Household Debt Overhang and Transmission of Monetary Policy

We investigate how the level of household indebtedness affects the monetary transmission mechanism in the U.S. economy. Using state‐dependent local projection methods, we find that the effects of monetary policy are less powerful during periods of high household debt. In particular, the impact of monetary policy shocks is smaller on GDP, consumption, residential investment, house prices, and household debt during a high‐debt state. We then build a partial equilibrium model of borrower households with financial constraints to rationalize these facts. The model points to the weakening of the home equity loan channel as a possible reason for the decline in monetary policy effectiveness when initial debt levels are high.     

Tobin's Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment

Incorporating debt in a dynamic real options framework, we show that underinvestment stems from truncation of equity's horizon at default. Debt overhang distorts both the level and composition of investment, with underinvestment being more severe for long‐lived assets. An empirical proxy for the shadow price of capital to equity is derived. Use of this proxy yields a structural test for debt overhang and its mitigation through issuance of additional secured debt. Using measurement error‐consistent GMM estimators, we find a statistically significant debt overhang effect regardless of firms' ability to issue additional secured debt.     

A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang

Debt maturity influences debt overhang, the reduced incentive for highly levered borrowers to make real investments because some value accrues to debt. Reducing maturity can increase or decrease overhang even when shorter term debt's value depends less on firm value. Future overhang is more volatile for shorter term debt, making future investment incentives volatile and influencing immediate investment incentives. With immediate investment, shorter term debt typically imposes lower overhang; longer term debt can impose less if asset volatility is higher in bad times. For future investments, reduced correlation between assets‐in‐place and investment opportunities increases the shorter term debt overhang.     

Debt Overhang, Costly Expandability and Reversibility, and Optimal Financial Structure

Abstract:   This article compares the investment and financing decisions of a firm that adopts a 'first‐best' strategy with those of a firm that adopts a 'second‐best' strategy. The former issues bonds upon deciding an initial capacity, while the latter issues bonds, and only then decides an initial capacity. The former is thus able to avoid the agency cost associated with the 'debt overhang' problem. Accordingly, the former will both issue more bonds and install a larger initial capacity than the latter. However, the agency cost of debt, i.e., firm value difference between these two strategies, is modest for plausible parameter values.     

Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeowners at Risk of Default

Homeowners at risk of default face a debt overhang that reduces their incentive to invest in their property: in expectation, some value created by investments in the property will go to the lender. This agency conflict affects housing investments. Homeowners at risk of default cut back substantially on home improvements and mortgage principal payments, even when they appear financially unconstrained. Meanwhile, they do not reduce spending on assets that they may retain in default, including home appliances, furniture, and vehicles. These findings highlight an important financial friction that has stifled housing investment since the Great Recession.     

中国家庭居民的债务素养及其影响研究

针对中国家庭居民债务素养研究缺乏的现状,采纳CHFS的大型实地调查数据,定量分析中国家庭居民债务素养的具体表现及其对经济、健康、国民幸福感的影响。债务素养包括五大维度、六个指标。研究表明,债务素养可通过影响家庭创业概率、消费结构升级进而作用于经济发展;"健康中国"的理念离不开高债务素养的居民;保持其他控制变量不变,高债务素养能显著提高家庭的幸福感,是社会幸福的根基。相关政策建议包括:债务素养多维度的积极作用和影响迫切要求将中国居民债务素养的建设提升到战略地位;积极采纳互联网金融服务以有效促进消费结构升级及促进居民健康水平;完善其他配套措施以保证债务素养作用渠道的畅通。     

Household Level Economic Incentives, Unemployment Trap and Job Finding Probability

This paper considers the sensitivity of the household's disposable income with respect to the labour market states and the labour market transitions of unemployed workers. The paper analyses the following questions: (i) which are the determinants of starting wages? (ii) how many unemployed are in the unemployment trap? (iii) how do household level economic incentives affect the conditional probability of finding a job? The empirical analysis is based on individual panel data covering the years 1987–1993 in Finland, when the unemployment rate rose from about 4% to 18%. We have estimated the starting wage equation to calculate the effects of hypothetical re-employment on the household's disposable income and to evaluate the frequency of the unemployment trap. To analyse factors affecting the transition out of unemployment to employment in open labour market, we estimate unemployment duration using a semi-parametric proportional risk model. The paper shows that the impact of the economic incentives, measured by the hypothetical change in household disposable income, on employment is more important in the recession than in the boom.     

基于宏观资产负债表的居民债务问题及其风险研究

本文从宏观资产负债表的编制出发,对比世界主要经济体的居民债务演变,有效度量中国居民部门的债务杠杆水平。通过宏观部门经济间的关联,构造基于存量-流量一致的部门结构化均衡模型,剖析居民部门债务风险的传导机制,分析货币、财政和地产政策在居民债务风险防范中的作用。结果表明:中国居民部门金融资产负债率和偿债比例偏高,偿债压力逐步加大。但适中的资产负债率和较高的潜在经济增速为我国居民部门债务风险的化解提供了足够的空间。紧缩性货币政策有利于居民部门去杠杆化,但由此引发的消费减速和经济下行将导致企业和政府部门债务攀升;减税较政府直接支出更能激发消费内需、降低居民和企业债务杠杆,同时,长期经济的好转利于政府债务风险稳定。紧缩性地产政策虽然有助于长期经济结构的调整,但需防范短期经济下滑。     

Hidden Overhang of Domestic Debt and Its Role in the This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome: An Empirical Contingent Liabilities Model

The recent studies in public finance literature open an exciting research area on hidden overhang of domestic public debt and creative accounting. In this study, I identify hidden public debts in Turkey. I then develop a dynamical model that takes as given the stock of contingent liabilities generated by lending/borrowing relationships among public entities and looks for the debt (in)tolerance of government to liquidate it in finite periods. Last, I introduce a general empirical methodology to analyze the role of overborrowing in the this-time-is-different syndrome and test model outcome against data for hidden debts in Turkey's postliberalization period (1989-2010).     

Household Response to Government Debt: Evidence from Life Insurance Holdings

We use state‐level panel data on life insurance in force in the United States and find that a $1 increase in government debt, at either the state or federal level is associated with a $0.96 increase in the face value of the average life insurance holdings per capita for a household in the average state. This increase represents an intention to save that would almost completely offset the government debt in specific states of the world (i.e., if the insured dies). Because this state of the world is rare, the immediate increase in actual savings is only about $0.03, the cost of the additional insurance. We find, in addition, that this response occurs mainly on the intensive margin, meaning that the size of the average life insurance policy increases when government debt increases. Along the extensive margin, we find the number of policies in force falls slightly with federal debt, and rises slightly with state debt increases. The results show altruistic planning in response to changes in government debt that are consistent with Ricardian Equivalence and the long‐run neutrality of government debt.     

Capital Gains Tax Overhang and Price Pressure

I study whether the capital gains tax is an impediment to selling by some investors and if so, to what degree associated delayed selling affects stock prices. I find that selling decisions by institutions serving tax‐sensitive clients are sensitive to cumulative capital gains, a pattern not observed for institutions with predominantly tax‐exempt clients. Moreover, tax‐related underselling impacts stock prices during large earnings surprises for stocks held primarily by tax‐sensitive investors. The corresponding price reactions are less negative (more positive) with higher cumulative capital gains. This price pressure pattern is more severe when arbitrage is more costly.     

美国家庭负债对净资产积累的影响

本文尝试从宏观和微观两个层面,对美国家庭的负债现状和变化轨迹、各类负债群体的财富特征、负债深度和债务用途等进行细致探索,以期发现家庭负债对家庭财富积累和投资意识等的影响方式与深度。本项研究对于揭示美国家庭负债的结构特征,深入研究家庭负债与家庭经济之间的数量化关系以及未来在我国建立科学和可行的家庭资产统计制度、准确识别我国居民家庭债务和变化趋势等具有理论和现实意义。     

Tax Coordination and Unemployment

This paper analyses the implications of unemployment for fiscal competition and tax coordination among small open economies. Unemployment is modeled as resulting from wage bargaining. The analysis focuses on the effect of labour and capital tax coordination on welfare. We show that, while coordinated capital and labour tax increases unambiguously raise welfare if labour markets are competitive, different results emerge if labour markets are unionised. It turns out that coordinated capital and labour tax increases may reduce welfare. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Unemployment insurance and incentives

In this paper we present a partial economic equilibrium model of the labor market in which we maximize the workers' expected discounted utility level, while implying a zero expected profit for the firms. The model we use for the labor market takes into consideration transitions between the various states of employment and the time periods spent in each state. The probability distribution of these time periods may be arbitrary, not restricted to being exponential, as is the case for ordinary time-continuous Markov processes. The basic principles and difficulties arising from monitoring problems and moral hazard are discussed. In order to analyze unemployment insurance schemes that include incentives for workers to avoid unemployment, we depart from the simplest form of the principle of equivalence in insurance. Several different alternatives are discussed, all giving rise to partial insurance and thus incentives. We also analyze the effects that early retirement have on unemployment. Here, we include social security benefits in the economic model. Finally, we show that the optimal solutions entail quantity rationing.     

中国政府债务可持续性和债务风险动态评估研究

债务杠杆率和债务可持续性是评估债务风险的两个重要指标。我国目前面临高政府债务杠杆率、高赤字率及经济下行压力。本文通过对债务杠杆率计算方法的分解以及对债务可持续性的分析发现:提高政府部门的投资效率将是降低当前政府部门债务杠杆的一个有效手段;当前国际所通用的债务上限标准并不适用于我国。本文还通过构建SVAR模型,进一步对我国债务情况进行了实证分析,发现财政赤字率和经济增长率的变化在当期对债务杠杆率产生的影响较小,其影响主要发生在其后的两到三年。针对这一分析结果,本文提出了相应的政策建议。     

Debt Relief: Implications of Secondary Market Discounts and Debt Overhangs

An efficient rescheduling of the debt must take into accountthe market value of the debt. I argue here that the appropriateapproach is not to write down the debt to its value on the secondarymarket, but to scale the flows of payments on the debt. Thekey to an efficient rescheduling is to offer debt relief reflectingthe market discount, where the relief is contingent upon thecountry's adjustment effort (rather than setting repayment terms"once and for all" as in the Brady plan). I propose, as an example,that stabilization or adjustment programs under the aegis ofthe International Monetary Fund or the World Bank could includeprovisions allowing debt servicing or repurchase for a set durationat the secondary market rate. This would both reflect and provideincentives to increase a country's ability to repay.     

The Impact of Taxing Unemployment Insurance Benefits on Unemployment Duration and Post-unemployment Earnings

In 1979, unemployment insurance benefits became taxableincome for recipients with income above a specified threshold.Further legislation in 1982 lowered the income threshold. Thispaper uses the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) database to evaluate the effects of the 1982 change on the compensatedduration of unemployment and post-unemployment earnings. The1982 episode is a particularly useful natural experimentbecause the treatment group (those newly subject to benefittaxation) is the middle income category and the two controlgroups (those whose benefits were already taxed and those whosebenefits still were not taxed) are the high and low income categories.If the two control groups show similar trends in unemploymentduration (or post-unemployment earnings) and the treatment groupshows a strikingly different pattern, this is compelling evidenceof a tax effect. The empirical results suggest that taxing unemploymentbenefits reduced the affected workers' mean compensated durationby more than a week, but did not have a statistically significanteffect on their post-unemployment earnings.