ANOTHER LOOK AT PRICE PROMOTION*

Weekly sales at retail stores exhibit several patterns that the literature on price promotion does not fully capture. In this paper we develop a simple symmetric model where duopoly manufacturers distribute through a monopoly retailer to serve consumers with heterogeneous reservation prices. We show that the heterogeneity in consumers' reservation prices coupled with the retailer's market power is sufficient to resolve the deficiency in the literature. We then show that, while pricing patterns under this model differ significantly from those under a model where the retailer has no market power, the manufacturers' expected profits are the same in both cases.     

ASYMMETRIC DYNAMIC PRICING IN A LOCAL GASOLINE RETAIL MARKET*

Asymmetric‐price adjustment is a common phenomenon in many markets around the world, particularly in retail gasoline markets. This paper studies the existence of this phenomenon in the retail gasoline market in the city of Santiago, Chile, using a data set of weekly gas station prices that covers a period of almost four years. We found that prices adjust asymmetrically, and the asymmetry is different for branded gas stations and unbranded stations. In addition, we found that the asymmetry for high‐margin stations is statistically equivalent to that for low‐margin stations. This evidence is suggestive of collusion as a rationale for the asymmetric pricing policy observed.     

PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING*

This study utilizes a brand‐level dataset that captures a unique natural experiment, a 100% increase in the excise tax, to evaluate different pricing models in the U.S. beer industry. To assess the plausibility of different models, the increase in marginal cost resulting from the tax increase is exploited: observed prices in the post‐increase period are compared to the prices that should be observed under various pricing models. Three types of models are analyzed: Bertrand‐Nash, leadership, and collusion. Results indicate that extreme cases of collusion can be confidently ruled out while several models may explain the observed prices equally well.     

Marginal cost and second-best pricing for water services

This paper examines the pricing strategy of water services relative to marginal cost and second-best pricing rules, which is a principal concern of utility commissions. The water utility is viewed as a multiproduct firm providing residential and nonresidential services, and a translog multiproduct cost function is estimated for a cross section of U.S. water utilities. Marginal costs are estimated and combined with demand elasticities to simulate second-best prices for water services. Results show that while the existing price structure is quite different from the one suggested by marginal costs, it does not depart substantially from the second-best optimum.     

An empirical investigation of the determinants of asymmetric pricing

This article empirically investigates the cause of asymmetric pricing: retail prices responding faster to cost increases than decreases. Using daily price data for over 11,000 retail gasoline stations, I find that prices fall more slowly than they rise as a consequence of firms extracting informational rents from consumers with positive search costs. Premium gasoline prices are shown to fall more slowly than regular fuel prices, which supports theories based upon competition with consumer search. Further testing also rejects focal price collusion as an important determinant of asymmetric pricing.     

The agency and wholesale models in electronic content markets

I analyze a model of dynamic competition between retail platforms in the presence of consumer lock-in. Two different revenue models are considered, one in which platforms set final retail prices and one in which the suppliers set final retail prices. Platforms have long-term (or strategic) pricing incentives but suppliers do not, which implies that the inter-temporal price path faced by consumers depends on the revenue model in place. When suppliers set prices instead of platforms, prices may be higher in early periods but lower in later periods, suggesting that appropriate antitrust enforcement ought to consider more than initial price changes when an industry shifts to the agency model. Indeed, consumers may (but need not) prefer the agency model even when prices increase in initial periods. A potential downside of the agency model is that it may align the incentives of suppliers and platforms and thereby encourage platforms to lower the competitiveness of the supplier market, harming consumers; no such incentives exist under the wholesale model. I relate my results to events in the market for electronic books.     

Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers?

This paper develops a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNO's) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNO's. In the absence of international alliances, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, international alliances are endogenously formed since they serve as a commitment device to soften competition on the retail market, leading to excessively high roaming per‐call prices.     

Progress and Challenges in Product Line Pricing

In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in research on product line pricing. Modelers in multiple disciplines have offered methods for the optimal design/selection and pricing of the products in new or modified product lines. Behavioral scientists have contributed insights on how consumers' perceptions of product line prices, attributes, and quality levels influence their evaluation of the alternative choices. Significantly, the work of both modelers and behavioral scientists is distributed across three types of product line contexts: price‐quality product lines, multi‐attribute product lines, and product lines that include a core product plus options. This paper reviews this literature, and assesses its usefulness for managers. One observation is that, while scholars have developed approaches to optimization that offer increased scope and tractability, the applicability of these models is constrained by the narrow specification of profit functions, and the limited consideration of competitive and other dynamic forces. A second conclusion is that the managerial usefulness of the behavioral science research on perceptions and product‐line choice has been limited by a dependence on attribute‐based estimation of utilities, uncertainty about possible interaction effects, and an excessive focus on the cannibalization aspects of product line pricing. Based on the review, a research agenda is identified for enhancing the applicability of research on consumer perceptions and choice to product line pricing decisions, and for building more complete product line price optimization models.     

Energy Costs in Germany—Developments, Drivers and International Comparison

This article summarises results a study undertaken by Frontier Economics and the EWI for the German Ministry of Economics. The study makes progress in creating transparency of energy supply prices and cost (for electricity, gas and oil products) in Germany in an international context. In Germany most retail prices have increased significantly since 1998 and are at the highest level for most customer groups and products in international comparison. Main drivers that differentiate prices internationally are, duties and taxes, network tariffs, political interference with retail prices and the degree of end customer competition. Based on this analysis the authors recommend a review of the consistency of policy measures (especially taxes, duties, levies and subsidies) with the energy policy goals of price competitiveness, security of supply and environmental sustainability. Furthermore, the authors suggest further refining network regulation, enhancing competition in the retail sector and improving transparency of price information.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

DO ROCKETS RISE FASTER AND FEATHERS FALL SLOWER IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF LOCAL MARKET POWER? EVIDENCE FROM THE RETAIL GASOLINE MARKET*

This study explores the possibility that local market power influences the observed asymmetric relationship between changes in wholesale gasoline costs and changes in retail gasoline prices. I exploit an original data set of weekly gas station prices in Southern California from September, 2002 to May, 2003, and take advantage of detailed station and local market level characteristics to determine the extent to which geographic and product differentiation influence price response asymmetry. I find that brand identity, proximity to rival stations and local market features and demographics each influence a station's predicted price‐response asymmetry.     

Commercial and Industrial Demand Response Under Mandatory Time‐of‐Use Electricity Pricing

This paper is the first to evaluate the impact of a large‐scale field deployment of mandatory time‐of‐use (TOU) pricing on the energy use of commercial and industrial firms. The regulation imposes higher prices during hours when electricity is generally more expensive to produce. We exploit a natural experiment that arises from the rules governing the program to present evidence that TOU pricing induced negligible change in overall usage, peak usage and peak load. As such, economic efficiency was not increased. Bill levels and volatility exhibit minor shifts, suggesting that concerns about increased expenditure and customer risk exposure have been overstated.     

First Degree Price Discrimination Goes to School

Personalized pricing is widely discussed but seldom observed, making studies of its efficacy rare. Yet, first degree price discrimination is common in the pricing of higher education, and I use data on prices and the characteristics of students admitted to a professional graduate program at a public university to estimate a matriculation demand function. I then derive linear pricing functions that maximize revenue for a target number of students. By allowing these functions to depend on progressively richer sets of observables, I explore the effect of personalization of pricing on profit. Tailoring prices to a one‐dimensional measure of student quality would raise revenue by 2.2 per cent above the revenue with uniform pricing. Pricing based on both student quality and state residency raises revenue by 8.4 per cent, and further tailoring based on available observables raises prices 9.0 per cent above the maximum revenue under uniform pricing. Pricing that obeys current statutory tuition limits raises revenue less but still by just over half as much. I also infer the welfare weights that the pricing process implicitly attaches to student characteristics.     

Multiproduct two part tariffs

Two part pricing by a multiproduct monopoly and a differentiated oligopoly are examined and compared. Two part pricing policies are seen to depend on whether products are complements or substitutes and on whether or not the market is segmented. A principle result is that although competition tends to lower unit prices, there is no corresponding tendency for competition to reduce entry fees. The unit pricing rule is related to the Ramsey pricing rule. Oligopoly equilibrium unit prices equal marginal cost when there is one consumer type.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly when Markets are Covered*

We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index under uniform pricing is equal to the weighted harmonic mean of the firm's relative margins under discriminatory pricing. Uniform pricing then lowers average prices and raises consumer surplus. We can calculate the gain in consumer surplus and loss in firms' profits from uniform pricing based only on the market data of the discriminatory equilibrium (i.e., prices and quantities).     

Fuly Distributed Cost Pricing,Ramsey Pricing,and Shapley Value Pricing: A Simulated Welfare Analysis for the Telephone Exchange

Economic theory has long been concerned with determining the optimal pricing scheme for a multiproduct monopoly, but it has been quite difficult to make use of developments in practice. Using LECOM, the Local Exchange Cost Optimization Model, over three stylized city maps, and assuming price elasticity values taken from the literature for four standard outputs of the local exchange, we demonstrate how fully distributed cost prices, Ramsey-optimal prices, Shapley prices, and standalone prices can be computed for a variety of baseline output levels. Analysis of consumer surplus changes relative to the marginal cost baseline shows that while Ramsey pricing maximizes social welfare over the set of schemes considered, only the Shapley approach results in subsidy-free prices.     

Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion

This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545–564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1–37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal.     

广东、广西天然气价格形成机制改革试点方案剖析

2011年底,国家发展改革委发出通知,决定自2011年12月26日起,在广东省、广西自治区开展天然气价格形成机制改革试点(简称天然气定价试点方案).天然气定价通常包括成本加成法、市场净回值法以及成本加成与市场净回值混合定价三种方法,国家发改委推出的天然气定价试点方案采用的是市场净回值法.天然气定价试点方案在定价方法、价格与市场的关系、价格与供需关系等方面取得突破,同时在省级管网定价、区域价格、LNG销售等方面面临挑战.为了促进我国天然气价格形成机制的不断完善,建议:1)坚定不移地推进我国天然气价格形成机制的市场化进程;2)在定价公式中设置“天花板价”和“地板价”,即形成S型价格曲线;3)未来适时增加一个或者两个市场中心;4)适时考虑将非常规气纳入天然气价格形成机制中;5)2015年前全面实施新的价格机制,2015-2020年进一步完善天然气价格形成机制.     

The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel

We study the collapse of collusion in Québec's retail gasoline market following a Competition Bureau investigation, and show that it involved two empirical regularities: high margins, and asymmetric price adjustments. Using weekly, station‐level prices we test whether collusion was successful, and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel's strategy. We do so in the markets targeted by the investigation, and in markets throughout the province with similar pre‐collapse pricing (cyclical markets). Our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the announcement: margins fell (by 30%/15% in target/cyclical markets), and adjustments became more symmetric.     

Centrality and pricing in spatially differentiated markets: The case of gasoline

We highlight the importance of ‘centrality’ for pricing. Firms characterized by a more central position in a spatial network are more powerful in terms of having a stronger impact on their competitors' prices and on equilibrium prices. These propositions are derived from a simple theoretical model and investigated empirically for the retail gasoline market of Vienna, Austria. We compute a measure of network centrality based on the locations of gasoline stations in the road network. Results from a spatial autoregressive model show that prices of gasoline stations are more strongly correlated with prices of central competitors.