Making economic sense of brain models: a survey and interpretation of the literature

Neuroeconomics draws attention to motive forces that are ignored in the standard framework of economic theory. The present paper develops a conceptual approach that, similar to Pennings et al. (Journal of Bioeconomics 7: 113–127, 2005), tackles the issues at the systemic level by analyzing and modeling the brain processes that decide on behavior. It takes as the basic unit of analysis potential stimulus-response actions which—when selected—become actual behavior. The objective of these potential stimulus-response actions is to increase utility. At any moment of time, several of these potential actions compete with each other for the privilege of becoming actual behavior. This competition can be modeled on the basis of economic principles. The behavior that materializes may cover the range from the rational to the foolish, depending on which of the potential responses gathers the greatest emotional strength. The emotional strength of a potential response, in turn, is determined by the individual’s past experience and her capacity for rational action. Given that the objective is always to increase utility, it can normally be expected that the more or less rational dominates the foolish, but this need not always be the case. Which potential actions become behavior in a concrete instance is decided by a mechanism implemented by the basal ganglia, a structure in the brain serving as the action selection mechanism. The insights provided by this approach afford coherent explanations of behaviors that are not readily explicable by the standard approach of economic theory.      

Neuroeconomics: two camps gradually converging: what can economics gain from it?

Neuroeconomics started off as a hybrid project. Two camps, behavioral economics in the scanner (BES) and Glimcher’s economics of neural activity (ENA), could be clearly distinguished. The camps disagreed not only about substantive issues but also about what neuroeconomics ultimately aims to accomplish. Recent developments suggest that the gap between the two camps is closing, however. There is a growing consensus, it seems, about the brain areas in which the final stages of individual decision-making occur and about relevant features of brain activity in these areas. BES and Glimcher’s ENA also seem to converge on the view that the neuroeconomics’ ultimate aim is to contribute to the construction of a new utility theory with stronger predictive power than standard expected utility theory. While the potential importance of an improved utility theory for economic theory cannot be denied, however, it remains to be seen whether an improved utility theory is something economic theory needs most badly or most urgently. Especially if economic theory is not ultimately interested in individual decisions, but in how aggregate behavior responds to incentives, attention should not be limited to what happens inside the skulls of individuals. What happens outside the individuals’ skulls, in the environments of individuals and in their interactions patterns, should also receive due attention.     

Constrained sales maximization under a linear technology

This paper employs the activity analysis framework of linear programming to solve the decision problem of maximizing sales revenue in the presence of a minimum acceptable profit constraint. One of the advantages of using this model relative to the standard neoclassical approach is that, in addition to determining the firm's optimal product mix, we can also explore the ramifications of constrained revenue maximization on the imputed valuation of the firm's resources. The primal and dual solution values for the constrained revenue maximization problems are then compared with those derived from a linear profit maximization model. A computational technique is offered which demonstrates how constrained revenue maximization is carried out in actual practice.     

Exponential discounting bias

We address intertemporal utility maximization under a general discount function that nests the exponential discounting and the quasi-hyperbolic discounting cases as particular specifications. Under the suggested framework, the representative agent adopts, at some initial date, an optimal behavior that shapes her consumption trajectory over time. This agent desires to take a constant discount rate to approach the optimization problem, but bounded rationality, under the form of a present bias, deviates the individual from the intended goal. As a result, decreasing impatience will end up dominating the agent’s behavior. The individual will not be aware of her own time inconsistency and, therefore, she will not revise her plans as time elapses, what makes the problem relatively simple to address from a computational point of view. The general discounting framework is used to approach a standard optimal growth model in discrete time. Transitional dynamics and stability properties of the corresponding dynamic setup are studied. An extension of the standard utility maximization model to the case of habit persistence is also considered.     

Instrumentalism and Economic Policy: The Quest for Reasonable Value

Neuroeconomics and behavioral economics (NEBE) is one of the most dynamic fields in contemporary economics. However, from the viewpoint of economic methodology there are still substantial reasons why NEBE is irrelevant for economic theory. This paper argues that they will only become an essential part of economics if they are embedded into a fully-fledged institutional and evolutionary paradigm. I develop a Neo-Veblenian theory of the individual that starts out from the observation that modern brain sciences do not support the notion of the brain to be an integrated and consistent rational decision apparatus. An evolutionary explanation is offered for this, which reinstates Veblen's distinction between adaptation as engineering optima and social selection. Individual identity does only emerge through communication and interaction among brains, in particular via language. The concept of the "extended brain" is proposed, which is applied to define human individuality as a social phenomenon. Thus, the systematic unity of neuroeconomics and institutional economics is established.     

The behavioral foundations of Austrian economics

Behavioral and experimental economics present challenges to the neoclassical theory of individual behavior, which is based on individuals making choices within the framework of utility functions that are assumed to have certain well-defined characteristics. Results in behavioral and experimental economics have shown that it is common for individual behavior to systematically deviate from the neoclassical axioms of utility maximization. Austrian economics is also based on axiomatic theories of utility maximization, but the assumptions underlying utility-maximizing behavior are much weaker in the Austrian approach. As a result, they have more solid behavioral foundations and are less subject to challenge by the empirical findings of behavioral and experimental economics. Neoclassical policy conclusions are often overly strong because of its behavioral foundations which are challenged by behavioral and experimental economics and are often misleading because of the comparative static nature of neoclassical welfare economics. For purposes of policy analysis, the Austrian approach provides better insights because of its more realistic behavioral foundations.     

Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains

Neuroeconomics uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to inform economic theory. It opens up the “black box” of the brain, much as organizational economics opened up the theory of the firm. Neuroscientists use many tools—including brain imaging, behavior of patients with brain damage, animal behavior and recording single neuron activity. The key insight for economics is that the brain is composed of multiple systems which interact. Controlled systems (“executive function”) interrupt automatic ones. Brain evidence complicates standard assumptions about basic preference, to include homeostasis and other kinds of state‐dependence, and shows emotional activation in ambiguous choice and strategic interaction.     

An Agenda for Reforming Economic Theory

In this article, Nobel Prize Laureate Joseph Stiglitz argues that the standard macro-economic paradigm has failed not only to predict the crisis but also to provide insights into the design of a regulatory framework that would make a recurrence less likely. He points out that many of the underlying assumptions of the standard paradigm always seemed implausible and many of its predictions, such as those concerning the micro-economic behavior of the constituents (firms and households), are inconsistent with the empirical evidence. He then identifies a number of key modeling challenges, what he views as key ingredients that have to be incorporated in any model that is going to describe economic fluctuations or be the basis of a well-designed regulatory or monetary framework.     

Towards a Theory of Revealed Economic Behavior: The Economic-Neurosciences Interface

Based on recent findings from economics and the neurosciences, we present a conceptual decision-making model that provides insight into human decision-making and illustrates how behavioral outcomes are transformed into phenomena. The model may be viewed as a bridge between the seemingly disparate disciplines of neuroscience and economics that may facilitate more integrative research efforts and provide a framework for developing research agendas for scientists interested in human behavior and economic phenomena.     

The Institutional Theory of Radhamakal Mukerjee: Lessons for Modern Nonprofit Economics

This paper examines the way the institutional economics of Radhamakal Mukerjee can inform modern nonprofit economics. A brief survey of Mukerjee's work highlights several elements of his theory that yield useful implications understanding the nonprofit sector. First, Mukerjee's theory implies that this sector's role is in helping the economies to better accommodate broader societal values, rather than in addressing market failure. Second, his theory suggests that the nonprofit sector provides an institutional framework for the pursuit of common interests that are not reducible to individual utility maximization. Finally, as he considered the state to be inherently coercive, he believed the nonprofit sector to be the only meaningful outlet for citizenship behavior, thus advancing an original theory of complementary state-nonprofit relationship. The paper concludes with calling for more institutionalist research on the economics of the nonprofit sector.     

科学与实证——一个基于“神经元经济学”的综述

诞生于20世纪90年代中晚期的神经元经济学(Neuroeconomics)是经济学的最新分支和经济学前沿研究的最新领域,它运用现代神经科学的范式、方法和技术工具分析人类的经济行为以及脑组织(主要是神经元及其相关的神经突触联结和神经网络)在人类决策过程中的功能、作用和机制,把经济学的实证研究提升到一个前所未有的高度,对经济学传统理论提出一系列意义重大的修正,从而为经济学的发展深化开拓了一个全新的空间。     

In search of general evolutionary principles: Why Darwinism is too important to be left to the biologists

Bioeconomics emphasizes the common ontological ground between economics and biology. However, this does not necessarily mean that both disciplines collapse into one. Instead it is proposed here that Darwinism provides a general, meta-theoretical framework for dealing with complex evolving systems, consisting of populations of varied and replicating entities, which are found in both nature and human society. There is no alternative to the core Darwinian principles of variation, selection and inheritance to explain the evolution of such systems. Neither the actual existence of human intentionality, nor the hypothetical existence of Lamarckian processes of acquired character inheritance, offer a barrier to the use of Darwinian explanations. However, while Darwinian principles are always necessary to explain complex evolving population systems, they are never sufficient on their own. Such a generalized Darwinism can accommodate several different stances found in the literature on bioeconomics and elsewhere.      

Altruism and Spite in a Selfish Gene Model of Endogenous Preferences

Economists and biologists have long grappled with the apparent contradiction of altruism in a naturally-selected world. Standard economic models are built upon an assumption of material self-interest where agents maximize individual outcomes without regard for the effects on others. This paper begins with a brief discussion of the evidence that human behavior deviates from the economic assumption. With the goal of more accurately describing human nature, the interpersonal components of preferences are derived in a genetic model. This model predicts a variety of behaviors that are considered paradoxical within the standard economic framework. The optimal attitude towards others is parameterized by the genetic relationship between individuals and by the population size. For interactions between ‘average’ individuals, the standard economic assumption is the limiting case of the genetic model as the population becomes arbitrarily large. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

中原崛起战略与河南农民工社会保障的关联性分析

中原崛起战略是建立和完善河南农民工社会保障机制的前提和基础,河南农民工社会保障机制的建立和完善又是实施中原崛起战略的重要举措和手段,二者体现着明显的正相应关联。中原崛起战略的实现是在市场经济框架下进行的,贯彻的是市场经济的原则,追求的是经济效益最大化的价值取向;而河南农民工社会保障的建立与完善是在国家和政府的强力作用下进行的,贯彻的是社会利益至上的原则,追求的是社会效益最大化的价值取向。价值取向的不同决定了二者运行模式必然遵循不同的路径,也决定了二者在运行过程中超过度的界限,必然产生负相应关联。     

Veblen’s Two Types of Instinct and the Cognitive Foundations of Evolutionary-Institutional Economics

In this article, I provide a detailed examination of Thorstein Veblen’s conception of instincts, what he believed were the “prime movers in human behavior.” I outline the meaning of his division of instincts into simple and complex forms, and also document his account of their operational function and evolutionary origins. I then evaluate this understanding in relation to the new field of evolutionary psychology, and demonstrate how Veblen conceived of these instincts as interacting with habits and institutions. Finally, I illustrate one method of how the bio-cognitive level of behavioral reality could be integrated with the socio-institutional level of behavioral reality, and how an intermediate-interactive level between these two could have been generated. By doing so, I emphasize the need for scientifically accurate cognitive foundations to evolutionary-institutional economics (EIE)     

Bioeconomics as economics from a Darwinian perspective

Bioeconomics—the merging of views from biology and economics—on the one hand invites the 'export' of situational logic and sophisticated optimization developed in economics into biology. On the other hand, human economic activity and its evolution, not least over the past few centuries, may be considered an instance for fruitfully applying ideas from evolutionary biology and Darwinian theory. The latter perspective is taken in the present paper. Three different aspects are discussed in detail. First, the Darwinian revolution provides an example of a paradigm shift which contrasts most significantly with the 'subjectivist revolution' that took place at about the same time in economics. Since many of the features of the paradigmatic change that were introduced into the sciences by Darwinism may be desirable for economics as well, the question is explored whether the Darwinian revolution can be a model for introducing a new paradigm in economic theory. Second, the success of Darwinism and its view of evolution have induced economists who are interested in an evolutionary approach in economics to borrow, more or less extensively, concepts and tools from Darwinian theory. Particularly prominent are constructions based on analogies to the theory of natural selection. Because several objections to such analogy constructions can be raised, generalization rather than analogy is advocated here as a research strategy. This means to search for abstract features which all evolutionary theories have in common. Third, the question of what a Darwinian world view might mean for assessing long term economic evolution is discussed. Such a view, it is argued, can provide a point of departure for reinterpreting the hedonistic approach to economic change and development. On the basis of such an interpretation bioeconomics may not only go beyond the optimization-cum-equilibrium paradigm currently prevailing in economics. It may also mean adding substantial qualifications to the subjectivism the neoclassical economists, at the turn of the century, were proud to establish in the course of their scientific revolution.     

Maximizing Behavior: Reconciling Neoclassical and X-Efficiency Approaches

International capital flows are constrained by a lack of complementary human capital, information asymmetries and transaction costs for small loan sizes. Extant research has provided a myriad of economic and cultural explanations of how microcredit has overcome these. Based on these, the paper develops a simple economic framework that accounts for these behavioral and institutional factors: a discontinuous marginal revenue curve and a U-shaped supply curve of capital for the microcredit environment. It then uses these analytical tools to explain capital flows and interest rates charged by traditional moneylenders. Finally, it uses these tools to present the growth of microcredit and the increase in financial flows and to explain why microcredit interest rates are lower than those of moneylenders, but higher than those of commercial banks to wealthier borrowers.     

Japanese Consumption,External Disequilibrium and their Statistical Measurement

Georgescu-Roegen's work is usually divided into two categories, his earlier work on consumer and production theory and his later concern with entropy and bioeconomics beginning with his 1966 introductory essay to his collected theoretical papers published in the volume Analytical Economics. Most economists usually praise his earlier work on pure theory and ignore his later work which is highly critical of neoclassical economics. Those economists sympathetic to his later work usually take the position that he “saw the light” and gave up neoclassical theory some time in the 1960s to turn his attention to the issues of resource scarcity and social institutions. It is argued here that there is an unbroken path running from Georgescu's work in pure theory in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, through his writings on peasant economies in the 1960s, leading to his preoccupation with entropy and bioeconomics in the last 25 years of his life. That common thread is his preoccupation with “valuation.” The choices our species makes about resource use and the distribution of economic output depends upon our valuation framework. Georgescu-Roegen's work begins in the 1930s with a critical examination of the difficulties with the hedonistic valuation framework of neoclassical economics, moves in the 1960s to the conflict between social and hedonistic valuation, and culminates in the 1970s and 1980s with his examination of the conflict between individual, social, and environmental values. This paper traces the evolution of Georgescu-Roegen's thought about valuation and the environmental and social policy recommendations which arise out of his bioeconomic framework.