湖北省枣阳市城乡低保监管实行“四制”促规范

为彻底解决城乡低保工作中存在的“关系保”、“人情保”、“权力保”等问题,今年以来,湖北省枣阳市注重加强对村（社区）主任、低保员、村（社区）干部近亲属申报城乡低保救济的监管,实行“四制”促城乡低保工作走向规范化。到目前,该市民政、监察、财政和纠风部门全程参与专项检查．共取消不符合条件的城乡低保资格674户1290人,月停发低保金12．2万多元。     

湖南冷水江:规范低保管理“严把四关”

正2013年,湖南省冷水江市开展了城乡低保"阳光工程"活动。全年共发放宣传资料11000份,召开低保评议会300多次,评议1860户,开展低保户清理,清退了一批不符合条件的低保户,取消388户家庭1224人的低保待遇,年节减财政支出139.7万元,开展入户调查6500次,对7520户城市低保对象、4621户农村低保对象全部进行年检,对新增低保对象建立了严格的准入制     

对低保人群宽容一些

据报道,辽宁省出台规定,低保人员今后因为"怕苦"而不接受社区介绍的工作,依据《辽宁省城市居民最低生活保障办法》,将不能享受低保待遇。 事实上,很多省市和辽宁一样,也都采取了给低保户找工作的措施,但是施行起来并不顺利,因为这些工作大部分     

农村贫困地区最低生活保障制度的问题及对策——基于河南省集中连片贫困地区的调研数据

自2006年实施农村最低生活保障制度以来,各级政府不断加大物力、人力和财力的投入,积极改善贫困农民的生活状态,但在农村基层依然存在因不满意低保政策而产生的村民上访行为,极大地影响了农村基层的社会稳定和经济发展。本研究以河南省南阳市镇平县石佛寺镇为研究样本,通过入户调研的方式,在第一手数据的基础上发现基层农民不满意低保制度的原因主要有:保障标准与受益对象不匹配、村民对低保制度了解不充分以及低保信息不透明。结合所发现的问题,本研究认为,现有的贫困地区农村最低社会保障制度应逐步建立公民信息共享系统,并在此基础上制定依据低保户的长期居住地、适合于低保户实际生活所需的低保标准,同时加强对农村居民的低保政策教育,提高农村居民对低保政策的认识。此外,还应增加乡镇级别民政机构的工作人员数量,将民政工作人员的人均工作量控制在合理水平。     

枣阳市发放农村低保金

今年5月8日,湖北省枣阳市出台《农村居民最低生活保障实施方案》。根据《方案》,五、六凡份,枣阳市将完成对申请农村低保家庭的入户调查、收入核算、评议、公示及民政部门审批、发证工作,七月份发放农村低保金。首批纳入农村低保     

警示台

严惩低保“乱象” “死人保、富人保、关系保、福利保”，各色人等显神通，农村低保金成了“唐僧肉”，而真正需要救助的弱势群体却领不到低保金。湖南耒阳一村支书为本村12人违规办理低保，其中8个是其亲属，还包括已经去世的父亲，而村里要养活智障儿子的贫困老人却常年无法得到低保救助。最近，湖南省耒阳市发现并清退了402名不符合政策的低保对象，部分涉事官员受到纪律处分。     

会昌县政府债务累积额的三分之一已消化

今年以来,湖北省赤壁市取消了已不具备城镇低保条件的低保户481户,涉及低保对象1771人,节省资金22万元。与此同时,调整低保对象1897户,涉及低保对象3822人,其中降标13户计18人,新增具备低保条件的低保户174户,涉及低保对象467人。从四月份开始,该市民政、劳动、工会部门联合对城镇低保对象进行了为期2个多月的拉网式核查,严格按照“有进有出、动态管理”的原     

福建省农村低保制度调查与思考

本文通过问卷调查、座谈等方式获取大量资料,对福建省农村低保制度开展分析研究。结果表明,近年来福建省逐步提高农村低保保障标准,并实行农村低保与其他社会救助相配套的扶持政策,农村低保户除享受农村低保补助外,还享受其他社会补助政策,如学杂费减免、医疗救助减免、年节补助等,群众满意度较高。但也存在保障水平低、分配不均,收入核查难,认知存在误区,评审流程不够规范等方面的问题,亟需在保障机制、保障水平、评审规范化、制度宣传等方面进行调整和完善。     

上海：资格认证脱去尴尬外衣

养老保险待遇资格认证从诞生之日起,就饱受争议,老人认为是＂麻烦认证＂＂侵犯人权＂,而社保经办机构觉得＂费力不讨好＂。10月中旬,记者在上海采访时发现,其与公安＂联姻＂、网上异地认证等做法会带给我们一些启示。     

探寻城乡居保待遇资格认证的“最优解”

<正>近年来,广东省注重结合城镇化进程、人口老龄化、区域发展不平衡等省情实际,不断探索城乡居民基本养老保险领取待遇资格认证服务模式。2023年,广东省从全新视角审视城乡居民基本养老保险领取待遇资格认证工作面临的新形势,印发了《广东省城乡居民基本养老保险领取待遇资格确认办法》（以下简称《办法》）,为规范城乡居保领取待遇资格认证提供了制度遵循。     

农村居民养老保险财政补贴与农民家庭消费异质性——基于CHARLS数据的研究

基于2011年和2013年两期CHARLS数据构建面板数据模型，分析农村居民养老保险制度中央财政“一刀切”的基础养老金补贴政策与地方财政差异化的缴费补贴政策对农民家庭消费的异质性影响。结果显示：财政补贴有利于整体促进参保农民家庭消费支出，尤其对已领取养老金的家庭，消费增进效应更明显；对于未领取养老金的参保农民家庭，却具有抑制效应。从不同收入阶层和不同地区来看，农村居民养老保险财政补贴对低、中、高收入阶层农民家庭消费的影响依次减弱，对东部、西部、中部地区农民家庭消费的影响依次增强。因此，加大财政补贴力度、优化补贴方式、扩展筹资渠道、强化制度联动能更好地发挥财政补贴改善社会福利的作用。     

吉林市中低收入群体医疗服务需求的调查分析

对吉林省吉林市315户中低收入家庭进行问卷调查的结果表明：部分中低收入群体的医疗费用负担沉重;城镇居民基本医疗保险的实效性较差;居民对医保政策缺乏了解;社区卫生服务机构没有充分发挥作用。强化政府责任,加大宣传力度,加强社区基础医疗卫生服务机构建设,提高居民医疗保障待遇,是完善我国中低收入群体医疗需求的有效途径。     

Endogenous Fertility and the Design of Family Taxation

The paper innovates on the existing optimal taxation literature by taking fertility as endogenous, and allowing for households to be differentiated by their ability to raise children, as well as by their ability to raise income. In a context where the government cannot observe personal abilities, fertility behaviour conveys a great deal of information about those characteristics, which helps to relax the self-selection constraints on re-distribution. Bi-dimentional household differentiation introduces the possibility that re-distribution will be from households with low utility to households with high utility, and that it may be optimal to accentuate or reverse the sign of laissez-faire utility inequality. Contrary to popular belief, we find that it is not necessarily optimal for the tax system to be so designed that an additional child would lighten the tax burden on his or her parents. If it is, the optimal policy may include an unusual mix of taxes on number of children, subsidies on child-specific commodities, income support for low-wage households, and positive marginal income tax rates for all.     

A Second-Best Theory of Local Government Policy

This paper provides a model where a large number of small jurisdictions compete for mobile firms and households by supplying local public goods and factors. Jurisdictions only have an incomplete set of tax instruments at their disposal to achieve an efficient allocation. We derive second-best behavioral rules for local governments and extend optimal taxation results to the local level. Local governments distort locational decisions of mobile firms and households by taxing them above marginal congestion costs so as to balance relative locational distortions between taxes. The analysis also reveals that there is a systematic difference between the provision of local public goods and factors. While local public goods are provided according to the Samuelson rule in most situations considered, local public factors are undersupplied relative to this rule.     

Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments

Academic literature in public finance has focused on interjurisdictional tax competition—namely among similar types of local governments—but has leaved vertical externalities arising from interactions between two overlapping governments sharing the same tax base aside. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model within which interjurisdictional tax competition and vertical interactions between two overlapping governments that share the same tax base can be analyzed simultaneously. We find that interjurisdictional tax competition reduces the global tax rate set by both overlapping governments (federal and local) but is unable to solve completely the distortion arising from vertical externalities. The model is also extended to allow for government subsidies to industrial capital. We give sufficient conditions for capital subsidies to be more efficient to attract capital when they are granted at a federal level rather than at a local level.     

中国城镇家庭的资产配置与消费行为:理论与证据

根据流动性资产和非流动性资产的配置组合,家庭可以分为P-HtM(贫穷月光族)、W-HtM(富裕月光族)、P-nHtM(贫穷非月光族)和W-nHtM(富裕非月光族)四类,他们表现出各自不同的消费特征。利用中国家庭金融调查2011年至2017年四轮数据,我们发现中国城镇家庭中四种类型的占比分别为6.8%、36.7%、6.6%和49.9%;在消费—收入弹性上,P-HtM和W-HtM家庭显著高于W-nHtM家庭,而P-nHtM家庭显著低于W-nHtM家庭;在暂时性收入冲击的边际消费倾向上,P-HtM和W-HtM家庭大于W-nHtM家庭,而P-nHtM家庭小于W-nHtM家庭。这些发现意味着,若要取得更好的消费刺激效果,需要更加精准的消费刺激政策。     

Government assisted earnings management in China

As the socialist system in China embraces the market economy, it has created many conflicts of interests and collusion between firms and different layers of governments. The central government in China sets regulations to ensure the quality of firms listed in the capital market, while local governments engage in inter-jurisdictional competition for more capital, and their interests are aligned with listed firms through the stringent IPO quota system. This paper examines how local governments in China help listed firms in earnings management to circumvent the central government’s regulation. We find that local governments provide subsidies to help firms boost their earnings above the regulatory threshold of rights offering and delisting. Moreover, this collusion between government and listed firms in earnings management exists mainly in firms controlled by local governments.     

On the optimal provision of social insurance: Progressive taxation versus education subsidies in general equilibrium

In this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, but distort the education decision of households. Optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions. We highlight the quantitative importance of general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers: subsidizing higher education increases the share of workers with a college degree thereby reducing the college wage premium which has important redistributive benefits. We also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation. We find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies, but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium.     

新型农村社会养老保险财政补贴机制优化研究

构建科学合理的财政补贴机制对于已经实现全覆盖的财政补贴型新型农村社会养老保险制度的可持续运行至关重要。现行补贴机制存在基础养老金补贴方式不合理、地方财政负担不均衡和地方财政补贴不规范等主要问题。基于此,文章设计了"定率补贴+分层筹资"的补贴机制,评估结论显示新补贴机制实现了地方政府财政补贴规模与财政能力的优化匹配、平衡了政府与个人的责任分担和有利于养老保险关系的城乡转续。     

Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments

This paper examines the problem of redistributing incomeacross jurisdictions and to mobile workers within jurisdictionswhen local governments have better information than the centralgovernment about local production conditions. Under the centralgovernments optimal policy, the subsidies or taxes that localgovernments provide to mobile workers normally depend on whetherthese governments are net recipients or net donors of interjurisdictionalincome transfers. Moreover, the public-input decisions of somelocal governments are distorted. The analysis demonstrates thatit may not be desirable to harmonize social policies across jurisdictions,even when the beneficiaries are quite mobile.