Central government subsidies to local public goods

We examine the welfare effects of a central government's subsidy for a local public good in a Nash equilibrium model with two types of public goods. We first show that the welfare effect depends on the substitution and evaluation effects. We also investigate the optimal subsidy rate in a second-best framework and explore how the optimal subsidy scheme depends on the relative evaluation of the two types of public goods. Received: August 20, 1998/accepted: February 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to John Quigley, Minoru Kunisaki, Tom Panella, Andy Haughwout, Steven Craig, William Hoyt, Michael Ash, Konrad Stahl, Amihai Glazer, David Wildasin and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions, An early version of this paper was presented at a seminar at University of California, Berkeley and at conferences at JAEE Annual Meeting in Japan, North American Meetings of The RSAI in Washington, WSAI conference in Hawaii, Public Choice Meeting in San Francisco.     

Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods

We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can. Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 18 February 1997     

Trading equilibrium in a public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers

Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.     

Government subsidy provision in biomass energy supply chains

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the government’s optimal subsidy provision strategy for a biomass energy supply chain that consists of the power plant, the villagers’ committee and farmer. We examine three possible subsidy provision strategies depending on which party (the power plant, the villagers’ committee or the farmer) the government chooses to subsidise, and compare how it can influence the government’s target by assuming that the subsidy price is exogenously given. We also extend our findings when the government can endogenously determine the subsidy price. Moreover, our analyses reveal the optimal stakeholder selection strategy for each party to maximise its payoff.     

The Role of Symmetry between the Revenue and the Expenditure Side of the Government Budget in the Debate about the Potential Negative Effects of Tax Competition

The effects of capital tax competition are reconsidered in this paper incorporating the argument that the expenditure structure of public budget should reflect its revenue structure. The paper offers a small open economy model where capital and labour tax revenues are used exclusively on the provision of public inputs. It is shown that if the revenue side of the government budget exactly matches the expenditure side that is if industrial public goods are financed by both private production factors with the weights reflecting the contributions of public inputs to the private factor productivity then public inputs are provided optimally even in the presence of tax competition.     

公共物品供给中内在性问题的探讨

公共物品供给中的内在性问题导致了公共物品供给的低效率,具体表现为公共物品的高成本和非均衡供给、反公共物品以及派生外在性问题等.产生内在性问题的原因在于公共机构演进的路径依赖被进一步强化以及公共机构内部产权的畸形化.要克服内在性问题、提高公共物品供给效率,就应该在改革政府职能、引入市场机制的基础上赋予公民更多的话语权.     

Efficient provision of public goods with endogenous redistribution

We study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-efficient individually rational allocations for an economy with public goods. The Government chooses a set of weights directly related to the Lindahl prices corresponding to the Pareto-efficient allocation to be implemented. The mechanism then guarantees that initial endowments are re-allocated so that the chosen vector of Lindahl prices is indeed a Lindahl equilibrium, and implements the corresponding Lindahl allocation. Finally, besides being balanced, our mechanism is simple. Each agent has to declare a desired increase in the amount of public good, and a vector of redistributive transfers of initial endowments (across other agents).Received: 9 May 2003, Accepted: 22 October 2003, JEL Classification: C79, H21, H30, H41We wish to thank Jeremy Edwards, Andrew Postlewaite and Emanuela Sciubba for helpful comments. Of course, any remaining errors are our own.     

城市公交成品油价格补助政策浅析

为消化油价调整给公交行业带来的成本负担,国家于2006年开始出台了一系列成品油价格补助政策,给予城市公交企业成品油价格补助。本文根据成品油价格补助政策产生的原因及现状,分析目前成品油价格补助政策存在的问题,并为成品油价格补助政策的有效实施提出建议。     

政府购买公共服务的路径选择与治理机制

推行政府购买公共服务是转变政府职能的重要路径。目前,政府购买公共服务在购买项目选择、市场准入、服务监督及组织治理等方面存在着一些问题和不足。因此,政府购买公共服务的路径及政策建议如下:建立社会组织和社会工作者孵化机制;完善购买项目选择机制;规范购买方式;建立购买服务价格形成机制;建立利益补偿机制与制度约束机制;加强政府购买公共服务过程监督与绩效评价。     

公共管理专业全英文教学的问题与建议

公共管理专业全英文教学意义重大,研究通过资料整合分析法和访谈法,对公共管理全英文教学进行了研究,对其现状与问题进行了总结:(1)教学实践发展缓慢;(2)课程设置不合理;(3)教学形式适应性不足;(4)教学效果有待提高;(5)相关研究缺乏等。相应地,研究提出了对策与建议:(1)增加多种形式的教学实践;(2)优化课程设置;(3)增强教学形式的适应性;(4)重视学生英语听说能力的提高;(5)加大研究力度等。     

城市公共设施供给中的融资创新——一种基于政府付费或补贴的资产证券化方式

城市政府当期财政难以满足未来城市建设中的公共设施需求,城市发展需要公共融资创新."私人生产、政府付费或补贴、公众消费"模式是城市公共设施融资中一种吸引私人投资的较好模式.在该模式基础上,提出了一种基于政府付费或补贴的资产证券化创新方式,阐述了该方式的运用范围、基本结构和运作流程,并分析了该方式在城市建设中运用的基本条件.     

WHAT ELUDES INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE? THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS

This paper provides an analysis of global warming policy as the provision of a global public good. Using a regional model composed of thirteen world regions, the paper shows how disparate incentives among the regions hinder a shift from a Business As Usual (BAU) policy to a Globally Optimal Policy (GOP). In the BAU scenario, there will be large variations in impacts from warming across the regions, meaning some countries have little incentive to participate in collective agreements. Under the GOP scenario, negative impacts from global warming will be significantly reduced in some regions resulting in strong incentives for these regions to press for action. The paper finds that an optimal regulation could save Europe, India, and Africa hundreds of billions of dollars per year by the end of this century, but would cause additional costs to China, Russia, Canada and the USA. Under the optimal regulatory framework, higher levels of abatement are required for developing countries, worsening the existing climate equity problem.     

古典时期雅典城市思想的伦理意蕴

分析了亚里士多德对城邦本质的伦理学解读,指出古典时期雅典城市思想中所蕴含的基本伦理指向是:城市是为美好生活而存在的。认为以实现人的美好生活为目标的古希腊城邦体制,其最重要的成果之一是以各种类型的公共建筑和公共空间为载体,促进了公共生活的充分发展,使城市成为人们展示自我、培养公民民主意识与公共精神的人性场所,使公民与城市形成了一种水乳交融的互动与共鸣关系。