群体规范、集体行动发生与共享资源合作治理

特定群体面临共享资源自发治理的需求时,需要通过群体合作的集体行动来实现,因而集体行动的主要特征是共享资源治理的成本分摊和收益分享问题。本文从近年来逐渐受到重视的群体规范对于集体行动实现的影响机制入手,在清晰界定群体规范的含义基础上分析其在集体行动中的作用机制,并且通过模型说明群体规范的内生性形成问题,从而完整的得出群体规范促进集体行动实现的一般性理论,以期对当今社会和谐治理给出政策含义。     

An Evolutionary Theory of Collective Action: Schumpeterian Entrepreneurship for the Common Good

This paper presents the foundations of a dynamictheory of collective action. Firstly, the role of public entrepreneursin processes of institutional development is characterized. Secondly,the protagonists of social change are analyzed in regard to theirmotivation, strategic options, levels of action, and specificcapabilities. A new perspective on successful collective actionis opened up.     

公开信息、共同知识与上市公司股权资本成本

上市公司的公开信息转化为市场参与者共同知识的程度越高,与上市公司证券定价密切相关的股权资本成本便越低.基于我国证券市场数据的研究表明,上市公司公开信息披露的数量、市场参与者对公开信息披露制度的信任程度对公司股权资本成本有显著影响,但并未发现公开信息披露及时性对股权资本成本影响的证据.     

Commons,Collective Action,and Corruption

John R. Commons tried to save capitalism by making it good. His career was characterized by a sustained attempt to reduce social inequality by promoting collective action. Thanks to his proximity to the terrain, Commons often found himself close to authentic examples of corruption. Indeed, in his published works, corruption was treated exclusively from this perspective. His analysis reveals that collective action is not only the cause, but also the consequence of corruption, and that, in addition, the struggle against corruption is dependent on collective action for its success. I argue that Commons’s position is diametrically opposed to the theses developed later by Nathaniel Leff and Samuel Huntington. For Commons, the main issue is not that there is too much control over individual actions, but that there is too little.     

西方集体行动理论的演化与进展

集体利益的公共产品特性导致成员普遍的搭便车行为,形成"集体行动的困境".如何克服搭便车、走出集体行动的困境,就成为集体行动理论研究的核心内容.西方对集体行动的研究成果非常丰富,但是不同学者之间观点针锋相对、分歧很大.本文把各种观点主要归类为集体行动的理性选择理论、意识形态理论和社会资本理论三种理论流派.各种理论流派各有所长,但都有一定的局限性.     

集体行动何以可能？——关于集体行动动力机制的文献综述

社会科学界对集体行动动力机制的研究由来已久。结构主义者认为结构才是集体行动的本源,结构决定了意识形态从而也决定了集体行动;功利主义认为有着共同利益的群体成员才有集体行动的可能,但个人理性会令集体行动陷入困境;而建构主义则认为人们是依据意义的社会建构来采取行动的,但集体行动所需的共同意识、资源、成员都需要组织者积极动员,除了群体的意义建构在影响集体行动,行动者的理性也仍然在考察不断变化的周围世界的基础上参与行动抉择。在借鉴国外最新理论的基础上,结合特定社会情境,中国学者建立了一个解释现阶段中国社会正在发生的集体行动的本土化模型。     

集体行动与社会规范的演进

文章描述了达成集体行动基础的两条研究路径,一是关注实验研究提供的证据及其可能的理论解释;二是考察真实世界的经验证据。关于集体行动的这两条研究路径是很活跃的研究领域,出现了很多重要的研究成果。其中一个重要的发现是,世界上的人有许多类型,有一些人会比另一些人更愿意为了集体行动的潜在收益而发起互惠行动。因此,一个核心的问题是,潜在的合作者如何相互发出信号,以及如何设计制度以促成而不是破坏有条件的合作。尽管还没有完全成熟的理论面世,不过,基于演化的一些理论对各种基于实验或者田野调查的研究发现的解释力也许是最强大的,因而有可能成为这一领域的核心理论。     

Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence

Collective action can take place at a plurality of levels. It has to be based on a constitution which defines the basic rules of interaction. Here, we are concerned with the problem of the constitutional setting of bottom-up formal institutions with a club nature. The pressure to improve the efficiency of services pushes local administrations to co-ordinate to produce public goods. This process has stimulated the birth of different forms of agencies or private companies with a club nature. The aim of this paper is to discuss the effects of institutional interdependence on the efficiency of this kind of collective action. In order to shed some light on this problem, the paper first discusses the problem of the relativity of efficiency to the institutional setting. A framework of analysis is then discussed to identify the main factors affecting collective action. Finally some evidence will be provided by a comparative institutional analysis performed on some case studies concerning local associational forms among communes in north-eastern Italy.     

利益集团与集体行动:一个文献述评

现有研究表明,集团利益的公共性会导致集团成员普遍的搭便车行为,形成"集体行动的困境".不同学者从不同的视角认为小集团、有选择性的激励、提供非集体收益、强制、组建有正规组织的社团、意识形态、利他主义和社会资本等能克服搭便车行为,促进合作,走出集体行动的困境.     

论劳资谈判中的信息披露问题

信息披露对提升劳资谈判质量至关重要。就个案资讯来看,在我国的劳资关系领域,技术层面的信息披露机制缺失,使本来就缺乏集体行动权的工人在劳资谈判中的弱势地位进一步恶化,包括偶发性在内的劳资冲突将可能显得更加无序。研究的结果表明,基于劳资关系调整、产业关系稳定、劳动关系和谐乃至社会和谐的现实考量,有必要强化资方在劳资谈判中的信息披露义务,以最大限度消解工人因谈判信息不对等而导致的误会和误解,在抑制劳资冲突的同时,让劳资双方在市场规则允许的条件下充分博弈,为劳资自治创造积极条件。     

Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

Continuous Time Models of Collective Action and Political Change

This paper presents continuous time models for an analysis of dynamic systems using them to examine the complex dynamics of collective action and political change. The study concentrates on the mutual dependence and behavior of two variables over time: the number of citizens participating in collective action, and the amount of resources mobilized by the government to combat such collective action. The models presented highlight the key components that determine outcomes, and allow for planning, of particular dynamics of collective action and political change. Specifically, the proposed models analyze the impact of collective action on the transition toward democracy as well as possible dynamics of revolution.     

Differing World-Views and Collective Action: The Case of Research

This essay combines constitutional choice and the sociologyof science. People do not only differ in preferences but alsoin worldviews. In order to steer research, society needs a basicsocial contract establishing a triple smallest common denominator.First: the provision with malleable resources is the best approximationto a common good to strive for. Second: formal procedures shouldbe used to determine the facts relevant to the question. Third:the maximization of malleable resources is the closest approximationto the incentives of those involved. If a hypothetical constitutionalassembly reaches an agreement on these points, it can designappropriate rules for research.     

集体行动、政治竞争与发展的障碍——基于新政治经济学的视角

本文在无限期界、内生化政治竞争中考察了经济发展条件的改善使利益集团面临权衡的思想:既提高利益集团掌握政治权力时的收益,也可能降低其掌权概率;刻画了利益集团阻止经济发展条件改善的条件。分析表明:(1)无论经济发展条件是否得到改善,利益集团都会增大对政治权力投资,导致经济绩效下降;(2)经济增长与利益集团面临的政治挑战同向变化;(3)社会不稳定和劳动密集型经济会强化利益集团阻止经济发展条件的改善的动力。最后是相关改革建议和未来研究方向。     

Olson's Logic of Collective Action: A Review Article

This comment is offered as a defense of humanistic economics whose feminist credentials have been questioned by Julie Nelson. To her, our contribution is little less than orthodox economics, an ideology enshrining masculine values. We find her arguments based on a clear misreading or misinterpretation of our work. Especially needing correction is her charge that our key notion of a dual self is contaminated by traditional hierarchy and masculinized reason, and the idea of a ‘mushroom man’ operating in a social vacuum. Once her arguments, which we find contrived, are deconstructed it can be readily seen that there remains little difference between her own and our economics.     

利益分配、战略行动与集体选择的不确定性

爱因斯坦说,时间是一种错觉;普利高津则说,确定性是一种错觉。而文章认为,均衡也是一种错觉:集体选择的结果存在内生的不确定性。基于个体战略行动的多样性,文章从利益分配的角度对集体选择的不确定性作出了理论上的证明。认识到集体选择的不确定性特征对于理解社会的运行以及设计与社会控制相关的制度规章都具有重要的意义。