The Value of Adjusting the Bias in Recommendations: International Evidence

The financial literature has shown that both earnings forecasts and investment recommendations are optimistically biased. However, while the bias in earnings forecasts has decreased over time and even some recent studies show that they are no longer optimistic, in the case of investment recommendations this bias still remains relatively constant over time. Therefore, it seems that recommendations are less credible to investors than earnings forecasts. The vast majority of recommendation studies have been carried out at the country level. In this paper, we use an international context to study whether profitable investment strategies exist when adjusting the recommendation bias of each analysed country. The adjustment we propose to correct this bias takes into account the differences across countries, and also varies in time to correct for the changes in bias over time within countries. Our empirical results show that there are in fact significant differences in the level of bias among countries, with the US and the UK being the countries with the highest bias. Second, the adjusted consensus portfolios are more orthogonal to typical investment styles (size, book‐to‐market and attention) and we find that investors could implement a higher number of profitable investment strategies using this adjusted measure. In this line, the results show that the countries with the lowest bias obtain the highest risk adjusted abnormal returns. Third, our work entails a practical implication, as it shows the value embedded in a simple necessary adjustment in the global asset management context. This is an important result showing that profitable investment strategies exist when considering a global portfolio based on adjusted recommendations.     

Internal control system,earnings quality,and the dynamics of financial reporting

Using an earnings management model in which managers manipulate information when the firm’s control system fails, I introduce a measure of earnings quality, based on the notion of integral precision, that has solid theoretical foundations. A trade‐off between the frequency and the magnitude of overstatements is shown: overstatements are larger when misreporting is less likely. Overall, the model generates a distribution of earnings announcements similar to its empirical analogue and provides a structural method to identify the likelihood and magnitude of misreporting by exploiting information from the moments of the distribution of reported earnings.     

A computing bias in estimating the probability of informed trading

This study identifies a factor that leads to a bias in estimating the probability of informed trading (PIN), a widely-used microstructure measure. It is shown that, along with the numerical maximization of the likelihood function for PIN, the floating-point exception (i.e., overflow or underflow) may eliminate feasible solutions to the actual parameters in the optimization problem. Approximately 44% of PIN estimates for recent stock market data may have been subject to a downward bias that is more pronounced for active stocks than for inactive stocks. This study develops a remedy to mitigate the resulting bias.     

How efficient is the market for Australian firms’ earnings information?

We construct a measure of the speed with which forecasts issued by sell-side analysts accurately forecast future annual earnings. Following Marshall, we label this measure earnings information flow timeliness (EIFT). This measure avoids the aggregation problem inherent in price-based measures of information efficiency. We document large variation in EIFT across firm-years, and show that EIFT is positively associated with the extent of analyst following, consistent with increased analyst coverage improving the speed with which earnings-related information is recognised. We also find that EIFT is higher for firm-years classified as ‘bad news’ (i.e., where analysts’ forecasts at the start of the financial period exceed the reported outcome). However, when we separately consider instances where analysts appear to forecast non-GAAP (or ‘street’) earnings rather than GAAP earnings, we find that the greater timeliness of bad news is concentrated among observations where analysts forecast non-GAAP earnings, where unusual items are typically excluded. We conclude that the market for accounting information is more efficient for negative operating outcomes than for negative outcomes reflecting unusual items.     

Relevance of the disposition effect on the options market: New evidence

A moneyness‐based propensity to sell (MPS) measure, at the aggregate level, determines the propensity of option holders to exercise their winning relative to losing positions. Using data on individual stock and S&P 500 Index options, we find that the MPS measure has significant predictive power over the cross section of delta‐hedged option returns. We test the disposition effect in the options market based on a long–short strategy that exploits price distortions induced by the disposition bias. More pronounced evidence of the disposition bias is found for individual at‐the‐money call options than put options where the significance of abnormal returns remains robust across different subsamples even after we control for the portfolio option greeks and market‐based risk factors. The profitability of the long–short strategy is related to limit‐to‐arbitrage proxies suggesting that behavioral explanations help explain the positive relation between the MPS measure and delta‐hedged option returns.     

Serial Correlation in Management Earnings Forecast Errors

We examine whether management earnings forecast errors exhibit serial correlation and how analysts understand the serial correlation property of management forecast errors (MFEs). MFEs should not exhibit serial correlation if managers efficiently process information in prior forecast errors and truthfully convey their earnings expectations through management forecasts. However, for long‐horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, we find significantly positive serial correlation in MFEs, and sample self‐selection does not seem to drive this phenomenon. Further analyses suggest that managers’ unintentional information processing bias contributes to this positive serial correlation. Analysts anticipate the intertemporal persistence of MFEs but underestimate the persistence level when reacting to management forecasts. Our findings have implications for market participants who rely on management forecasts to form earnings expectations, and also shed light on the efficiency of managerial decision making.     

Prediction of Operating Cash Flows: Further Evidence from Australia

This paper examines empirically the relative abilities of current operating cash flows (hereafter OCF) and earnings in predicting future operating cash flows in Australia. It extends prior Australian research on cash flow prediction ( Percy and Stokes 1992 ; Clinch, Sidhu and Sing 2002 ; Farshadfar, Ng and Brimble 2009 ) by examining future cash flow predictions for one‐, two‐ and three‐year‐ahead forecast horizons; incorporating additional contextual variables likely to affect the predictive association between current cash flows or earnings and future cash flows; and comparing cross‐sectional versus time series‐based prediction models to ascertain the relative superiority of one approach over the other. Regression results reveal that the cash flow‐based models are more accurate in predicting future operating cash flows than earnings‐based models. This result, however, is moderated by firm‐specific contextual factors like firm size, negative versus positive cash flow pattern, cash flow variability and firm operating cycle. Finally, a comparison between cross‐sectional and time series approaches reveals that the cross‐sectional model outperforms the time series model for both the operating cash flows and earnings models in most of the forecast years.     

Using earnings forecasts to simultaneously estimate firm-specific cost of equity and long-term growth

A growing body of literature in accounting and finance relies on implied cost of equity (COE) measures. Such measures are sensitive to assumptions about terminal earnings growth rates. In this paper we develop a new COE measure that is more accurate than existing measures because it incorporates endogenously estimated long-term growth in earnings. Our method extends Easton et al. (J Account Res, 40, 657–676, 2002) method of simultaneously estimating sample average COE and growth. Our method delivers COE (growth) estimates that are significantly positively associated with future realized stock returns (future realized earnings growth). Moreover, the predictive ability of our COE measure subsumes that of other commonly used COE measures and is incremental to commonly used risk characteristics. Our implied growth measure fills the void in the earnings forecasting literature by robustly predicting earnings growth beyond the five-year horizon.     

Portfolio performance and accounting measures of earnings: an alternative look at usefulness

Measures of economic performance, such as accounting earnings, working capital and cash flows, have been evaluated in tests of relative explanatory power of regressions of market returns on earnings, working capital and cash flows. We employ a different test. Using Basu’s (J Finance 663–682, 1977) investment trading strategy, we measure portfolio returns based on these three accounting measures of earnings. The objective is to ascertain whether investment performance also supports the findings of the explanatory power studies that accounting earnings is the premier measure of performance. The evidence does not support this conclusion. Our findings are at variance with prior conclusions that accounting earnings is more useful than cash flow. The Basu trading strategy is effective for all three measures. Excess market returns are observed for all three measures, even when controlled for risk and for low priced stocks. But accounting earnings portfolios do not dominate working capital or cash flow portfolios. In fact, the raw returns to cash flow portfolios are marginally (statistically) larger than accounting earnings portfolios. Economically, a dollar invested in a portfolio using accounting earnings to select the stock would have an accumulated value of 22.73 while the same dollar investment using cash flow instead of accounting earnings would accumulate a value of22.73 while the same dollar investment using cash flow instead of accounting earnings would accumulate a value of 33.94 over the same 16 years starting with the second quarter of 1988 and concluding at the end of the first quarter of 2004. Thus, our results have implications for the studies of explanatory power of different measures of earnings and their comparison in the US and other markets.     

European Momentum Strategies,Information Diffusion,and Investor Conservatism

In this paper we conduct an out‐of‐sample test of two behavioural theories that have been proposed to explain momentum in stock returns. We test the gradual‐information‐diffusion model of Hong and Stein (1999) and the investor conservatism bias model of Barberis et al. (1998) in a sample of 13 European stock markets during the period 1988 to 2001. These two models predict that momentum comes from the (i) gradual dissemination of firm‐specific information and (ii) investors’ failure to update their beliefs sufficiently when they observe new public information. The findings of this study are consistent with the predictions of the behavioural models of Hong and Stein's (1999) and Barberis et al. (1998) . The evidence shows that momentum is the result of the gradual diffusion of private information and investors’ psychological conservatism reflected on the systematic errors they make in forming earnings expectations by not updating them adequately relative to their prior beliefs and by undervaluing the statistical weight of new information.     

Accounting Standards and Earnings Management: Evidence from China

This article examines the effect of an asset impairment–related regulatory reform on earnings management in China. Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8), which prohibits the reversal of long‐lived asset impairments, was promulgated to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long‐lived asset impairment losses only, while allowing the reversal of short‐term asset impairment losses. Based on a sample of China's A‐share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period 2001–2008, we reveal that managers use less current asset write‐downs and more reversals in the post–CAS No. 8 period. However, such reporting practices do not appear to be influenced by managerial incentives to avoid reporting losses and/or for “big bath” accounting purposes.     

The Market's Valuation of Fraudulently Reported Earnings

This study examines the market valuation of accounting earnings during the period before it is publicly revealed that the earnings are fraudulent. Using both cross‐sectional and time‐series valuation models, we first find that the market accords less weight to earnings when the accounting numbers are fraudulent. We also show that the market better anticipates the presence of fraud when there is information in the public domain indicating a high ex‐ante risk of fraud. Our findings suggest that investors are able to accurately assess the probability of fraud and that such assessments affect the market's valuation of earnings even before it is publicly announced that fraud has occurred.     

Analyst forecast,accounting conservatism and the related valuation implications

This study investigates whether financial analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and whether it is more difficult for them to forecast earnings for less conservative firms, and then examines the impact of the findings on the return predictability of the value‐to‐price (V/P) ratio. After controlling for the other factors affecting forecast accuracy, such as earnings predictability and information uncertainty, I find that analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and that forecasting earnings is more difficult for less conservative firms. Consequently, the return predictability of the V/P ratio is stronger for more conservative firms, and previously reported return predictability of the V/P ratio is an average across firms with differing levels of conservatism.     

A Tale of Leadership in Value Creation

In this prologue to his new book, Curing Corporate Short‐Termism, the founder and CEO of Fortuna Advisors presents a fictional account of a corporate turnaround—a “composite” reflection of the author's many years of consulting experience that dramatizes the pressure to meet near‐term earnings targets and other kinds of “agency” problems facing a public company called Blue Dynamics Corp. The tale begins with the puzzlement of the incoming CEO, Betty Manning, at finding the company's highest‐return business unit starved for investment, even as the low‐return units continue to receive and spend capital with little success. At the core of the company's capital allocation and “underinvestment” problems, she finds a corporate‐wide performance measurement and reward system focused on setting and beating budgets and growth in EPS and ROE. Manning's solution is to divorce the performance and reward system entirely from the budgeting process and implement new annual incentives and target‐setting practices that result in both more reliable budgeting and forecasting and a longer‐term view of value creation. The new measure of economic profit, called BDVA (short for Blue Dynamics Value Added), is based on a customized measure of EBITDA less a capital charge. The adoption of the new measure has the effect of encouraging her team to take a number of decisive steps: make an objective, “fact‐based” case for a strategic acquisition whose price appears to be too high (at least using conventional measures like EPS accretion); pull the trigger on a divestment that appears to have been adding value, but is more valuable outside the firm; and, more generally and most important, guide operating managers toward an ideal balance of overall growth and return on capital.     

Return windows and the value relevance of earnings

Research on the value relevance of annual earnings commonly accumulate stock returns over a 12-month period starting from the fourth month of the fiscal year, resulting in a mismatch between the return window and the earnings period (i.e. the fiscal year). By comparing this return window with alternative windows, we show that the mismatch produces a downward bias in the estimated R² from the regression of stock returns on earnings, especially for firms that announce earnings early. Our results also show that both profits and losses are more value relevant when announced earlier, supporting regulatory calls for timely disclosure.     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

Identifying Factors Consistently Related to Value Line Earnings Predictability

Earnings predictability can affect investment decisions and stock prices. An important source of earnings forecasts for a wide variety of empirical studies has been the Value Line Investment Survey. The purpose of this study is to identify factors that consistently account for cross-sectional differences in Value Line earnings predict-ability. A multivariate model consisting of four company variables and a set of industry indicator variables is used to evaluate the intertemporal consistency of factors related to earnings predictability. Quarterly and annual forecasts are used to measure earnings forecast accuracy. The results by year indicate that one factor, earnings variability, is consistently related to earnings predict-ability.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

How Much New Information Is There in Earnings?

We quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in providing new information to the share market, using the R² in a regression of securities' calendar‐year returns on their four quarterly earnings‐announcement “window” returns. The R², which averages approximately 5% to 9%, measures the proportion of total information incorporated in share prices annually that is associated with earnings announcements. We conclude that the average quarterly announcement is associated with approximately 1% to 2% of total annual information, thus providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of incremental information to the market. The results are consistent with the view that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. By inference, that role lies elsewhere, for example, in settling debt and compensation contracts and in disciplining prior information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm's accounting system. The relative informativeness of earnings announcements is a concave function of size. Increased information during earnings‐announcement windows in recent years is due only in part to increased concurrent releases of management forecasts. There is no evidence of abnormal information arrival in the weeks surrounding earnings announcements. Substantial information is released in management forecasts and in analyst forecast revisions prior (but not subsequent) to earnings announcements.     

Overvalued equity,benchmark beating and unexpected accruals

We investigate the extent to which the overvaluation hypothesis provides incentives for managers to beat earnings benchmarks, and whether this benchmark beating can be reliably interpreted as evidence of earnings management. We carefully identify firms immediately above earnings benchmarks that have a priori, overvaluation‐based incentives to achieve the benchmark. We therefore focus on benchmark‐beating observations where manipulation is most likely, providing a more powerful test of the existence of opportunistic financial reporting. Consistent with overvaluation‐related incentives encouraging earnings management, we find that overvalued firms that just exceed levels‐related earnings benchmarks have higher unexpected accruals than firms with less extreme valuations.