Tullock's Puzzle in Pay‐and‐Play Lobbying

We explain Tullock's puzzle of small payments from special interests to policy‐makers by the hold‐up problem between the two parties. We construct a simple lobbying environment where an uninformed policy‐maker is a price‐setter who sells access to two opposed and privately informed lobbyists. The key equilibrium property is “the curse of the ex ante favored lobbyist”; the lobbyist proposing a project with the higher expected public value ends up worse off than the lobbyist proposing a project with the lower expected public value. In the absence of contribution caps, the ex ante favored lobbyist strategically devalues her project, and the resulting competitive devaluations destroy private values, revenues, as well as correlated public values. Ex ante, the policy‐maker benefits from a binding contribution cap protects the ex ante favored lobbyist, eliminates competitive devaluations, and thus remedies the hold‐up problem.     

Efficient performance in two agent bargaining

This paper concerns ex ante incentive efficient performance in the bargaining of one buyer and one seller over a single item. For any element in a specified class of distributions of the buyer's and the seller's valuations of the item, all of the (interim) individually rational and efficient allocation rules are characterized. It is also shown that the “buyer's bid” and the “seller's price” double auctions are efficient for all distributions in the specified class. These results are obtained by studying efficiency as a linear programming problem.     

EX ANTE INVESTMENT,EX POST REMEDIES,AND PRODUCT LIABILITY*

A firm can increase product safety through ex ante investment and can remedy quality problems after sales. An increase in product liability raises returns to ex ante investment through higher consumer demand, but may also negatively affect the investment incentive due to more ex post remedial activities. The trade‐off between these “output” and “substitution” effects can result in an inverted U‐shaped relationship between product liability and ex ante investment. We find that the firm prefers full liability, but consumer surplus can be higher under partial liability. We further identify conditions under which full liability or partial liability is socially optimal.     

Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy

This paper considers location decisions of a monopolist, who faces a tax on its emissions in the home country, under ex post that is, time consistent, and ex ante, that is precommitment, environmental policies. We show that the monopolist will relocate more often under ex post optimal emission taxes. A government which cannot commit to an ex ante emission tax and sets its tax ex post after abatement effort has been chosen, is unable to affect the monopolist’s location decision, because it cannot commit to strategically reduce its tax level in the first stage. Domestic welfare is often higher under ex post emission taxes whenever the monopolist relocates under both policy regimes. Otherwise, welfare is higher under government commitment to an ex ante emission tax level. Thus, government commitment to a policy is not always welfare improving.     

DYNAMIC INCONSISTENCY IN THE PUBLIC SUPPLY OF LIQUIDITY*

This paper analyses the optimal control of government securities. The special role of government securities under aggregate macroeconomic shocks results from the government's ability to collect taxes. Liquidity is loosened by an increase in the supply of government securities. The policy‐maker, however, faces a trade‐off between an ex ante incentive for entrepreneurs to expend effort and an ex post efficient utilization of investment opportunities.     

Is ex‐ante ex‐post analysis irrelevant to Keynes's theory of employment?

Ex‐ante ex‐post analysis has become a standard tool in macroeconomics. Yet Keynes dismissed it. We argue that Keynes's dismissal of ex‐ante ex‐post analysis is not an oddity but an indication of the originality of his theory of employment compared to standard macroeconomics. First, the principle of effective demand does not amount to a process that determines employment and income at the point of intersection of the traditionally defined ex ante supply and demand functions. Second, the finance motive allowed Keynes to confirm the identity of aggregate supply and demand already asserted in The General Theory. This latter conclusion is puzzling, however, since the principle of effective demand presupposes the possibility of a discrepancy between supply and demand. We suggest that Keynes's theory of employment is linked to a theory of income distribution whereby profits are a redistributed share of factor income which is transferred to firms when prices exceed factor costs. The identity and the equilibrium condition then relate to separate measurements of income and output, factor cost and prices.     

SOCIAL NORMS,LOCAL INTERACTION,AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING*

This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one “acceptable” group of neighbors. Our main results demonstrate a basic trade‐off in the design problem between suboptimal punishment and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishment arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring is imperfect. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When individuals' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative “core” and an uncooperative “fringe.”“Uncooperative” (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the ex ante distribution over individual discount factors, then in some cases the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul‐de‐sacs), whereas in other cases incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.     

The twilight of the setter? Public school budgets in a time of institutional change

We use a policy change that occurred in Oregon in the late 1980s to re‐visit the budget‐maximizing agenda setter theory of local public expenditure. Prior to 1987, Oregon school districts held operating levy elections with an exogenous, often zero or very low, spending reversion. From 1987 through 1990, districts experienced a “safety net” regime where the reversion was at least the previous year's nominal spending. We find that the “safety net” sharply limited the agenda setter's ability to use the reversion as a threat to obtain voter approval of relatively large expenditures.     

WATER QUALITY TRADING IN THE PRESENCE OF ABATEMENT‐COST SHARING

This paper examines how water quality trading interacts with nonpoint‐source abatement‐cost sharing (e.g., as currently practiced by the National Resource Conservation Service through its Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP]) to promote the participation of nonpoint sources in a water quality market, participation that has thus far been noticeably lacking nationwide. As such, an idealized version of water quality trading is envisioned, where water quality trading and nonpoint cost sharing are treated as complementary policy instruments rather than substitutes. Toward this end, the subgame‐perfect equilibrium concept is used to model a “multilateral contracting” relationship between the regulatory authority and nonpoint sources when the regulator has incomplete information about the nonpoint sources' production costs. We characterize ex ante (or second‐best) nonpoint abatement levels when the regulator chooses cost‐share rates in concert with a water quality market. Numerical analysis indicates that current EQIP cost‐share rates would likely be lower and more flexibly determined in the presence of water quality trading. (JEL Q53)     

Useful Government Spending and Macroeconomic (In)stability under Balanced-Budget Rules

It has been shown that an otherwise standard one‐sector real business cycle model may exhibit indeterminacy and sunspots under a balanced‐budget rule that consists of fixed and “wasteful” government spending and proportional income taxation. However, the economy always displays saddle‐path stability and equilibrium uniqueness if the government finances endogenous public expenditures with a constant income tax rate. In this paper, we allow for productive or utility‐generating government purchases in either of these specifications. It turns out that the previous indeterminacy results remain unchanged by the inclusion of useful government spending. By contrast, the earlier determinacy results are overturned when public expenditures generate sufficiently strong production or consumption externalities. Our analysis thus illustrates that a balanced‐budget policy recommendation which limits the government's ability to change tax rates does not necessarily stabilize the economy against belief‐driven business cycle fluctuations.     

What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy‐motivated bureaucrats

In choosing environmental policy, governments rely on information provided by bureaucrats, who may have a political motivation of their own. We analyze the ensuing principal–agent relationship and derive the government's optimal contract. We find that a regulatory agent who is more environmentalist than the government is rewarded for truthfully stating that the environmental impact of the regulated economic activity is low (and vice versa). The bureaucrat has a stronger influence on policy if there is greater uncertainty about the environmental impact, or if the policy choice has a strong weight in his utility function. For some impact values, the bureaucrat is permitted to set his own preferred policy, which is a form of optimal delegation.     

Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism,Chinese style

Aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies. Using a panel data set from China, we investigate the relationship between provincial government's fiscal incentives and provincial market development. We report three empirical findings. First, we find that during the period of “fiscal contracting system” the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small, suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible. Second, we find a much higher correlation, about four times, between the provincial government's budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s, demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform. Third, we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives, measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue, are associated with faster development of the non-state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy. This holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization. Finally, we compare federalism, Chinese style, to federalism, Russian style.     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

Toward a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making

Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behavior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reiterate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare criterion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in principle justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an independent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behavioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible examples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset clauses.     

What to stabilize in the open economy*

We consider the question how “best” to maintain price‐level stability in an open economy, and evaluate three possible policy choices: (a) a constant money growth rate rule; (b) a fixed exchange rate; and (c) a policy of explicit commitment to a price‐level target. In each case we assume that policy is conducted by injecting reserves into or withdrawing reserves from the “banking system.” In evaluating the three regimes, we adopt the criterion that the “best” policy should leave the least scope for indeterminacy and “excessive” economic volatility. In a steady‐state equilibrium, the choice of regime is largely irrelevant; any steady‐state equilibrium under one regime can be duplicated by an appropriate choice of the “control” variable under any other regime. However, we show that the sets of equilibria under the three regimes are dramatically different. When all countries follow the policy of fixing a constant rate of money growth, there are no equilibria displaying endogenously arising volatility and there is no indeterminacy of equilibrium. Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, indeterminacies and endogenously arising fluctuations are impossible if and only if the country with the low “reserve‐to‐deposit” ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate. Finally, when one country targets the time path of its price level, under very weak conditions, there will be indeterminacy of equilibrium and endogenously arising volatility driven by expectations.     

EXTERNAL MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

We employ relative size of International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit as a proxy for interdependent macro variables that are associated with external macroeconomic imbalances or balance of payment (BOP) crisis to investigate how they impact foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Relative size of IMF credit as a share of gross domestic product sends two mixed signals to multinational enterprises (MNEs). First, it is a signal that a country is facing an actual or potential BOP crisis. Second, countries that seek IMF credit typically agree to implement a set of “IMF conditionality” before financial credit is disbursed. This may signal to MNEs that policy reforms that must accompany IMF financial credit may result in ex ante positive economic outlook and stability. We find that relative size of IMF credit is negatively (positively) correlated with FDI inflows to developing countries below (above) a threshold value of economic freedom. The main implication of these findings is that MNEs may view developing countries with below average index of economic freedom as lacking institutional capabilities to implement recommended IMF policy reforms when faced with an actual or potential BOP crisis. Our results are robust across alternative model specifications and consistent with the theory of catalytic finance. (JEL F21, F23, F33)     

Budget windows,sunsets, and fiscal control

In recent years, the United States has evaluated policy changes using a multi-year budget window. A budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window's endpoint, while a window that is too long includes years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless, and allows the shifting of fiscal burdens to those whom budget rules are supposed to protect. This paper characterizes the “optimal” budget window. An appropriately designed budget window eliminates the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions. The analysis also has implications for how to account for long-term term budget commitments.     

Multiunit Pay‐Your‐Bid Auction with One‐Dimensional Multiunit Demands*

An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two‐step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single‐unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package. We study the impacts that variations of the “relative” supply have on the equilibrium, on the bidders' average payoffs per unit, and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation.     

THE WELFARE IMPACT OF REDUCING CHOICE IN MEDICARE PART D: A COMPARISON OF TWO REGULATION STRATEGIES*

Motivated by widely publicized concerns that there are “too many” plans, we structurally estimate (and validate) an equilibrium model of the Medicare Part D market to study the welfare impacts of two feasible, similar‐sized approaches for reducing choice. One reduces the maximum number of firm offerings regionally; the other removes plans providing donut hole coverage—consumers’ most valued dimension. We find welfare losses are far smaller when coupled with elimination of a dimension of differentiation. We illustrate our findings’ relevance under current health care reforms, and consider the merits of instead imposing ex ante competition for entry.     

EVALUATING THE SOCIAL OPTIMALITY OF DURABLE PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION USING THE HOUSING PRICE RESPONSE TO PUBLIC INVESTMENT

Recent empirical work in public finance uses the housing price response to public investment to assess the efficiency of local durable public good provision. This article explores the theoretical justification for this technique. It points out that the logic justifying the technique for evaluating nondurable public good provision does not translate to the durable case. A model in which investment is determined by the interaction between a budget‐maximizing bureaucrat and a community's residents is used to demonstrate that the technique can falsely predict underprovision, falsely predict overprovision, or perform without error.