共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(1-2):171-188
We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates. Those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital. It is surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the income loss from taxation and make the highly confident want higher taxes than the less confident do. The results, however, turn out to be in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals. 相似文献
2.
Günther Rehme 《Bulletin of economic research》2023,75(4):988-1012
How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns. 相似文献
3.
This paper studies the simultaneous determination of the socially optimal levels of unemployment insurance, income taxation and experience rating. It argues that there is a normative justification for state unemployment insurance. When the government wishes to use redistributive taxes, but cannot enforce lump-sum transfers, it is not socially optimal for there to be full experience rating of unemployment insurance schemes: one distortion should be used to off-set another. The state must then intervene in the provision of insurance for those without jobs. 相似文献
4.
Neslihan Uler 《Journal of public economics》2009,93(3-4):440-453
This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. The price of charitable giving decreases with the degree of redistribution, and this has a positive effect on the total amount of giving (substitution effect). However, redistribution leads to lower consumption for the contributors and therefore has a negative effect on contributions to the charity (income effect). The theoretical model developed in this paper demonstrates that, under a general class of utility functions, the substitution effect dominates the income effect. Hence, charitable giving increases with the tax rate. In purely egalitarian societies, the public good is provided efficiently and the total welfare is maximized independent of the ex-ante income inequality. However, the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and welfare may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and redistribution does not take into account the cost of effort. 相似文献
5.
Leslie J. Reinhorn 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2019,21(3):460-487
This paper addresses conflicting results regarding the optimal taxation of capital income. Judd proves that in a steady state, there should be no taxation of capital income. Lansing studies a logarithmic example of one of Judd's models and finds that the optimal steady‐state tax on capital income is not always zero—it is positive in some specifications and negative in some others. There appears to be a contradiction. However, I show that Lansing derives his result by relaxing the convergence hypotheses of Judd's theorem. With less restrictive hypotheses, a wider range of primitives (parameter values, initial condition, etc.) satisfy the hypotheses and because each specification of primitives generates its own optimal time path(s) for the model's variables, it follows that a wider range of time paths with a wider range of steady‐state properties is possible. This raises a question. What happens if the convergence hypotheses are weakened further so that they are satisfied by a wider yet range of primitives? I find that at any interior steady state for the model's optimal tax equilibrium, either the capital tax is zero or else the elasticity of marginal utility is unitary which is satisfied identically in Lansing's log example. In effect, Lansing's example illustrates the only way in which an interior steady state can violate the zero tax result. 相似文献
6.
Günther Rehme 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2023,25(1):168-195
Are capital depreciation allowances when coupled with capital income taxes good instruments for redistribution in the long run? In a simple two-agent-economy I find that accelerated depreciation is good for growth, but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. However, in a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, where the government is the leader and the private sector the follower, the depreciation allowance is maximal in the long run, time-consistent optimum. This removes the accumulation distortion of capital income taxes. Furthermore, the latter, and so redistribution, is found to be generically nonzero in the time-consistent optimum, and depends on the social weight of transfers receivers, the pretax factor income distribution, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the time preference rate. Thus, accelerated depreciation allowances are an important indirect tool for redistribution. The tax scheme allows for a separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns for redistributive policies. 相似文献
7.
Toshiki Tamai 《Journal of public economics》2010,94(11-12):1067-1072
This paper presents an extension of a static model of public goods provision with redistributional taxation, as described by Uler [Journal of Public Economics 93 (3–4), pp. 440–453], as a dynamic model of wealth accumulation. Intertemporal consumption and saving behavior strongly affect the relation between redistributive taxation and charitable contribution. Indeed, the analyses presented herein reveal that more patience (i.e. higher saving) engenders a lower redistributional tax rate. However, the optimal redistributive tax rate is not zero because redistributive taxation improves the efficiency of providing public goods that are not improved by balanced growth. This paper fills the gap separating static analysis and dynamic analysis, and generalizes the results presented by static analysis. 相似文献
8.
Craig Brett 《Journal of public economics》2003,87(11):2549-2569
In this article, the joint use of an income tax and public provision of education as instruments to achieve the government’s distributional objectives is considered. Individuals differ in innate labour productivity and in aptitude to acquire skills through education. Actual labour productivity depends on both innate skill and the amount of education received. Using a generalized version of the Mirrlees tax problem that incorporates these features, qualitative properties of an optimal tax schedule are investigated. 相似文献
9.
The purpose of this paper is to present a statiscial model of inequality that allows us to analyse simultaneously the impact of several major redistributive expenditure policies, as well as analysing the impact of income taxation on inequality. The paper includes multivariate exogeeity tests to determine whether the policies have ‘caused’ the observed income distribution or if there is feedback, i.e. inequality in the distribution has lead to enhanced (or diminished) redistributive policies. The direction of causality for these policies has not, to ourr knowledge, been previously examined. This paper examines the usual redistributive vehicles of transfer payments, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, as well as analysing the impact of the personal income tax system on inequality. Using time series analysis we can allow for lagged effects of these policies as well as current period effects. This lagged effects specification may be sugggestive of behavioural responses to policy changes. 相似文献
10.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(6-7):1215-1233
Paternalism, merit goods and specific egalitarianism are concepts we sometimes meet in the literature. The thing in common is that the policy maker does not fully respect the consumer sovereignty principle and designs policies according to some other criterion than individuals' preferences. Using the self-selection approach to tax problems developed by Stiglitz [Stiglitz, J.E., 1982. Self-selection and Pareto-efficient taxation. Journal of Public Economics 17, 213–240] and Stern [Stern, N.H., 1982. Optimum taxation with errors in administration. Journal of Public Economics 17, 181–211], the paper provides a characterization of the properties of an optimal redistributive mixed tax scheme in the general case when the government evaluates individuals' well-being using a different utility function than the one maximized by private agents. 相似文献
11.
We study optimal income taxation when labor supply reacts along the intensive and extensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous across two unobserved dimensions: their skill and disutility of participation. We develop a new method to analytically derive conditions under which optimal marginal tax rates are non-negative everywhere. It is typically optimal to provide a distinct level of transfer to the non-employed and to workers with negligible earnings. Numerical simulations illustrate these properties for the US. We also apply our method to sign output distortions in other adverse selection frameworks with random participation, namely the monopoly nonlinear pricing and the regulatory monopoly problems. 相似文献
12.
We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens, and we show that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. We argue that these results extend to the case where there are also taxes on wage income that involve administrative and compliance costs. 相似文献
13.
《Journal of public economics》1999,73(3):423-453
This paper provides a counterexample to the simplest version of the redistribution models considered by Judd (1985) in which the government chooses an optimal distortionary tax on capitalists to finance a lump-sum payment to workers. I show that the steady-state optimal tax on capital income is generally non-zero when the capitalists’ utility is logarithmic and the government faces a balanced-budget constraint. With log utility, agents’ optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of return, not any future rates of return or tax rates. This feature of the economy effectively deprives the government of a useful policy instrument because promises about future tax rates can no longer influence current allocations. When combined with a lack of other suitable policy instruments (such as government bonds), the result is an inability to decentralize the allocations that are consistent with a zero-limiting capital tax. I show that the standard approach to solving the dynamic optimal tax problem yields the wrong answer in this (knife-edge) case because it fails to properly enforce the constraints associated with the competitive equilibrium. Specifically, the standard approach lets in an additional policy instrument through the back door. 相似文献
14.
Individual welfare,social deprivation and income taxation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. In a homogeneous framework where individuals can only be distinguished on the basis of their incomes, we examine the incidence
of taxation on the amount of deprivation felt in the society. We conceive deprivation in terms of utility or well-being rather
than just in terms of income and we measure it by comparing the deprivation profiles arising in the different situations.
We identify the restrictions to be imposed on the utility function which guarantee that a more progressive system of taxes
always results in less social deprivation. We show that, in general, it is not possible to get an equivalence and realize
a social improvement in terms of social deprivation by substituting a more progressive system of taxes for a less progressive
one.
Received: September 20, 1999; revised version: March 6, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper forms part of the research programme of the TMR network Living Standards, Inequality and Taxation [Contract
No. ERBFMRXCT 980248] of the European Communities whose financial support is gratefully acknowledged. Chakravarty wishes to
express his sincere gratitude to the French Ministry of Education for financing his stay at DELTA during which this paper
was written. The authors would like to thank Stephen Bazen, Nicolas Gravel and an anonymous referee, whose comments have helped
to improve the paper, but they retain sole responsibility for remaining deficiencies.
Correspondence to: P. Moyes 相似文献
15.
Voting over income taxation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context is not a trivial task. We do this here in the context of nonlinear taxation and attempt to provide a formal argument in support of this heuristic claim. We first establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria and identify certain cases in which marginal-rate progressive taxes are chosen almost surely by the political parties. Unfortunately, we also find that if the tax policy space is not artificially constrained, the support of at least one equilibrium cannot be contained within the set of marginal-rate progressive taxes. 相似文献
16.
17.
Stéphane Auray 《European Economic Review》2010,54(6):778-802
This paper is an attempt to explain differences in economic performance between a subset of OECD countries. We classify countries in terms of their degree of rigidity in the labor market, and use a matching model with labor/leisure choice, bargaining frictions, and labor income taxation to capture these rigidity differences. Added flexibility improves economic performance in different ways depending on whether income taxation is high or low. Feeding income taxation rates estimated from the countries at hand, we find that the model is able to replicate the observed rigidity levels. The model is also shown to reproduce well cross-country differences in non-employment population ratios and the share of part-time jobs. In the absence of rigidity differences, taxation shows little promise to replicate cross-country differences, as it has insufficient quantitative effects on production and productivity. However, the interaction of rigidity and income taxation is crucial in explaining the empirical patterns of the non-employment rate and of the share of part-time jobs. 相似文献
18.
Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be no such implicit taxation. The point of this paper is that, when first-best redistributive instruments are not available, because some variables are not observable, the optimal policy does imply a distortion of the retirement decision. Consequently, the inducement of early retirement may be part of the optimal tax-transfer policy. We consider a model in which individuals differ in their productivity and their capacity to work long and choose both their weekly labor supply and their age of retirement. We characterize the optimal non-linear tax-transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when weekly earnings and the length of active life are observable while individuals' productivity and health status are not observable. 相似文献
19.
A flat tax rate on labour income has gained popularity in European countries. This article assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the smallest distortions to employment. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. The model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked, labour force participation, skill formation, wage bargaining between unions and firms and a wide variety of institutional details. The simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the Netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained. Only flat tax reforms that reduce redistribution will raise employment. This finding bolsters the notions from optimal tax literature regarding the equity-efficiency trade off and the superiority of nonlinear taxes to obtain redistributive goals in an efficient way. 相似文献
20.
Hannu Piekkola 《Journal of Economics》1995,62(3):295-322
In a two-period overlapping-generations model, residence criteria are shown to be optimal with lump-sum transfers to the younger generation in a dynamically efficient open economy even if all wage income, corresponding to rent income under exogenous labor supply, is not taxed away. When tax revenues are also distributed to the older generation — which indeed may be desirable for short-term intergenerational welfare distribution reasons — a weighted average rule is derived for optimal international taxation. The taxation of domestic savings income follows the inverse elasticity rule in respect to savings and, surprisingly, higher investment elasticity increases the tax level. Finally, for a small open economy and for large identical economies, tax competition with a mixed scheme of residence-based taxes and source-based subsidies yields the same tax policy as tax cooperation with no restrictions on the domestic and international capital income tax instruments. 相似文献