Conceptualizing the Roles of Founder Personality Traits in Startups' Construction of Brand Identity

Founder personality traits (FPT's in short) play unique roles in a start-up organization's brand identity construction (BIC in short) and hence merit more research attention (Miller 2015). Here, startup FPT's are theorized to play three different roles that give rise to three different startup brand identities because of start-ups' BIC.

The first role played by startup FPT's is an indirect one that gives rise to a startup brand identity called a sticky identity. In order to build the sticky identity, we propose that startups focus on innovative product features regardless of FPT. The second role played by startup FPT's is a long-term-oriented direct one that gives rise to a startup identity called a static identity. In order to build the static identity we propose that startups with joiner-cultured FPT's focus on long-term gains such as loyalty. The third role played by startup FPT's is a short-term-oriented direct one that gives rise to a startup identity called a fluid identity. In order to build the fluid identity we propose that startups with non-joiner cultured FPT's focus on short-term gains such as transient, sporadic, but profitable transactions.     

Patent Protection,Startup Takeovers,and Open Innovation

Abstract

Open innovation largely relies on startup innovators transferring their R&D to incumbent firms. Yet, such innovators are at a disadvantage when faced with incumbents holding patent portfolios, raising the question why do such Lilliputian firms choose to innovate? In view of this, we study the impact of patent protection on the innovation incentives of startup firms in a dynamic model where an incumbent faces a sequence of potential startups and the incumbent’s chance of winning an infringement lawsuit increases with the size of its patent portfolio. It is shown that open innovation–style takeover deals generate extra benefits for the incumbent via its enhanced future bargaining positions, a part of which accrues to the current startup as an increased bargaining share, justifying R&D activity that would not have taken place otherwise.     

Signaling by early stage startups: US government research grants and venture capital funding

Entrepreneurship researchers have documented that early stage startups rely on signals to demonstrate the transitions in their identities that they must make when they cross organizational life cycle thresholds. However, early stage startups in emerging industry contexts tend to have few good signals upon which to rely. Public agencies can play a valuable role in this process, but prior research has not sufficiently examined how startups effectively leverage this support. In this paper, therefore, we develop a framework to investigate the role that signals can play for early stage startups when they win prestigious government research grants. We test this framework in the setting of the emerging U.S. clean energy sector and find that in comparison to a matched sample of clean energy startups that have not won prestigious research grants, startups with these grants were 12% more likely to acquire subsequent venture capital (VC) funding. Another significant result is that the value of this signaling is greater for startups that have fewer patents. The important contribution of this finding is that it shows that signaling has the potential to redistribute benefits rather than just provide an additional accrual of advantages to the already high status actors. Together these results highlight the advantages for startups in emerging industries of pursuing signaling strategies with public agencies when they attempt to make important transitions through the stages of their organizational life cycles.

Early-stage business model experimentation and pivoting

Recent literature suggests entrepreneurs struggle to pivot—or fundamentally change aspects of their venture—due to identity-based resistance to change. Yet, when entrepreneurs receive negative feedback, overcoming this resistance may be important to pivoting their business model. We adopt a convergent, mixed methods research design to explore when and why some entrepreneurs overcome resistance to change in response to negative feedback during early-stage business model experimentation. Building upon qualitative data that we gathered and analyzed, we theorize entrepreneurs may resist pivoting their value proposition relative to other business model components despite receiving negative feedback on this aspect of their business model. However, we find three factors – entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size – may enable entrepreneurs to pivot in response to negative feedback. We theorize that these factors broaden a startup team's perspective, enabling value proposition pivoting during early-stage business model experimentation. We test these relationships with quantitative data from 80 startups engaged in business model experimentation and find support across hypotheses. We contribute to understanding when and why entrepreneurs pivot aspects of their business models in response to negative feedback during early-stage business model experimentation.Executive summaryThe entrepreneurship literature suggests startups may benefit from experimentation and pivoting different parts of their business model in response to negative feedback from stakeholders (Andries et al., 2021; Camuffo et al., 2020; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). In early stages of starting a new venture, a business model refers to a cognitive schema or belief about an activity system that could potentially create and capture value (Massa et al., 2017; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). Business model experimentation is the process of testing assumptions underlying this potential business model and pivoting business model assumptions in response to negative feedback (Andries et al., 2013; McDonald and Eisenhardt, 2020; Leatherbee and Katila, 2020). Building upon prior literature, we define business model pivoting as a fundamental change to parts of the business model (Berends et al., 2021; Snihur and Clarysse, 2022; Shepherd and Gruber, 2021). Yet, literature also suggests founders often struggle to pivot assumptions despite negative feedback. Motives to preserve and protect certain assumptions relevant to founders' identities can interfere with pivoting (Grimes, 2018; Kirtley and O'Mahony, 2023; Zuzul and Tripsas, 2020). Despite the general understanding that founders struggle to change their ideas, however, the entrepreneurship literature currently lacks precise insight into when and why founders can overcome resistance to pivoting.In this research, we explore when and why startups pivot different parts of their business model. We do so within the context of early-stage business model experimentation, where founders explicitly state assumptions about different parts of their potential business model, test those assumptions against stakeholder feedback, and are encouraged to pivot business model components in response to negative feedback. Through a mixed methods research design, we find (1) founders tend to resist pivoting their value propositions relative to other parts of a business model in response to negative feedback; and (2) entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size enables startups to overcome this resistance to pivoting in response to negative feedback. We theorize these factors broaden founders' perspectives (Warshay, 1962), contributing to a greater willingness to pivot during experimentation.We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial pivoting by explaining nuanced variation in pivoting distinct business model components during experimentation. This contribution is important because it reveals that resistance to pivoting the business model may be more complex than previously thought. We also contribute to the literature at the nexus of business model experimentation and entrepreneurial cognition by finding that entrepreneurial experience, startup mentoring, and team size enable startups to pivot despite psychological resistance to pivoting in response to negative feedback because it broadens founders' perspectives. This insight is important theoretically because it advances what we know about enabling experimenting with business models under conditions of uncertainty. The research presented here has clear and important implications for practice. This research suggests founders often resist changing the value proposition versus other components of their business models in early stages of venture development. This resistance can impede experimentation and pivoting in response to negative feedback. To the extent founders want to broaden their perspective to enable pivoting their value propositions in response to negative feedback during early stages of venture development, our data suggest they may be able to do so by recruiting members with entrepreneurial experience on their team (or gain entrepreneurial experience themselves), engage frequently with startup mentors, and increase the size of their team. Overall, we view the breath of perspective that comes from experience and interactions with others as an advantage for entrepreneurs when experimenting with their business models during early stages of venture development.     

An international perspective of the business incubators' perception about business model canvas for startups

This work aims to approach the reasons for Business Incubators (BINCs) to replace Business Plan by Business Model Canvas (BMC) for creating and accelerating the startup process. The main value of this study lies in its empirical appliance to test the adoption of business modeling for startups in two different entrepreneurial ecosystems. A qualitative approach has been used in analyzing two case‐studies, one from Brazil (Supera) and the other from Portugal (Fabrica). The method used was inquiring into the managers' impressions when helping to create startups and accelerating their development. The analysis was based on the data obtained from interviews and secondary data through a content analysis technique supported by ATLAS ti 7.0 software. The findings highlight how the use of BMC is bringing real opportunities for the development of nascent businesses. Furthermore, the perceptions of the BINCs studied suggest the adequacy of this model to startups due to their flexibility, user‐friendliness, and capability to manage innovation, communicate, and share business logic.     

Startup time,innovation and organizational emergence: A study of USA-based international technology ventures

The acceleration of new technology venture launch and growth is an important and rapidly growing field of practice for university-based accelerators, incubators, and technology transfer offices. Based on four comparative case studies of fast-launching clean tech startups in the USA (two of which were university-affiliated), this paper explains how some technology startups are able to develop innovative products, form organizations, internationalize, and release products into global markets very rapidly, and highlights implications for university-sourced ventures. Findings show that two processes, “product emergence” and “organization emergence,” have to be managed strategically, with time as a critical variable to be considered. This paper suggests that there are dynamic tensions between temporal, financial, and human resources in the technology startup process. To start up quickly, the new international technology venture compresses two parallel timelines: product launch and organization launch, which can also accelerate the internationalization process. This study identifies the organizational formation pivot as a risky but necessary transition from a lean, informal, fast-paced technology development project to a structured, legally compliant organization, in the case of a university-sourced venture fully independent from the university that spawned it, that can be trusted for transactions and investment.     

Choose wisely: Crowdfunding through the stages of the startup life cycle

Crowdfunding is attractive to startups as an alternative funding source and offers nonmonetary resources through organizational learning. It encompasses the outsourcing of an organizational function, through IT, to a strategically defined network of actors (i.e., the crowd) in the form of an open call—specifically, requesting monetary contributions toward a commercial or social business goal. Nonetheless, many startups are hesitant to consider crowdfunding because little guidance exists on how the various types of crowdfunding add value in different life cycle stages and which type is best suited for which stage. In response to this gap, this article introduces a typology of crowdfunding, the benefits it offers, and how specific benefits relate to the identified crowdfunding types. On this basis, we present a framework for choosing the right crowdfunding type for each stage in the startup life cycle, in addition to providing practical advice on crowdfunding best practices. The best practices outlined have shown demonstrable contributions toward achieving funding goals and are likely to prove valuable for startups.     

Are all startups affected similarly by clusters? Agglomeration,competition, firm heterogeneity,and survival

Are all startups similarly affected by the survival benefits and drawbacks of locating in geographic clusters? In this paper, we argue that prior theorizing may have missed important contingencies that affect whether a startup experiences the benefits and costs of locating in a cluster. In particular, while the local levels of skilled labor, suppliers, and purchasers have a beneficial influence and local competition has a detrimental influence on startup survival, these relationships are moderated by heterogeneity in firms' resources and capabilities. We find support for these arguments using a dataset covering the early life of all independent startups in the Canadian manufacturing sector from 1984 to 1998.     

The Impact of Familiarity and Perceived Trustworthiness and Influence on Donations to Nonprofits: An Unaided Recall Study

What affects donations? Is it all in “the ask,” or does brand image matter? In the nonprofit brands literature perceived trustworthiness and influence of the organization are important factors that increase constituents’ willingness to support an organization. We examined the association between a nonprofit organization’s familiarity, trustworthiness, and influence and the propensity of donations it receives. To this end, we used a questionnaire on attitudes toward nonprofit organizations and unaided recall of nonprofit organizations collected from a nationally representative sample. The attitudes data revealed that perceptions of nonprofits’ effectiveness and trustworthiness in Israel are not particularly positive. A multivariate fractional polynomial regression on the unaided recall results shows that while familiarity and perceived effectiveness are positively associated with the propensity of donations to nonprofit organizations, trustworthiness is not. We explain this surprising result by changes in Israeli social policy, political culture, and trust in institutions. We suggest different efforts that organizations can make to enhance their brand image and consequently increase donations.     

Critical competitive strategy issues every entrepreneur should consider before going into business

The topic of formulating and implementing competitive strategy is usually considered from the perspective of a large, well established, and oftentimes multi-divisional corporation. Achieving a sustainable competitive advantage, however, is every bit or even more critical to the survival of smaller startup businesses. Although much research has been performed on how startup companies create value for their constituencies and on how they launch products, few attempts have been made to apply classical large-company strategy ideas to startups. In this paper we consider eleven distinct differences between how large, established firms and their smaller startup counterparts consider strategy initiatives with an eye to guiding entrepreneurs toward higher probabilities of success. The eleven differences are building on market strengths, size of market, relationship to resources, presence of constraints, visibility of and by competitors, investor expectations, shareholder/investor risk tolerance, process, portfolio management, triage, and time horizon for results.     

The Joint Effects of Machiavellianism and Ethical Environment on Whistle-Blowing

Given the importance of the Machiavellianism construct on informing a wide range of ethics research, we focus on gaining a better understanding of Machiavellianism within the whistle-blower context. In this regard, we examine the effect of Machiavellianism on whistle-blowing, focusing on the underlying mechanisms through which Machiavellianism affects whistle-blowing. Further, because individuals who are higher in Machiavellianism (high Machs) are expected to be less likely to report wrongdoing, we examine the ability of an organization’s ethical environment to increase whistle-blowing intentions of high Machs. Results from a sample of 116 MBA students support our premise that Machiavellianism is negatively related to whistle-blowing. Further, we find that Machiavellianism has an indirect effect on whistle-blowing through perceived benefits and perceived responsibility. Finally, we find that a strong ethical environment, relative to a weak ethical environment, increases whistle-blowing intentions incrementally more for individuals who are higher in Machiavellianism. Taken together, these findings extend our understanding of how Machiavellianism and an organization’s ethical environment impact whistle-blowing.     

Is your organization conducive to the continuous creation of social value? Toward a social corporate entrepreneurship scale

Over the last decade, explicit emphasis on the creation of social value has grown in profit-seeking firms as well as nonprofits and has even led to the emergence of a new legal organizational classification known as for-benefit corporations. Like financial value, social value is dynamic and therefore subject to perpetual changes in the firm’s external environment, changes that yield opportunities and threats for the firm. Although social entrepreneurship researchers have begun to study the identification and exploitation of opportunities to create social value, this research has taken place primarily within the context of startup organizations. In contrast, corporate entrepreneurship research has emphasized value creation within existing firms, but focused primarily on the identification and exploitation of opportunities to create financial value. Combining the two, we examine the creation of social value within the firm by proposing the social corporate entrepreneurship scale (SCES), a new instrument that measures organizational antecedents for social corporate entrepreneurship and offers managers an opportunity to analyze whether the perceived environment is supportive of corporate entrepreneurial behaviors intended to create social as well as financial value. The article concludes with a discussion of the instrument’s potential contribution to managerial practice.     

Corporate accelerators: Building bridges between corporations and startups

Today's startups are a major source of innovation, as they employ emerging technologies to invent products and reinvent business models. Corporations that embrace an open innovation strategy increasingly look to startups as a source of external innovation. Corporate accelerators offer a potent approach to nurturing innovations from entrepreneurial ventures. However, the vast differences between corporations and startups make collaboration a challenge. Corporate accelerators need to be designed effectively to add value for startups and create innovation benefits for the company. Based on information obtained during interviews with managers and participants of corporate accelerators (n=40), managers receive a framework and strategies for designing corporate accelerators. To leverage startups’ innovation and to make corporate accelerators an effective part of a firm's overall innovation strategy, managers need to systematically and thoughtfully consider the design dimensions of proposition, process, people, and place.     

Blitzscaling: The good,the bad,and the ugly

Today’s disruptive innovations are driving the creation of numerous billion-dollar startups. Venture capitalists focus on these potentially disruptive technology startups and fund them furiously, advancing their speed of growth. The idea is to scale fast and seek huge returns for investors. Terms that define this type of aggressive scaling have recently developed in Silicon Valley. Unicorn is defined as a venture with a value of $1 billion, while a decacorn describes startups with a value of $10 billion. Another recent term is blitzscaling: funding a venture for extremely fast growth and prioritizing speed over efficiency in an environment of uncertainty. While blitzscaling is being used heavily by investors in Silicon Valley, we look at exactly what comprises this new phenomenon and how it is used in practice. We examine the concept, its stages, and its prevalence before reviewing the different examples of how the strategy has been implemented for success (the good), cases of its failure in practice (the bad), and the extreme cases of ethical compromise by ventures (the ugly). From these cases, we draw specific lessons that, if understood and appropriately addressed, would help new ventures effectively implement the strategy.     

New-firm startups,technology, and macroeconomic fluctuations

New-firm startup activity is examined within a framework pooling a cross-section of 117 industries over six time periods between 1976 and 1986. A model is introduced relating startup activity both to elements of the business cycle, in particular the macroeconomic growth rate, the cost of capital, and the unemployment rate, and to industry-specific characteristics, especially the technological conditions underlying the industry. The pooled cross-section regression results suggest that macroeconomic fluctuations as well as industry-specific elements contribute to startup activity. While new-firm startups respond positively to macroeconomic growth, they are promoted by a low cost of capital and high unemployment rate. A somewhat surprising result is that new-firm startups are not apparently deterred in capital intensive industries and where R&D expenditures play an important role. The empirical results suggest that new firms may be able to overcome their inherent size and experience disadvantages in such markets through exploiting university research and pursuing innovative activity.     

Designing a dangerous unicorn: Lessons from the Theranos case

Until its highly publicized downfall, Theranos was a so-called unicorn with a compelling proposition to popularize routine blood testing by making it more convenient, using a smaller sample of blood, and testing at a lower cost than conventional, often fear-inducing needles. Holmes and Theranos were reliant on the development of new technology to bring their idea to life. Instead, they became perhaps one of the most infamous examples of failed product innovation. In this article, we contend that although character failings and alleged criminal activity could not have been mitigated realistically, valuable strategic and operational lessons can be learned for future technology startups. By conducting a counterfactual thought experiment and examining Theranos through the lens of Design Innovation (DI), we provide evaluations and predictions across strategic and operational constructs from both an internal and external perspective. We use Theranos to demonstrate the value of DI to future technology-driven entrepreneurs, proposing alternative approaches to medical device startups.     

Firm Status and Evaluators’ Trust: The Many Ways to Trust a Firm

The decision to trust encompasses evaluation of multiple information cues that are used by evaluators to make inference about the trustee’s qualities and capabilities. The information about the social status of the trustee firm is one of such cues available to evaluators. Yet the relationship between perceived social status of the trustee and the evaluator’s trust remains underexplored. In two experimental studies, we (1) find a non-linear relationship between a firm’s status and the evaluator’s trust, and (2) test theorized mechanisms that can explain this relationship. The paper reveals that firms having low, middle, and high status are not only trusted differently, but are trusted for different reasons: qualities, such as perceived benevolence and integrity, mediate higher trust for middle-status firms, while trust for high-status firms is mediated by ability and integrity. The findings thus suggest that in the assessment of an organization’s trustworthiness, the relative importance of a particular virtue, such as ability, benevolence, or integrity, varies depending on the status position of that organization.     

The effects of leader‐member exchange and employee learning on perceived employability

In today’s rapidly changing society, the critical issues for organizations are how to attract individuals with high‐level employability and what role to play in maintaining and enhancing that employability. This study primarily aimed to investigate the effects of leader‐member exchange and employee learning on perceived employability. The literature review showed that leader‐member exchange is about the mutual relationship between the leader and members of an organization, and that employee learning consists in the individual employees’ continuing learning behaviours. The data for this study were collected from 257 South Korean insurance company employees. The study findings demonstrated that leader‐member exchange has a significant positive influence on the one dimension of perceived employability: corporate sense. Employee learning, on the contrary, was shown to have statistically significant positive effects on all the five dimensions of employability. Conclusions were drawn, and the implications and limitations of the study are discussed.     

Do Environmental CSR Initiatives Serve Organizations’ Legitimacy in the Oil Industry? Exploring Employees’ Reactions Through Organizational Identification Theory

Little is known about employees’ responses to their organizations’ initiatives in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Academics have already identified a few outcomes regarding CSR’s impact on employees’ attitudes and behaviours; however, studies explaining the underlying mechanisms that drive employees’ favourable responses to CSR remain largely unexplored. Based on organizational identification (OI) theory, this study surveyed 155 employees of a petrochemical organization to better elucidate why, how and under which circumstances employees might positively respond to organizations’ CSR initiatives in the controversial oil industry sector. Findings first support that perceived CSR (i.e. environmental CSR) positively relates to employees’ OI which is known as an important antecedent of employees’ outcomes (Riketta, J Vocat Behavior, 66(2):358, 2005). Furthermore, results highlighted that the relationship between perceived CSR and employees’ OI is mediated by organizational trust. Finally, this study also revealed that some contingency factors such as employees’ attributions of self-centred motives to their organization’s investment in environmental issues can moderate the relationship between perceived CSR and organizational trust. Based on these findings, it is argued that CSR initiatives can support organizations’ efforts to maintain a strong relationship with their employees, and gain their support even in a controversial industry sector.     

Toward a better understanding of corporate accelerator models

Corporate accelerator programs—accelerators managed by or directly sponsored by one or multiple established firms—are becoming an integral part of startup ecosystems and an important startup engagement vehicle for established firms. Previous research focused either on independent accelerators or on corporate accelerator programs that one established firm operates internally. However, new accelerator models emerged recently, making the corporate accelerator phenomenon more diverse. The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the different types of corporate accelerators, along with their objectives and characteristics in order for managers to better understand which type best fits their organization. Our insights on corporate accelerators emerged from secondary data and interviewees from companies and accelerator programs. We used these insights to categorize the programs into four corporate accelerator models that vary according to number of participants and the accelerator’s management structure and explain how companies can select the right model for their objectives.