Limits to Altruism: Organ Supply and Educational expenditures

Current U.S. law prohibits compensation for cadaveric organ donation. The resulting organ shortage causes thousands of deaths per year. The primary tool currently relied on by the organ procurement industry to increase organ supply is educational spending aimed at both industry professionals and the general public. This article evaluates the effectiveness of such spending across a fairly comprehensive and unique sample of free-standing U.S. organ procurement organizations, controlling for the size of the organization, population demographics, and geographic region. The authors find no evidence that such spending is effective on the margin and conclude that the organ shortage is unlikely to be resolved by increased educational expenditures. (JEL I18 , I11 )     

BIDS AND COSTS IN COMBINATORIAL AND NONCOMBINATORIAL PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS—EVIDENCE FROM PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC CLEANING CONTRACTS

Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand‐alone bids in order to favor their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand‐alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer's cost as explained by auction format is found. (JEL D44, H57, L15)     

AN EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVE POLICIES FOR ORGAN DONATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

This paper examines the association between financial incentives and organ donations. Although the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 prohibits financial compensation for organs for transplant, we focus on the impact of laws that influence the relative cost of deceased and live organ donations on the supply of organs for transplant. First, we hypothesize that states that have relatively stringent funeral regulations, which have been associated with higher whole‐body donations, will have fewer organ donations. Second, we examine the impact of two common state laws that offer financial compensation to live donors: one that allows a tax deduction for costs incurred and the other which entitles government employees up to 30 days of paid leave. We find no evidence to support that these laws affect organ donations. (JEL I11, I18)     

Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits

This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model.     

Precautionary savings and the governance of nonprofit organizations

We present a model of nonprofit governance built on two assumptions: (1) organizations wish to hold precautionary savings in order to smooth expenditures; and (2) it is relatively easy for managers to divert these funds for personal use. Hence, donors face a trade off between expenditure smoothing and donation dissipation. We examine the model's predictions using panel data on U.S. nonprofits. We show that organizations in states with poor government oversight have managerial compensation that is more highly correlated with inflows of donations and allocate a smaller percentage of donations to the endowment for future expenditures relative to organizations in strong oversight states.     

Family model of contributions to non-profit organizations and labour supply

In this article a model is presented in which the family decides the labour supply of both spouses and their time donations to non-profit organizations. For the estimation, Spanish data was used which showed that family size and pre-school children influence decisions made about time distribution of husband and wife. Women with fewer family responsibilities work longer hours and donate more time, whilst the effect on men is the contrary. Also, monetary donations by the family are directly related to time donations by the spouses.     

STRATEGIC BIDDING AND CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION

When firms bid in procurement auctions, they take into account the likelihood of future contract renegotiations. If they anticipate that certain input quantities will change ex post, they have an incentive to strategically skew their itemized bids, thereby increasing profits for themselves and costs for the procuring agency. We develop and estimate a structural model of strategic bidding using a data set of road construction projects in Vermont. We find that bidding strategies lead to increased markups for renegotiated items and reduced markups for nonrenegotiated items, results consistent with bid‐skewing.     

Time vs. money — The supply of voluntary labor and charitable donations across Europe

In spite of its importance for civil society, we know relatively little about the way in which individuals spend their time and money in the charitable provision of goods and services. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive picture of the philanthropic behavior in Europe by analyzing both, the correlates of individuals' charitable cash donations and volunteer labor as well as their interdependence. Using data from the European Social Survey, we document a positive correlation between time and money contributions on the individual as well as on the country level. In addition, we find evidence that individuals substitute time donations by money donations as their time offered to the market increases. Moreover, analyzing philanthropic behavior on the disaggregated level reveals large differences in the determinants and the relationship of time and money donations in Europe – both across different types of voluntary organizations and across different welfare regimes.     

Incentive Contracts for Infrastructure,Litigation and Weak Institutions

In this paper we revisit incentive contract design in a simple setting, after developing a model that captures the fact that in weak institutional settings the procurement of large scale public works through contracts with strong incentives for private firms, may result in excessive litigation over contract terms. This result is possible because we assume that parties in litigation can influence (by purchasing better or more legal services) the observable merits of their case. In weak institutional settings, governments have an inherent disadvantage in these litigation contests. We show that a commitment to a prespecified level of litigation effort by the government, together with weaker incentive contracts, is a more efficient procurement mechanism.Jel Classification: D8, H57, H54, K41, K23, L51     

The Role of United Charities in Fundraising: The Case of Singapore

Abstract: Theory suggests that a united charity helps to economize on fundraising costs by reducing competition for donations among member charities. However, donors often cannot control the allocation of their donations, and charities may dislike the monitoring of their activities. This paper examines these and other issues relating to the Community Chest of Singapore. The results, based on analysis of financial positions and fundraising costs of a large number of charities, suggest that the Community Chest does possess important fundraising advantages. Thus charities in financial difficulties or in need of funds for additional programs tend to seek membership. However, organizations that value their autonomy and independence, and that are able to achieve low fundraising costs tend to remain as non‐members. Thus a monopoly agency raising funds for all charities in the future is unlikely in the case of Singapore.     

关于规范高校捐资助学管理的若干思考

社会捐资助学,古今中外早已有之。但是,与西文发达国家相比,当前中国还没有形成有民族特色的社会捐资助学文化,社会捐资助学力度相对较小,有必要加强相关的宣传和管理工作,将民间潜在的积极性转化为现实的捐资助学力量,在全社会营造产生慈善家的环境氛围和机制,形成诸多慈善家资助学校、学生,学校更好地培养学生,学生刻苦学习,努力完成学业,学成后感恩社会,回报母校的良性循环。在此基础上,更多地资助名校、名师,培育名徒,推动国家核心竞争力的发展。     

Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments

This article studies the nature, determinants, and impact of"negative" activities in organizations. In competing for promotion,the members in organizations can work not only to enhance theirown performances, but also to "sabotage" their opponent's performances.It is worthwhile for them to engage in negative activities becausepromotion is generally based on relative, rather than absolute,performance, and its nature is winner take all. I find thatabler members are subject to more attacks. Consequently, notonly is there a double inefficiency in effort, but also membersof the highest caliber might not have the best chance of beingpromoted. Finally, I discuss several institutional designs thatmight help to reduce the influence of negative activities.     

The nonprofit sector in international perspective: The case of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka, a developing country, has a small but growing nonprofit sector that engages in the formation of social overhead and human capital, as well as in more traditional social services. The most active multipurpose organizations combine large foreign monetary donations with domestic donations of volunteer labor. Smaller organizations depend primarily on modest government grants for financial support. Private domestic monetary contributions, unlike in the U. S., play only a minor role. Origins of these nonprofit institutions, motivations of foreign donors and of volunteer labor, interactions with the government, and implications for economic development and social welfare are examined.     

A Theoretical Model of the Effects of Public Funding on Saving Decisions by Charitable Nonprofit Service Providers

Why do charitable nonprofit, service‐providing organizations save? What are the tradeoffs between using income to build up cash reserves and serving more clients? Saving may generate income, protect the organization against a drop in donations, and increase the organization's chances of survival. Saving, though, may affect the likelihood that nonprofits receive private and public funding. We model the relationship among private and public income, economic conditions, and nonprofit savings. We find that anticipation of government help during difficult times tends to reduce the amount of saving done by the nonprofit. This effect is strengthened if government officials view unspent donations as indicative of a lack of need. Both these effects provide a strong incentive for nonprofits to spend on current consumption rather than to save for the future, and thus to increase the burden on the public purse.     

中美两国基础研究社会捐赠比较及对我国的启示

鼓励多元化投入基础研究的国家政策频繁出台，使社会捐赠作为基础研究投入来源引起学者普遍关注。美国运用社会资本进行科研捐赠具有多年发展经验，在支持生命科学、数学、物理学等前沿基础研究领域取得较好成效。为考察我国基础研究社会捐赠现状，对中美两国社会捐赠框架、科研投入多元化格局、捐赠激励政策、非营利机构布局及社会捐赠瓶颈等内容进行对比，从增设基础研究捐赠类目、成立基础研究专项基金会、完善基础研究捐赠税收优惠政策和积极吸收社会小额捐款4个方面提出适合我国国情的基础研究社会捐赠政策措施。     

Optimal production of transplant care services

Most organ transplants are from dead donors. National transplant organizations exhibit considerable differences in terms of their donor population rates. Spain's organization is by far the most efficient in this respect. We argue that much of the productivity advantage of Spain's transplant organization proceeds from an efficient organization of the production chain, from organ procurement to transplantation. Transplants from dead donors are analogous to a common resource for the transplant community. Their circulation through the national transplant organization creates public good externalities between the care units in charge of organ retrieval and those in charge of transplantation. A socially efficient production of transplant care services obtains through an optimal control, by the national transplant agency, of both the circulation and the production of transplants. In particular, transplant shortage makes the rotten kid theorem fail in this context. The analysis also produces a natural measure of public good externalities, evaluated from the standpoint of care units.     

非营利组织信息披露与社会捐赠:一个博弈分析

对非营利组织来说,提高自身持续发展能力为社会提供公益服务是其目标之所在。实现这一目标,非营利组织必须建立一个固定的社会捐赠群体来获取稳定的资金来源。通过一个完全信息动态博弈模型的分析可知,非营利组织在管理和运作中只有充分披露所接收的社会捐赠款的使用效率和效果,才能满足捐赠人的信息需求并使其享受到捐赠行为所带来的效用,进而采取进一步捐赠行动,非营利组织也由此提高其社会公信力,并能持续地获得资金来源。     

Educational contributions, academic quality, and athletic success

This article examines the role of successful Division I football and basketball programs in motivating alumni and other donors to make charitable educational contributions to U.S. universities. Results from fixed effects analysis of panel data on 87 universities for the period 1986–87 to 1995–96 indicate that year-to-year changes in athletic success have a positive impact on levels of alumni giving, but that other types of donors are not as responsive. Also, long-standing athletic traditions established prior to the sample period appear to generate academic benefits in the form of increased charitable donations from all sources. However, the estimated impact of a successful athletic tradition is relatively weak when compared to the effect of student and faculty quality on educational contributions.     

The Effect of Status on Charitable Giving

Fundraisers often start their campaigns by soliciting the wealthier, more recognized, and respected individuals in a community. We examine whether the success of this solicitation ordering in part can be attributed to the fact that it enables individuals to select organizations that have a high‐status donor base. Assuming that individuals prefer to associate with individuals of higher social ranking we use a simple linear model to show that both aggregate donations and earnings are larger when high‐status donors are solicited first. We investigate the predicted comparative statics using the experimental laboratory. Inducing a status differential we reverse the contribution ordering between participants of high and low status. Consistent with current fundraising practice, we find that low‐status followers are likely to mimic donations by high‐status leaders and this encourages high‐status leaders to give. Donations are therefore larger when individuals of high status give before rather than after those of low status.     

Profitability of mergers in food manufacturing

Two issues are examined. The statistical significance of a number of socio-economic factors that affect the level of charitable giving are evaluated. Family wealth and age of the head of household tend to be significant determinants of charitable giving, regardless of whether it is to all charities or to religious charities only. Such is not the case for the price of giving; for instance, the price of giving is an important determinant of all charitable contributions, but almost non-existent as a determinant for religious donations. Results such as this suggest that changes in marginal tax rates prompted by a switch to a tax credit as a substitute for a deduction, and hence a change in the price of giving, may have virtually no impact on contributions to religious organizations but may affect conntributions to other charitable organizations. The extent to which some socio-economic factors changed in relative importance as determinants of charitable giving from 1982 to 1986 is also reviewed.