of other types of MFIs. This induces them to make more extreme decisions that increase risk. Furthermore, the decision‐making freedom powerful CEOs have in NGOs appears to lead to worse decisions, because the presence of powerful CEOs in microfinance NGOs is associated with lower performance.     

管理者过度自信与盈余管理关系研究——基于董事会治理视角实证检验

基于行为财务理论,本文选取我国上市公司A股市场作为研究样本,在董事会治理的视角下,考虑了管理者过度自信与盈余管理之间的关系。     

Does Illegitimate Corporate Behaviour Follow the Forms of Polity? The Turkish Experience

In this study, we argue that illegitimate corporate actions can not only be strategic responses to the conflicting technical and institutional demands at the field level but also manifestations of the contradictory higher‐order institutional logics at the polity level. By focusing on the statist polity, somewhat neglected by the new institutional theory, we argue that the contradictory nationalist and capitalist institutional logics in the statist polity generate illegitimate corporate actions. We also propose that uncertainties and opportunities created by statist polity characteristics such as weak policy‐making capacity, neopatrimonialism, and clientelism lead to illegitimate corporate actions by triggering conflict between nationalism and capitalism. To demonstrate this, we examine the Turkish case, by focusing particularly on a recent example of illegitimate corporate action, namely the pursuit of non‐operating revenues. The case supports our arguments. It implies that illegitimate corporate behaviours may be ‘institutionalized’ as continuously reproduced by the actors embedded in a polity. It also implies that the impression management techniques to legitimate illegitimate behaviours may vary according to the forms of polity. Finally, it suggests that organizations may adopt hybrid missions as a survival strategy in a contradictory and uncertain business environment, paradoxically ultimately restricting their competitive capacities.     

董事会深度与广度资本能促进企业国际化战略吗？——基于两职合一调节作用的分析

基于资源依赖理论,以2011—2016年A股上市公司为研究样本,从董事会深度、广度资本两方面探讨董事会资本与企业国际化战略之间的逻辑关系,并进一步检验两职合一对董事会资本与企业国际化战略两者关系的情境作用。研究发现：董事会深度资本与广度资本对企业国际化战略均存在显著的正向影响;当两职合一时,董事会深度与广度资本对企业国际化战略的正向影响将被增强。结论说明,董事会深度资本、董事会广度资本以及两职合一的领导结构的不同是导致企业间国际化战略差异的重要因素。     

非CEO高管独立性的治理效应——基于审计定价的证据

从高管团队内部治理角度出发,当非CEO高管相对于CEO具有较强的独立性时,可以对CEO的不当行为发挥“自下而上”的制约与平衡作用。基于会计信息外部监督者的视角,通过考察会计师事务所对客户非CEO高管独立性的反应,来揭示企业非CEO高管独立性的治理效应。研究发现：非CEO高管独立性越高,则会计师事务所的审计定价越低。机制检验表明,上述结果主要因企业财务报表错报风险和经营风险下降导致。此外,当非CEO高管约束能力更强时,非CEO高管独立性能够更加有效地发挥治理效应,进而降低事务所的审计定价;且这一关系在董事会监督效率较低、事务所类型为“非十大”的企业当中尤为明显。进一步研究表明,非CEO高管独立性提高了企业收到标准无保留意见的概率;而且即使审计定价降低,审计质量也并未下降。研究结论为明晰非CEO高管独立性的治理机制提供了重要依据,对于上市公司优化管理层结构以及事务所进行审计决策具有一定的借鉴意义。