The Role of Short‐Termism in Financial Market Crises

The purpose of this paper is to examine the contribution short‐termist behaviours have had in various financial market crises. The early warning signs and drivers of short‐termism are investigated, as well as ways to mitigate short‐termist behaviour and consequences in the future. Short‐termism as defined for the purposes of this paper is the excessive focus on short‐term performance, earnings and other metrics at the expense of attention being given to the development of a long‐term strategy that promotes sustainable long‐term value creation.     

The Paradox of Transparency,Short‐Termism and the Institutionalisation of Australian Capital Markets

As the ultimate corporate decision‐makers, directors have an impact on the investment time horizons of the corporations they govern. How they make investment decisions has been profoundly influenced by the expansion of the investment chain and the increasing concentration of share ownership in institutional hands. By examining agency in light of legal theory, we highlight that the board is in fact sui generis and not an agent of shareholders. Consequently, transparency can lead to directors being ‘captured’ by institutional investor objectives and timeframes, potentially to the detriment of the corporation as a whole. The counter‐intuitive conclusion is that transparency may, under certain conditions, undermine good corporate governance and lead to excessive short‐termism.     

The Effects of Public Information with Asymmetrically Informed Short‐Horizon Investors

This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short‐horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information revealed by price in equilibrium (i.e., price informativeness) and can lead to multiple linear equilibria. We then demonstrate that the presence of both information asymmetry and short horizons provides a channel through which public information influences price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness. We identify conditions under which public information increases or decreases price informativeness, and when multiple equilibria may arise. Our analysis shows that public information not only directly endows prices with more (public) information, it can also have an important indirect effect on the degree to which prices reveal private information.     

How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short‐Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency

We develop a cost–benefit tradeoff that provides new insights into the frequency with which firms should be required to report the results of their operations to the capital market. The benefit to increasing the frequency of financial reporting is that it causes market prices to better deter investments in negative net present value projects. The cost of increased frequency is that it increases the probability of inducing managerial short‐termism. We analyze the tradeoff between these costs and benefits and develop conditions under which greater reporting frequency is desirable and conditions under which it is not.     

Short‐Term Corporate Debt around the World

Short‐term corporate debt as a proportion of total debt issued by public firms varies greatly across countries, between 28% in the United States and 78% in China. This paper argues that the interaction between information asymmetry and legal protection of creditors is an important determinant of debt maturity. When short‐term debt plays a dual role as signaling and commitment devices, a reduction in information asymmetry has a larger impact on debt maturity when creditor rights are weaker. We find empirical support for this prediction using firm‐level data from 45 countries around the world.     

Conglomerate Investment,Skewness, and the CEO Long‐Shot Bias

Do behavioral biases of executives matter for corporate investment decisions? Using segment‐level capital allocation in multisegment firms (“conglomerates”) as a laboratory, we show that capital expenditure is increasing in the expected skewness of segment returns. Conglomerates invest more in high‐skewness segments than matched stand‐alone firms, and trade at a discount, which indicates overinvestment that is detrimental to shareholder wealth. Using geographical variation in gambling norms, we find that the skewness‐investment relation is particularly pronounced when CEOs are likely to find long shots attractive. Our findings suggest that CEOs allocate capital with a long‐shot bias.     

Short‐selling constraints and corporate payout policy

This study shows that managers adjust corporate payout policies to counteract intensified short‐selling pressures following the removal of a short‐selling constraint. We use a controlled experiment, the Regulation SHO pilot program, to find that changing the short‐selling rule brings small companies to increase cash dividends, but not to repurchase more shares. Because paying dividends is costly, it is acknowledged as a more reliable signal of stock undervaluation than share repurchase. While our evidence suggests that companies select this payout strategy to deter predatory short sellers, it also shows that a short‐selling activity has a causal effect on corporate payout decisions.     

The Cost of Short‐Selling Liquid Securities

Standard models of liquidity argue that the higher price for a liquid security reflects the future benefits that long investors expect to receive. We show that short‐sellers can also pay a net liquidity premium if their cost to borrow the security is higher than the price premium they collect from selling it. We provide a model‐free decomposition of the price premium for liquid securities into the net premiums paid by both long investors and short‐sellers. Empirically, we find that short‐sellers were responsible for a substantial fraction of the liquidity premium for on‐the‐run Treasuries from November 1995 through July 2009.     

权力型国有企业高管支付了更高的职工薪酬吗?

管理层权力假说从个人私利角度解释管理层权力与高管、职工薪酬的正相关关系,但国内文献并未关注管理层权力如何影响职工薪酬。本文以2007～2010年间A股国有上市公司为样本,研究了我国国有企业管理层权力对职工薪酬的影响及其成因。结果显示:(1)权力大的国有企业CEO更倾向于支付较低的职工薪酬。(2)CEO权力大的国有企业更可能超额雇员,超额雇员是国有企业CEO权力与职工薪酬负相关的一种可能解释。(3)进一步分析表明,职工力量、职工监事、管理层持股等内外部制约因素并未有效制约管理层权力,反而增强了CEO权力对职工薪酬的负向影响。本文从超额雇员角度解释了我国国有企业管理层权力与职工薪酬的负相关关系,有助于丰富薪酬的管理层权力假说。     

Investment Horizon and Repo in the Over‐the‐Counter Market

This paper presents a three‐period model featuring a short‐term investor in the over‐the‐counter bond market. A short‐term investor stores cash because of a need to pay cash at some future date. If a short‐term investor buys bonds, then a deadline for retrieving cash lowers the resale price of bonds for the investor through bilateral bargaining in the bond market. Ex‐ante, this hold‐up problem explains the use of a repo by a short‐term investor, the existence of a haircut, and the vulnerability of a repo market to counterparty risk. This result holds without any uncertainty about bond returns or asymmetric information.     

An Investigation of the Short‐Run and Long‐Run Stock Returns Surrounding Insurer Rating Changes

We find that stock returns move in the direction of insurer rating changes in the 12‐month period prior to the announcement. There is an additional stock price response following the announcement of a downgrade, but no response to upgrade announcements. The reaction to a downgrade is more pronounced when it involves a smaller insurer, when it spans multiple levels, or when it is a threshold downgrade. Returns are significantly more negative during the 12 months leading up to a downgrade announcement during the financial crisis (2008 and 2009) compared to other sample years.     

A Phillips Curve with Anchored Expectations and Short‐Term Unemployment

This paper examines the behavior of U.S. core inflation, as measured by the weighted median of industry price changes. We find that core inflation since 1985 is well‐explained by an expectations‐augmented Phillips curve in which expected inflation is measured with professional forecasts and labor‐market slack is captured by the short‐term unemployment rate. We also find that expected inflation was backward‐looking until the late 1990s, but then became strongly anchored at the Federal Reserve's target. This shift in expectations changed the relationship between inflation and unemployment from an accelerationist Phillips curve to a level‐level Phillips curve. Our specification explains why high unemployment during the Great Recession did not reduce inflation greatly: partly because inflation expectations were anchored, and partly because short‐term unemployment rose less sharply than total unemployment.     

CEO inside debt and investment‐cash flow sensitivity

This paper provides a new explanation for investment‐cash flow sensitivity from the perspective of CEO inside debt holdings. We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on investment‐cash flow sensitivity for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012. We find that the firms with higher relative CEO leverage ratios (CEO's debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm's debt/equity ratio) generate higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the relative CEO leverage ratio enlarges investment‐cash flow sensitivity by 50 per cent. This positive relationship still holds even after we take account of endogeneity and financial constraints.     

Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors

A small group of academics and practitioners discusses four major controversies in the theory and practice of corporate finance:

• • What is the social purpose of the public corporation? Should corporate managements aim to maximize the profitability and value of their companies, or should they instead try to balance the interests of their shareholders against those of “stakeholder” groups, such as employees, customers, and local communities?
• • Should corporate executives consider ending the common practice of earnings guidance? Are there other ways of shifting the focus of the public dialogue between management and investors away from near-term earnings and toward longer-run corporate strategies, policies, and goals? And can companies influence the kinds of investors who buy their shares?
• • Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? What role have equity ownership and financial incentives played in the past performance of U.S. companies? And are there ways of improving the design of U.S. executive pay?
• • Can the principles of corporate governance and financial management at the core of the private equity model—notably, equity incentives, high leverage, and active participation by large investors—be used to increase the values of U.S. public companies?

     

Short‐selling pressure and last‐resort debt finance: evidence from 144A high‐yield risk‐adjusted debt

This study examines why non‐financial publicly traded firms knowingly issue wealth destroying Rule 144A debt, which is associated with a negative announcement return and a higher yield. We provide a plausible ‘demand‐side’ explanation (i.e. last‐resort debt financing) for the motivation for issuing such debt. We also provide evidence as to what drives this negative reaction. Our findings suggest that the negative market impact is mainly driven by short‐selling pressure from convertible bond arbitrageurs.     

CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions,Facts, and Challenges

This article brings a broad range of statistical studies and evidence to bear on three common perceptions about the CEO compensation and governance of U.S. public companies: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average CEO pay increased substantially during the 1990s, it has declined since then— by more than 30%—from peak levels that were reached around 2000. Moreover, when viewed relative to corporate net income or profits, CEO pay levels at S&P 500 companies are the lowest they've been in the last 20 years. And the ratio of large‐company CEO pay to firm market value is roughly similar to its level in the late 1970s, and lower than the levels that prevailed before the 1960s. What's more, in studies that begin with the late '70s, private company executives have seen their pay increase by at least as much as public companies. And when set against the compensation of other highly paid groups, today's levels of CEO pay, although somewhat above their long‐term historical average, are about the same as their average levels in the early 1990s. At the same time, the pay of U.S. CEOs appears to be reasonably highly correlated with corporate performance. As evidence, the author cites a 2010 study reporting that, over the period 1992 to 2005, companies with CEOs in the top quintile (top 20%) of realized pay in any given year had generated stock returns that were 60% higher than the average companies in their industries over the previous three years. Conversely, companies with CEOs in the bottom quintile of realized pay underperformed their industries by almost 20% in the previous three years. And along with lower pay, the CEOs of poorly performing companies in the 2000s faced a significant increase in the likelihood of dismissal by their own boards. When viewed together, these findings suggest that corporate boards have done a reasonably good job of overseeing CEO pay, and that factors such as technological advances and increased scale have played meaningful roles in driving the pay of both CEOs and others with top incomes—people who are assumed to have comparable skills, experience, and opportunities. If one wants to use increases in CEO pay as evidence of managerial power or “board capture,” one also has to explain why the other professional groups have experienced similar, or even higher, growth in pay. A more straightforward interpretation of the evidence reviewed in this article is that the market for talent has driven a meaningful portion of the increase in pay at the top. Consistent with this conclusion, top executive pay policies at roughly 97% of S&P 500 and Russell 3000 companies received majority shareholder support in the Dodd‐Frank mandated “Say‐on‐Pay” votes in 2011 and 2012, the first two years the measure was in force.     

CEO Overconfidence and Long‐Term Performance Following R&D Increases

We examine the relation between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) overconfidence and significant increases in research and development (R&D) expenditures. Although prior studies reveal a significantly positive market reaction to increases in R&D expenditures in both the long and short run, we find that long‐run stock performance is positive only for firms whose CEOs are not overconfident. Our findings, which may be attributable to overinvestment and the overestimation of future cash flows, imply that R&D resulting from overconfident behavior does not provide any value to firms.     

CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验

本文利用逐步回归和路径分析方法 ,检验了我国上市公司CEO薪酬的激励制约机制和激励制约效果。结果发现 :(1)决定CEO薪酬增长的因素主要是营业利润率变动 ,决定CEO薪酬下降的因素则主要是总资产净利率变动 ,这表明在我国上市公司的CEO薪酬层面已体现了一定的激励制约机制 ;(2 )增加CEO薪酬对提高企业的规模和股东财富均有一定的促进作用 ,但降低CEO薪酬却不仅不能提高企业规模和股东财富 ,反而会对其产生一定的负面影响 ,这不仅说明CEO薪酬也具有“工资刚性”特征 ,而且说明我国上市公司的CEO薪酬也仅有单方面的激励效果 ,而没有预期的制约效果 ;(3)无论是增加或降低CEO薪酬 ,CEO均不存在盈余管理或利润操纵的机会主义行为 ,这表明CEO进行盈余管理或利润操纵的动机不应该是为了增加其公开性薪酬 ,而应该是居于除公开性薪酬以外的其他目的。